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This thesis argues that English higher education has, for 
several centuries, progressed in a loose confederation 
with the spread of the economic and culturally 
homogenising phenomenon we now recognise as 
globalisation. The study comprises an historical survey 
that maps the evolution of the universities and their 
international influence. This interaction becomes more 
identifiable toward the end of the eighteenth century, 
after the independence of the American colonies when the 
British consolidated their empire elsewhere. The thesis 
argues that the universities, in their role as educators 
of the elite for the world’s largest empire, shaped the 
politics and the progress that contributed to modern 
globalisation. English institutions of higher education 
crafted their own attitudes and philosophy into a formula 
that was adopted, adapted and integrated into a worldwide 
‘knowledge society’. 
  
This investigation spans two centuries, the long 
nineteenth and the short twentieth. The long nineteenth 
century is considered to have begun in 1789 with the 
French revolution and the publication of the ‘Rights of 
Man’ and to have finished in 1914 with the start of the 
Great War, which wrecked the existent globalised network. 
The short twentieth century starts with the conflict of 
1914 and finishes in 1989 with the collapse of the Soviet 
empire and communism in Eastern Europe. It is not my 
intention to construct a complete history of this period 
but, rather, to trace the steady progress of the 
technological and socio-economic conditions that have 
created an ever shrinking world. This ‘time-space 
convergence’ is central to globalisation theory and will 
be juxtaposed with the equally complex cultural, economic 
and often political route of English higher education 












This thesis argues that for several centuries the 
economic and cultural processes of globalisation and 
English higher education have advanced in a loose 
confederation. From the beginning of the nineteenth 
century Britain employed both ‘gunboat diplomacy’ and 
‘colonial dominance’ to advance a policy of international 
commercial expansion that would develop into an overseas 
empire (Nayyar, 2006, p139). While Britain’s  
aristocractic gentry were happy to share in the profits 
from this overseas trade they preferred to leave the 
‘everyday running of the Empire’ to a new strata of 
middle class university educated administrators (Morris, 
1979, p219). This greatly increased graduate 
opportunities and prompted institutions of higher 
education to consciously produce ‘an identifiable elite’ 
who shared similar ‘values and codes of honour’ and were 
suited ‘for public service and the running of an Empire’ 
(McCulloch, 1991, p15). As Britain’s overseas possessions 
expanded, its universities became ever more 
‘imperialised’ by their efforts to meet the demand for 
suitable graduates (Rubinstein, 1994, p104). By the end 
of the nineteenth century the interconnectedness of 
Britain’s international trade had become recognisable as 
the foundation of ‘modern globalisation’ (Went, 2002, 
p10); equally the Oxbridge ethos of 'education for 
leadership' had become widely accepted as ‘a specifically 
English tradition’ (McCulloch, 1991, p16). 
 
Thus, the universities, which have ‘always figured in the 
global environment’ (Altbach, 2004, p4) were among the 
earliest of the establishment institutions to create a 
niche in the ‘the long history’ of globalisation 
(Scholte, 2005, p19). The foundations of Britain’s 
imperial expansion had been established in the eighteenth 
century by the free market theories of philosophical 
‘economists’ like Adam Smith and David Ricardo (Jones, 
2003). Their innovative views gained political 
credibility and came to provide the basis of a lobby for 
the reduction of protectionist import and export tariffs 
(Cain, 1999, p1). The 1846 abolition of the restrictive 
Corn Laws removed the last ‘serious opposition’ to the 
British government’s unilateral declaration of free trade 
(Trevelyan, 1922, p276) and enabled the international 
release of the ‘forces of capitalism’ (Das, 2009, p6). 
 
These were the events that during the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries would create the demand for 
increasing numbers of university educated colonial 
officers and civil servants (Hoppen, 1998, p112).  
 
 8 
Ferguson argues that their aptitude for organisation and 
fair-play did much to promote ‘Western norms of law, 
order and governance around the world’ (Ferguson, 2003, 
pxxii). Britain’s combination of public school and 
ancient university has long been recognised as a 'nursery 
of power' (Anderson, 2006, p137). For example, between 
1868 and 1955 only one cabinet minister who had attended 
a public school did not also study at Oxford or Cambridge 
university (Guttsman, 1963, p156). In the mid nineteeneth 
century university graduates whose public school had 
taught them the behavior and manners of the 'English 
gentleman' (Wiener, 1992, p18) considered a foreign or 
colonial office posting to be ‘one of the plum prizes’ 
(Morris, 1979, p185). These liberally educated civil 
servants were sent to the far-flung outposts of empire 
where they demonstrated the Oxbridge ideals of ‘balance 
and detachment’ levened with a little ‘knightly 
gentleness and honour’ (Barnett, 1987, p221). For 
Britain's 'classically trained administrative elite' much 
of the appeal of imperial governorship lay in the 
opportunity to reproduce the sense of civic order 
described in 'Plato's Republic'. The prospect of a ‘just 
society’ overseen by Oxbridge graduates as Plato's stable 
and incorruptible 'guardians' proved a ‘persuasive ideal 
for Britain's bureaucratic rulers overseas' (Weir & 
Beetham, 1999, p35).  
 
At its Victorian peak the British Empire could flaunt its 
‘red-bespattered’ maps (Porter, 2004, p46) and the claim 
to have a quarter of the world’s landmass was ‘under its 
banner’ (Shridharani, 1942, p49). When British statesmen 
proclaimed their empire to be a free trade zone they 
anticipated the creation of an ‘endless era of peace and 
prosperity’ (Davies, 2005, p56). The declaration of free 
trade was intended to have global consequences, it was 
the decision of men intent on a single world market, a 
‘Greater Britain’, knitted together by networks of 
railways and steamships and connected by telegraph 
(Egerton, 1903, p5). Ferguson identifies this process of 
imposing British standards and methods on a large section 
of the world’s population as ‘Anglobalization’ (Ferguson, 
2003, pxxiv). This British territorial expansion went 
beyond its previously conceived limits and is now 
considered to be globalisation’s ‘belle époque’ (Hirst, 
1997, p409). ‘The British Empire was the nearest thing 
there has ever been to a world government’ (Ferguson, 
2003, pxxvi). These were the circumstances under which 
English higher education became a conduit, a globalising 
agency that broadcast British socio-cultural ideals and 





The process of globalisation has been with us for 
centuries, although the actual word ‘globalisation’ was 
not applied to the worldwide expansion of trade, 
investment and cultural homogenisation until the 1960’s 
(Guillén, 2001, p5). Since then ‘globalisation’ has 
achieved ‘terminological stardom’ (Osterhammel & 
Petersson, 2005, p1). It has become a ‘favourite 
catchphrase’ (Robertson, 2003, p3) and a publishing 
industry ‘buzzword’ (Chanda, 2007, p2), which has been 
attached to almost every field of human endeavor 
(Jeffery, 2002). The only reliable ‘consensus about 
globalisation is that it is contested’ both in its 
process and its origins (Scholte, 2005, p46). 
Globalisation is surrounded by an ‘annoying lack of 
historical specificity’ (Eley, 2007, p159). However, 
there much historical evidence to indicate that 
globalisation is more than a ‘twentieth-century 
phenomenon’ (Hall, 2008, p773) and Macgillivray argues 
that researchers should ‘focus in’ on this evidence 
(Macgillivray, 2006, p17). The assumption of modernity 
risks missing the ‘historical and social depths’ of a 
globalising tendency that as a ‘human dynamic has always 
been with us’ (Robertson, 2003, p4). Ancient trading 
patterns provide evidence for 'archaic globalization' 
(Macgillivray, 2006, p15) that reaches back thousands of 
years to the ‘first ships and land caravans’ (Moore & 
Lewis, 2009, p1). These trends are discernable in 
networks of international trade such as the Silk Road 
(Scholte, 2005; Tabari, 2006). Trade goods, knowledge and 
news passed along these routes, and eventually launched 
an age of ‘interoceanic travel’ that generated a series 
of globalisation cycles that ‘transformed entire 
societies across the globe’ (Coatsworth, 2004, p38). 
 
Globalisation may have ‘evolved out of the past’ but any 
account of that past cannot be a conventional history 
(Bell, 2003, p813). While kings, queens, presidents and 
wars leave reliable footprints, globalisation is a less 
easily identifiable network of ‘trends, patterns and 
processes’ (Stearns, 2010, p12). It is precisely because 
these networks are susceptible to ‘shifting perceptions 
of time and space’ that ‘globalization scholars assign 
particular significance to historical analysis’ (Steger, 
2003, p8). This impression of a ‘time-space convergence’ 
is central to ‘mainstream’ globalisation theory. The 
steady progress of technology and integrated socio-
economic conditions bind nation states together while 
innovation in transport and communications provide an 
increased efficiency that creates the view of an ever 




Globalisation is not a ‘phenomenon without a past’ 
(Rothschild, 1999, p106) and I suggest that within that 
past a synergy existed between the British Empire, 
globalisation and existent forms of English higher 
education. Globalisation progresses in ‘jerky’ and uneven 
space-time contractions, thus in this thesis I intend to 
illustrate that relationship through a series of 
‘critical planet shrinking moments’  (Macgillivray, 2006, 
p17). Thompson states that globalisation has been 
‘underway for centuries’ and that any survey which 
examines only its ‘most recent tail end’ would be 
incomplete  (Thompson, 2000, p3). Therefore, I start my 
thesis with a contextual setting, which is a brief 
account of relevant events that precede my more detailed 
investigation. Historical ‘turning points’ are 
susceptible to many spheres of influence and cannot be 
relied upon to occur with the ‘mechanical regularity’ 
that would place them within the limits of the calendar 
(Osterhammel & Petersson, 2005, p27). Historians overcome 
this by implementing the notion of the ‘long and short 
century’, a variable period that can be adjusted to allow 
an event to be completed within an allotted timeframe 
(Clark, 1998, p10).  
 
Steger argues that globalisation studies cut across 
‘traditional disciplinary boundaries’ and require that 
the researcher adopt an approach, which is broad enough 
to ‘behold the big picture’ (Steger, 2006, p64). 
Therefore my investigation will span two centuries, the 
long nineteenth and the short twentieth. The long 
nineteenth century is considered to begin in 1789 with 
the French revolution and the publication of the ‘Rights 
of Man’ (Kurth, 1995, p3) and to finish in 1914 with the 
start of the Great War which wrecked the existent 
globalised network and dashed the hopes of free market 
liberals (Davies, 2005, p57). The short twentieth century 
starts with the conflict of 1914 and finishes in 1989 
with the ‘collapse of communism in Eastern Europe’ 
(Kurth, 1995, p3; Hobsbawm, 1994, p56). The two hundred 
year span from 1789 to 1989 does conveniently add up to 
two numerical centuries (Kurth, 1995, p3). However, it is 
not my intention to construct a complete history of this 
period but to trace the interconnections and ‘lines of 
rupture' that are caused by, or strongly influenced by 
international and domestic commercial and political 
action and then to observe their 'time and space’ 
consequences for higher education (Bell, 2003, p814). I 
have selected those events that mark the complex 
cultural, economic and often political route of English 
higher education as it moves from an exclusive elite 




Universities have been among the ‘keenest participants in 
the surge of globalisation’ (Mroz, 2008) and higher 
education in general is now regarded as ‘an important 
global phenomenon’ whose participants are often ‘more 
worldly' than those involved in other pursuits (Keane, 
2003, p130). Throughout history the incidents considered 
to be milestones in the evolution and expansion of 
globalisation similarly mark the evolution and expansion 
of universities and higher education. There is 
substantial evidence that China and the Islamic countries 
were the earliest to engage in the sort of international 
commercial and cultural exchanges that can be identified 
as globalisation (Macgillivray, 2006, p15) but my thesis 
will be necessarily Anglocentric as it deals largely with 
British institutions. Equally, although forms of higher 
education are known to have existed from the fourth 
century at Alexandria, Athens, Constantinople, and 
Antioch (Durant, 1950, p121) my references to the 
‘universities’ and to ‘higher education’ will be intended 
to indicate the Western European model.  
 
Modern globalisation is widely perceived as an 
Americanising process but before ‘Pax Americana’ came 
‘Pax Britannica’ (Nayyar, 2006, p146). Throughout the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when Britain 
was the ‘greatest power in the world’ (Black, 2005, 
p353), its empire was managed ‘very largely by graduates 
of the ancient universities’ (Morris, 1979, p187). They 
prepresented an ‘imperial service’ of ‘pre-eminently 
upper middle class’ district commissioners, colonial 
civil servants and regional officials (Morris, 1979, 
p219) whose shared educational background was an 
‘essential factor’ in maintaining the international ‘web 
of government’ (Morris, 1979, p188). The English 
universities were encouraged to become ‘outward-looking’ 
to strengthen their ‘cross-border chains and loops’ until 
they themselves became a vital factor in the ‘vigorous 
global debate about globalisation’ (Keane, 2003, p130).  
 
The evidence, which I believe supports my thesis of a 
loose confederation between the English universities and 
the historical progress globalisation, will be presented 
as chronologically as overlapping and simultaneous events 












The process of globalisation is sometimes identified as a 
‘late twentieth-century phenomenon’ which ‘of course, it 
is not’ (Hall, 2008, p773). The two hundred year period 
which I intend to examine was shaped by centuries of 
previous development. This brief contextual setting 
introduces many of the elements that have contributed to 
the international diffusion of ideas that mark the 
progress of economic and cultural globalisation (Momin, 
2007).  
 
In 1267 the Polo brothers, merchant adventurers from 
Venice, set out to travel the Silk Road all the way to 
the Chinese imperial city of Changan (Marshall, 1998, 
p19). The Silk Road, described by Tabari as an early 
‘channel for globalization’, was the longest trade route 
of the ancient world (Tabari, 2006). It was a chain of 
over-lapping communities peopled by dealers and brokers 
who also disseminated news, ideas and beliefs (Gladney, 
1999, pp440-441). When the Polo brothers eventually 
returned home Marco was assisted by a writer in 
assembling an account of his travels. Published in 1300, 
‘The Travels of Marco Polo’ was instrumental in bringing 
the potential for lucrative trade with China to 
international attention (Marshall, 1998, p19). The book 
is identified by Legrain as a promoter of early economic 
globalisation (Legrain, 2002, p82). 
 
Polo’s book is still acclaimed as one of the ‘great 
records of geographic exploration’ (Martin & Preston, 
1993, p46). Although when it appeared each volume had to 
be hand written there were professional copists who 
catered for the secular tastes of wealthy bibliophiles 
(Rietbergen, 1998, p185). Religious and academic 
manuscripts were copied and often illuminated by monks 
whose monasteries maintained significant book collections 
(Cubberley, 1920, p135). During Europe’s Middle or Dark 
Ages, the ‘lamp of learning’ was kept alight by 
monasteries intent upon providing educated church 
management (Roberts, 1947, p7). But an increasingly 
complex and secular society created a demand for educated 
administrators as well as priests (Scott, 2006, p6). The 
monasteries with their valuable libraries were best 
positioned to teach and by 1088 a group of monks in 
Bologna were teaching in an institution which they 
regarded as a university (Haskins, 1923, p10; Rietbergen, 




In the twelfth century France followed suit and 
transformed an 'outgrowth' of the cathedral school of 
Notre-Dame into the University of Paris (Haskins, 1923, 
p22). The universities of Bologna and Paris became 
intellectual nuclei and attracted students from all over 
Europe (Kibre, 1948, pix). English students who had 
studied at the University of Paris founded a university 
of their own at Oxford, a later group moved on to do the 
same at Cambridge (Roberts, 1947, p8). By the beginning 
of the fifteenth century there were approximately ‘eighty 
universities in Europe’ (Duiker & Spielvogel, 2011, 
p304). 
 
Academic thinking in Western Europe was greatly enriched 
by Jewish and Muslim scholars who slowly migrated into 
the Iberian Peninsula after its eigth century Moorish 
invasion (Cox, 2001, p132). With them came the knowledge 
of the Islamic world, which included numerous learned 
texts gathered from the libraries of ancient Greece, Rome 
and Egypt and which had been preserved for centuries 
(Murphy, 2001, p118). Muslim scholars allowed their 
European counterparts access to what must be considered 
the ‘entire corpus' of scientific and philosophical works 
available at that time (Vernet, 1991). Western Europe was 
introduced to the writing of Greek philosophers and 
physicians (Rait, 1912, p6), that contributed greatly to 
the ‘globalisation of science and philosophy’ (Momin, 
2007).  
 
This ‘new’ knowledge brought the requirement for a 
different pedagogical approach to thirteenth century 
university education (Scott, 2006, p8). Among 
rediscovered Greek works were examples of Aristotle’s 
philosophical thinking, where resolutions were arrived at 
by a process of deductive reasoning rather than by faith 
(Duiker & Spielvogel, 2011, p305). Christian 
intellectuals were attracted by this method of inquiry 
but the church had difficulty in accepting it. Aristotle 
was no Christian (Marenbon, 2005). Thomas Aquinas, mid 
thirteenth century philosophical thinker, found enough 
common ground to combine Aristotle’s ‘natural law’ with 
God, the ‘creator of nature’ (Goldman, 2007, p109). The 
resulting ‘synthesis of truth’ (Harrison, 1953, p3) was 
labelled ‘Scholasticism’; a process that successfully 
blended theology with philosophy by accepting the 
authority of the Church in matters of faith and the 
authority of Aristotle in everything else (Roberts, 1947, 
p14; Woodhead, 2004, p62). Scholasticism became the 
‘state-of-the-art teaching method’ of the medieval 




While much of fourteenth century Europe was mired in 
political and territorial conflict, cities of Northern 
Italy enjoyed a ‘relative peace’ that was maintained by 
the powerfully aggressive merchant families who dominated 
them (Smith & Smith, 1994, p94). Such families 
demonstrated their escalating social status with 
expensive municipal gifts and elaborate artworks (Smith & 
Smith, 1994, p95). This self-aggrandising philanthropy 
initiated a creative ‘Renaissance’, a rebirth of 
intellectual pursuits that truly blossomed after 1440 
with the arrival of Byzantine scholars fleeing the 
advance of the Ottoman Turks on Constantinople (Cox, 
2001, p132). These scholars settled in the sophisticated 
cities of Northern Italy, bringing with them entire 
libraries, the accumulated knowledge of the Byzantine 
Empire. The philosophy of the Renaissance spread out 
across the known world (Cox, 2001, pp132-133) and helped 
to reduce some the cultural restrictions imposed by the 
religious leaders of the Dark Ages (Cowen, 2002 p81).  
 
Renaissance intellectuals were critical of scholasticism. 
Almost two centuries of repetitive teaching had reduced 
the ‘precision’ of Aristotle’s deductive reasoning to a 
thoughtless ritual (Green, 1952, p22). The wisdom of the 
ancients was highly revered but so rarely examined that 
its very practice was impeding the progress of 
scholarship (Harrison, 1953, p3). Italy’s Renaissance 
educationists searched the Byzantine texts for evidence 
that would support their alternative view (Smith & Smith, 
1994, p95). They found it in the work by ancient Roman 
philosopher Marcus Cicero. It the transcript of a speech 
titled ‘Studia Humanitatis’, Cicero proposed that the 
‘cultural’ basis of individual freedom and responsible 
action could be approached through process of critically 
analysing classical writings rather than merely reading 
and accepting them (Mann, 2004, p1). 
 
The advocates of this ‘humanist’ approach believed that a 
critical examination of the ancient philosophies would 
lead students to a better understanding of their own 
circumstances (Brotton, 2006, p39). ‘Humanism’ provided a 
‘blueprint’ (Brotton, 2006, p42) for the ‘new progamme of 
education’ (Proctor, 1998, p14), which was embraced by 
those Italian intellectuals who had ‘shifted away’ from 
scholasticism (Smith & Smith, 1994, p95). The 'eternal 
truths' that were to be discovered through a critical 
assessment of the ancient philosophers was considered an 
ideal basis from which ‘to govern society’ (Smith & 




Humanistic studies were non-vocational but still ’highly 
marketable’; its students were considered ‘civilised’ and 
better able to solve ‘moral and ethical problems’. These 
were the skills required for a bureaucratic or 
administrative career (Brotton, 2006, p40). Although 
Humanism flourished throughout Europe, it initially did 
so outside of the ‘university walls’ (Durant, 1957, 
p283). Some philosophical elements of humanism were 
adopted, but most universities were loath to discard 
scholasticism (Grendler, 2004a). England’s two ancient 
universities, Oxford and Cambridge, maintained scholastic 
practice until well into the nineteenth century 
(Harrison, 1953, p22). Catholic scholars had toiled for 
years to reconcile ancient texts with the scriptures and 
while much Aristotelian philosophy had been ‘approved’ 




Advancing technology played a significant part in the 
globalisation of knowledge. Fifteenth century Renaissance 
Humanism owes much of its success as a widespread 
intellectual movement to the invention of mechanical 
printing (Brotton, 2006, p41). The process of printing 
text by hand using woodcuts had long been practiced in 
China, where the world’s oldest known ‘book’, a sixteen-
foot long Buddhist scroll was printed in the ninth 
century (Duiker & Spielvogel, 2011, p256). In fifteenth 
century Europe, Johannes Gutenberg’s printing machine 
adapted the operating principle of the screw-type wine 
press and incorporated his own design of movable metal 
type (Bellis, 1997). By 1455, when he published his 
‘Gutenberg Bible’, the process had become so efficient 
that it rapidly spawned a printing industry. Within ten 
years there was at least one Gutenberg printing press 
operating in every European country (Thackeray & 
Findling, 2001, p106).  
 
The mechanisation of printing provided a relatively 
inexpensive method of mass producing images and writing 
that was to have ‘global consequences’ (Osterhammel & 
Petersson, 2005, p46). The successful publication of 
religious works was closely followed by descriptions of 
voyages, narratives of exotic travel and atlases. These 
provided marine navigation and topographical information 
previously available only by word of mouth or hand drawn 
charts (Scammell, 2004, p181). For example, such wider 
availability enabled Christopher Columbus, a ship’s 
navigator, to purchase his own copy of ‘The Travels of 




Columbus had calculated that East Asia must lay about 
three thousand miles west of Europe's Atlantic Coast 
(Marshall, 1998, p19). In October 1492 he sailed westward 
until he reached the islands that would later become 
known as the Bahamas. It was a pivotal event in the 
progress of globalisation (Fragoso, 2007, p1).  
This transatlantic voyage opened a new era of western 
European maritime achievements; mainland America landings 
were made, the Cape of Good Hope was rounded and the 
earth circumnavigated (Guillén, 2001, p5). A literal 'new 
world' of previously unknown sea routes, supported a 
‘determined European expansionism’ (Orser, 2002, p252). 
The voyage of Columbus was a ’landmark in the history of 
globalization’ (Chanda, 2007a, p1); it opened up the 
Atlantic trade routes and market so vast that it 
effectively ended the Mediterranean epoch (Durant, 1957, 
p331). 
 
At the beginning of the sixteenth century Flemish 
cartographer, Gerhard Mercator adapted ancient knowledge 
to produce a method of rendering the whole of the earth’s 
known spherical surface as a flat chart (Scammell, 2004, 
p181). This new view of the world avoided the 
mathematical flaws of previous charts and became a vital 
navigational aid (Macgillivray, 2006, p46). But 
Mercator's ‘projection’ produced a distortion, the 
countries furthest from the equator appeared larger than 
they actually were, while those near the equator such as 
Africa and India appeared smaller (Goody, 2006, p20). 
Goody argues that Mercator's ‘projection’ was popular 
with Europe’s politicians because its ‘distortion of 
space’ produced a worldview in which their continent 
appeared more prominent (Goody, 2006, p21). Toward the 
end of the sixteenth century printed maps and atlases 
were creating a ‘global consciousness’; most people were 
aware of the earth as a planet spinning in space 
(Scholte, 1999, p14). For example, William Shakespeare 
was sufficiently confident of this understanding that he 
has Puck, a character in ‘A Midsummer Night's Dream’ 
boast that he could ‘put a girdle round about the earth 
in forty minutes' (Shakespeare, 2011, p91).  
 
The prospect of world travel spurred the efforts of 
European adventurers in the Americas and the East, these 
explorations often revealed pagan cultures who pursued 
Godless lives with ‘apparent impunity’ (Durant, 1957, 
p23). Such discoveries undermined Catholic claims of a 
universal church and doctrinal enquiries were quietly 





In 1517, Martin Luther, an ‘unpublished professor’ at the 
German University of Wittenberg expressed his doubts 
about Rome’s self-awarded status as the highest spiritual 
authority (Wilson, 2007, p35). He taught that Christian 
salvation came through faith in God not the trappings and 
rituals of the established church (Thackeray & Findling, 
2001, p162). According to Luther, anyone who could read a 
bible could minister his or her own religious needs 
without the assistance of any organised system of worship 
(Wilson, 2007, p35). Enterprising printers provided the 
bibles as well as publishing and distributing Martin 
Luther’s ideas so widely that he became a ‘well-known and 
controversial public figure’ (Thackeray & Findling, 2001, 
p163). 
 
Luther’s views so incensed Henry VIII of England that he 
felt obliged to defend the Catholic cause; he published a 
rebuke of Luther’s reform plans (Edel, 1987, p8). When in 
1533 Henry wanted a divorce because his wife could not 
produce a male heir he might have expected a favourable 
response. He was mistaken; the Pope refused (Scott, 2006, 
p10). Henry was furious, his wife-in-waiting was very 
shortly to give birth. He took it on his own authority to 
divorce his first wife and promptly marry his second 
(Thurston, 1910, p1). The Pope immediately declared the 
English king excommunicated. Henry retaliated by removing 
England from the Catholic faith and founding a new 
national church of which he would be supreme head 
(Thackeray & Findling, 2001, p164). 
 
However, England’s monasteries and aristocratic Catholic 
families were slow to comply with directives from Henry’s 
new national church and they railed against demands that 
all links with Rome should be severed (Kelly, 1977, p3).  
Moves to prevent such reluctance developing into a 
‘threatening linkage’ between English Catholics and the 
pope (Kelly, 1977, p5) began in 1538 when Henry starting 
closing down ‘corrupt’ monasteries (Kelly, 1977, p6). The 
monastic universities of Oxford and Cambridge had been 
among the first to deny Rome and recognise the authority 
of the crown, this allowed them to claim a semi-secular 
status that provided immunity from Henry’s actions 
(Curtis, 1959, p23). Monastic wealth and lands continued 
to be seized in a steady, dogmatic process that after 
four years had largely dismantled the English monastic 
system (Kelly, 1977, p6). 
  
This dissolution was met with a vengeful papal edict that 
made Henry the ‘common enemy of Catholic Europe’ (Wood, 
1918, p8). The ships of the Catholic countries were given  
‘full Papal sanction’ to attack any English ship they met  
(Wood, 1918, p14).  
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With Henry ‘menaced’ by the Catholic powers he stepped up 
the ambitious shipbuilding programme he had started at 
the beginning of his reign (Wood, 1918, p8). Much 
monastic ‘plunder’ was channeled into superior shipping, 
dockyards and coastal fortifications (Tucker, 1920, 337). 
Henry died in 1549 leaving a country that was on its way 
to becoming the world’s ‘chief naval power’ (Griffiths, 
1952 p48). One of Henry’s major achievements was the 
creation of the Royal Navy (Bush, 1968, p53) and the 
executive office of the Admiralty (Wood, 1918, p15). The 
eventual dominance of maritime commerce by the Royal Navy 
and the British merchant fleet would generate capital for 
industrialisation and accelerate the globalisation 
process (Raudzens, 1999, p170). 
 
As international trading increased so did the spread of 
the commercial practice known as ‘mercantilism’ 
(Dilorenzo, 2000, p25). Most Western European 
mercantilist systems revolved around just two major 
tenets. The first was the belief that the amount of trade 
in the world was ‘relatively fixed’ (Marshall, 1999, p19) 
and the second was that the purpose of trade was to 
accumulate gold and silver (Hoar, 2003, p33). If, as 
frequently happened, aggressive trading turned to genuine 
conflict; the bullion would be on hand to fund the war 
(Smith, 1937, p399). Johnson defines a merchant as ‘one 
who trafficks to remote countries’ (Johnson, 1775), but 
while away trafficking the merchants wanted their goods 
and factories to be protected by a strong nation state 
(Warlow et al, 2007, p68). As the strength of the nation 
was measured by its precious metal holdings (Warlow et 
al, 2007, p69) the exportation of gold and silver was 
prohibited (Warlow et al, 2007, p70); the expenditure of 
bullion was justified if it bought raw materials for 
manufactures that could be re-exported for a profit 
(Smith, 1937, p400). The export of manufactures and the 
import of materials were expected to maintain the gold 
and silver equilibrium in the short term and increase it 
in the long term; this was known as the balance of trade  
(Marshall, 1999, p20). 
 
The spirit of mercantilism was to thrive throughout the 
reign of Elizabeth, ‘Henry VIII’s last surviving child’ 
(Thackeray & Findling, 2001, p186). Soon after she had 
been crowned in 1558 Elizabeth I pointedly declared her 
country and her church to be steadfastly Protestant. The 
Pope countered with excommunication (Thackeray & 
Findling, 2001, pp186-8). But her church was not of a 
single mind; a Protestant split had produced two major 
groups (Foster, 2006, p26). Elizabeth sought a solution 
and offered the two doctrines a settlement of uneasy 
alliance.  
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The Calvinist Protestants, known as ‘Puritans’ after 
their preference for a no-frills religion of pure 
biblical truth, accepted Elizabeth’s settlement as an 
unofficial royal sanction. Those who rather enjoyed the 
frills were accommodated separately within the more 
ritualistic ‘crypto-Catholicism’ of Jacobus Arminius of 
the Dutch reform church (Ogg, 1956, p24). Oxbridge 
theologians had prepared the way for Arminius; the 
universities had significant influence over religious 
matters and were the ‘principal source’ of enthusiasm for 
the movement (Curtis, 1959, p226). 
 
Spain’s king Philip II wanted England’s throne as much as 
he wanted to prevent Elizabeth’s ‘pirates’ from 
accumulating further wealth at his expense (Tucker, 1920, 
p338). Ferguson states that English maritime supremacy 
was rooted in ‘seaborne violence and theft’ (Ferguson, 
2003, p1). Philip executed any pirates he could catch and 
Elizabeth knighted the ones who got away (Lang, 2006, 
p179). Determined to ‘settle accounts for ever’ (Bracco, 
2006, p53) Philip declared war against Elizabeth in 1588. 
The Spanish fleet was ordered to sea where it met English 
vessels that were faster, more manoeuvrable and manned by 
crews who excelled in the ‘science of naval gunnery’ 
(Griffiths, 1952, p48). The Armada was so mauled by the 
English force and some unexpectedly foul weather that the 
attack was abandoned (Thackeray & Findling, 2001, p188). 
This defeat removed the most imminent threat to English 
security and freed previously unavailable sea routes for 
commercial expansion (Osterhammel & Petersson, 2005, 
p58).  
 
These new maritime opportunities prompted the launch of 
the East India Company, which was awarded a royal charter 
1600. A charter carried the right to act in the monarch’s 
name for as long as company dividends were paid to the 
crown (Low, 2009, p9). Globalisation studies have 
identified the East India Company as a ‘pioneering force’ 
in the development of world trade (Robins, 2004, p31). 
Its ‘global reach’ was to become a ‘defining feature’ of 
seventeenth and eighteenth century trade (Rocher, 2004, 
p207). The Company intended to trade with the East Indian 
islands of Java and Sumatra, a successful voyage to buy 
spices could show profits of up to one thousand percent 
(Allitt, 2009, L4).  
 
The ‘spice islands’ were already occupied by Dutch 
traders who were prepared to fight for such large profits 
and it took a twenty-year trade war to convince the 
English merchants that their business would be better 
concentrated on the Indian subcontinent (Spear, 1961, 
p167).  
 20 
This change of trade location altered the Company’s main 
cargos from spice to indigo, calicos, cotton, sugar and 
yarn (Spear, 1961, p167). International trading and 
decreasing shipping costs should theoretically produce a 
‘commodity-price convergence’ between sourcing and 
retailing, but there was no discernable reduction 
(O’Rourke & Williamson, 2002, p424). Legrain states that 
the price gap did not narrow because trade was not free. 
Cheaper transport was being offset by high import duties 
and the manipulation of the market by ‘state-sponsored 
monopolies like the East India Company’ (Legrain, 2003, 
p85-86). 
 
When Elizabeth I died in 1603 without issue, James, King 
of Scotland and first cousin twice removed, accepted the 
vacant throne. His overbearingly ‘autocratic behavior’ 
succeeded in antagonising two parliaments instead of one 
(Knox, 2004, p2). He believed the universities to be the 
‘solid bulwarks’ of society (Roberts, 1947, p23) and so 
extended to Oxbridge the already existent Scots right of 
a university to elect its own Member of Parliament. This 
further removed the universities from their 
ecclesiastical origins as the clergy were ‘explicitly 
excluded’ from the House of Commons (Curtis, 1959, p30). 
Although largely remembered as the principle target of 
the 1605 Gunpowder Plot, James was a literary monarch who 
was said to have ruled with the ‘pen as much as the 
sword’ (Doelman, 2000, p78). He ordered Oxford and 
Cambridge scholars to produce a new translation of the 
English bible (Roberts, 1947, p24). Its first readers 
would have witnessed eighteen years of civil war, the 
English monarchy abolished, a king executed, a 
commonwealth declared and then quashed. The country’s 
capital city suffered both a great plague and a great 
fire (Lang, 2006, pp213-215). 
 
However, Parliament rejected the mid seventeenth century 
English commonwealth and in 1660 accepted the return of 
the monarchy. Charles II was convinced that the civil war 
had been caused by ‘religious pluralism’ and he wanted 
this multiplicity of sects politically excluded in the 
future (Hutson, 2008, p6). Hence, the Test and 
Corporation Act required that all public officials swear 
an oath of allegiance to the national religion (Whiteman, 
1962 p79). Any who refused would be labelled ‘dissenters’ 
and would be unable to hold civic or governmental office 
or attend university (Watts, 1995, p345).  
A significant proportion of these new dissenters were 
middle class, most were well educated, and some were 
wealthy (Ashton, 1962, p19). Denied access to the 
universities they began founding ‘Dissenters Academies’ 
(Butts, 1955, p210).  
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These institutions were intended to provide students with 
higher education that was ‘similar to that at the 
universities’ (Rivers, 2007, p2).  
 
The Academies were unencumbered by the Aristotelian 
tradition, so beyond their religious obligation they had 
the ‘intellectual freedom’ to teach a more commercially 
oriented curriculum that included science, medicine, and 
technology (Shaw, 1907). The views of dissenting 
intellectuals began to closely parallel the fundamentals 
of the enlightenment (Kreis, 1984, p7). Academies 
adjusted their curricula to incorporate recent thinking 
in science and engineering and generally provided an 
education that prepared students for the more practical 
aspects of life (Prueter, 2004, p3). Since nonconformists 
were prohibited from civic duties some of the country’s 
brightest graduates now applied themselves to commerce 
and manufacture (Watts, 1995, p345). A significant number 
of innovative dissenters became associated with the 
expansion of industry (Ashton, 1962, p21), the more 
adroit businessmen being those able to accept others as 
‘potential customers’ rather than assail them as 
‘potential converts’ (Watts, 1995, p342). Graduates from 
dissenting acadamies may have been deprived of the 
‘advantages and privileges’ of an Oxbridge university 
education (Curtis, 1959, p279) but they were well 
prepared for the ‘more relevant’ globalising market 
(Prueter, 2004, p3). 
   
In the years that followed the defeat of Spain’s Armada 
the Spanish Atlantic presence was so significantly 
reduced that the English were able to begin acquiring 
their own new world territories (Scammell, 2004, p25). In 
1607 settlers founded Jamestown, Virginia. Although 
initially disappointed at the lack of precious metals 
they were soon employed in the ‘almost as lucrative’ 
cultivation of tobacco (Allitt, 2009, L2). Tobacco was a 
‘poor man’s’ crop, requiring little capital and much hard 
work (Allitt, 2009, L3) but was so profitable that 
Virginia quickly became America’s first ‘get-rich-quick 
scheme’ (Hutson, 2008, p11).  
 
Almost four hundred thousand people seeking to escape 
England’s political uncertainties voluntarily crossed the 
Atlantic during the late seventeenth century. Additional 
thousands were ‘forcibly transported’ for a variety of 
often rather insignificant 'crimes' such as vagrancy 
(Morrill, 2000, p12). Religious non-conformists, a broad 
group that included Quakers, could be transported for 
merely assembling in ‘pretence of religious worship’ 
(Child, 1751, p139).  
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But once in Virginia few English settlers could survive 
the backbreaking labour, suffocating heat and malarial 
swamps (Allitt, 2009, L3). Death from exhaustion or 
disease often occurred before ‘they could be replaced by 
the next boatload of benighted settlers’ (Hutson, 2008, 
p11).  
Europeans could not do the work so the tobacco planters 
began buying hardier, acclimatised African slaves 
(Coatsworth, 2004, p45). The slaves enabled Virginia to 
prosper. By 1650 it was annually exporting one and a half 
million pounds of tobacco to Europe (Allitt, 2009, L3). 
 
So great were the returns that English tobacco growers 
were prepared to risk planting on some of the smaller, 
and hitherto ignored, islands of the Spanish Caribbean 
(Allitt, 2009, L3). This slow encroachment escalated into 
a desire to expel the Spanish entirely and in 1655 the 
English successfully captured Jamaica, the ‘heart of the 
Caribbean’ (Scammell, 2004, p25). The ‘fundamental role’ 
of the navy in the area was to protect the islands and 
their attendant merchant ships, thus creating the 
confidence and the economic stability required to bring 
in the big investors (Bracco, 2006, p52). These 
entrepreneurs now started plantations for sugar rather 
than tobacco. European demand for the sweetener had 
soared; of all the new world products sugar was the one 
that ‘really mattered’ (Lang, 2006, p304). Only big 
investors could fund the  ‘great sugar cane venture’ as, 
apart from an ideal climate, it required high capital 
outlay, specialised equipment and slavery on a ‘huge 
scale’ (Bracco, 2006, p32). The Caribbean became one of 
the richest regions in the world, easily eclipsing the 
thirteen English colonies in North America (Coatsworth, 
2004, p45). By 1700 England monopolised the slave trade 
and had established the Atlantic triangle (Scammell, 
2004, p25). This trade pattern saw ships taking English 
manufactured goods to Africa, reloading with slaves bound 
for the Caribbean and America, and then returning to 
England with sugar and tobacco (Smellie, 1962, p77). 
 
International trade was booming, but it was still 
regulated by tariffs and duties. Henry Martyn’s book of 
1701, ‘Considerations upon the East India Trade’ is 
considered the first to publically question the 
‘mercantilist orthodoxy’ (Legrain, 2003, p87) and to 
promote the ‘mechanisms of unfettered trade’ (MacLeod, 
1983, p228). Martyn argued that it was only import 
tariffs that made the ‘vain labour’ of underpaid workers 





If the duties were removed these same goods could be 
cheaply imported and the workers employed on tasks of 
‘value to the nation’ (Martyn, 1701, pp34-35). Martyn's 
‘eloquent words’ fell on ‘deaf ears’ (Legrain, 2003, 
pp86-87). 
 
In 1707, Scotland and England having shared the same 
monarchs for almost a century agreed to share the same 
Parliament and were amalgamated into the union of Great 
Britain. In 1756 this union, along with the other major 
European powers was drawn into what would become known at 
the ‘Seven Years War’. Britain’s fighting forces were 
greatly enhanced by the temporary addition of the ships 
and soldiers of the East India Company; ‘military muscle’ 
had always been ‘an integral component’ of the way in 
which the corporation conducted its business (Rocher, 
2004, p207). When in 1763 the war stuttered to a close, 
British territorial gains were so substantial that, when 
combined with existing holdings, Britain could claim to 
be the world’s foremost colonial power (O’Farrell, 2007, 
p249). 
  
But the war had been expensive and Britain now sought to 
recoup some of its ‘great cost’ by increasing the taxes 
from its territorial possessions in North America and 
Asia (Seavoy, 2003, p113). Westminster was beginning to 
appreciate the financial benefits of a ‘truly global’ 
empire (Pitts, 2005, p12) even though some territories 
were more troublesome than others. The Seven Years War 
had banished French and the Spanish settlements from 
North America. The English colonists now relieved of the 
threat of ‘catholic encirclement’ began to display a new 
level of assertiveness (Allitt, 2009, L1). The prosperous 
colonists did not object in principle to taxation but in 
return wanted to be represented in Parliament (Lang, 
2006, p268). Their demands were strengthened by a boycott 
of imported British goods on which a tax was levied 
(Lloyd, 2001, p47). This manoeuvre so damaged British 
trade that Westminster abolished all duties except that 
on tea which was kept ‘for principles sake’ (Lavell & 
Payne, 1918, p125). In response the colonist boycott was 
lifted on all commodities but tea, which they continued 
to purchase from local smugglers (Lloyd, 2001, p48). The 
British government’s solution was to propose that the 
East India Company, which was experiencing economic 
difficulties, should export tea, which it had in 
abundance, to America and taxed at only three pence per 
pound instead of one shilling. This would generate funds 
for the Company as well as offering the colonists a 
‘bargain so irresistible’ that they would break their 
boycott (Lloyd, 2001, p48).  
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The merchants and smugglers whose prices this would 
undercut began creating a groundswell of discontent 
(Cross, 1920, p527). By the time the East India Company’s 
ships arrived the colonists were aggrieved enough to 
refuse to land the tea and it remained on the anchored 
ships for two months (Davies, 2004, p67). Finally a force 
of over a hundred men boarded the three ships moored in 
Boston Harbour and spent several hours dumping the whole 
consignment overboard (Lloyd, 2001, p48). British 
retaliation was swift. The state of Massachusetts would 
be absorbed into Canada and Boston Harbour would be 
closed until the East India Company was compensated. Four 
thousand troops were dispatched to Boston to ensure 
compliance (Davies, 2004, p68). Other American colonists 
deeply resented this intervention on behalf of a trading 
monopoly and resolved to stand with the Bostonians 
(Lloyd, 2001, p48).  
 
The road from ‘post tea party fervour’ to revolution was 
‘a short one’ (Davies, 2004, p68). Troops and colonists 
exchanged shots at Lexington in April 1774 and so started 
the ‘civil war’ that would make the colonists independent 
(Lavell & Payne, 1918, p127). Seven years later, an 
outnumbered British military commander surrendered to a 
combined American and French force at Yorktown and 
effectively ended any hope of a British victory (Cross, 
1920, p536). Westminster voted to abandon the war and 
entered into negotiations with the former colonists 
(Davies, 2004, p77). The United States of America was 
created by treaty in 1783 (Allitt, 2009, L7).  
 
While it was humiliating for the British to lose their 
American colonies, the empire was ‘far from shattered’ 
(Ferguson, 2003, p101). Anglo-American commerce quickly 
recovered and the trade in cotton was to rise 
exponentially during the next two decades (Allitt, 2009, 
L7). But the real wealth of the new world was in 
Caribbean sugar. British merchants had ‘four times’ more 
capital invested in slave-worked sugar plantations than 
in the whole of India (Proudman, 2008, p367). The sugar 
trade was ‘so rich’ that there had been serious 
consideration of returning Canada to the French in 











In 1776, the same year as the colonists signed their 
declaration of independence, Scottish philosopher Adam 
Smith published his hugely influential book ‘An Inquiry 
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations’.  
Smith argued that economies could be safely left to run 
themselves without governmental interference and that all 
countries should abolish import duties as obstacles to 
free and more successful trade.  
 
Smith’s book set out the ‘doctrines of free trade, 
laissez-faire capitalism and the economic rationism’ that 
became the ideological basis for globalisation (Raudzens, 





























Chapter 1 1789-1890	  
 
The beginning of the long nineteenth century is marked by 
the rise of the 1789 French Revolution’s liberal 
'bourgeoisie'; a class which Hobsbawn identifies as the 
forerunners of the neoliberals who were to claim the 
capitalist ‘conquest of the globe’ by 1989 (Hobsbawn, 
1987, p9). Before the French Revolution descended into 
‘mindless and vengeful chaos’ (Doyle, 2001, p4) the 
largely bourgeois National Assembly produced ‘something 
entirely new’ in the 1789 ‘Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and the Citizen’ (Doyle, 2001, p15). The sentiments 
expressed in this document proved fundamental to the 
concept of human rights and its echoes appear in many 
subsequent international agreements and treaties (Doyle, 
2001, p17).  
 
In this chapter I explain how the opportunistic politics 
of post revolutionary France created the circumstances 
that led to the research-based methods that would 
revolutionise German universities. This research based 
concept was in turn adopted by London’s two newly founded 
universities; both went on to thrive in the economic boom 
that followed Britain’s mid nineteenth century 
declaration of free trade. Here I also deal with the 
revitalisation of English education by Arnold and Newman 
and how their ideals shaped the Oxbridge ethos of the 
gentleman graduate and how that permeated the entry 
examinations for the domestic and imperial civil service. 
The chapter also illustrates how the Great Exhibition of 
1851, an event that generated sufficient funds for the 
founding institutions of research and technical 
education, represented the global reach of the expanding 
British Empire. This momentum encouraged the 
philanthropic creation of a network of technical colleges 
that would campaign to be upgraded to chartered 
universities before the end of the century.  
 
The chapter starts with the French Revolution that 
Hobsbawn argues was a direct consequence of its American 
counterpart (Hobsbawn, 1996, p58). 
 
The French tyrannies  
 
King Louis XVI supported the rebellious American 
colonists as an act of revenge against the British for 
their seizure of the French Caribbean islands (Doyle, 
2001, p20). The degree of French involvement rose 
exponentially and the ultimate victory at Yorktown was 
undeniably more ‘French than American’ (Doyle, 2001, 
p20).  
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It was followed by a speedy resolution in which Britain 
and the colonists settled their differences and signed a 
treaty without the ‘knowledge and consent’ of France 
(Lavell & Payne, 1918, p134). British merchants swiftly 
resumed trading with the independent Americans and Louis 
was left with no territorial gain or trading advantage to 
show for an expenditure which had brought France to the 
brink of bankruptcy (Rudé, 1976, p660). 
 
The financial crisis worsened and by 1788 food shortages, 
escalating prices and mass unemployment combined with an 
unusually severe winter caused widespread hardship and a 
threat to public order (Rudé, 1976, p660). Louis’s 
incompetent bureaucracy was at a loss, the upper classes 
were obstructive and the lower were obstreperous; Louis 
desperately needed the cooperation of the ‘bourgeoisie’ 
the educated middle class (Hobsbawn, 1996, p60). This he 
achieved by the revival of a medieval representative 
assembly, the ‘Estates-General’ for which the bourgeoisie 
were invited to stand for office (Frey & Frey, 2004, p3). 
The new congress met on May 5th 1789 but so different 
were the aims of its various cliques that it quickly 
became politically deadlocked. In Paris bread riots broke 
out; the hopes for the Estates-General ‘began to turn 
sour’ (Doyle, 2001, p39). Desperate to regain order the 
bourgeois deputies declared themselves, and as many of 
the clergy and nobles as would join them, to be a 
National Assembly on June 10th (Rudé, 1976, p668).  
 
This assumption of power confirmed the notion of the 
people as a sovereign nation (Doyle, 2001, p40) and the 
people accepted ‘the nation’ as a ‘revolutionary concept’ 
(Hobsbawn, 1996, p60). The ungovernable mob is another 
revolutionary concept and in Paris they raided shops, 
storehouses and monasteries in search of food and weapons 
(Rudé, 1976, p672). In this ‘electrified atmosphere’ the 
rioters stormed the Bastille on July 14th (Rapport, 2008, 
p351), this was the act that emboldened the peasants all 
over France to rise up as a vast but ‘irresistible 
movement’ (Hobsbawn, 1996, p61).  
 
In August 1789 members of the National Assembly in Paris 
formulated their ‘Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
Citizens’ (Frey & Frey, 2004, p5). It sought to replace 
the medieval view of a society dominated by monarchy, 
aristocracy and religious authority with the concepts of 
‘liberté, egalité, et fraternité’ (Thomas, 2012). While 
the Westphalia treaty delineated a geographical area, the 
Rights of Man, in a ‘powerful innovation’ bound the 
population of that area to the land as a nation-state 
(Hardt & Negri, 2000, p102).  
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In both Britain and America these worthy sentiments were 
dismissed as mere ‘catching up’ (Doyle, 2001, p3). 
Britain’s virtually bloodless ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 
over a hundred years earlier had produced an ‘English 
Bill of Rights’ and the more recent American Constitution 
had been written twelve years before (Davis, 2009, p115).  
 
However, the English Bill was less of a declaration than 
a ‘political settlement’ which sought to enshrine the 
'ancient rights and liberties' of Parliament by laying 
down the exact parameters of the monarch’s power 
(Clapham, 2007, p6). The American Bill was an adaptation 
of the English Bill but with a ‘series of afterthoughts 
and amendments’, but both documents applied quite 
specifically to circumstances that prevailed in their 
countries of origin (Doyle, 2001, p16). The ‘Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and Citizens’ was intended as a 
universal legal instrument (Frey & Frey, 2004, p5). The 
declared rights of security, equality and freedom were 
intended to be ‘applicable everywhere’ they would become 
the expected standard by which ‘all citizens could 
measure the behaviour of governments’ (Doyle, 2001, p16). 
Its expressions of equality were repeated in the 1948 
United Nations ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ 
and the 1953 ‘European Convention on Human Rights’ 
(Doyle, 2001, p17).  
 
But these were eventual outcomes; in the years 
immediately following the declaration the revolution was 
commandeered by ruthless revenge-hungry mobs (Frey & 
Frey, 2004, p11). In 1792 France declared itself a 
republic and King Louis was guillotined (Hobsbawn, 1996, 
p64; Lang, 2006, p273). A series of rapid coups saw the 
country fall under the dictatorship of the ‘Committee of 
Public Safety’ a political clique intent on ‘crushing 
internal opposition’ (Doyle, 2001, p55). So began the 
reign of ‘Terror’ (Thomas, 2012). The constitution was 
suspended and virtually any citizen ‘even suspected of 
disloyalty’ could be arrested and swiftly sent to the 
guillotine (Frey & Frey, 2004, p11) Hobsbawn estimates 
that seventeen thousand ‘enemies of the state’ were 
executed in the first fourteen months of the Terror 
(Hobsbawn, 1996, p68). 
 
The anarchistic republic was unable or unwilling to 
maintain cordial relations with its European neighbours 
and virtually all of them saw the opportunity for 
territorial gains and declared war (Hazen, 1920, p180).  
Inadequately equipped and poorly led French troops 
struggled to prevent invasion and counter-revolution (Van 
Loon, 1921, p348).  
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After successfully repelling attackers during a siege, 
Napoleon Bonaparte, a Corsican, whose island homeland the 
revolutionary government had liberated was touted as an 
example of the French citizen-soldier (Van Loon, 1921, 
p351). By October 1795 Napoleon had suppressed another 
counter-revolution and had consolidated his position with 
a politically advantageous marriage (Weiner, 2005, L5).  
Fast becoming a national hero he was appointed commander-
in-chief of the French troops stationed in Italy (Mishra, 
2008, p95). In a swift and successful military campaign, 
Napoleon the ‘greatest of actors’ (Van Loon, 1921, p351) 
was able to inspire his armies to seize both Venice and 
Austria for France (Mishra, 2008, p95). 
 
Napoleon next proposed to capture Egypt in order to 
disrupt Britain’s trade routes with India (Hazen, 1920, 
p226). In May 1798 four hundred French ships landed 
thousands of troops on the Egyptian coast near Alexandria 
(Hazen, 1920, p227). While Napoleon’s armies battled 
their way inland, British Vice Admiral Horatio Nelson 
mounted a surprise attack on the anchored French fleet 
and sank all but three of them (Mishra, 2008, p95). 
Napoleon’s army was trapped (Hazen, 1920, p228). For 
eighteen months, battles costing thousands of lives raged 
back and forth across Egypt and Syria. When it became 
obvious that the expedition ‘must inevitably fail’ 
(Hazen, 1920, p229) Napoleon ‘secretly’ escaped alone 
from Egypt (Hazen, 1920, p230) leaving his army to ‘face 
the music’ or get home as best they could (Herold, 1962, 
p341). Arriving back in Paris in September 1799 Napoleon 
found an administration on the brink of collapse (Hazen, 
1920, p230). While he still had the support of the 
domestic militia (Herold, 1962, p333) a coup d’état was 
mounted. A ‘trumped up’ plot against the republic was 
given as the excuse to oust the existing administration 
and to appoint three Consuls, one of whom was General 
Bonaparte (Hazen, 1920, p233). Within four years Napoleon 
had divested himself of his two co-consuls and summoned 
the Pope to officiate at his coronation as Emperor (Van 
Loon, 1921, p353). 
 
In 1805 the French lost a second fleet of ships to the 
British. Twenty-seven vessels led by, Admiral, now Lord, 
Nelson had attacked thirty-three French ships off the 
Spanish coast near Cape Trafalgar. It was a decisive 
British victory with twenty-two of the French ships sunk. 
Nelson lost no ships but was himself killed (Roberts, 
2005, pp45-47). This was small consolation to Emperor 
Napoleon who, no longer able to wage war at sea, began to 
consider a ‘European colonial system’ (Davis, 2006, 
p130).  
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The target of this inland expansion was to be the loosely 
confederated German states that comprised the ‘soft 
centre’ of the continent (Blanning, 1998, p37). Under his 
leadership French troops seized vast tracts of the 
continental interior (Dobbelaer, 2007). Napoleon 
abolished all of the previous boundaries and redisignated 
the land as either part of France or the property of his 
relations. He conceded that Prussia should remain under 
the management of its German princes, but only after they 
had sworn obedience to their new Emperor (Blanning, 1998, 
p37). In adopting this political expedience Napoleon was 
unwittingly giving Prussia the territorial advantage that 
would be the first step in unifying all of the German 
states (Blanning, 1998, p40).  
 
Many of these states had been created in 1648 when the 
Treaty of Westphalia had officially brought Europe’s 
Thirty Years War to a close (Cavendish, 1998, p50). The 
Treaty established political equilibrium by creating over 
three hundred ‘sovereign’ nation states (Sampford, 2005, 
p9) and in consequence ‘Westphalian’ principles are still 
recognised as the ‘basic system of governance’ of the 
independent nation state (Suter, 2006, p421). With such 
systems comes the requirement for an efficient bureacracy 
and in 1807, the Prussian government tentatively 
introduced a series of social and administrative reforms. 
The initiatives failed because they were resisted by the 
obstructive and often poorly educated incumbant officers 
(Hohendorf, 2000, p619). The country’s bureaucracy needed 
a more progressive middle class and that meant better 
higher education (Blanning, 1998, p39). 
 
Von Humboldt’s concept   
 
The Prussian government determined that they would create 
an efficient state through a reinvigorated programme of 
education and culture that would begin with a new 
university in Berlin (Vernon, 2004, p16). The search for 
someone capable of designing an education system to match 
these aspirations lighted upon Wilhelm von Humboldt, a 
methodical career civil servant working as an envoy to 
the Vatican (Hohendorf, 2000, p619). From his first day 
in February 1809, von Humboldt took just sixteen months 
to formulate an academic plan for the newly founded 
University of Berlin (Hohendorf, 2000, pp613-619). 
Drawing on the ideas of the ‘late Enlightenment’ 
(Rothblatt, 2000, p620) and greatly influenced by 
humanist thinking and his own classical studies while in 
Rome, von Humboldt designed an innovative non-vocational 
educational system that required teaching and research to 
be practiced simultaneously (Hohendorf, 2000, p620).  
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This was a significant element of Von Humboldt’s 
approach; he was convinced that the proximity of research 
to teaching would lead to fresh discoveries and new 
knowledge (Anderson, 2006, p29). The University of 
Berlin, today the Humboldt University of Berlin 
(Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin) was to be an 
‘intellectual powerhouse’ (Anderson, 2006, p29), a centre 
for original research, where students would be released 
from the ‘overgrown schoolhouse’ and allowed to 
investigate rather than simply ‘regurgitate’ the 
knowledge of the past (Vernon, 2004, p17). 
 
The new regime was quickly approved and applied. Von 
Humboldt’s ‘modern Research University’ freed students 
from ‘patronising supervision’ and encouraged them to 
concentrate on specialist areas (Goztepe-Celebi et al, 
2004, p1). Equally their professors could accrue 
increased academic status by researching and publishing  
‘innovative ideas’ (Vernon, 2004, p17). Prussian higher 
education gained international recognition as a leader in 
scientific laboratory experiments and instruction. Their 
observation of the natural world and humanities research 
was also producing new ideas in philosophy, history and 
linguistics (Anderson, 2006, p32). A new stress was 
placed on ‘independent study’ that was free of ‘religious 
dogma’, but not at the expense of theology which remained 
a significant element of Humboldtian higher education 
(Tingley, 2000, p30). 
 
In 1815 Napoleon’s armies were ‘crushed’ at Waterloo by a 
combined force led by Britain and Prussia (Lloyd, 2001, 
p60). The French retreated and peace was restored. This 
left the Prussians free to combine with other Germanic 
states and build an infrastructure that included an 
expanded Prussian university system. Its ‘impressive 
intellectual achievements’ were repeated in the new 
German cities as the Humboldtian model was adopted 
nationally (Anderson, 2006, p32). Anderson states that 
this expansion of Humboldt’s programme assisted in the 
promotion of rising secularisation, nationalism and the 
‘shift of social power’ from the landowners to the 
professional middle classes (Anderson, 2010).  
 
Foreign observers were so much impressed by the 
international prominence of German graduates that 
Humboldtian elements began to colour the teaching 
strategies in other European and some American 





Adam Smith revisited  
 
Nelson’s victory at Trafalgar in 1805, ‘finally assured’ 
British dominance of the seas (Davis, 2006, p130). The 
extent of British expansion into overseas territories and 
colonies was acquiring the gravitas of empire (Lloyd, 
2001, p60). In the event of a problem, which required a 
military solution, the first threats would be an economic 
blockade or trade sanctions (Davis, 2006, p130). The 
destabilising effect of blocking international commerce 
and the movement of money was a new area of study for 
political tacticians. Adam Smith had died in 1790 but in 
an era before the economy was widely understood his 
economic observations began to take on a special 
significance (Allitt, 2009, L9). 
 
Smith’s 1776 publication, ‘An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations’, was the first to offer 
a 'systematic’ overview of a national economy (Legrain, 
2003, p87). Its conclusions ranged from the proposition 
that free markets would regulate themselves as if guided 
by an ‘invisible hand’ (Smith, 1937, p423), to a thinly 
disguised ‘attack on mercantilism’ (Irwin, 1996, p10). 
Smith argued that the wealth of a nation is not measured 
by its accumulation of precious metals, but by the 
‘abundance or scarcity’ of goods, manufactured and traded 
(Smith, 1937, pp398-399). Smith regarded the Cape of Good 
Hope route to India and the trade with the America’s as 
the two ‘most important events’ in history. Apart from 
greater commercial opportunities both territories proved 
to be a source of silver which allowed world commerce to 
expand (Smith, 1937, p590). Legrain states that the early 
nineteenth century was witness to many ‘powerful’ 
developments which collectively ‘began to turn the tide 
against mercantilism’ (Legrain, 2003, p88). 
 
Smith was by no means an unqualified supporter of free 
trade but he discouraged governmental interference in the 
economy and was especially critical of collusion between 
the state and trading monopolies such as the East India 
Company. Despite recent suggestions that this corporation 
pioneered the ‘birth of modern consumerism’ Smith’s 
comments are still considered valid (Robins, 2004, p31). 
He stressed that prices would be kept artificially high 
by both the lack of competition and the inability of so 
large a corporation to prevent ‘waste... fraud and abuse’ 
for which the consumer would ultimately be expected to 
pay (Smith, 1937, p596). Smith objected to these vast 
companies behaving like monarchies in the countries they 
had ‘conquered’ (Smith, 1937, p601) and accused them of 
creating a ‘great empire’ for the ‘sole purpose of 
raising up a nation of customers’ (Smith, 1937, p626).  
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Many political figures were influenced by Smith’s 
questioning of the ‘intellectual basis’ of mercantilism 
(Howe, 1997, p2) and by 1800 he had posthumously become 
the patron saint of that faith of which ‘freedom of trade 
was an indispensable part’ (Magnusson, 2004, p5). 
Predictions of financial instability became reality when 
the East India Company, an arch practitioner of 
restrictive mercantilism ran into economic difficulties 
(Jones, 2003). The corporation had attempted to secure 
greater profits by extending its militia backed political 
control of India and had seized a wider geographical area 
than it could possibly manage (Raudzens, 1999, p156). In 
1813 a parliamentary inquiry found the company wallowing 
in a deadly combination of chaotic administration and 
huge financial losses (Lawson, 1993, p141). An anti-
monoply faction lobbied to have the Company stripped of 
its special trading privileges; their ‘most-cited’ 
slogans were the words of Adam Smith. Phrases from ‘The 
Wealth of Nations’ were used to justify attacks on the 
state sponsored monopoly of the India trade (Lawson, 
1993, p138). Unsurprisingly the India Act of 1813 
declared Parliamentary ‘sovereignty over the Company's 
dominions’ (Griffiths, 1961, p215). The Company’s charter 
was renewed but retained little of the original mandate 
and completely abolished the Company’s long held monopoly 
(Misra, 1959, pp51-2). The Company was left as little 
more than a ‘bureaucratic shell’, without any special 
privilege but still having to accept the responsibility 
for governing the country (Lawson 1993, p142).  
 
Adam Smith’s work provided an ‘intellectual starting-
point’ for many early nineteenth century economic 
thinkers (Haakonssen, 1985, p628). James Mill and David 
Ricardo were prominent among these and both later refined 
Smiths ideas (Legrain, 2003, p88) by clearly restating 
the ‘theory of comparative advantage’ (Jones, 2003).  
Ricardo’s illustration highlighted the low labour costs 
and good weather of a country like Portugal. These 
conditions made the production of exportable wine more 
cost effective that weaving cloth which was better 
manufactured elsewhere and imported with the vineyard 
profits (Ricardo, 1929, p82).  
Both Ricardo and Mill believed that international trade 
would prosper if countries were to specialise in products 
in which they had a ‘comparative rather than an absolute 






The writings of Smith and his followers was to provide 
the advocates of free trade with their most effective 
arguments, and would eventually become one of the 
‘central aspects of economic globalization’ (Went, 2000, 
p655). The Wealth of Nations has been seen as a champion 
of ‘individual liberty’, which has promoted the free 
market as being morally superior to other economic 
systems (Brown, 1994, p181). The philosophical tone of 
the work is unsurprising as Smith was for twelve years a 
professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow University where 
his teachings integrated ‘moral philosophy, 
jurisprudence, politics and economics’ (Brown, 1994, 
p182). He presented an overview in which the rules of 
law, the economy and politics rested upon the virtues of 
justice, ‘prudent self-interest’ and public spiritedness, 
respectively (Haakonssen, 2006, p20). Mill and Ricardo 
were very much public-spirited political economists. 
Though each had a different view of society both 
advocated electoral reform, extension of the voting 
franchise and the benefits of a secret ballot (Milgate & 
Stimson, 2009, p8-9). Mill investigated what might be 
required of a voter to exercise ‘sound judgment and good 
political choice’; his conclusion was that ‘education was 
the answer’ (Milgate & Stimson, 2009, p164). This was a 
view with which Adam Smith, a ‘fully paid-up member of 
the Enlightenment’ would have agreed (Berry, 2006, p135).  
 
 
London’s University and King’s 
Colleges 
 
In 1825 a British visitor to Germany’s Humboldtian 
university in Bonn was so impressed that on his return to 
London he wrote a letter to the Times newspaper. He 
extolled the virtues of Bonn and declared his intention 
of founding such a university in London (Malony, 1993, 
p33). The proposal was met with enthusiasm by a diverse 
group of British Humboldtian supporters who roughly 
divided into ‘nonconformist divines’ and ‘philosophical 
radicals’ (Roberts, 1947, p37). Given the potential for 
religious argument within its own ranks this proposal 
group neatly sidestepped the issue by making the 
curriculum and the constitution of the new university 
free of any theological doctrine (Roberts, 1947, p37).  
 
This ‘godless university’ would be in line with its 
French and German counterparts (Powicke, 1947, p247) as 
well as British liberal thinking which sought to reduce 




Although meetings of the new university group were 
presided over by London’s Lord Mayor there was little 
municipal support (Barnard, 1961, p84), so initially the 
project could only progress as a commercial venture. In 
1827 the ‘proprietors’ of the University of London 
acquired a site of an ‘old rubbish dump’ in Gower Street, 
and laid a foundation stone (Armytage, 1955, p171). An 
appeal for funds was met with sufficient generosity that 
the university was able to open a year later with three 
hundred students (Roberts, 1947, p37). That the venture 
was so rapidly successful indicates that it filled an 
‘obvious gap’ (Anderson, 2006, p27), but the University 
of London remained an unchartered institution and a 
commercial company. This become the basis of a campaign 
of objections ‘led by medical schools’ that a private 
company could not assume the functions of a university 
because it could not grant degrees. The company countered 
by retitling their venture the ‘University College of 
London’ (Powicke, 1947, p246). Oxford and Cambridge 
universities remained hostile; they saw the new 
institution as lacking the ‘essential quality of a true 
university’ (Powicke, 1947, p247).  
 
The Rector of Lambeth denounced the ‘godlessness of Gower 
Street’ (Roberts, 1947, p37) and demanded a Christian 
university for London (Dowland, 1997, p35). By June 1828, 
the Rector’s committee numbered several bishops and 
archbishops as well as the Duke of Wellington and Sir 
Robert Peel (Dowland, 1997, p42). This second new 
university would, like its Gower Street rival, provide 
‘cheap and useful’ higher education (Vernon, 2004, p53) 
but on an ‘Anglican basis’ (Roberts, 1947, p37). King 
George IV agreed to act as patron, which led to the 
institution being titled, ’King's College’ (Roberts, 
1947, p37). The monarch granted the college a 
considerable plot of Crown land near Somerset House 
between the ‘Thames and the Strand’ (Roberts, 1947, p38). 
In 1829 a Royal Charter of Incorporation for the college 
named leading parliamentarians and the Lord mayor as ex-
officios while prominent ecclesiastics were enrolled as 
the official governors (Dowland, 1997, p42).  
 
King’s College was opened in 1831. It suffered fewer 
pangs than University College though its first principle, 
the Rector of Lambeth’s brother in law, was forced to 
resign for being ‘disconcertingly’ friendly with the 
Gower Street opposition (Dowland, 1997, p43). Thus by the 
1830’s, London had two universities but neither had the 
power to grant a degree. An early suggestion for the 
institutions to merge for examining purposes was rejected 
by both (Barnard, 1961, p85; Roberts, 1947, p38). 
 36 
A second solution was the creation of an external 
examining body unconnected to either institution. This 
did not suit King’s College because it made no 
distinction between ‘religious persuasions’ (Roberts, 
1947, p38). University College complained that the 
proposed body was to be termed, the ‘University of 
London’. This was their original choice of name and 
acceptance would prevent them from ever claiming it back 
(Barnard, 1961, p85; Roberts, 1947, p38). However both 
institutions needed a mechanism for qualifying their 
students and so reluctantly agreed. In 1836 the State 
created the University of London, a ‘public, non-
denominational body’ (Anderson, 2006, p27) that would 
become the ‘board of examiners for the Empire’ (Roberts, 
1947, p38).  
 
Although Oxford and Cambridge universities had never held 
a monopoly as providers of higher education, their 
position in being able to confer degrees was unique 
(Powicke, 1947, p245; Roberts, 1947, p37). The University 
of London ‘solution’ had changed that. From 1836 it was 
possible to study at institutions other than Oxford or 
Cambridge and still be eligible for entry into 
examinations that led to a degree (Barnard, 1961, p83). 
Although this extended the available curriculum into 
‘modern studies and science’ (Barnard, 1961, p84) neither 
the University of London nor the Oxbridge institutions 
were yet accepting the ‘emerging discipline of economics’ 
as a ‘subject suitable for study’ (Soffer, 1994, p58-59). 
This, however, did not prevent private publication and in 
1827 there appeared ‘A Catechism on the Corn Laws, by a 
Member of the University of Cambridge’ (Apjohn, 1881, 
p59). Written by ‘ardent’ economist, Colonel T. Perronet 
Thompson, this enormously popular pamphlet appeared in 
twenty different editions during the following twelve 
years and provided a group of Manchester industrialists 
with a basis on which to found the Anti-Corn Law League 
in 1839 (Apjohn, 1881, p59). 
 
Free trade, the Corn Law and the gold 
standard 
 
The Corn Law was the most significant barrier to early 
nineteenth century free trade. It restricted competitive 
imports while keeping the price of home-grown wheat 
artificially high (Gash, 1986). The Anti-Corn Law League 
campaigned against the protectionist Corn Law because, 
they claimed, it increased bread prices reduced the money 
available for other purchases and eventually increased 
unemployment (Fontana, 2006, p226).  
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The Anti-Corn Law League were pressing for the government 
to fulfill its 1820 declaration that all future 
commercial policies would be ‘guided’ by the principles 
of free trade (Grampp, 1987, p86).  
 
Some government factions had begun to see an 
international exchange of goods unimpeded by duties or 
taxes, as a way of increasing exports and stimulating the 
economy (Howe, 1997, pvii). Legrain argues that the ideas 
of Smith, Mill and Ricardo were an important contributory 
factor in establishing this view (Legrain, 2003, p89). 
Ricardo, who sat in the commons from 1819 until his death 
in 1823 (Grampp, 1987, p93) exerted considerable 
influence over the government’s decision to support free 
trade (Grampp, 1987, p86). Now twenty years later that 
declaration was still being obstructed by the Corn Law, 
the ‘ark of the Tory Covenant’ (Trevelyan, 1922, p204). 
This ‘law’ was a protectionist measure that was supported 
by the land owning squires who made up most of Prime 
Minister Robert Peel’s Conservative government (Gash, 
1986).  
 
In the autumn of 1845, Peel, who was sympathetic to the 
Anti-Corn Law League (Fontana, 2006, p226), used the 
failure of the Irish potato crop as an excuse to lift 
restrictions and allow both domestic and imported wheat 
into Irish ports (Fay, 1932, p98). Once the principle of 
imported wheat appeared to have been accepted Peel went 
to his cabinet in November of that year and asked that 
they should consider a full repeal of the law (Magnusson, 
2004, p48). The cabinet refused, Peel resigned, efforts 
to form another government failed and in December Peel 
was back and asked once again for a full repeal. This 
time it was carried and the Corn Law was abolished in 
1846 (Fay, 1932, p99). 
 
The Corn Law repeal was to mark the beginning of a ‘true 
revolution’ (Cain, 1999, p1). The removal of the last 
‘serious opposition’ (Trevelyan, 1922, p276) to the 
world’s first free trade policy was to prove ‘an 
important building block’ (Magnusson, 2004, p2) in a 
series of commercial and social developments that we now 
recognise as economic globalisation (Davies, 2005, p55). 
Cultural globalisation too was ‘kick started’ as the 
British government abolished its remaining import taxes 
(Legrain, 2003, p89) and prompted an immediate inflow of 
cheaper foreign-produced food and luxury goods.  
 
The government’s declaration of free trade not only 
marked the point at which a burgeoning empire moved from 
‘one economic regime to another’ (Price, 1999, p88) but 
it ushered in a ‘new global era’ (McKeown, 2007, p219). 
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Worldwide trade had previously been obstructed by the 
lack of an international currency exchange system (Hirst, 
1997, p410). Britain became the first ‘major proponent’ 
of globalising policies with the introduction of the 
international gold standard (Davies, 2005, p55).  
This mechanism was based on the requirement for the 
national bank of any country to know the gold value of 
their bank notes so that paper could be exchanged for 
metal if required. The fluctuating price of gold was 
fixed at 7.322 grammes to the British pound and the 
countries that signed up to the gold standard agreed to 
fix the gold equivalent of their monetary unit to that 
price. Currency rates between countries were calculated 
by the amount of gold each monetary unit could buy 
(Legrain, 2003, p86; Anikin, 1983, pp145-147). 
 
The introduction of such an international monetary system 
was of the greatest advantage to the British, whose 
network of colonial possessions and trading stations 
amounted to a ‘world-market on a vast scale’ (Trevelyan, 
1922, p276). It was natural therefore for Britain to 
stand as principal regulator and guarantor of the gold 
standard. Considerable international confidence was 
placed in the currency exchange simply because it was 
‘underwritten by the United Kingdom’ (Hirst, 1997, p410). 
International business developed via this fixed exchange-
rate system that was regulated from London, which became 
the centre of the ‘financial solar system’ (Ford, 1962, 
p18-19). The sterling-based gold standard dramatically 
increased the volume of mid nineteenth century world 
trade but was only applicable to industrially developed 
countries with relatively stable currencies (Steger, 
2003, p32). The rest of the world had to ‘adapt as best 
they could’ (Anikin, 1983, p146). 
 
Increasing free trade was to prove the mainspring of 
economic globalisation (Went, 2000, p655). Cheaper 
imports were seen as benefiting the consumer and the 
manufacturer alike (Cain, 1999, p1). Only those who had 
sheltered behind protectionist tariffs and were now 
‘exposed to international competition’ could be 
considered the ‘net losers’ (Ferguson, 2003, pxx).   
The ‘cogent and appealing liberal economic theories’ of 
Smith and Ricardo (Jones, 2003) would have held little 
appeal for such people; Smith himself had little 
confidence in Britain adopting free trade describing the 
idea as ‘absurd’ (Smith, 1937, p437). It was ‘comparative 
advantage’ that carried the day; imports could reduce 
manufacturing costs by providing cheaper raw materials 
and thereby establishing British industrial supremacy 
(Cain, 1999, p1).  
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Foreign wheat imports broke the back of the protectionist 
argument and encouraged the investment in manufacturing 
that would make nineteenth century Britain ‘the richest 
country on earth’ (Passell, 1993). 
 
Much of this new found wealth was in the pockets of the 
entrepreneurs and businessmen who were the main 
beneficiaries of a ‘capitalist’ free market regulated 
only by Smith’s 'invisible hand' (Steger, 2003, p31). 
With the removal of the Corn Law in 1846 came a new style 
of industrial investment which began ‘pulling out the 
props’ which had long supported the landowning elite 
(Wiener, 1992, p12). Those whose status in society was 
considered to be between the ‘upper and lower orders’ 
began to think of themselves as a ‘class’ and not simply 
of 'middle rank'(Hobsbawn, 1996, p185). The upper and 
middle strata of society became somewhat blurred as 
landowners extended their interests to railways, canals 
and mines and the ‘new’ middle class cultivated 
aristocratic interests in ‘style... leisure, and 
political service’ (Wiener, 1992, p12-13). The triumph of 
the Anti-Corn-Law League, ‘that most class conscious 
body’(Hobsbawn, 1996, p185), signalled the ‘victory of 
trade over the land’ (O’Farrell, 2007, p315). The 
bourgeois middle classes were replacing the aristocracy 
as a new political and economic force (Lichtheim, 1964, 
p136). The sons of the industrialists had little trouble 
being accepted by the upper classes provided that they 
were prepared to disavow their ‘backgrounds and their 
class’ (Wiener, 1992, p20). The ‘central institution’ for 
such transformations was the public school and the man 
who contributed greatly to this ‘separation’ of 
industrial origins and elitist future was Thomas Arnold 




Despite being the most expensive educational provision in 
the country at that time, the ‘great public schools’ had 
long been in decline (Strachey, 1918, p207). The 
curriculum was almost entirely based on classical studies 
in Latin (Clarke, 1959, p173) and the institutions 
themselves had become notorious as ‘pits of anarchy and 
bullying’ (Barnett, 1987, p214). The teaching staff saw 
their role as to ‘render learning possible’. Any 
responsibility for system or discipline was secondary 
(Bradby, 1900, p55). Most pupils were boarders and slept 
in ‘unsupervised’ dormitories that were filthy and 
perpetually stank of ‘ordure and urine’ (Rubinstein, 
1994, p104). Public school days, as well as nights, were 
filled with terror, rebellion, ‘appalling practical 
jokes’ and ‘savage ritual' (Strachey, 1918, p211). 
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Men of religion and influence denounced the ‘great 
scandal’ of the ‘unchristian’ circumstances in which the 
upper classes were educated (Worboise, 1870, p65).  
Dissatisfaction turned to demands for change; the public 
schools must either be reformed or replaced (Stanley, 
1877, p85). This was the atmosphere in 1828 when the 
trustees of Rugby school in Warwickshire set about 
interviewing candidates for the post of headmaster. They 
elected Thomas Arnold, a man who came with impressive 
recommendations and who burned with reforming zeal 
(Strachey, 1918, p207). Arnold was forceful character and 
let it be known that he would brook no interference. Any 
dissatisfaction with his performance must be met with 
dismissal; he wanted no criticism, and his power must be 
‘absolute’ (Stanley, 1877, p90). The trustees agreed to 
this and confirmed Arnold as Doctor of Divinity, the 
office required to perform his duties (Strachey, 1918, 
p207). 
 
Dr Arnold had fixed ideas and every intention of carrying 
them through (Stanley, 1877, p109). Rugby school was an 
‘average specimen’, the Doctor was aware of the challenge  
and was able to arrive with a serviceable plan (Stanley, 
1877, p85). It had long been a feature of public schools 
that senior boys were permitted to exercise power over 
the juniors; Arnold endorsed and extended this practice 
by making each of sixth formers a Praepostor or prefect 
(Bradby, 1900, p56). These boys became the schools 
internal managing body and had real authority; Arnold 
believed that this demonstration of trust would be 
reciprocated (Strachey, 1918, p214). He refused to 
consider pupils as children, they were treated ‘rational’ 
adults (Worboise, 1870, p69).  
While corporeal punishment was not advocated, Arnold 
considered flogging unavoidable in cases of ‘lying, 
drinking, or indomitable idleness’ (Worboise, 1870, p70). 
Sixth form Praepostors could administer a flogging but 
were themselves excused such punishment (Strachey, 1918, 
p217), any misuse of this privilege or other flagrant 
rule breaking would result in the ‘unpromising subject’ 
being expelled (Bradby, 1900, p56). Arnold insisted the 
school fees were increased, this was to improve the 
incomes of masters and assistants who were expected to 
devote all of their time to their school duties (Bradby, 
1900, p58). 
 
Educational reformers demanded that public schools 
embrace a more liberal curriculum and a ‘higher moral 
tone’ (Strachey, 1918, p212). Arnold recognised that new 
subjects, however ‘subordinate’, must be included in a 
‘liberal’ regime (Norwood & Hope, 1909, p27). 
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Mathematics, modern history and modern languages made a 
‘tentative’ curriculum appearance but accounted for less 
than one hour a week for each subject and pupils made 
little progress (Strachey, 1918, p218). More acceptable 
ancient history was taught from a large picture book 
depicting great heroes of the past in chronological 
order. Arnold required that the illustrations showed 
‘striking characters’ undertaking ‘heroic actions’ so the 
boy might experience some ‘lasting association’ with the 
subject (Arnold, 1845, p357). Arnold admitted in a letter 
to the schools trustee’s that his pupils would ‘never 
learn to speak or pronounce French’ nor would they grasp 
the fundamentals of mathematics but this was what might 
be expected of subjects that were ‘taught but seldom’ 
(Stanley, 1877, pp120-121). Physical science proved too 
difficult to accommodate in one hour lessons and so was 
left out entirely (Strachey, 1918, p219). 
 
In Dr Arnold’s opinion, education was largely about the 
‘formation of character’ (Bradby, 1900, p55). He did not 
accept the headmastership at Rugby to ‘train’ scholars 
but to create ‘Christian gentlemen’ (Worboise, 1870, 
p69). This result would be achieved via the recognition 
of individual responsibility, countless soul saving 
sermons, diligent study of ancient Greek and Roman 
classics and strict discipline (Strachey, 1918, pp213-
214). Arnold’s ‘cane lay close to the Bible’ (Guttsman, 
1963, p151). Despite the more liberal curriculum at 
Rugby, it was the ‘dead languages’ of the ancients that 
would provide the ‘basis of all teaching’ (Strachey, 
1918, p218).  
 
During the nineteenth century the ‘bond’ between 
scholasticism and classical antiquity had been loosened 
by an increased archaeological understanding of ancient 
Greece and a belated appreciation of ‘Humanist’ thinking 
(Clarke, 1959, p172). Arnold recommended the classical 
authors for their views on history and philosophy rather 
than using their work as examples of ancient grammar 
(Norwood & Hope, 1909, p27). The Doctor was aware that 
those unfamiliar with the classics might consider it an 
‘absurdity’ to spend so much of a valuable education 
studying the work of a ‘few ancient writers’ who were 
totally unacquainted with the contemporary world (Arnold, 
1845, p348). In answer to such criticism Arnold declared 
that his intention was not to ‘fill’ his pupils with 
‘useful information’, but to inspire them with classical 
examples to gain such information for themselves (Arnold, 
1845, p356). He fervently believed that the moral and 
political building blocks of the ‘human character’ could 
be gleaned from a study of the work of Aristotle, Plato, 
Thucydides, Cicero, and Tacitus (Arnold, 1845, p349). 
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When interviewing potential pupils Arnold looked first 
for the highest principles, then for ‘gentlemanly 
conduct’ and lastly ‘intellectual ability’ (Strachey, 
1918, p212). These values were shared by large numbers of 
wealthy English parents (Strachey, 1918, p213) and are 
displayed in the character of the country squire in 
Thomas Hughes’ ‘Tom Brown’s School-Days’. In this 
‘testament of gratitude’ to Dr Arnold (Wiener, 1992, 
p20), the squire sends his son to Rugby school because he 
wants him returned as a ‘brave, helpful, truth-telling 
Englishman’ who is also a ‘Christian’ (Hughes, 1911, 
p71). The success of Thomas Arnold’s educational 
experiment (Worboise, 1870, p69) was considered a great 
achievement. He had succeeded in transforming ‘licensed 
barbarism’ (Strachey, 1918, p211) into something ‘more 
religious and less raffish’ with the intention of 
attracting the offspring of a ‘serious’ middle class 
clientele (Anderson, 2006, p43). His personal 
contribution was cut short by sudden death in 1842 but 
his fame and his influence continued to be felt by 
countless contemporaries (Bradby, 1900, p63). Arnold left 
an evolving ‘common ethos’ and mid-Victorian ‘social 
thought’ enthusiastically accommodated and ‘propagated 
it’ (Wiener, 1992, p11). They took up the Arnoldian 
philosophy and transformed British public schools into 
the ‘regimented, christianised, imperialised’ 
institutions of ‘legend’ (Rubinstein, 1994, p104). 
 
Thomas Arnold was eventually recognised as an innovative 
educationalist whose advice was sought by institions 
other than Rugby school (Barnett, 1987, p214). He was 
initially one of the governors of the University of 
London but resigned at the news that it would not be 
conferring degrees in theology (Williamson, 1964, p169: 
Strachey, 1918, p225). However his ‘new romantic’ vision 
of Christian education was to prove inspirational to so 
many of his pupils and his staff that it was transmitted 
by them to other public schools and to the universities 
(Barnett, 1987, p215).  
 
The idea of a liberal arts education was shown to combine 
the ‘aristocratic ideal of leadership and service’ with 
the administrative skills required to govern both the 
empire and at home (Cain & Hopkins, 1993, p122). The 
combination of public schools and universities was to 
produce an elite that exhibited the ‘amateurism and 
efficiency which was the mark of the English 
establishment well into the twentieth century’ (Cain & 




Newman’s idea of a university 
 
During the eighteenth century the ancient universities 
had ‘sunk’ in the public estimation, they ‘neither taught 
nor examined’ and were barely able to maintain discipline 
(Inge, 1922, p26). The nineteenth century educational 
reformers who so appreciated Arnold’s methods wanted to 
see a similar transformation in higher education. John 
Henry Newman was a fellow of Oriel College and the vicar 
of Oxford’s parish church; he converted to Roman 
Catholicism, became an influential priest and was 
eventually named a Cardinal (Turner, 2010, p119). In 
later life Cardinal Newman published 'The Idea of a 
University Defined and Illustrated' being a collection of 
lectures he had first given during the 1850’s at Dublin 
University (Anderson, 2010). A critic of the period 
condemned Dublin’s ‘professed’ University as a Catholic 
outpost with no royal charter but conceded that such 
disadvantage should not diminish Newman’s lectures 
(Campbell, 1901, p4). Turner describes Cardinal Newman as 
a ‘brilliant’ thinker and writer who readily broadcast 
his opinions (Turner, 2010, p119). He frequently 
criticised the evangelical movement, a religious group 
whose response to rising scientific awareness was to 
steadfastly maintain that the Bible was the ultimate 
authority on everything (Bebbington, 2010, p236).  
 
It could not be denied that the evangelicals wielded 
popular power, indeed their Clapham Sect and William 
Wilberforce had successfully convinced Parliament to 
abolish slavery throughout the empire in 1833 (Chapman, 
2006, p61). Newman could not fault such humane action but 
he could loudly fault their teaching. Biblical 
literalists either tried to counteract scientific 
advances by quoting the Scriptures or vaguely alluded to 
some eventual ‘higher unity’ that was beyond present 
understanding (Livingston, 2010, p145). Newman’s 
standpoint was that science and theological knowledge 
occupied different ‘spheres’ that did not conflict or 
interfere with each other and that there was no need to 
try and reconcile them (Livingston, 2010, p145).  
 
Central to this position was the Cardinal’s insistence 
that he was not speaking of knowledge in the ‘vague and 
ordinary sense’ but of that which connected with 
Christian revelation (Newman, 1886, p111). It was the 
actual process of the ‘search for truth’ that developed 
the ‘personality of the cultivated man’ (Anderson, 2010) 
and therefore any ‘knowledge’ attained had been pursued 
simply for ‘its own end’ (Newman, 1886, p111).  
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Newman’s ‘knowledge of God’ was profitless in the 
financial sense; it was on a higher plane and therefore 
incomparable with scientific fact (Tingley, 2002, p16). 
Students who attended Newman’s sermons were urged to 
study the Bible as the ‘fountain head’ of ‘all doctrinal 
knowledge’ and to use its inspiration to form original 
views. Newman was adamant that ‘if we would solve new 
questions, it must be by consulting old answers’ (Newman, 
1886, p223). He justified this unabashed ‘appeal to the 
ancients’ by explaining that while the Apostles were the 
‘sole depository’ of Christian Revelation so Aristotle 
was the ‘oracle of nature and of truth’ (Newman, 1886, 
p109). 
 
In 'The Idea of a University’ the Cardinal condemns such 
subjects as drawing, fencing, botany, ‘stuffing birds or 
playing stringed instruments’ as topics to occupy the 
mind but definitely ‘not education’ – because education 
was a ‘preparation for knowledge’ (Newman, 1886, p144). 
Only a ‘liberal’ preparation could cultivate the 
intellect with no other aim or motive than to achieve 
‘intellectual excellence’ (Newman, 1886, p121). Newman 
proclaimed that ‘liberal knowledge’ was not ‘useful 
knowledge’ and nor was it intended to be (Newman, 1886, 
p112). The ‘mechanical arts’ might achieve unimaginable 
engineering and technical wonders but he did not think 
that the process of such ‘brute creation’ could rightly 
be described as ‘knowledge’ (Newman, 1886, p112).  
Newman equated ‘liberal knowledge’ with ‘a gentleman's 
knowledge’ (Newman, 1886, p111) the graduate was 
described as having a ‘cultivated intellect’ and a ‘noble 
and courteous bearing’ – these exclaims Newman ‘are the 
objects of a University’ (Newman, 1886, p120). The 
processes of education advocated by Newman and Arnold are 
markedly similar. Newman would have been familiar with 
Arnold’s writing and when he remarked that the works of 
Virgil and Horace were more likely to appear in 
educational courses than those of Shakespeare and Milton, 
the Cardinal was closely paraphrasing the Doctor (Arnold, 
1845, p348; Newman, 1886, p260). 
 
Newman was aware of his detractors and acknowledged the 
‘protests’ of the ‘Edinburgh Reviewers’, a group of 
writers who frequently questioned the wisdom of an 
education based on ancient classics (Newman, 1886, p160). 
Review writer Sydney Smith, bitterly complained of the 
‘infinite quantity of talent’ that is ‘destroyed’ by the 
universities in the pursuit of a ‘delusive sort of 





Such comments and condemnations were to become more 
frequent and Anderson argues that while Newman’s writing 
was ‘seldom read or cited’ during the Cardinal’s 
lifetime, it became widely used by the twentieth century 
defenders of liberal education (Anderson, 2006, p100). 
 
The ideals of Dr Arnold and Cardinal Newman were to be 
promoted and spread by the Victorian ‘apostles of 
culture’ to most public schools and to the universities. 
Their success was based on the continuing belief that 
non-vocational study produced graduates with skills 
applicable to a ‘wide range of jobs’ (Anderson, 2010). 
The universities produced large numbers of classically 
educated graduates, whom they claimed would be versatile 
enough to ‘fill any post with credit’ (Soffer, 1994, 
p18). Barnett argues that this defence of a ‘wide’ 
classical education as opposed to ‘narrow’ vocational 
training was misleading. Not only was a classical 
education more specialised in that it revolved around the 
‘minute study of a handful of texts’ but was itself 
originally intended as ‘vocational training - for 
clerics’ (Barnett, 1987, p220). 
 
Newman’s gentlemanly graduate was required to add 
patriotism to his other qualities when Oxbridge extended 
its provision of graduates for a ‘national elite’ to 
include education for imperial ‘leadership’ (McCulloch, 
1991, pix). As the concept of a geographically ‘Greater 
Britain’ was expanded to include all the territories 
within the Empire (Soffer, 1994, p95), it became 
necessary to ensure that colonial peoples would willingly 
consent to British rule and become ‘new subjects’ of the 
Crown. ‘Education was key to that process’ (Hall, 2008, 
p774). Oxbridge graduates ‘monopolised’ prestigious 
positions in government, administration and education 
(Soffer, 1994, p1) they broadcast the Arnold-Newman ethos 
at home and throughout the ‘far-flung empire’ (Wiener, 
1992, p21). The public schools and the universities 
remained largely aloof from the increased interest in 
science and engineering generated by advances in steam 
machinery (Barnard, 1961, p88). The classical, Christian 
curriculum was proclaimed the basis of ‘civilization’ 
(Wiener, 1992, p19), the study of the classics had become 
a ‘mark of social class’ and science languished, 
perceived as uncomfortably close to industry and akin to 






Victorian science and engineering  
 
Britain’s ‘Open Door’ free trade policy had created a 
virtual ‘magic carpet’ on which unrefined ores and raw 
yarns flowed into British ports to be transformed into 
manufactured goods for export (Smith, 1903, p24). Despite 
the remarkable advances of industry it took the political 
initiatives of the 1840’s to bestow a ‘truly global’ 
status on the British economy (Stearns, 2010, p92). The 
combination of maritime supremacy, the gold standard and 
emerging technologies combined to create a unique 
international advantage for Britain (Trevelyan, 1922, 
p276).  
 
Stearns states that progress in the transport and 
communications sectors is the most reliable indicator of 
the difference between earlier ‘protoglobal patterns’ and 
the truly global expansion of British influence after the 
1840’s (Stearns, 2010, p93). A measure of such progress 
is illustrated by the rapid development of the railways. 
In 1804, as a consequence of a large bet, a stationary 
steam driven water pump was mounted onto a wheeled 
carriage and successfully hauled itself and five fully 
loaded trucks almost ten miles (Beard, 1919, p35; Harvie 
& Matthew, 2000, p49). The success of the experiment 
turned many inventive minds to the possibility of using 
steam energy to ‘mechanise movement’ (Osterhammel & 
Petersson, 2005, p67). In 1814 George Stephenson’s 
‘travelling engine’ pulled eight loaded trucks along a 
track that included a steep incline (Bellis, 2012).  
 
Some sixteen engine designs and ten years later 
Stephenson demonstrated the ‘Locomotion No 1’ on the 
rails of the Stockton and Darlington horse drawn tramway. 
Locomotion completed the twelve-mile route in two hours 
(Beard, 1919, pp35-36). This not only established 
Stephenson as the first successful locomotive designer 
but also gave the world its commonest railway gauge, four 
feet eight and a half inches, the required distance 
between the rails for a horse to walk comfortably 
(Allitt, 2009, L22). 
 
Stephenson and his son next constructed the ‘Rocket’ for 
the ambitious thirty-five mile Liverpool to Manchester 
route (Cross, 1920, p634). The new railway was opened in 
1830 to jubilant crowds and ornate coaches filled with 
local and national political celebrities. Despite 
Liverpool MP William Huskisson misjudging the speed of an 
oncoming locomotive and becoming the world’s first 
recorded railway fatality, the inaugural run was 
considered an engineering triumph (Lang, 2006, p262; 
Trevelyan, 1922, p222).  
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The railway went on to provide a regular service, 
transporting cotton and cotton goods between the 
Liverpool docks and the Manchester mills at the 
‘unprecedented speed’ of fifteen miles an hour (Clark, 
2007, p237). Entrepreneurs who saw the industrial and 
social potential of steam travel fought to buy shares in 
anything that ran on rails. They created a decade of 
‘railway mania’ (Robinson, 1991, p1) in which almost two 
and a half thousand miles of track was laid, linking all 
of Britain’s major cities and creating a national railway 
network (Harvie & Matthew, 2000, p51).  
 
The use of steam engines in ships was developed with 
equal rapidity (Stearns, 2010, p93). Early paddle wheeled 
steam ships were unstable in heavy seas and were quickly 
replaced when more robust sea going vessels were required 
to cope with the increasing coal demands of 
industrialising European countries (Ville, 2008, p297). 
The acceleration of steamship technology was assisted, 
remarkably, by a lack of adequate patent protection, ship 
building yards were large sprawling spaces with many 
employees and news of successful innovations soon 
‘leaked’ to other manufacturers (Clark, 2007, p237). By 
1840 this spree of industrial espionage had created a 
procession of ever-larger iron-hulled vessels with screw 
propellers, high-pressure boilers and increased engine 
efficiency (Cross, 1920, p741). The first Atlantic 
steamship crossing in 1819 ran out of coal and finished 
the thirty two day voyage under sail.  
Within twenty years, Samuel Cunard had trimmed the 
crossing to just fifteen days (Cross, 1920, p741), had 
founded the Cunard Steamship Company and had been 
contracted to carry British transatlantic mail (Stearns, 
2010, p94). In 1848 the Navigation Acts, which restricted 
the transportation of British goods to British ships with 
British crews, were repealed. This greatly expanded and 
internationalised the British merchant shipping fleet 
(Ashton, 1955, p150; Scammell, 2004, p139). 
 
Advances in steam technology were paralleled by 
experiments with other potential energy sources such as 
electricity. From the 1820’s it was known that 
electricity travelled along a wire in ‘pluses’ that could 
be made to cause a needle to flicker. This led to 
speculation as to whether such a property could be 
utilized to create an ‘instantaneous’ messaging system 
(White, 2003). Samuel Morse, a professor in the painting 
department of the University of the City of New York 
(Gerard, 2008, p491) was the first to develop an 
apparatus that translated the electrical pulses into ink 
marks on a paper strip.  
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By 1835 he had improved the device to represent long and 
short electrical pulses as either ink dots or dashes 
(Curley, 2010, p53). Morse teamed up with electrical 
engineer, Alfred Vail and in 1844 they made an 
experimental ‘Morse code’ transmission using a single 
wire attached to poles over the thirty five mile distance 
between Washington and Baltimore (Gerard, 2008, p492). 
The American government adopted the project and rapidly 
began connecting all regions of the United States by 
telegraph lines. Many other countries followed this 
example and, although the actual brand and design of the 
telegraphic equipment may have varied, it was Morse and 
Vail's ‘dot-and-dash’ that became the ‘worldwide 
standard’ (White, 2003). The British government was 
attracted by the speed with which information could be 
transmitted and soon began building an Empire-wide 
telegraph network with wires on overland poles and 
insulated cables under the sea (Cross, 1920, p740). 
 
In 1851 the first international submarine cable was laid 
between Dover and Calais, the practical application of 
which was immediately seized upon by Julius Reuter who 
founded his telegraph news agency in the same year 
(Legrain, 2003, p94). A decade later saw Britain and 
America connected by an Atlantic cable (Cross, 1920, 
p740) and by 1880 the world’s oceans were criss-crossed 
by almost a hundred thousand miles of British telegraph 
cables. London was in virtually constant communication 
with India, Canada, Australia, Africa and Australia 
(Ferguson, 2003, p168). Kipling was sufficiently inspired 
by the concept to write of ‘shell-burred cables’ creeping 
through the ‘ooze’ (Kipling, 1896, pp9-10)). The British 
mainland telegraph system was nationalised and, although 
private companies developed the overseas network, the 
government exercised overall control through a carefully 
calculated programme of official subsidies (Morris, 1979, 
p60).  
 
The same system of ‘generous’ government subsidies was 
employed to underwrite the private sector development of 
the empire’s railways; huge numbers of British 
locomotives were exported to India because British 
engineers had provided the subcontinent with twenty four 
thousand miles of track (Ferguson, 2003, p169). The 
railway, the steamship and the electric telegraph allowed 
British industry to expand at an ‘unheard-of rate’ 
(Barker, 1910, p76). These were to be the vital elements 
in the development of Britain’s nineteenth century 
globalised economy (Anastasiadou, 2007, p172).  
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Expansionist ambitions are revealed in the ‘railway 
imperialism’ that drove rails through ‘other people's 
countries’ eventually arriving at the grandiose station 
termini that still stand in many major cities (Robinson, 
1991, pp1-3). Johnson wrote in 1898 that the steamships, 
railway and the telegraph had ‘practically annihilated 
distance’ (Johnson, 1898, p29). Since these advances also 
facilitated the rapid deployment of troops and munitions 
Ferguson wryly added that they correspondingly increased 
the possibility of ‘long-distance annihilation’ 
(Ferguson, 2003, p170). 
 
The conjunction of the declaration of free trade and the 
spectacular advances in engineering technology allowed 
Britain to make a virtual ‘monopoly’ of much of the 
world’s trade and commerce (Barker, 1910, p76). Ferguson 
asks how such success could have been achieved by a small 
‘archipelago of rainy islands’ off the European coast 
(Ferguson, 2003, pxi). A large part of Britain’s success 
rests on the early development of coal mining and the 
proximity of those mines to sources of iron ore. The 
manufacture of cotton goods lent itself to mechanisation, 
this supported the engineering sector that sprang from an 
abundance of coal and iron. British innovators and 
entrepreneurs were initially ‘luckier in their geology’ 
than their commercial rivals (Allen, 2011, pp381-382).  
 
That luck was rapidly translated into commercial wealth 
and territorial power, ‘ringing the earth with railways 
and submarine cables, lending money everywhere’ and 
populating ‘empty places’ with settlers from home 
(Morris, 1979, p22). This ‘Greater Britain’ was initially 
managed by traders and merchants with ‘minimal 
parliamentary oversight’ (Pitts, 2005, p12), but it soon 
became obvious that if the worst excesses of the 
‘corruption and ignorance that plagued colonial rule’ 
were to be avoided a system of civil administration was 




The urgent need for an efficient colonial bureaucracy 
served to highlight the inadequacies that also existed at 
home (Hobsbawn, 1996, p191). A series of early nineteenth 
century legislative adjustments had separated public 
office holders from members of parliament (Young, 1961, 
p242-243), this should have made it possible to replace 
the existent rambling arrangement of public management 
with a ‘unified civil service’ (Greenaway, 2004, p11).  
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But systematic thinking was not welcome in a world where 
generations of civil employees had been recruited and 
promoted by a system of patronage.  
A career in the British bureaucracy relied on family 
connections and party allegiance and was widely regarded 
as a safe job for the ‘unambitious’ (Johnson, 2002, p3), 
although there were always enough ‘career men’ with 
ability who despite this dubious and unfair system were 
able to steer governments through their essential 
functions (Young, 1961, p243). Such administrative 
ability was rarely recognised and while advancement 
remained subject to bribery and influence it was still 
possible for inappropriate candidates such as ‘prize 
fighters and dog fanciers’ to be offered lucrative 
positions (Hoppen, 1998, p112). 
 
A similarly unedifying situation existed within the 
offices of the East India Company. Although not 
technically a branch of government, the Company exercised 
political sovereignty over the Indian subcontinent and 
consequently maintained a large administrative staff 
(Washbrook, 1997, p10). Most of these were graduates from 
the Company’s own East India College, which it had 
established at Haileybury in 1809 (Kaminsky, 1996, p563). 
However, even college entry was heavily ‘skewed in the 
hereditary direction’ (Oakes & Parsons, 2001, p18).  
 
Most of the Company’s officers were British born and 
traditionally drawn from a small group of families whose 
fortunes and futures were so closely bound up with those 
of the subcontinent that they were referred to as the 
‘Anglo-Indians’. It was a term not commonly used to 
describe people of mixed race until the twentieth century 
(Ferguson, 2003, p197). The privileged status of these 
Anglo-Indians prompted Kipling to write that if in the 
whole of India there were only a single loaf of bread it 
would belong jointly to the ‘Plowdens, the Trevors, the 
Beadons, and the Rivett-Carnacs’ (Kipling, 1950, p102). 
This wholly British ‘inscrutable clique’ regarded 
themselves as being quite separate from the rest of 
British society who in turn resented the privileges 
assumed by the Anglo-Indian section of the British 
establishment known as the ‘India Interest’ (Thiessen, 









By the mid nineteenth century, the government under Prime 
Minister Gladstone declared that Britain’s public 
administration must be reformed. The decision was 
prompted by an East India Company efficiency initiative 
that identified ‘intellectual’ and 'mechanical' 
administrative tasks (Young, 1961, p253) and a survey 
entitled 'The Organisation of the Permanent Civil 
Service' (Partridge, 2002, p76).  
 
This survey had been compiled by two eminent public 
administrators; Sir Charles Trevelyan, who after twelve 
years service in the East India Company had returned to 
London as assistant secretary to the Treasury and Sir 
Stafford Northcote, Oxford scholar and Gladstone’s 
private secretary at the Board of Trade (Young, 1961, p6; 
Thiessen, 1994, p40). Hailed by its opponents as a 
‘brilliant airing of preconceived ideas’ the Northcote-
Trevelyan survey presented an acceptable digest of the 
existing situation along with a potential solution 
(Hoppen, 1998, p111). 
 
Northcote and Trevelyan recommended that the civil 
service should be staffed by professionals who had been 
recruited by competitive examination and that ability 
should be rewarded by promotion (Anderson, 2006, p37; 
Soffer, 1994, p15). Gladstone applauded these rather 
obvious conclusions because the examinations would 
require university oversight and he hoped to draw them 
more closely into the government services (Hoppen, 1998, 
p112). Chief among Gladstone’s university associates was 
Benjamin Jowett, master of Balliol College and a 
‘dominating Oxford figure’ (Anderson, 2006, p50).  
 
In Jowett's view the universities were the ‘spiritual 
home’ of the professions (Anderson, 2006, p55) and he 
particularly encouraged students who showed an interest 
in ‘public service and empire’ (Anderson, 2006, p55). For 
some years Jowett had steered promising students toward 
the civil service where he hoped their ‘Oxbridge ethos’ 
(Vernon, 2004, p41) might eventually imbue the whole 
system. When Northcote and Trevelyan interviewed Jowett 
for their report he urged the recruitment of ‘Oxbridge 
types’ and suggested that the planned examinations be 
'tailored accordingly’ (Vernon, 2004, p41). Anderson 
suggests that Benjamin Jowett was a man with his own 
ideals and through his students he intended to see these 






Given Jowett’s influence it was unsurprising that 
Northcote and Trevelyan’s published findings should 
recommend civil service recruitment by competitive 
examination of a university degree standard (Anderson, 
2006, p37; Seaman, 1995, p202). The universities offered 
the best opportunities to study for the proposed 
examinations and their graduates would carry the 
‘Oxbridge ethos’ into the administrative heart of 
government (Vernon, 2004, p41). In his championing of the 
Northcote-Trevelyan recommendations Gladstone, as MP for 
Oxford university would be offering his constituents the 
opportunity to take ‘command’ of the upper echelons of 
the civil service (Hoppen, 1998, p112).  
 
The Northcote-Trevelyan recommendations were not so 
enthusiastically received in all quarters (Partridge, 
2002, p76). The allocation of lucrative public service 
posts as favour or reward was part of a long-standing, 
well-understood and mutually beneficial system. It was 
the means most often used to maintain political support 
and a commons majority (Seaman, 1995, p201). Politicians 
feared that a shift from patronage to meritocracy would 
upset this status quo and so refused to support the 
legislation (Greenaway, 2004, p3). Not prepared to let 
the matter rest, Sir Charles Trevelyan brought in his 
brother-in-law, Thomas Macaulay (Thadani, 2001). He was a 
well known diplomat and ‘lightweight’ historian and he 
came with an alternative plan (Fonseca, 2008). Like 
Trevelyan, Macaulay had strong ties with India and 
fervently believed that it was possible to transform 
Indian society into the image of Britain’s own ‘superior 
civilisation’ (Washbrook, 1997, p11). He seized upon any 
opportunity to render this vision concrete and 
enthusiastically promoted English as the ‘global 
language’ (Spring, 1998, p16; Spring, 2006, p175). 
 
The Indian Civil Service examinations 
 
Macaulay suggested that as Gladstone had been unable to 
secure enough support for the Northcote-Trevelyan plan at 
home maybe it could be experimentally imposed on the 
Indian civil service (Seaman, 1995, p202; White, 1935, 
p1). It seemed an ideal solution. A trial run in the 
‘great laboratory’ of far away India was agreeable to all 
parties (Young, 1961, p6). It would undermine the Anglo-
Indian 'jobocracies' (Greenaway, 2004, p6) while 
providing Macaulay’s proposed English-educated Indian 
elite with role models of ‘intellectual and social 
distinction’ (Moore, 1998, p429) who had achieved the 
‘highest academic honours’ at the ancient universities 
(Thiessen, 1994, p43).  
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An amended and more far reaching Macaulay-Trevelyan plan 
was drawn up for India and quickly implemented (Thiessen, 
1994, p43). The academic standing of the ‘competition 
wallahs’ as the applicants became known was not at first 
as high as had been predicted (Lubenow, 2000, p250). 
Britain’s upper classes were not interested in the 
‘practical work’ of running an empire as it was closely 
associated with 'trade' (Porter, 2004, p40). While the 
aim may have been to recruit the Oxbridge ‘crème de la 
crème’ the competitive system ultimately attracted the 
‘bright young sons of provincial professionals’ who were 
prepared to study law and languages at university for an 
extra two years (Ferguson, 2003, pp185-186).  
 
An overseas posting was not only prestigious but 
lucrative, to an ‘exceptionally high’ salary a civil 
servant might add ‘decent living quarters’ and the 
opportunity of retirement at age fifty-five (Balogh, 
1955, p265). The ‘competition wallahs’ may not have come 
from the established Anglo-Indian families but they 
swiftly adopted their mantle of attitude and manners, 
exhibiting both bureaucratic caution and a ‘fierce 
loyalty’ to the Indian Civil Service (Thiessen, 1994, 
p42). They were charged with stabilising the public 
bureaucracy by building an administrative ‘steel 
framework’ that would support the civil infrastructure of 
the whole country (Braibanti, 1963, p3). Shils that 
states the framework was an ‘oligarchy’ created by 
circumstances to rule India without any of the accepted 
legal restrictions or controls (Shils, 1961, p90). But 
this relatively small core of men could not have taken 
responsibility for three million people (Burroughs, 1998, 
p177) without the cooperation of the indigenous 
population, many of whom carried out the ‘mechanical’ 
tasks of administration (Young, 1961, p253).  
 
British trading and business interests were beginning to 
industrialise the subcontinent. Within fifty years 
Calcutta and Bombay would, after London, be the second 
and third largest cities of the empire (Washbrook, 1997, 
p13). For the Indian elite, a thoroughly English 
education held the promise of status and professional 
advancement and by 1857 the East India Company’s 
principal cities of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, all had 
their own Oxbridge style university (Moore, 1998, p431). 
These institutions not only introduced ever-greater 
numbers of Indian students to British culture (Washbrook, 
1997, p13) but also supervised instruction and prepared 
examinations for the colleges within their jurisdiction 
(Chambers, 1950, p509). 
 
 54 
A ‘steady stream’ of graduates began to move on from 
these home grown institutions to ‘seek higher education 
at Oxford, Cambridge and London’ (Washbrook, 1997, p15). 
Shils states that the ‘modernisation’ of India’s systems 
of administration and higher education encouraged the 
emergence of political activists and gave rise to an 
‘Indian intelligentsia’ (Shils, 1961, p16). 
 
In the thirty years following their founding, India’s 
three universities were attended by over sixty thousand 
Indian students (Moore, 1998, p431). By the 1860’s four 
thousand of India’s ‘most talented’ graduates (Shils, 
1961, p16) were employed in government service, albeit in 
largely subordinate administrative roles (Burroughs, 
1998, p182). Twenty years later numbers had risen to 
eleven thousand (Moore, 1998, p432). They had been 
educated in British patterned universities that saw their 
role as creators of a new Indian class of English 
speaking professionals (Moore, 1998, p431). Students who 
graduated from Calcutta, Bombay or Madras had been 
encouraged to aspire to ‘Western ambitions’ (Burroughs, 
1998, p182) but were intended to fill those minor 
administrative roles that either lacked prestige or were 
not ‘sufficiently lucrative’ for the British (Harris & 
Willis, 2003 p221). It was the system of education that 
had been advocated by Thomas Macaulay, the ‘architect of 
Colonial Britain's Educational Policy in India’ (Thadani, 
2001) and was implemented with the stated aim of creating 
a ‘nation of brown Englishmen’ (Washbrook, 1997, p13). 
 
Although large numbers of the indigenous population 
eventually worked within the bureaucratic system very few 
became fully fledged civil servants; those who did found 
their presence ‘unwelcome’ and promotion slow (Burroughs, 
1998, p182). Indians were able to apply to sit the Civil 
Service competitive examinations and although these were 
held in London enough enthusiastic Indian candidates 
arrived to ‘make their presence felt’ in the metropolis 
(Washbrook, 1997, p15). Not all were destined for the 
civil service, there were others who studied law or 
medicine but most on their return to India as ‘brown 
Englishmen’ found that they faced resentment (Griffiths, 
1952, p261; Shils, 1961, p93). Despite the ‘hatred or 
admiration’ that a civil service career might bring with 
it, there was never a shortage of Indian applicants 
(Braibanti, 1963, p3). But they did have to wait until 
1869 before the first of their number was accepted into 
the civil service proper and by the century’s end only 
another thirty-two had been recruited (Shils, 1961, p16; 
Moore, 1998, p429).  
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But of the many who had a western style education with 
its ideas of ‘nationalism and liberal democracy’ a few 
began to question British rule and to develop an interest 
and an aptitude for politics (Lumby, 1962, p87). The 
Indian National Congress was founded in 1885 and 
maintained a permanent committee in London to better 
lobby for Indian national participation in the civil 
service and ‘representative rights’ (Washbrook, 1997, 
p15).  
 
Determined to maintain and if possible increase the 
number of British ‘gentlemen scholars’ appointed to the 
Indian Civil Service the examination board reduced the 
lower age limit for candidates to nineteen in 1876 
(Moore, 1998, p429). After selection, these candidates 
were required to spend two years ‘finishing’ their 
education at university. Oxford, by 1880 became home to 
two-thirds of the probationers with Jowett’s Balliol 
College specialising in preparation for the Indian Civil 
Service, the ‘blue riband of the Victorian competitive 
system’  (Anderson, 2006, p51). This ‘social pattern’ was 
to become the accepted order of the Indian Civil Service 
and would be ‘still easily recognisable in 1940' (Porter, 
2004, p40). 
 
A British civil service 
 
Competitive recruitment for the Indian civil service 
started in 1853, and corruption and incompetence had been 
significantly reduced (Moore, 1998, p429). Gladstone and 
his political allies saw this success as an opportunity 
to reform both the British administrative and higher 
education systems in tandam. Gladstone declared, in 1854, 
that competitive recruitment for the British civil 
service could now be introduced at home (Moore, 1998, 
p429). Their ‘spectacularly ambitious’ (Vernon, 2004, 
p41) hopes were for civil service examinations that would 
encourage the reform of Oxford and Cambridge and 
‘reshape’ the public schools. They were intent on the 
creation of a ‘public service bourgeoisie’ (Anderson, 
2006, p51) and a ‘closer nexus’ between the universities 
and government service (Hoppen, 1998, p111). This applied 
particularly to overseas government service where due to 
the continuing ‘globalisation of the international power-
game’ large numbers of British civil servants and 
diplomats were engaged in maintaining the European 
balance of power, while Britain drew ‘the rest of the 
globe’ into its trading and economic network (Hobsbawn, 
1987, p315). However, implementation of this ‘massive 
piece of Victorian social engineering’ was to be dogged 
by delay (Anderson, 2006, p37).  
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The most vocal objectors being those who had benefited 
from the years of nepotism and now would only accept a 
‘much diluted’ version of Northcote-Trevelyan proposals 
(White, 1935, p1). The process was further interrupted by 
a war against Russia in the Crimea. It was this military 
action, which conclusively revealed ‘administrative 
incompetence on a massive scale’ and underscored the 
urgent need for civil service reform (Kelsall et al, 
1955, p1). 
 
The Northcote-Trevelyan recommendations finally gained 
Parliamentary approval in 1870. The British civil service 
was at last to become an organisation of 'full-time, 
salaried officials’ recruited from the 'elite of the 
universities’ (Kelsall et al, 1955, p2).  The entrance 
examinations would continue to be modeled on Oxbridge 
degrees so the only ‘existing agency’ to tutor candidates 
would remain the universities (Soffer, 1994, p15). This 
created a ‘shifting interdependency’ between those inside 
the universities who enjoyed the autonomy that came with 
their position as providers of administrators to the 
Empire (Vernon, 2004, p47) and those on the outside who 
felt that the universities could ‘do more for the nation’ 
(Hughes, 1919, p154). But the universities had developed 
an advantageous relationship with the British 
administrators and the Indian civil service, which became 
the largest employer of Oxbridge graduates  (Hoppen, 
1998, p112). Public service became a ‘new rationale’ and 
Oxford and Cambridge universities were able to re-
establish a classical education as the route to the 
‘centre’s of power' (Anderson, 2006, p37). 
 
Victorian and Edwardian elite education was shaped by the 
legacies of Arnold and Newman (Barnett, 1987, p214). 
Their educational philosophies may not have been intended 
to ‘manufacture’ a new imperial administrative class with  
'fine and governing qualities' (Wiener, 1992, p16) but 
the values that they and their followers impressed upon 
their pupils were ‘particularly attuned’ to the 
responsibilities of duty to the empire (Paxman, 2011, 
p62). They became the imperial ‘prefects’ who did not 
question authority and always tried to do the ‘right 
thing’ in the certain conviction ‘that all else was 
second best' (Morris, 1979, p220). Judd argues that 
although 'fair play' and 'decent behavior' were 
universally expected of the officials of empire, the only 
‘genuine bond’ was provided by the ‘old school tie’ 





Although colonial civil service candidates hoping to work 
in Malaya, Hong Kong or Ceylon were subject to the same 
examinations as those bound for India a ‘quiet word in 
the right quarter’ could still secure a post in one of 
the ‘lesser tropical colonies’ (Morris, 1979, p186). The 
officers of the Colonial Office, who represented the 
British government throughout the empire, were a separate 
body from the civil service departments. They came from 
that same ‘stratum of society’ that had been ‘stamped to 
a pattern’ by an education at public school and Oxbridge 
(Morris, 1979, p185) but were selected by interview 
rather than examination.  
 
Colonial Office ‘spies’ maintained close contacts with 
Oxbridge dons who recommended graduates who displayed 
‘reliability’ rather than ‘cleverness’ (Paxman, 2011, 
p63). Paxman argues that sport was vital to the building 
of character for Britain’s overseas administrative and 
government officials, being in a team, playing by the 
rules and not questioning the umpire or referee were all 
elements ‘which spoke of the imperial design’ (Paxman, 
2011, p62). The concept of ‘muscular Christianity’ as a 
‘chivalric code’ (Krebs, 2004, p92) grew from university 
sports and the image of the wholesome but devout student 
who excelled at everything (Judd, 1996, p143). The idea 
of ‘muscular Christianity’ was brought to popular 
attention by Thomas Hughes who used it as a theme in his 
1861 Tom Brown sequel, ‘Tom Brown at Oxford’ (Watson et 
al, 2005). ‘Muscular Christianity’ when combined with the 
total experience of sport, school and university was 
believed to ideally prepare graduates who would go on to 
‘govern a quarter of the world's landmass’ (Oakes & 
Parsons, 2001, p16). 
 
An exhibition of globalisation 
 
Along with international financial success and political 
stability came pioneering industrial progress and the 
desire to show it off (Thackeray & Findling, 2002, p93). 
1851 saw a sparklingly structure erected in London’s Hyde 
Park as the venue for the first ever ‘worlds’ fair’ 
(Tyack, 2000). The spectacular combination of four and a 
half tons of iron and over three hundred thousand glass 
panes (Hibbert, 2000, p213) was dubbed the ‘Crystal 
Palace’ by Douglas Jerrold writing in Punch magazine 
(Proudman, 2008, p285). Designed by Joseph Paxton, 
supervisor of the gardens at Chatsworth House (Lang, 
2006, p298), this vast greenhouse was at that time the 




The building illustrated Britain’s industrial and 
engineering superiority as well as promising a prosperous 
future to any other country prepared to adopt a policy of 
‘peace and free trade’ (Porter, 2004, p91). Dunckley 
states that the Crystal Palace was literally a monument 
to free trade because without the lifting of the 
prohibitive import duty on glass it could never have been 
built (Dunckley, 1896, p40). 
 
Officially titled the ‘Great Exhibition of the Works of 
Industry of All Nations’ the display was to be a measure 
of the status of the empire. Europe had seen national 
trade shows and conventions before but no country had 
previously ‘dared’ to show the products of its industry 
alongside those of its rivals (Porter, 2004, p91). The 
project has since been trumpeted as the idea of Queen 
Victoria’s husband, Prince Albert, but Thackeray and 
Findling argue that it was more likely launched by 
leading members of the Royal Society of Arts who then 
‘drew’ Prince Albert into their scheme (Thackeray & 
Findling, 2002, pp95-96). The Prince may not have been 
deeply involved with the planning but he did play an 
active part in raising funds (Tyack, 2000). Since the 
free traders among the organisers wanted to promote the 
commercial and industrial possibilities of a world 
without government intervention they could hardly expect 
the money from the public purse (Porter, 2004, p91).  
 
Half the exhibition space was to be crammed with the 
‘wealth and exoticism’ of Britain’s imperial realm 
(Reynolds, 2002, p99), while the other half would exhibit 
works from Europe, the United States of America and the 
‘distant nations’ of the Ottoman Empire and China (Cohn, 
2010, p1). The displays were artfully arranged so as to 
emphasise British ‘industrial achievement’ and the ‘great 
global range’ of its overseas possessions (Stearns, 2010, 
p98). Auerbach argues that the exhibition 'domesticated 
the empire’; literally bringing home the idea that many 
other countries ‘belonged’ to the family (Auerbach 1999, 
p101). It was this notion of ‘internationalism’ that 
appealed to Prince Albert (Auerbach 1999, p161); by 
lending the project his support he could be ‘visibly 
useful’ in a way that his German origins might be an 
asset (Thackeray & Findling, 2002, p96). At fund raising 
event in March 1850, he spoke of his hope that imperial 
expansion would lead to the ‘realization of the unity of 






Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels mischievously dubbed the 
event the ‘Great Examination’, and prophetically added 
the globalising comment that international industrial 
methods were ‘demolishing national barriers and 
increasingly blurring local peculiarities of production, 
society and national character among all peoples’ (Marx & 
Engels, 1850).  
 
The Great Exhibition was officially opened on May 1st 
1851, the ticket price during the first three weeks was a 
hefty five shillings, for the next eighteen weeks the 
price was reduced, but still expensive at one shilling 
(Thackeray & Findling, 2002, p98). However, this did not 
prevent six million people, approximately twenty percent 
of the British population (Reynolds, 2002, p101), from 
visiting the world’s ‘first international industrial 
display’ (Young, 2008, p4). For many visitors a trip to 
the Crystal Palace was the furthest they had ever 
travelled and the new railways were at the heart of this 
first example of ‘mass tourism’ (Reynolds, 2002, p101). 
Thomas Cook, the ‘booking clerk of the empire’ (Morris, 
1979, p64) organised ‘exhilarating’ one-day tours that 
returned ‘trippers’ over night to work in the morning 
(Harvie & Matthew, 2000, p64).  
 
The exhibition was a ‘validation of free trade’s new 
world order’ and an open declaration of Britain’s 
international ambitions (Young, 2008, p5). It succeeded 
in depicting Britain as the economic centre around which 
revolved all other ‘dependent’ or ‘complementary’ 
economies (Auerbach 2008, pxi). The juxtaposition of 
exhibits and spaces revealed an ‘easily digestible 
framework’ of British political thinking on the future 
hierarchy and design of the ‘global community’ (Cohn, 
2010, p8). The Crystal Palace finally closed its doors in 
October, and the enterprise was acclaimed a ‘triumph’ 
(Hibbert, 2000, p214). In a post exhibition lecture the 
Reverend Whewell was moved to prophesy that the public 
had been introduced to a wealth of innovations that would 
ultimately ‘annihilate space and time’ (Whewell, 1852, 
p11).  
 
The exhibition marked a high point in Victorian ‘power 
and self-confidence’ and although the empire would 
continue to expand this would be the last time that 
British claims of ‘global technological and economic’ 
supremacy would go unchallenged (Proudman, 2008, p286). 
Prince Albert was aware that his adopted country was in 
danger of losing its manufacturing superiority to ‘more 




He had studied at the Humboldtian University of Bonn and 
was a keen advocate of ‘systematic education’ and 
research into technical processes (Sheppard, 1975, p77). 
Albert directed that the substantial profits generated by 
the Exhibition should be used to purchase property in 
Kensington, adjacent to the Crystal Palace site (Harvie & 
Matthew, 2000, p64). The intention was to create a 
permanent legacy of the exhibition in a network of 
institutions whose central aim would be to apply ‘science 
and art’ to technical and industrial education (Sheppard, 
1975, p74). The first institutional arrival was the 
Science and Art Department of the Board of Trade, 
eventually simply referred to as ‘South Kensington’ 
(Barnard, 1961, p135). The rest of the network followed 
and ‘Albertopolis’ has since become home to the Victoria 
and Albert, the Natural History and the Science Museums 
as well as Imperial College, the Royal Colleges of Art, 
Music and Mines and the Royal Albert Hall (Paxman, 2011, 
p39).  
 
The South Kensington institutions continued the process 
of art, science and design education that had been begun 
in 1851 with an approach that combined elements of German 
educational theory and traditional British ‘pragmatism’ 
(Sheppard, 1975, p74). Prince Albert’s initiative in 
using technical education to bring science, art and 
design to industry (Sheppard, 1975, p74) was cut short by 
his untimely death in 1861. At that time the provision of 
English higher education rested with the South Kensington 
institutions, the ancient Oxbridge universities, various 
regional colleges with a ‘clear scientific and technical’ 
mission and two newer universities in London and Durham 
(Larson, 1977, p94). 
 
Durham University and the colleges 
 
In 1830, the Chapter of Durham Cathedral was one of the 
country’s wealthiest ecclesiastical bodies (Roberts, 
1947, p38). Fearful that some of its 'surplus' wealth 
might be diverted to London, the Chapter determined that 
it should be used to promote religion and 'sound 
learning’ (Anderson, 2006, p28; Roberts, 1947, p38). An 
1831 application for an Act of Parliament to permit an 
‘academical institution’ was approved (Knight, 1838, 
p219) and Durham Castle was appropriated as a suitable 
campus for the newly titled ‘University College’ 
(Roberts, 1947, p39). Confirmed and endowed in 1834, the 
new university authorities soon received their royal 
charter and degree awarding status (Anderson, 2006, p28; 




Durham intended to emulate the London Universities by 
appealing to students of ‘limited means’ (Barnard, 1961, 
p124) but it did also offer Oxbridge style residential 
study (Silver, 2003, p4). Student applications were swift 
and numerous, demonstrating that the demand for higher 
education ‘at reasonable rates’ was as strong in the 
north of the country as it was in its capital (Barnard, 
1961, p124). This initial success was not to last. The 
university had been conceived as a ‘shadowy replica’ of 
Oxbridge (Silver, 2003, p65) and the 1860 completion of a 
reliable national rail network meant that prospective 
students were able to by-pass Durham and attend the ‘real 
thing’ (Anderson, 2006, p73). Even the acceptance of non-
Anglicans failed to make much difference to recruitment 
and Durham was to remain the smallest university in 
England until the early twentieth century (Sanderson, 
1988, p93).  
 
The founding of Durham University served to encourage the 
ambitious officials of Britain's larger industrial towns 
and cities. Manchester had no wealthy religious 
foundation but the ‘forest of chimneys’ that turned its 
sky to an ‘inky canopy’ (Taylor, 1842, p3) had generated 
a ‘new elite’ of merchants and manufacturers (Armytage, 
1955, p186). They sought better higher education both for 
its own sake and for their industries. From as early as 
1829 prominent Manchester merchants had been trying to 
transform a variety of educational foundations into more 
prestigious institutions (Armytage, 1955, p186). But the 
plans came to nothing until in 1846 local entrepreneur 
and philanthropist John Owens died.  
 
Owens had been a giant in the cotton yarn business. He 
was a local trader who had become an international 
businessman with partnerships in China and America 
(Armytage, 1955, p187). He did not marry or have children 
but he did amass a fortune. Owens left just over one 
hundred thousand pounds to establish a new college in 
Manchester. Owens’ bequest laid down rigid conditions; 
the college was to be free of any kind of religious 
testing for students or staff and it was to teach those 
subjects that were ‘usual in universities’ (Sanderson, 
1988, p91). This less ecclesiastical version of Newman’s 
ideal of a liberal education became widely adopted during 
the latter half of the nineteenth century and often 
diverted religious zeal toward more ‘patriotic goals’ 
(Soffer, 1994, p18). 
 
Owens College was granted a warrant to forward qualifying 
students for the University of London external 
examinations and opened to students in October 1851 
(Tribe, 1993, p186).  
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The college was ambitious from the first with a programme 
of both daytime and evening classes; it was even an early 
leader in teacher training (Patrick, 1986, p244). John 
Owens was by no means alone in his desire to promote 
higher education; it was to become something of a fashion 
among well-heeled industrialists. The educational 
foundations of a pair of steel manufacturers were 
eventually merged into Sheffield University, a college 
founded by the world’s leading maker of pen nibs became 
Birmingham University, while Reading University was 
largely arranged by the Palmer half of the Huntley and 
Palmer biscuit company (Sanderson, 1988, p91). Henry 
Hartley, a wealthy but eccentric wine merchant of 
Southampton died in the same year as Owens and likewise 
left a fortune to be used for educational purposes. 
However Hartley’s wishes were unclear and the will was 
contested. Lawyers managed to whittle the hundred 
thousand pound bequest down to forty thousand with which 
the Southampton authorities were just able to fund the 
rather modest Hartley Institute (Vernon, 2004, p105).  
 
Confusion over benefactors wishes and clashes with local 
authorities were not uncommon and educational facilities 
provided with only a launch fund did not always flourish 
(Vernon, 2004, p105). Sanderson states that it was often 
the ‘kiss of death’ for a college to named after a local 
businessman, as industrial competitors would ignore an 
institution emblazoned with the name of a rival company 
or product (Sanderson, 1988, p91). The promising start 
made by Owens proved to be no more than that, the college 
floundered. Within ten years of opening it was considered 
a failure (Tribe, 1993, p186). The problem lay in Owens 
wish to create an institution that attempted to provide a 
liberal Oxbridge education (Sanderson, 1988, p91). The 
classics and mathematics proved of little interest to the 
middle and working classes in provincial cities where a 
’more strictly vocational imperative ruled’ (Tribe, 1993, 
p186). Owens College managed to stay open on the strength 
of its popular evening classes until new benefactors were 
found. Specialist lawyers applied a little ‘legal sleight 
of hand’ and altered the terms of Owens bequest that 
related to liberal education (Vernon, 2004, p98). An 
appeal for funds was made to the citizens of Manchester 
and they generously contributed over two hundred thousand 
pounds to the revamped project (Barnes, 1996, p276). By 
1871 the college, with a new constitution and new 
premises had been ‘virtually refounded’ (Anderson, 2006, 
p73) and in this new guise was able to set about 
consolidating ‘its position as the premier provincial 




Most of the civic institutions and colleges were modeled 
on University College, London in that they were ‘secular, 
open to both sexes’ and offered a broad range of teaching 
in ‘classical and modern subjects’ (Tribe, 1993, p186). 
This more widely accessible education was seldom the 
result of ‘parliamentary interest’ (Anderson, 2006, p73) 
but was more often created by local civic authorities to 
answer ‘regional industrial needs’ (Sanderson, 1999, 
p162).  
 
Although civic foundations were most commonly found in 
industrial cities their curricula were not exclusively 
scientific or technical; many still promoted a background 
in the classics for which they looked to Oxford or 
Cambridge extension classes (Anderson, 2006, p73). The 
English ‘university extension movement’ was started in 
1873 by Cambridge University and aimed to make its 
lectures and culture available throughout the country 
(Halsey, 1992, p34). Once the service had proved popular 
Oxford University joined, and also provided travelling 
lecturers. The two universities liaised in what became 
the world’s first ‘systematic’ scheme for extramural 
university level education for adults (Goldman, 1995, 
p11).  
 
The curricula of the best civic colleges ranged from 
Oxbridge taught classics to local expertise in science 
and technology, and all within the teaching structure 
required by the University of London external 
examinations board. It is no surprise that the ‘most 
ambitious’ and most successful of the colleges were soon 
considering making applications for ‘independent 
university status’ (Vernon, 2004, p93). It was Owens 
College that first had the ‘audacity’ to apply for a 
charter to become England’s fifth university (Silver, 
2003, p4). The application raised questions about the 
maintenance of academic standards and the total to which 
the number of English universities could be safely 
multiplied (Flexner, 1930, p247). There were also some 
doubts that a sophisticated institution like a university 
could exist within the ‘hellish confines’ of Britain’s 
industrial centres (Vernon, 2004, p94). Government 
ministers examined every aspect of the application then 
suggested a compromise. Using a similar mechanism to that 
which had ‘solved’ the rival ambitions of University 
College and King’s College in London, Owens College would 
not be granted a charter of its own but would become the 
first constituent member of a new ‘examining university 
for the north’ (Anderson, 2006, p74). Despite the obvious 
‘timidity’ of this decision it gained sufficient support 
for Owens to become the federal institution that was 
renamed Victoria University in 1880 (Silver, 2003, p15). 
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Just a year later Liverpool College became the second 
member of the new universities (Flexner, 1930, p247). The 
constituent institutions of Victoria University retained 
their own local management, this allowed more curricula 
control than had been permitted by London University 
(Vernon, 2004, p69) and encouraged relatively ‘small 
student bodies’ (Anderson, 2006, p74) to achieve high 
academic standards. 
 
The increasing numbers of colleges within industrial 
provincial cities did much to raise the standard of 
higher education; intercity rivalry and ‘civic pride’ 
were satisfied by a commitment to continuing improvements 
(Vernon, 2004, p93). Yorkshire acquired its College of 
Science as a ‘direct response’ (Sanderson, 1999, p161) to 
the very poor showing of British engineering at the 1867 
Paris Exhibition (Powell, 1965, p105). A subsequent Paris 
exhibition in the 1889 further demonstrated the 
industrial rise of Britain’s Continental rivals. An 
impressive array of engineering and chemical progress was 
presented beneath an especially designed marvel of 
structural steel - the Eiffel Tower (Sanderson, 1999, 
p165).   
 
The production of steel had become an economic ‘virility 
symbol’ and during the 1880’s the output of both America 
and Germany began to overtake that of British steel 
manufacture (Sanderson, 1999, p165). Alford states that 
this ‘slight’ industrial eclipse should not be taken as 
an indication of a reduced sphere of influence (Alford, 
1999, pp86-87). Britain was still the ‘richest of 
nations’ with a sound economy based on exports, 
insurance, banking, international shipping, foreign 
investments and the largest gold reserves in Europe 
(Morris, 1979, p60).  
 
Laissez-faire, national wealth and 
free trade  
 
Britain owed the strength of its economy to its overseas 
territorial possessions and a wide range of technological 
advances. Although both were initiated by commercial 
ambition they resulted in an international trading empire 
that provides substantial evidence of globalisation in 
the nineteenth century (Legrain, 2003, p89). Although the 
British government of the period was prepared to support 
virtually any measure that extended the ‘free play of the 
market’ it was reluctant to accept any further 




The official policy in dealing with matters of trade and 
finance was one of strict nonintervention, almost 
‘overwhelmingly laissez-faire’ (Platt, 1968, p298). The 
1870-1913 ‘free trade era of laissez-faire’ so closely 
resembles contemporary globalisation that it convincingly 
counters claims for the current phenomena being a novelty 
(Went, 2002, p10). However, Micklethwait and Wooldridge 
argue while the globalisation of the period may have been 
impressive it does not compare with more modern levels of 
integration in capital markets and the exchange of 
services (Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2000, p5). 
Giddens likewise states that the modern globally 
integrated economy had no ‘parallels in earlier times’ 
(Giddens, 2002, p9). Britain’s nineteenth century free 
trade area was not as advanced as today’s globalisation 
but this does not contradict the view that the process 
has been slowly advancing throughout ‘earlier periods of 
history’ (Osterhammel & Petersson, 2005, p28).  
 
Legrain argues that British politicians of the nineteenth 
century adopted free trade as a ‘political choice’ and 
did see a globally integrated market for both commerce 
and culture as a viable goal (Legrain, 2003, p89). This 
vision was supported by the knowledge that the 
universities could be relied upon to provide that ‘fusion 
of aristocratic and professional values’ (Wiener, 1992, 
p23) which administrative officers were thought to 
require ‘to run a world empire’(Callinicos, 2006, p24).   
The difficulty with such free market ambitions was 
convincing other countries to follow suit (Legrain, 2003, 
p89). Generous trade agreements were negotiated with 
willing participants while reluctance was subjected to 
‘gunboat diplomacy’ (Legrain, 2003, p91). Britain’s 
dependant colonies were pressured to accept what Cain 
identifies as ‘Free Trade Imperialism’ while some 
‘smaller or weaker’ countries only signed after being 
reminded of Britain’s naval supremacy (Cain, 1999, p3). 
It was a process that began to blend the ‘military, 
political, economic, and cultural’ thinking of previously 
remote parts of the world (Clark, 1998, p36). The 
nineteenth century’s free trade idealists viewed the 
homogenising effect of this global transformation as a 
‘guaranteed’ method of improving living standards of 
‘everyone’ everywhere (Davies, 2005, p56). Much of this 
vision was ultimately corrupted for the sake of 
commercial and military expedience, not all living 
standards were improved, and not all peoples welcomed 
free trade. There would have been no ‘globalisation 





Most of Europe, initially at least, did sign up to a new 
'wave of commercial treaties’ that pledged to follow the 
principles of an international free market (O'Rourke, 
2000, p457). Countries that had previously levied duties 
of up to fifty percent now entered into an era of 
cooperation that that would reduce import charges to 
about ten percent. The ‘utopia of international free 
trade’ appeared to be just ‘around the corner’ (Price, 
1999, p91). In 1870 the international banking community 
was discussing the possibility of a ‘European central 
bank’ with a common ‘European currency’ (Rothschild, 
1999, p106).  
 
The possibility of closer political and economic ties 
between the British and their continental cousins was 
being promoted in Britain by W. T. Stead’s ‘Pall Mall 
Gazette’ (Ferguson, 2003, p258). The prevailing spirit of 
optimism even extended to British landowners and farmers 
whose predicted financial doom had been postponed. In the 
wake of the Corn Law repeal the amount of cheaper foreign 
wheat available for import was insufficient to pose an 
immediate threat and it would be some years before 
transporting grain from the giant cereal growing regions 
of America and the Ukraine would become financially 
viable. Many landowners saw the delay as an opportunity 
to adjust their crop production and cultivation methods. 
They took a renewed interest in improved farming 
techniques that in turn created confidence and investment 
in the development and manufacture of agricultural 
machinery. Not all imports were unpopular with farmers; 
the wide use of fertilizer during the 1850s required the 
import of one hundred thousand tons of guano annually 
(McCord, 1991, p329; Howe, 1997, p194). 
 
The increase in imported food, and newly mechanised 
farming methods meant that less people were required to 
work on the land. This drop in agricultural employment 
was offset by an increased demand for workers in 
industrial towns. The nation was in transformation, its 
‘future lay in commerce rather than in agriculture’ 
(Trevelyan, 1922, p204). Cheaper imported food was more 
widely available in the developing urban centres than in 
the countryside. This encouraged a population shift to 
the better-fed townships and their ‘guarantee of working-
class welfare’ (Howe, 1997, p194). Most of Britain’s 
population were enjoying a marked increase in prosperity 
which was largely based on an ‘uncritical’ acceptance of 
free trade and a growing reliance on foreign food imports 





Although Britain maintained a healthy ‘margin of safety’ 
economic observers were aware that it could no longer be 
taken for granted (McCord, 1991, p437). For too long 
British industry had relied on traditional and outmoded 
processes and methods and was slowly being overtaken by 
‘better educated foreign competitors’ (Sheppard, 1975, 
p75). Higher education in the English colleges was being 
expanded to meet this challenge but it had initially been 
very slow (Vernon, 2004, p28). Increasing numbers of 
students could study an increasing range of subjects; 
science, history, linguistics and philosophy had recently 
been joined by biology and astronomy (Butts, 1955, p395).  
 
The teachers, tutors and scientists who supported this 
extension into 'modern' subjects were attuned to the 
changes in the nature of knowledge (Vernon, 2004, p28). 
One of the great challenges to the 'Aristotelian 
tradition’ was Charles Darwin's ‘On The Origin of 
Species’, published in 1859. The theory of evolution 
sparked an intellectual argument that in twenty years had 
acquired the status of a movement; it questioned accepted 
knowledge and was a significant factor in releasing 
‘learning’ from its rigid traditions (Reiser, 1958, p41).  
 
Oxbridge accepts ‘reforms’ 
 
However, Oxford and Cambridge Universities had the 
Aristotelian tradition at their very core, a position 
left  ‘undisturbed’ by the changes that industrialisation 
brought to the rest of society (Powicke, 1947, p244). 
This aloofness did not go unnoticed by Parliament, the 
press or even the public; the expectation was that 
Oxbridge should adapt and contribute to prevailing 
conditions (Soffer, 1994, p14). The universities 
countered with the familiar argument that their 
traditional ‘liberal arts education’ was deemed to 
improve the mind and strengthen character, and that this 
was how they best served the nation (Soffer, 1994, p14). 
This apparent lack of enthusiasm for change resulted in 
the Oxbridge institutions being subjected to two 
investigations by Royal Commission. The first, in 1850, 
recommended that both institutions should be left to 
reform themselves (Barnard, 1961, p123). The second, 
twenty years later, discovered that they had not done so 
(Soffer, 1994, p5). 
 
The authorities of both ancient universities agreed to 
attend an inquiry, which they conceded could be conducted 





Both institutions were confident that, over the 
centuries, they had gathered enough obscure 
ecclesiastical bylaws to stave off almost any legal 
challenge (Vernon, 2004, p9). While the universities 
organised examinations and conferred degrees it was the 
colleges that controlled the money (Vernon, 2004, p12). 
All attempts to extend the Oxbridge curriculum to include 
‘essential’ science tuition and new laboratories were 
doomed because the colleges would refuse to pay (Vernon, 
2004, p31). The Oxbridge authorities knew they would have 
to accept some level of reform so they listened and 
discussed and then ‘quietly rejected’ those most 
injurious to their ‘essential interests’ (Soffer, 1994, 
p16). They did however, accept a recommendation for the 
removal of religious restrictions (Vernon, 2004, p28).  
 
The abolition of the Test Act was the first step in 
reducing the influence of the church in the Oxbridge 
institutions. Orthodox theology was being assailed on 
biblical matters by questions that arose from Darwinism 
and the study of paleontology and geology. ’Religious 
doubts grew among the Victorian intelligentsia’ 
(Anderson, 2006, p45). Both Oxford and Cambridge 
universities abandoned ‘compulsory ordination and 
celibacy’ which they recognized as an obstruction in 
attracting qualified professional teaching staff 
(Anderson, 2006, p46). The universities knew from the 
outset that they had little to fear from the commission. 
The views of Oxbridge, church and state were virtually 
indistinguishable and the government was unlikely to 
impose harsh restrictions on an area of ‘its own 
authority’ (Vernon, 2004, p10) 
 
The Oxbridge universities agreed to continue making such 
‘adjustments’ to their methods as would not interfere 
with the style of liberal education which they had 
successfully developed into a ‘licensing system’ for 
entry into the upper echelons of society (Soffer, 1994, 
p5). Oxbridge graduates not only ‘monopolised the 
dominant positions in public and private life’ but also 
throughout the British Empire (Soffer, 1994, p1). 
Britain’s state bureaucracy, its home and overseas civil 
service were now staffed by the 'Christian gentlemen’ of 
Arnold and Newman. Barnett argues that the ‘liberal-
studies lobby’ had created a governing élite with more 
inclination toward 'cautious' fair play than in taking 
innovative action (Barnett, 1987, pp215-216). It was a 
hierarchy which bound the universities and the public 
schools into an even ‘closer association’ bestowing on 




The public schools themselves operated within ‘narrow 
social and intellectual limits’ (Anderson, 2006, p32) and 
like the universities maintained a curriculum that was 
‘unaffected by contemporary progress’ (Barnard, 1961, 
p126). Most public school teachers were Oxbridge 
educated, so themselves were already imbued with Oxbridge 
‘values’ (Anderson, 2006, p32). Anderson argues that the 
closer ties with the public schools did little to 
‘broaden university access’ and even less to ‘weaken the 
dominance of the classics’ but did guarantee the supply 
of suitable university candidates from the new middle 
class (Anderson, 2006, p43). It was this clientele that 
ultimately pressured the universities to consider a more 
‘modern’ approach than that which might be found within 
the ‘embrace of the church’ (Anderson, 2006, p34). 
 
Oxbridge managed to apply enough reforms to temporarily 
satisfy their critics without incurring any serious 
reduction of ‘social prestige’ (Anderson, 2006, p49). By 
the end of the nineteenth century natural science 
subjects had achieved some limited acceptance, enough for 
the public schools to also start taking some science 
seriously (Sanderson, 1999, p157). The Oxbridge 
universities were even prepared to tolerate some 
vocational training as long as it could be cloaked in the 
‘gentlemanly guise’ of a profession that was unconnected 
with ‘industry and moneymaking' (Anderson, 2006, p49). 
The ancient universities had little time for the grubby 
pursuits of industrialists and businessmen who in turn 
could see ‘little relevance’ in a curriculum based on 
classical literature, philosophy and language (Vernon, 
2004, p96). For most commercial employers an Oxford or 
Cambridge education appeared to be an expensive diversion 
that simply kept young men from starting a ‘productive 
life’ (Vernon, 2004, p96).  
 
The colleges strive to become 
universities 
 
Although most mechanical innovations were developed in 
the workshop rather than the classroom, there was an 
acknowledged need for more formal technical education 
(Anderson, 2006, p25). This was reflected in the founding 
of a further six colleges in the midlands and the north 
of England between 1871 and 1881 (Roderick & Stephens, 
1974, p41). Although the government was aware of the poor 
showing by British manufacturers at international 
exhibitions they played no part in the development of 
colleges. Instead they relied on local industrialists and 
businessmen to put up the funds and find suitable 
management (Barnard, 1961, p126).  
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Institutions were founded with bequests, endowments, 
corporate and commercial sponsorship during the late 
nineteenth century's ‘flush of mercantile and industrial 
opulence' (Armytage, 1954, p305).  
 
Many of the students at civic colleges faced considerable 
difficulty in successfully completing a degree course 
(Roderick & Stephens, 1974, p44). In part this was the 
need for working class artisans to actually be working, 
but it was also because many students simply had not 
received elementary, or secondary education of a 
sufficient standard as to support the ‘superstructure’ of 
extended technical education (Barnard, 1961, p91). By the 
mid 1890’s some elementary and secondary schools were 
very slowly beginning to benefit from Prince Albert’s 
Science and Art Department. The teaching of science and 
technology throughout the country was encouraged by the 
system of funding known as the 'South Kensington grants'. 
Money was available to both elementary and secondary 
schools that complied with the department’s conditions 
for the teaching of technical subjects (Roach, 1991, 
p115; Barnard, 1961, p136). Roach argues that together 
with other agencies, the Science and Art Department 
managed to run what amounted to a ‘publicly financed’ 
national, though ‘uncoordinated’, system of secondary 
education that greatly enhanced the work of the civic 
colleges (Roach, 1991, p246). To encourage enrollments 
many colleges began offering a variety of non-degree 
courses, which required less study time but were in line 
with local needs. These often proved more popular than 
the courses for a full degree (Roderick & Stephens, 1974, 
p44).  
 
Although college’s courses might range from engineering 
and chemistry to skills and crafts not all offered the 
whole range or to the same standard. Such differences 
were usually dependent upon local circumstances and 
funding (Roderick & Stephens, 1974, p42). The founding of 
the colleges may have been spurred by a local need for 
trained labour but as ambitions to provide university 
level education rose, so did the cost (Vernon, 2004, 
p94). Traditional sources could either not afford, or did 
not want to meet the required increases and there were 
not enough willing ‘merchant princes' to make up the 
shortfall (Armytage, 1954, p305).  
 
This shortage of funds was not restricted to provincial 
colleges; Kings College London was also in dire straits.  
The college’s prestigious London site, a ‘gift’ from the 
King, had come with the ‘burdensome’ proviso that the 
monumental river frontage designed by Sir William 
Chambers be completed (Dowland, 1997, p55).  
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Donations and subscriptions had initially kept Kings 
College adequately funded, but by the 1870’s the council 
of the college had to admit that they could not raise the 
‘sizeable sum’ required for the river front wall 
(Dowland, 1997, p56). A series of appeals did little to 
alleviate the situation and in 1894 the college was 
forced to apply for public funds. Kings was still 
essentially an all-Anglican college but could only 
acquire grants from the Treasury or London County Council 
by abandoning its ‘religious exclusiveness’ and religious 
testing. This was reluctantly agreed (Dowland, 1997, 
p56). 
 
Flexner states that the expansion of higher education 
opportunities in a broader range of subjects was an 
‘amazing achievement’ (Flexner, 1930, p247). It 
constituted Britain’s first line of defence against the 
‘rapid growth’ of Continental industrial rivals 
(Sanderson, 1999, p165). The government's laissez-faire 
policy had allowed most of this growth to occur without 
official sanction or guidance (Anderson, 2006, p73). The 
state had founded the Royal School of Mines and the Royal 
College of Science and only they received government 
financial support. The philanthropic industrialists who 
had founded and managed the civic colleges complained 
that government funding was also needed further north 
where the educational facilities were closer to the 
‘major centres of industry’  (Roderick & Stephens, 1974, 
p56). It had become accepted that university level 
training, education and research was a national asset 
whose future should not be threatened by a lack of funds. 
In 1889 though still without much enthusiasm it was 
agreed that the Treasury should provide a ‘crucial 
lifeline’ in the form of grants in aid (Vernon, 2004, 
p94). 
 
This was the beginning of the English higher education 
‘two-tier hierarchy’ in which state-aided provincial 
institutions aspired to match the ‘social and 
intellectual prestige’ of the national and very 
independent Oxbridge institutions (Anderson, 2006, p65). 
The competition was unfair from the outset. Local 
colleges were unlikely to recruit from the public schools 
or to even compete socially with the ancient universities 
(Schwarz, 2004, p946). But to qualify for public funding 
the colleges did have to compete at an academic level so 
a team of observers from Oxford and Cambridge 
universities were recruited to oversee the quality of the 





The civic colleges rose to the occasion. As the 
nineteenth century drew to its close most were producing 
educational programmes that the ‘Oxbridge inspectors’ 
recognised as being of university level (Vernon, 2004, 
p94). The colleges had raised their standards and offered 
new courses that further stretched already meagre 
resources. Some of the colleges still attracted donations 
and endowments from local business and industry but these 
were not sufficiently consistent to qualify as ‘day-to-
day income’ (Drummond, 1998, p248). Several London 
colleges came under the auspices of the City and Guilds 
Institute and were funded by the appropriate livery 
companies (Armytage, 1957, p67) but the colleges in 
Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester and 
Sheffield received funding from central government.  
To qualify for further state aid these colleges were 
expected to accept additional educational 
responsibilities until they were universities in all but 
name (Vernon, 2004, p94). 
 
It was a situation some felt should be rectified. In July 
of 1898 a campaign was launched to gain university status 
for the city of Birmingham’s Mason College of Science 
(Drummond, 1998, p247). The college had been opened in 
1880, with a £150,000 gift from Sir Josiah Mason for the 
establishment of an institution of practical science 
(Roderick & Stephens, 1974, p41; McCord, 1991, p333). 
Mason had started life as a street hawker who landed a 
job in a factory where his invention of a machine to make 
split key rings provided the foundation for a financial 
empire (McCord, 1991, p332). A practical self made man 
who saw no merit in a ‘mere literary education', he had 
seen Owens College come to the brink of failure and was 
determined that his would be an industrial training 
institution. He wanted ‘no truck’ with imitations of 
Oxbridge (Sanderson, 1988, p92). Theology was simply 
banned (Anderson, 2006, p77). Mason died a year after his 
college was opened though doubtless he would have taken 
pleasure in the support rallied by worthies like the 
Birmingham Higher Education Association as his 
institution prepared a bid for university status (Vernon, 
2004, p130). 
 
The campaign was spearheaded by Birmingham Member of 
Parliament, Joseph Chamberlain (Drummond, 1998, p247). He 
had been a local businessman and a very successful mayor 
of Birmingham before moving onto Westminster and an 
appointment as Secretary of State for the Colonies 





A number of ‘disparate groups’ had been campaigning for a 
city university for some years but the support of a 
political celebrity with many local connections was 
required to coordinate the proposal (Drummond, 1998, 
p258; Soffer, 1994, p29). Chamberlain launched a 
university fund and painted a vague picture of an 
autonomous foundation that would ‘incorporate 
postgraduate education’ and secure tenure professorships 
(Soffer, 1994, p28). The declared aim for the new 
university was the training of ‘captains of industry’. 
Anderson makes the point that when Chamberlain coined 
this phrase he was referring specifically to the middle 
management required to run a factory, not the ‘generals 
or colonels’ who owned it (Anderson, 2006, p77). 
 
The campaign fund exceeded expectation and had raised 
almost three hundred and sixty thousand pounds by 1900 
(Drummond, 1998, p249). It was the year in which 
Birmingham was officially granted the charter that 
transformed their civic college into the ‘first civic 
university’ (Anderson, 2006, p77). The creation of 
Birmingham University coincided with the new millennium; 
it was a pivotal moment for English higher education. 
Apprehension for Britain’s continuing status as a world 
power and its ‘economic competitiveness’ renewed public 
and political interest in the relationship between the 
‘universities and scientific research’ (Anderson, 2006, 
p80). Science related subjects were still largely avoided 
by the ancient universities of Oxford and Cambridge who 
continued to defend their ‘medieval disciplines’ by 
maintaining a requirement for students of all subjects to 
first qualify in Greek (Barnett, 1987, p218). 
 
The civic universities recognised 
 
Germany’s commercial ascendancy, military development, 
and expansionist ambitions coupled with ‘geographical 
proximity’ would soon lead Britain to see Germany as a 
‘primary threat’ (Thompson, 2000, p18). Equally the 
‘English danger’ was the topic of ‘countless’ German 
publications (Schmitt, 1918, p1). As the ‘great power 
rivalries’ began to build, fears were voiced that British 
‘scientific and technical education’ was not producing 
the expertise that would be required should the country 
need to defend and renew itself (Anderson, 2006, p66). 
English universities could not easily be convinced to 
undertake militaristic training and research. Despite 
receiving some financial assistance universities remained 
free of state control and enjoyed considerably more 
independence than their continental equivalents 
(Anderson, 2006, p30; Barnard, 1961, p249).  
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However, for the civic universities, ‘financial 
independence’ often meant almost continual campaigning 
for additional funding (Silver, 2003, p6). Though the 
civic universities’ declared aim was to ‘rely primarily 
on local contributions’, it quickly became apparent that 
such sources could not keep pace with the levels of 
support required (Barnes, 1996, p298). The running costs 
of Manchester University alone had trebled during the 
years between 1900 and 1914 (Barnes, 1996, p298). 
 
But the civic universities were a great success. Their 
scholarship ranged across ‘every field of knowledge’,  
students were enrolled for technical as well as 
professional studies and all were approached with the 
‘methodological rigor’ that might otherwise be associated 
with ‘a liberal arts academic training’ (Soffer, 1994, 
p29). Oxbridge declared its disdain for the overly 
practical as being too closely associated with the 
‘vulgar world’ of commerce, manufacture and financial 
profit (Anderson, 2006, p106) but the civic universities 
had grown out of provincial colleges that were 
necessarily created in industrial cities. It was 
therefore quite natural for them to have a ‘scientific or 
technological bias’ (Barnard, 1961, p199). Higher 
education and research were slowly being recognised as 
potential sources of industrial progress (Silver, 2003, 
p13) but not quickly enough for the commentor who in 1901 
wrote that Britain’s best ‘trained brains’ were being 
lost to countries who appreciated that ‘intellectual 
supremacy’ was connected to ‘commercial supremacy’ 
(Starling, p1028, 1901). 
 
The undervaluing of the civic universities, was a 
reflection of the ‘anti-industrial, anti-urban, anti-
technological bias’ that had been adopted by that sector 
of British Society who clung to the country’s 
‘aristocratic past’ (Barnes, 1996, p301). This attitude 
was also promoted by the ‘nation's elite educational 
institutions’ where it was ‘assimilated by an upwardly 
mobile, increasingly gentrified middle class’ (Barnes, 
1996, p301). It was certainly an anti-industrial view 
that was presented in a 1914 Oxford University 
broadsheet, which charted the ‘progress’ of a civic 
university student and included the couplet: ‘He gets 
degrees in making jam - At Liverpool and Birming-ham 
(Warner, 2001, p24). Oxbridge undergraduates may have 
been amused by the idea of university level 
qualifications in commercial and industrial processes but 
it was the deficiency of such skills that was beginning 




This chapter has charted the rising importance of 
research-based methods in higher education and the 
impetus this gave to the founding of the London 
universities. It has explored the elevated international 
status gained by Oxford and Cambridge universities 
through their management of the civil service 
examinations and funds generated by the Great Exhibition 
that enabled the extension of technical education 
provision. Finally the chapter has detailed the founding, 
by British industrialists and entrepreneurs, of the 
colleges that would eventually become the basis for a 





























Chapter 2 1890-1930 
 
Chapter two describes the early years of the newly 
chartered universities, the launch of the London School 
of Economics and the consequences of Britain’s 1914 entry 
into the First World War. I relate how the previously 
rather low status of institutions of higher education was 
elevated by the wartime requirement for skilled 
administrators and researchers. This newfound respect for 
higher education was to last through to Germany’s 
surrender of 1918. However, efforts to establish an 
international forum to prevent future wars were 
significantly diminished by the refusal of the US 
congress to join. This signaled America’s postwar return 
to isolationism allowed Britain to adopt a proxy hegemony 
that reinstated colonial and career opportunities for 
university graduates. 
 
In what follows I describe how the postwar surge of new 
and returning students obliged the government to 
subsidise higher education costs via the University 
Grants Committee. Almost as the state was agreeing to 
provide for both university running costs and the 
provision of residential facilities, the country was 
subjected to a massive economic shift. The situation had 
international origins but was exacerbated by Britain’s 
overly optimistic return to the gold standard at the 
prewar level. The economy could only be balanced by 
severe fiscal control, which cut public funding and 
squeezed workers wages. In 1926 the Trades Union Congress 
retaliated by calling a nationwide general strike. After 
several days the action was called off with no side 
gaining any advantage except maybe those university 
undergraduates who had been allowed the novelty of 
waiting on tables and driving buses or trains. This 
chapter also explores how British and American academic 
life initially rode out the effects of the 1929 American 
stock market crash but could not avoid the subsequent 
economic depression. Severely curtailed investment drove 
American institutions of higher education to collaborate 
more closely with commercial interests while their 
British counterparts redesigned PhD courses to better 
suit and attract American students. Universities were 
beginning to adopt the internationally outward looking 
stance that would later be identified as an element of 
globalisation. Although toward the end of the nineteenth 







Britain entered the last years of the nineteenth century 
with its economy resting on the ‘three pillars’ of 
Victorian policy planning, a combination of the gold 
standard, free trade and very cautious budgets 
(Tomlinson, 1990, p14). Many leading politicians believed 
that free trade represented a ‘universal economic truth’ 
that would eventually lead to a ‘new moral order’ of 
peace and international financial stability (Cain, 1999, 
p2). This view seemed to be confirmed by the number of 
countries that had become financially and commercially 
interlocked with the British led trading system (Hirst, 
1997, p409). But by 1890 the growth of these interlocked 
economies had begun to slow down. The economic ‘utopia’ 
promised by the ‘optimistic globalisers’ was plainly in 
doubt (Davies, 2005, p56).  
 
Economic observers do not dispute that European economies 
began to decline but they are less sure of the ‘nature 
and extent’ of the depression (Berghoff & Moller, 1994, 
p262). Friedlander argues that the downturn may have been 
created by the expanding global market itself 
(Friedlander, 1992, p19). Rapidly improving transport 
systems distributed products and produce via a network of 
steamships, railways and roads that reached out across 
the world. New routes further speeded consignments 
through alpine tunnels and the Suez and Panama Canals 
(Ruggie, 2002, p27). Steamships had reduced the cost of 
‘transoceanic transport’ making previously expensive 
imports cheaper. Bulk cargos like grain, which were not 
worth moving by sail, were made financially viable by the 
larger, faster steamships (O'Rourke, 2008, p37). As the 
vast American and Canadian grasslands came under 
cultivation ‘transatlantic’ wheat began flooding the 
European market (Estevadeordal et al, 2003, p369). 
Refrigerated transport was sufficiently advanced by 1870 
as to significantly reduce the prices of meat, fruit and 
vegetables (Legrain, 2002, p93). The absence of trade 
barriers allowed demand to be met by new sources, the 
resulting increase in availability led to a dramatic fall 
in world commodity prices (Davies, 2005, p56).  
 
As commodity prices dropped and the European depression 
began to bite there was a significant ‘crumbling’ of the 
support previously enjoyed by the free trade sector 
(Howe, 1997, p286). Europe’s cereal producers were the 
first and the hardest hit and they cried out for the 
protection of import duties (McCord, 1991, p441). Many 
governments ‘caved in’ and reinstated agricultural 
tariffs severe enough to prevent further integration of 
the international markets (O'Rourke, 2008, p37). 
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Britain’s dream of a world united by free trade was sent 
‘into reverse’ (Legrain, 2003, p91) as the European 
economy sank behind new barriers of import duties and 
tariffs (Price, 1999, p91). The spirit that had driven 
the international integrated economy slowly ‘dribbled 
away’ (Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2000, p10). Britain’s 
‘complacent assumption’ (Cain, 1999, p2) that free trade 
would become recognised as a sure path to universal 
growth and prosperity was badly shaken. However, Britain 
stubbornly retained its open market policy becoming the 
‘last redoubt’ of the cause (Clark, 1998, p38), refusing 
to change course even when its ‘open door’ policies 
threatened to ruin domestic agriculture (Howe, 1997, 
p194). O’Rourke argues that this determined political 
stance illustrates the reduced political importance of 
agriculture within the ‘first industrial nation’ 
(O'Rourke, 2000, p458). 
 
The perception of Britain’s future as an importer of raw 
material and an exporter of manufactured goods remained 
unchanged and an increasingly heavy reliance on foreign 
food imports illustrates the continuing confidence in the 
theory of comparative advantage (McCord, 1991, p330).  
McCord argues that the depression was largely confined to 
continental Europe and that its effects in Britain were 
exaggerated by those landowners in a position to make the 
most noise (McCord, 1991, p330). But there was an 
undeniable ‘hardening of the international tone’ and this 
had caused slow down in economic growth (Trevelyan, 1922, 
p367). Britain imported increasingly large amounts of 
food while exporting machinery that mechanised the 
production of goods rather than the goods themselves 
(Havighurst, 1966, p16). Thompson states that this would 
eventually depress the manufacturers market and that this 
period should have been used for reflection and 
reorganisation. Much of Britain’s industry was based on 
cotton and iron, but the twentieth century was 
approaching with new technologies that featured 
electricity, chemicals and the manufacture of steel 
(Thompson, 2000, p160). Not only were Germany and the 
United States beginning to excel in these areas, but 
unlike Britain they sheltered their ‘infant industries’ 
behind ‘high tariff barriers’ while developing higher 
output and superior product (O'Rourke, 2000, p457).  
 
By 1900 American manufacturers were responsible for 
thirty six percent of the ‘world's industrial output’ 
(Seavoy, 2003, p256). They were easily able to supply 
their own massive home market without having to rely 




Motor vehicles created great change including a 
preference over traditional high street shopping for the 
convenience of the new ‘cathedrals of commerce’, the 
department stores (De Grazia, 2005, p156). Exports 
however were considered very desirable and America 
nurtured more manufacturing corporations with 
international ambitions than either Germany or Britain 
(Seavoy, 2003, p256). Some American commercial exports 
such as Heinz bottled foods, Campbell’s tinned soups and 
Remington typewriters had already achieved international 
status by 1900 and would go on to become global brands 
(Scholte, 1999, p14).  
 
Britain was not greatly concerned. It was able to 
maintain its free trade stance because it was ‘Greater 
Britain’, a phrase coined by Charles Dilke in 1869 to 
convey the Britishness of the British Empire (Dilke, 
1869, pvi). Greater Britain at that time encompassed a 
quarter of the worlds ‘habitable’ landmass (Porter, 2004, 
p1). Imperial expansion had been developed into an 
‘economic and strategic entity’ which could be relied 
upon to provide a captive export market (Clark, 1998, 
p38). Britain had long since achieved naval supremacy and 
its merchant shipping fleets ‘dominated world commerce’ 
(Hirst, 1997, p410). London was the world’s financial 
centre, investing so heavily in foreign railways, mines 
and industry that by 1900 the city’s brokers managed over 
forty percent of the ‘world’s overseas investments’ 
(Legrain, 2003, p95). Britain’s overall productivity may 
have been decreasing, but it was generally taken as 
indicative of a slow down, rather than ‘an absolute 
decline’ (McCord, 1991, p436).  
 
The Victorians considered the year 1900 to be the last of 
the nineteenth century rather than the first of the 
twentieth, so the notion of the new millennium was 
postponed (Harvie & Matthew, 2000, p135). However 1900 
did mark the opening of London Underground's ‘Central 
line’ (Havighurst, 1966, p25) and Hiram S. Maxim’s 
knighthood for the invention of the machine gun, the 
world’s ‘swiftest death-dealing machine’ (Briggs, 2002, 
pp39). The Queen died in following year bringing an end 
to the sixty-four year Victorian era. Her long absence 
from public life had hampered the government and become a 
‘political nuisance’, there were ‘sighs of relief’ in 
some quarters (Havighurst, 1966, p5). For Britain the new 
century brought a new monarch, a less fettered government 
and a revived spirit of optimism. It was the age of 
telephones, motorcars typewriters, gramophones, domestic 
electric lighting and world’s first purpose built cinema, 
which opened in Colne, Lancashire, in 1907 (Harvie & 
Matthew, 2000, p135). 
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New century, new universities 
 
Britain entered the twentieth century with a total of 
only twenty thousand students in higher education. Briggs 
argues that this was simply not enough for a country that 
claimed a ‘special place’ in the future planning of the 
world (Briggs, 2002, p36). The supporters of university 
reform and extension argued that higher education had a 
significant role to play in this brilliant future 
(Soffer, 1994, p29). The country’s civic colleges drew 
confidence from the example set by the city of Birmingham 
and were quick to press their advantage; the first years 
of the new century saw ‘remarkable developments’ in 
university education (Barnard, 1961, p249). The 1902 
Education Act passed the responsibility for all education 
other than universities onto local borough and county 
councils; Prime Minister Balfour explained that the Act 
would create a connection that would link up through the 
whole system to university level  (Anderson, 2006, p81; 
Barnard, 1961, p250). Also in 1902 the federal Victoria 
University was dissolved and within two years its 
constituent parts, Manchester, Liverpool and Leeds were 
awarded independent university rank. Sheffield obtained 
its charter in 1905 and Bristol followed in 1909 
(Barnard, 1961, p249). These six institutions were known 
as the civic or the provincial universities. Anderson 
suggests that the collective term ‘Redbrick’ is derived 
from Liverpool University’s Victoria Building which is of 
distinctive redbrick (Anderson, 2006, p78).  
 
The new redbrick universities followed the lead of 
London’s University College and King’s College in 
modeling themselves on successful ‘Scottish and German 
examples’ (Vernon, 2004, p17). The notion of the 
Humboldtian research university had by this time taken 
firm root throughout Europe and America as well as in 
Scotland (Halsey, 1992, p39). However, it was only 
Humboldt’s principles that travelled well, the practice 
was rather different.  
 
Almost all German universities were ‘welfare-state 
institutions’ whose primary financial support was 
provided by the taxpayer (Ash, 2006, p47-48). University 
running costs could be taken from the public purse 
because higher education was regarded as a ‘public and 
not a private good’ (Ash, 2006, p48), hence the 
government called the tune, they supervised university 
curricula and exercised approval of professorial 
appointments (Anderson, 2006, p30). Their English 
university counterparts were almost all private ventures 
that received little state aid (Vernon, 2004, p217).  
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In 1906 the various agencies that provided some financial 
support were drawn together as the ‘National Advisory 
Committee on Grants to University Colleges' (Silver, 
2003, p5). These grants were comparatively small and 
English universities retained considerably more ‘legal 
and financial independence’ than their continental 
equivalents (Anderson, 2006, p30). In England the 
government could not ‘dictate’ what a university should 
teach or control the appointment of staff (Barnard, 1961, 
p249). This lack of state intervention allowed 
manoeuvring space for the ‘schemes’ of two independently 
minded champions of higher education, Sidney Webb and R. 
B. Haldane (Vernon, 2004, p105).  
 
Webb, Haldane and the LSE 
 
As a young man Sidney Webb’s exceptional aptitude for 
learning enabled him to pass the civil service entry 
examinations without ever attending a university, and to 
obtain a first division post at the Colonial Office 
(Anderson, 2006, p84; Cole, 1946, p47). In 1892 Sidney 
Webb married Beatrice, a political researcher, writer and 
heiress (Webb, 1948, p30). The couple were able to become 
deeply involved in socialist politics after Beatrice’s 
inheritance provided ‘sufficient means’ for them to ‘work 
for nothing’ (Webb, 1948, p64). The Webb’s became the 
‘moving spirits’ of the Fabian Society, a concerned 
middle class socialist group and in 1892 Sidney was 
elected to the London County Council (LCC) (Anderson, 
2006, p84). Despite being denounced in the Pall Mall 
Gazette as both a socialist and a ‘wiley, shrewd adroit 
wirepuller’ (Stead, 1892, p50) Webb became a popular and 
effective LCC member. He sat on numerous committees and 
was chairman of the Technical Education Board (Harrison, 
2000, pp270). He spread a sphere of influence on every 
available level, creating around himself the myth of Webb 
the ‘Machiavelli of County Council politics’ (McBriar, 
1949, p75). 
 
In 1894 Henry Hunt Hutchinson, an ‘eccentric’ but wealthy 
supporter of the Fabian Society, became depressed by 
advancing age and illness and shot himself (Webb, 1948, 
pp84-85). His considerable fortune of twenty thousand 
pounds was left to the Fabians with directions that 
Sidney Webb, assisted by three trustees, should spend the 
entire sum on the advancement of socialism (Webb, 1948, 
p85). Webb had frequently criticised the Oxbridge 
universities for their lack of economics teaching 
(Harrison, 2000, p286), he harboured a vision to correct 




To a man with such an ambition, but without the means to 
achieve it, the Hutchinson legacy must have come as 
‘manna from heaven’ (Cole, 1961, p68). When some of the 
Fabian Society members failed to see the socialist value 
in the project and suggested that it might contravene the 
terms of the trust, Webb sought advice from his friend 
Richard Haldane, Q.C. (Harrison, 2000, p297). 
 
Haldane was a ‘philosophical Germanophile’ with a well-
connected upper class Scottish background.  He had 
studied at Göttingen University before embarking on a 
‘distinguished’ career as a London barrister and becoming 
a radical Liberal MP. The experience of studying in 
Germany had created in Haldane an ‘idealist world-view’ 
and a sincere commitment to public service (Vernon, 2004, 
pp87-88). Haldane considered higher education to be 
‘essential to a modern society’ for its fostering of 
insight and organisation (Silver, 2003, p18). Sidney 
Webb, the ‘austere’ socialist and Richard Haldane, the 
wealthy ‘socialite’ would seem unlikely friends and 
collaborators (Vernon, 2004, p89). Both men believed in 
taking ‘reasoned and efficient action’ (Vernon, 2004, 
pp88-89). Haldane doubtless approved of ‘wiley’ Webb and 
his sometimes-dubious methods and both were often 
involved in ‘public spirited conspiracies’ (Harrison, 
2000, p297). 
 
Haldane considered the legal implications of Webb’s 
intention to use the money for the founding of a school 
of economics. He then advised that if Webb firmly 
believed that the workers lot would be improved by the 
scientific study of social conditions then the socialist 
requirements would have been met and his proposed use of 
the bequest could be regarded as legal (Beveridge, 1949, 
p44). Once assured, Webb bulldozed all objections aside 
declaring that the school should simply be seen as a 
‘permanent and institutionalised’ version of the Fabian’s 
socialist lecture programme (Harrison, 2000, p286). 
  
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
started life in 1895 in a rented ground floor apartment 
near London’s Strand. Student numbers increased rapidly, 
and day to day running costs became an immediate concern 
(Vernon, 2004, p88). Webb initially diverted LCC funds 
intended for the Technical Education Board (Kadish, 1993, 
p229), to the coffers of his ‘new venture’ (Beveridge, 
1949, p48) and eventually convinced the LCC to officially 
become the LSE’s ‘principal source’ of funds (Vernon, 
2004, p88). From its earliest days the school had been 
registered with the Westminster authorities as a library 
that conducted lectures and classes.  
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Webb knew that the Scientific Societies Act of 1843 
exempted libraries from the payment of local rates 
(Beveridge, 1949, p50). For similar financial reasons 
Webb chose to eschew a royal charter. Instead the LSE was 
incorporated as a company and limited by guarantee under 
the Companies Acts. A special dispensation authorised the 
school to leave the word ‘limited’ out of its name 
(Beveridge, 1949, p51) but it technically remains (Reg 
no. 70527) ‘The London School of Economics and Political 
Science Limited’ (LSE website, 2011). Such financial 
dodges were no longer required after the LSE became 
established as the ‘chief powerhouse of British social 
science’ (Anderson, 2006, p84) and also one of the 
country’s ‘most heavily endowed... academic institutions’ 
(Beveridge, 1949, p44). 
 
In 1904, the Haldane Committee was created to produce an 
overview of the enlarged and somewhat disparate group of 
science and technology institutions at South Kensington 
(Sheppard, 1975, p90). Both Sidney and Beatrice Webb were 
members of the committee and supported its eventual 
conclusion that all of the existing South Kensington 
science and technical schools should be fashioned into a 
‘major new entity’ (Silver, 2003, p17). In 1907, the 
South Kensington institutions were duly amalgamated and 
became the Imperial College of Science and Technology 
(Anderson, 2006, p84). Haldane directed that the teaching 
at Imperial College be styled after that used by ‘German 
technical high schools’; he wanted to create an 
institution ‘fit for the metropolis of the Empire' 
(Anderson, 2006, p84). Although no longer the only 
industrialised nation, Britain maintained its hegemony 
through its capital’s management of the ‘liberal world 
economy’ (Callinicos, 2006, p146). London was the 
‘imperial city’ (Morris, 1979, p27) literally the ‘hub of 
a global Empire’ (Tabili, 2006, p54). However with both 
‘industrial and naval supremacy’ under threat from 
continental technical innovation Britain’s leaders 
elected to side with one of Europe’s ‘two great military 
blocs’ (Callinicos, 2006, p146).  
 
European alliances: a basis for war 
 
Historical accounts are often more conveniently divided 
by political, economic and social events than by the 
calendar. Consequently the beginning of the First World 
War is widely considered to mark the end of the long 
nineteenth century and the beginning of the short 
twentieth century (Clark, 1998, p10; Hobsbawm, 1994, p56; 




The terrible conflict that was to start the new century 
had been foreshadowed by years of diplomatic pacts and 
treaties, these were the agreements by which the nations 
of Europe sought to insure themselves against foreign 
military interference (Anderson & Hershey, 1918, p16). 
Most alliances were initially drawn up as defence pacts 
but throughout the first decade of the century they were 
secretly rewritten in increasingly aggressive terms 
(Poon, 1979). In 1910, George V ascended the British 
throne. He and Germany’s Wilhelm II, Russia’s Nicholas II 
and Alexandra were all cousins. It appears that there was 
a ’real bond’ between ‘Nicky and Georgie’ (Perry & 
Pleshakov, 1999, p163) but somewhat ‘strained relations’ 
between ‘Nicky and Willy’ (Anderson & Hershey, 1918, 
p285; Tomaszewski, 2002, p50). When a British, French and 
Russian triangular alliance was arrived at, George V 
expressed his belief that European peace could be 
maintained as long as these three ‘stuck together’ 
(Tomaszewski, 2002, p50). This was not to be the case. 
 
In Vienna, the leaders of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
expressed concern that the Balkan provinces of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina were becoming unstable (Anderson & Hershey, 
1918, p382). The region had been under Ottoman rule for 
almost five hundred years but was increasingly coming 
under the influence of Slavic nationalists (Anderson & 
Hershey, 1918, p382; Wedel, 1932, pp40-42). To contain 
this ‘threat’, Austro-Hungarian troops moved into the 
area and in October 1908, the annexation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was declared and with it Vienna gained 
valuable coastal access (Wedel, 1932, p58). In June 1914 
the Austrian army planned a show-of-force military 
exercise in Bosnia, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to 
the Austro-Hungarian throne was invited to attend. The 
Archduke and his wife accepted with reluctance, the 
region was known to be still ‘seething’ with armed 
nationalists (Gerolymatos, 2002, p12). Their concerns 
were justified. As their motorcade slowed to negotiate 
the narrow streets of Sarajevo, nationalist gunman 
Gavrilo Princip, found himself within yards of the 
official car. He stepped forward and fired two shots, 
killing both the Archduke Ferdinand and his wife 
(Eisenhower, 2004, p137).  
 
The assassination, though shocking, did not at first 
appear to be of great political significance. Ferdinand’s 
death was the fifth in a series of recent Habsburg 
assassinations and none had previously warranted an 
international response (McMaster, 1918, p1). But there 
was political capital to be made; the eastward expansion 
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire had long been blocked by 
Serbia (Robbins, 1993, p3.  
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The loss of the Archduke provided Vienna with a ‘golden 
opportunity’ to accuse Serbia of sheltering Bosnian 
rebels (Richelson, 1997, p18). An Austrian ultimatum 
arrived in Belgrade on July 23rd; its deliberately 
provocative demands could not possibly be met (Gooch, 
1923, p536). The Serbs appealed for assistance from the 
Russian government (Warth, 1997, p192) and a ‘sickening 
train of events’ was set in motion (Micklethwait & 
Wooldridge, 2003, p49).  
 
The ‘tangle of complex alliances, treaties’ and ‘military 
considerations’(O’Farrell, 2007, p367) started the 
dominoes falling. Austria declared war on the Serbians 
and by default the Russians. The Russians reciprocated. 
The German declaration against Russia triggered a defence 
pact that brought in France. The French mobilised. 
Germany declared war on France hoping that a swift 
invasion via neutral Belgium would quickly dispose of the 
French threat leaving German troops free to turn on 
Russia (Cawood & McKinnon-Bell, 2001, p3; Holmes, 2004; 
Schmitt, 1918, p5-60). German domination of Europe would 
allow the seizure of French possessions in North Africa, 
their presence in the Mediterranean would jeopardise 
British sea routes to India and the whole of its ‘extra-
European network’ (Cain & Hopkins, 1993, p450).  
 
Prime Minister Herbert Asquith’s assurance that the 
British public would be mere 'spectators’ to the conflict 
(Asquith, 1923, p300) was ridiculed by the pro-war lobby 
who produced an eighty year old treaty in which Britain 
guaranteed Belgian neutrality (Brockon, 1990, 147). This 
agreement was violated on August 2nd when Germany invaded 
Belgium and Asquith was obliged to declare war on 
Tuesday, August 4th 1914 (Asquith, 1923, p319; Coakley, 
1956, p366). So precarious had been the balance of 
political power in Europe, that from the Austrian 
ultimatum, when all had seemed at ‘perfect peace’ 
(McMaster, 1918, p3), to Britain’s entry into the war, 
only twelve days had elapsed (Havighurst, 1966, p120). 
 
During the first hour of hostilities the British General 
Post Office cable ship ‘Alert’ was ordered to sea. When 
it returned its crew had completed the dangerous task of 
dredging up and irreparably severing the undersea cables 
that were at the heart of Germany’s international 
telegraphic communications system. Britain was determined 
to be the only country able to access the ‘vast network’ 
of telegraphic communication (Winkler, 2008, pp5-6) All 
further communication between the Germans and the western 
hemisphere had to be conducted by neutral cable or 
wireless (Spencer, 1953, p55).  
 
 86 
The only way to send a secure message via these ‘open’ 
services was to employ a complex cipher. The keys to the 
German codes were contained in a series of books, almost 
all of which had already been obtained by British 





Britain’s overview of clandestine activities both at home 
and abroad was formalised in 1909 with the founding of 
the British Secret Service Bureau. Domestic counter 
espionage fell to MI5, while MI6 was in charge of 
overseas intelligence gathering (Clarke & Norman, 1999, 
p486). Many military officials were disdainful of the 
Secret Service seeing it as simply sneaks ‘telling tales’ 
(Heffernan, 1996, p507). Intelligence gathering was an 
un-gentlemanly occupation that relied on ‘casual agents’, 
‘rogues’ (Goodman, 2009, p156) and a smattering of 
genuinely patriotic eccentrics with a ‘taste for 
travelling incognito’ (Heffernan, 1996, p507).  
 
The ill-informed military decisions of the Boer and 
Crimean Wars helped persuade the government of the need 
for specialists to gather secret information rather than 
‘casual agents’ (Richelson, 1997, p11). Those charged 
with seeking out such specialists rarely looked further 
afield than Oxford and Cambridge universities. David 
George Hogarth, the keeper of Oxford’s Ashmolean Museum 
from 1909, was an early ‘academic spy-master’; he 
recruited graduates who might be trained in the ‘arts of 
espionage under the guise of scholarship’ (Heffernan, 
1996, p513). One of Hogarth’s protégés, T. E. Lawrence, 
participated in pre-war sorties into the Ottoman 
territories; archaeological excavations provided ‘cover’ 
for spying missions with a ‘clearly defined’ military 
purpose (Satia, 2008, p35). Hogarth praised Lawrence’s 
remarkable ability to report back absolutely everything 
that he had seen and heard (Hogarth, 1920, p428).  
 
Despite spending two years of the First World War in the 
desert and suffering ‘Arab diseases and fleas’, Lawrence 
of Arabia remained ‘essentially an Oxford intellectual’ 
(English, 1987, p7). Spies from almost all the 
belligerent nations were observing Middle Eastern 
developments, with the British paying particular 
attention to the tottering Ottoman Empire which still 
posed a ‘serious threat’ to sea routes and oil supplies 
(Woodward, 2009, p). Britain’s ‘honorary attaches’ at the 
embassy in Constantinople maintained a surreptitious 
watch on all of the Ottoman territories.  
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These agents were ’aristocratic Oxbridge graduates’ who 
had been drawn by the intrigue and excitement of the 
‘drama of European rivalry’ that unfolded in the 
Byzantine city (Satia, 2008, p34). Goodman states that 
some ‘gentlemen’ volunteered for dangerous missions in 
exotic places simply for the ‘thrill of the adventure’; 
they signed on for spying missions as ‘a sort of 
bourgeois game’ (Goodman, 2009, p156). Those public 
school attitudes that had earlier dismissed espionage as 
underhand now celebrated covert intelligence gathering as 
an exciting extension of school and university game 
playing. Indeed the chief of the secret service thought 
spying to be ‘capital sport.’ (Richelson, 1997, p11). 
 
The conflict begins  
 
Asquith’s declaration of war with Germany ‘was greeted 
with unbelievable glee’ (Roberts, 2005, p48), and an 
indecent rush to destruction that was driven by patriotic 
fervour and the ‘popular support’ for a fight (Cawood & 
McKinnon-Bell, 2001, p4). Each of the belligerent 
countries committed to war in the unshakable belief that 
given their military superiority it would ‘all be over by 
Christmas' (Grenville, 2005, p60). In Britain’s case this 
optimistic prediction was shared by the Cabinet who had 
been assured by economists that none of the countries 
involved could afford to finance total war for ‘more than 
six months’ (Allen & Hirst, 1926, p21). Britain’s 
position as the ‘world's banker’ could be damaged or even 
ruined by a protracted conflict that required high levels 
of ‘defence expenditure’ over a long term (Cain & 
Hopkins, 1993, p450). Just three months after the opening 
of hostilities the cost of the British war effort was 
running at a million pounds a day (Allen & Hirst, 1926, 
p22).  
 
Germany had an economic advantage, in that its industrial 
expansion had been methodical and its traditionally 
‘authoritarian political culture’ lent itself more 
efficiently to adaptation for war (Cawood & McKinnon-
Bell, 2001, p48). The British government had no such 
national control and an aversion to a large standing army 
prevented any early consideration of conscription 
(Havighurst, 1966, p132). Britain relied instead on part-
time support groups, such as the Territorial Army, the 
Officer Training Corps and the Army Reserve. All had been 
formed or revised under the 1905 to 1912 tenure of R. B. 
Haldane as Secretary of State for War (Roberts, 2005, 
p51). Public schools and universities were encouraged to 
offer training that would introduce boys to the ‘military 
arts’ and the ‘gentlemanly character’ that was required 
of an officer (Palazzo, 2000, p15).  
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The War Office oversaw the teaching and examinations and 
by 1914 most public schools and all of the universities 
had ‘officer training programs’ (Palazzo, 2000, p15). 
Haldane’s army reforms were generally well received, 
however the reformer himself fared less well. A famous 
advocate of German university methods, research and even 
German industry, Haldane fell foul of the wave of 
‘hysterical anti-German feeling’ that swept Britain in 
the first days of the war (Vernon, 2004, p183). His 
enthusiastic support for all things German forced him to 
give up his cabinet post and maintain a lower profile 
until the armistice. Haldane spent much of the rest of 
the war co-opted onto various committee’s and enquiries, 
usually at the suggestion of friends like Beatrice and 
Sidney Webb (Vernon, 2004, p183). The decline in the 
popularity of things German also led to the dismissal of 
the First Sea Lord, Prince Louis of Battenberg, because 
of his German name, which he quickly abandoned in favour 
of Mountbatten (Juniper, 2004, p33). The royal family had 
inherited Prince Albert’s surname and title, they 
discarded the title, ‘Saxe-Coburg-Gotha’ and changed the 
family name, which is recorded as either ‘Wettin or 
Wipper’ to the rather more English sounding ‘Windsor’ 
(Tunzelman, 2007, p42) 
 
The battle plans of all the belligerent powers almost 
immediately ‘proved inadequate’ (Cawood & McKinnon-Bell, 
2001, p4). Much of the forward planning had been based on 
backward thinking. An old style 'war of movement’ that 
required a highly ‘mobile combination of infantry and 
cavalry’ had been both expected and planned for 
(Havighurst, 1966, p136). But the German army’s rapid 
advance through Belgium had found its entry into France 
barred by an unexpectedly well-prepared defence. Neither 
side made any significant progress and a stalemate 
developed, the textbook field battle strategies were 
abandoned as the opposing armies dug in (Hammond, 1999, 
p8). All hope of the widely predicted Christmas finale 
was dashed as the fighting became bogged down in the 
muddy, bloody attrition of virtually static trench 
warfare.  
 
The scale of the conflict soon required that Britain’s 
regular and territorial armies be reinforced; a campaign 
designed to appeal to the ‘patriotism and self respect’ 
of potential volunteers was a huge success and young men 
from all social backgrounds flocked to join up (Dent, 
1961, p64). To provide these raw recruits with leaders 
the War Office turned to the Officer Training Corp. Two 
thousand ‘invitations’ were sent to ‘university and 
public school men’ urging them to apply for a commission 
(Palazzo, 2000, p15).  
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The impact on all of the universities was ‘catastrophic’ 
(Vernon, 2004, p176). Large numbers of students left or 
suspended their studies in their enthusiasm to 
participate in the Great War. Oxford, Cambridge and the 
civic universities, who had ‘hardly got into their 
stride’, were suddenly deserted by many of their 
‘students and younger teaching staff’ (Dent, 1961, p64).  
 
Preoccupied government agencies were unconcerned with 
academic niceties. For them the universities provided 
either requisitionable buildings or officers to lead men 
‘over the top’. Potential troops were quickly processed 
and ‘swept indiscriminately’ into the trenches (Dent, 
1961, p64). Initially civilian expertise was ignored, 
this had led to Britain’s top physicist, Henry Moseley, 
the ‘discoverer of atomic numbers’ (Morrell, 1997, p6) 
being arbitrarily recruited and sent to Gallipoli where 
he was killed in action (Sinclair, 1986, p19).  
 
But a shortage of artillery shells at the beginning of 
1915 caused a loss of confidence in the technical staff 
of Britain’s munitions factories (Cawood & McKinnon-Bell, 
2001, p40-45). New production methods had to be developed 
quickly; this dire necessity prompted both government and 
manufacturers to turn to the only existent broad based 
pool of ‘scientific and technical’ research available to 
them – the universities (Vernon, 2004, p176). In Germany 
all universities were closed and any remaining staff and 
students forced to accept essential war work (Cawood & 
McKinnon-Bell, 2001, p26), but most British universities, 
despite the shortage of personnel, stayed open and 
attempted to maintain some sort of normality.  
 
Prior to 1914 the civic universities in particular had 
experienced an ‘uphill battle’ to get research work taken 
seriously. Now, these ‘sources of scientific expertise’ 
were presented with ‘something of a breakthrough’ 
(Barnes, 1996, p285). The civics had already made 
significant contribution to the development of machine 
lubricants, ‘colliery pumps, vanadium steels, chrome 
leather, gas fires’ and ‘sparking plugs’ (Sanderson, 
1988, p90). Their new challenge was to create 
replacements for those materials and products that had 
previously been imported.  
 
The universities took up the challenge with enthusiasm 
and the Great War was to prove a ‘huge accelerator’ of 
technical progress (Juniper, 2004, p32). The university 
research departments were confident that any aspect of 
German progress could be bettered, as long as the 
‘necessary resources were made available’ (Heffernan, 
1996, p505).  
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These sentiments were enthusiastically echoed by some of 
the country’s ‘most distinguished scientists’ and an 
energetic campaign was launched by novelist H. G. Wells, 
to seek additional funding for scientific facilities 
involved in war work (Heffernan, 1996, p505). From 1915 
the civic universities began to enjoy a more prestigious 
role in ‘national life’ (Barnes, 1996, p285); their 
research departments were able to replicate many urgently 
needed industrial processes relatively quickly. Britain 
was soon producing its own versions of numerous products 
previously regarded as being of uniquely German 
manufacture; these included ‘dyes, drugs, optical glass, 
magnetos and soap powder’ (Sanderson, 1999, p169). 
 
Technological advancement was also apparent in the 
trenches of Western Europe. As the war dragged on, the 
opposing earthworks became more elaborate, and more 
permanent. A ‘great sinuous scar’ dominated the landscape 
from the Channel coast to the Swiss border (Heffernan, 
1996, p511). Railways, motorcars, aircraft and telephones 
were all employed in the newly industrialised processes 
of making war. Communication by radio was a technical 
possibility but the British Army was ‘unenthusiastic’, 
the Corps of Signals had made a ‘huge investment in 
telephone and telegraph cable’ and saw the fixed battle 
positions throughout France and Belgium as an ‘unequalled 
opportunity to lay it all out’ (Juniper, 2004, p36). 
Literally thousands of miles of wires and cables made up 
a communications network that connected frontlines with 
support trenches, staff headquarters and strategic 
planning offices on the continent and the politicians in 
London (Juniper, 2004, p36).  
 
Mud, blood, trenches and politics 
 
Mismanagement of the war in general and the shell 
shortage in particular was making Asquith’s minority 
Liberal government look positively incompetent (Glynn & 
Booth, 1996, p126). Senior Conservatives were invited 
into a coalition Cabinet but this did not stop the 
criticism of Asquith’s lack-lustre leadership (Simkin, 
1997). The Daily Mail and the Times, the flagship 
newspapers of Lord Northcliffe, were happy to print such 
complaints along side editorials calling for Asquith to 
be replaced (Thompson, 1999, p68). David Lloyd George, a 
Liberal member of the Cabinet, was in agreement with 
Northcliffe and together they ‘plotted’ with the 
Conservatives to ‘bring about Asquith's downfall’ (Duffy, 
2009). In December 1916 the coalition Cabinet finally 
decreed that Asquith must go. Soon after the forced 
resignation Lloyd George was named as the new Prime 
Minister (Pearce, 2007, p16).  
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He immediately appointed a five-man ‘quick decision’ team 
(Pugh, 1999, p168) who met daily in the 'garden suburb', 
a group of large sheds that stood behind the Downing 
Street terrace (Winter, 1994, p15)  .  
 
As the conflict approached its second Christmas without 
showing any sign of a satisfactory conclusion, the flow 
of British volunteers signing on for military service 
‘began to sag’ (Havighurst, 1966, p132). If the British 
were to provide the large-scale reinforcements pledged to 
France and Russia, the Liberal members of the Cabinet 
would have to overcome a ‘fundamental aversion’ to 
conscription (Chester & Willson, 1957, p60). The 
Conservatives pressured Lloyd George who was reluctant 
but understood the circumstances (Havighurst, 1966, 
p133). When the Military Service Act came before the 
House half the Liberals voted against or abstained. But 
their objections were not significant enough to prevent 
the vote being carried and, as of January 1916, unmarried 
men between the ages of 18 and 41 started to be called up 
for compulsory enlistment (Havighurst, 1966, p133). 
Within three months the call up was extended to all men 
of the prescribed age regardless of marital status. Its 
passing into law trampled the ‘sacred principles’ of the 
very liberal Liberal Party and shattered its ‘cohesion’ 
so completely that it would never recover (Robbins, 1993, 
p133). 
 
1916 was a grisly year of ‘great battles’, the conflict 
raged with no end in sight (Morrow, 2003, p124), the 
alliance arrangements ‘virtually guaranteed’ ever more 
casualties as previously neutral nations were drawn into 
the fray (Darby, 1998, p25). The treaties and pacts of 
increased economic and social interdependence had been 
transformed into the ‘globalisation of...  conflict’ 
(Molle, 2003, p22). The original ‘Central’ alliance of 
Germany and the empires of Austro-Hungary and the 
Ottoman’s were reinforced by Bulgaria while the ‘Entente’ 
powers of Britain, Russia, and France had gathered Italy 
and Japan and would eventually recruit Portugal, Romania, 
Greece, China and the USA to its cause (Strachan, 2004). 
Many of the belligerent countries, Britain in particular, 
had colonies and dependant nations from which combatants 
could be drawn. Neutral countries such as Switzerland, 
Spain, the Scandinavian states and the Netherlands were 
not caught up in the actual conflict but were ‘not 
unaffected’ (Robbins, 1993, p25). Only the world’s 
remotest regions managed to stay out of both the fighting 





As far as the populations of the countries engaged in the 
‘all-embracing do-or-die’ of ‘industrialized combat’ 
(Steinberg et al, 2005, pxix) were concerned, it was 
indeed a ‘global war’ (Strachan, 2004). 
 
International repercussions  
 
Directly after declaring war Britain deployed a naval 
blockade to prevent shipping of any kind from reaching 
German seaports (Kennedy, 1982, p4). Germany did not have 
the naval vessels to mount a permanent counter-offensive, 
the only way it could impose a retaliatory blockade was 
to resort to maritime guerrilla warfare – the submarine 
raider (Goebel, 2008). Little effort was made to avoid 
attacks on neutral shipping and so began the ‘submarine 
frightfulness’ (McMaster, 1918, p82). In March 1915 three 
American cargo ships were sunk by German U-boats 
(McMaster, 1918, p82). America’s President, Woodrow 
Wilson, warned Germany that further attacks would be met 
with retaliation (McMaster, 1918, p82). On May 8th 1915, 
a German submarine sank Cunard’s luxury liner, Lusitania, 
off the coast of Ireland with the loss of a hundred and 
twenty eight American lives (Aron, 2004, pp112-113). The 
American public was outraged by the attack and by 
Germany’s claim that the sinking was ‘a great event’ 
(McMaster, 1918, p100). Allied and neutral governments 
were ‘sickened’ as the Kaiser hailed the submarine’s 
captain and crew as hero’s (Rose, 2007, p250).  
 
The Kaiser had little else to celebrate; the ‘noose’, 
which British patrols had drawn around the North Sea, was 
‘cinched ever tighter’ and Germany’s civilian population 
were starving (Kennedy, 1982, p4). It was a game of 
brinkmanship, German estimates of British food stocks led 
them to believe that five months of unrestricted 
submarine warfare would bring the country ‘to its knees’ 
(Morrow, 2003, p153). Such attacks would inevitably 
involve American shipping and prompt Wilson to declare 
war, but the Germans were gambling that Britain would be 
‘starved into defeat’ before the United States could 
transport a significant force to Europe (Kennedy, 1982, 
p5). In September 1916 American diplomats were warned by 
German high command that any ship failing to identify 
itself as neutral would be sunk without warning (Hayes, 
1920, p215). Wilson broke off diplomatic relations with 
Germany but did not declare war (Coakley, 1956, p370). In 
London, Prime Minister Lloyd George was furious that 






The German submarine offensive had indeed severely 
reduced the number of merchant ships that made it into 
British ports. There was only enough grain in Britain to 
last six weeks; if the U-boats were allowed to continue 
unchallenged it would spell disaster (Morrow, 2003, 
p202). 
 
On January 16th 1917, the British intercepted and 
deciphered a telegram from Arthur Zimmermann, the German 
Foreign Secretary that had been sent to the President of 
Mexico (Coakley, 1956, p370). The message was intended to 
entice Mexico into partnership with Germany in a war 
against the United States. In exchange, Mexico would 
receive substantial financial support plus, after the 
assumed victory, the return of the lost territories of 
Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona (Coakley, 1956, p370; 
Hayes, 1920, p216). The British passed the message, with 
proof of its authenticity, through diplomatic channels to 
Washington. Wilson released the text of the telegram to 
the press; the ‘nation was shocked’ (Coakley, 1956, 
p371).  
 
While America reconsidered its position the Russian war 
effort was halted by an internal Bolshevik revolt. 
Government troops lost control and in March the Tsar 
abdicated. The news revitalised the Western allies who 
hoped that the Russian ‘steamroller’ could now pursue the 
war with ‘more energy and effect’ (Kennedy, 1982, p9). 
Russia’s provisional government adopted an administration 
based on the democratic western model and America led the 
world in its recognition of the new regime (Hayes, 1920, 
p21). A democratic Russia was acceptable to Wilson as an 
ally against Germany in a war which he expected to be 
joining very soon (Hayes, 1920, p21).  
 
Those Americans who opposed such action were immediately 
considered either ‘unpatriotic or pro-German’ (Spencer, 
1953, p97). Germanic sounding names were changed, 
sauerkraut would be called ‘liberty cabbage’, hamburger 
became ‘salisbury steak’ and frankfurters would forever 
be ‘hot dogs’ (Perry & Pleshakov, 1999, p115). The United 
States of America finally declared war on Germany on 








Germany and the new Russia 
 
During March 1917 Germany not only had to consider 
America's entry into the war but also the prospect of 
Russian troops under better leadership (Kennedy, 1982, 
p9). Although Russia's provisional government was a 
‘questionable’ coalition of Duma moderates and Petrograd 
Soviets its actions appeared politically credible (Cawood 
& McKinnon-Bell, 2001, p119). An uneasy contentment had 
settled over Russian society since most of its 
‘professional revolutionaries’ had fled the country after 
the failure of the 1905 uprising (Warth, 1997, p92). The 
surest way for the Germans to ‘cripple’ this political 
progress would be to return the exiled revolutionaries 
and hope that they created enough trouble to destabilise 
the provisional government (Kennedy, 1982, p9). Vladimir 
Lenin was a leading revolutionary, a ‘brilliant 
combination’ of ‘fanatic and staff officer’ (Cruttwell, 
1934, p425) who had for some years been in ‘deep hiding’ 
in Zurich (Trotsky, 1957, p460).  
 
German Foreign Secretary, Arthur Zimmermann, once again 
stepped into the role of history maker. He had, since 
1914, been surreptitiously providing Russia’s Bolshevik 
revolutionaries with funds and the abdication of the Tsar 
now offered ‘an entirely new spectrum of opportunities ‘ 
(Pearson, 1975, p62). Lenin’s ‘value to the Germans’ rose 
considerably (Pearson, 1975, p62) and Zimmermann was 
authorised to offer the agitators the opportunity of a 
return to Petrograd (Cawood & McKinnon-Bell, 2001, p125). 
The offer was accepted and the German high command 
arranged for Lenin and his circle of political exiles to 
be transported safely across the war torn continent in a 
specially marked and sealed railway carriage (Cruttwell, 
1934, p425).  No one was allowed to leave the train en 
route; the ‘radical virus’ was only to be released when 
the train reached Petrograd (Kennedy, 1982, p9).  
 
Once back in Russia a series of stage-managed events 
promoted the charismatic Lenin as a figure to be revered 
to the point of ‘uninhibited demagogy’ (Seton-Watson, 
1952, p364). By October Lenin’s Central Committee were 
sufficiently assured of popular support that they gave 
the order for armed insurrection and seizure of ‘key 
buildings and installations in Petrograd’ (Wood, 2003, 
pxx). The 'Red October' coup was a success, it had, 
initially at least, seized power ‘without bloodshed’ 
(Trotsky, 1957, p460). Lenin told his Bolshevik-Soviet 
‘Communist Party’ that the German army posed no further 
threat as ‘German workers’ would soon follow the Russian 
example and rise up against their leaders (Seton-Watson, 
1952, p364).  
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But the future of Russia was in the balance and with no 
evidence of 'other revolutions in the offing’ Lenin 
approached the Germans for peace negotiations (Goemans, 
2000, p253). 
 
In return for withdrawing from the Eastern Front the 
Germans demanded that Russia ‘give up the Baltic states, 
Finland, Poland, and Ukraine’ (Cawood & McKinnon-Bell, 
2001, p137; Mosley, 2010). Lenin had little choice but to 
advise his comrades to agree to Germany's ‘harsh terms’ 
and then concentrate on consolidating the revolution 
(Goemans, 2000, p258). In March 1918, the Congress of 
Soviets voted overwhelmingly to accept the German 
conditions (Goemans, 2000, p256). In July 1918, the world 
was told that Tsar Nicholas, the Tsarina Alexandra, their 
five children and members of the royal household had all 
been executed (King & Wilson, 2003 p45).  The ‘brutal 
murders’ were carried out in the cellar of a house in 
Ekaterinburg on orders from Lenin. Their remains were 
thrown into a disused mineshaft (Ananich & Ganelin, 1996, 
p398; McCauley, 1997, p171). 
 
The war on Europe’s Eastern Front was over. But the 
wrangling over the treaty had taken up so much of the 
Communist party’s time that their opposition had been 
able to regroup. Russia ‘erupted’ into a civil war which 
it took the Communists two years to quell (Mosley, 2010). 
Political unheaval was spreading and President Wilson was 
aware of the danger of the rest of Europe falling into 
similar turmoil.   
 
Wilson’s fourteen points  
 
In a series of wartime speeches Wilson was careful to 
avoid alienating German-Americans by stressing that their 
argument was with a regime rather than ‘kinsmen’ (Bailey, 
1947, p35). One of his speeches presented a fourteen-
point agreement that he considered would be acceptable 
grounds to open for peace negotiations with Germany.  
Though never discussed with the Entente powers or 
intended as a blueprint for action, the ‘Fourteen Points’ 
were published internationally (Bailey, 1947, p44). 
 
German front line troops were showing signs of ‘war 
weariness’; the prospect of soon having to fight fresh 
American reinforcements sapped morale and increased the 
inclination to desertion or munity (Watson, 2008, p21). 
The revolution in Russia served as an example to 
socialist workers in Germany that ‘victorious revolution’ 
was a real possibility and that it could end the war 
(Broué, 2005, p90). Young recruits being transported to 
the trenches sensed this atmosphere of rebellion.  
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They delayed their trains by rioting and vandalism, 
uncoupling wagons and assaulting their officers or simply 
deserted (Watson, 2008, p22). In October, the German 
fleet was ordered out into the Baltic, the great 
battleships had sailed only once and the ensuing Battle 
of Jutland had been inconclusive (Morrow, 2003, 150). Now 
after almost two years of leaving the ‘ships and the 
morale of its sailors rotting’ the call came to action 
(Morrow, 2003, 152). But desperation was in the air and 
rumours of a ‘final suicide attack’ circulated; the 
sailors were in no mood to obey such orders and mutinied 
(Cawood & McKinnon-Bell, 2001, p120). 
 
The sense of inevitable German defeat that spread through 
the starving homeland was confirmed when almost half a 
million German front line troops were incapacitated by 
influenza (Morrow, 2003, p245). Strategic planning and 
battle tactics were virtually impossible with so many 
soldiers too demoralised or too ill to fight (Rosenhek, 
2005). By July 1918 the depleted German lines were in no 
state to repel a ‘sudden and ferocious’ (Watson, 2008, 
p23) attack by British, French and American troops at the 
Marne or another by British and French troops in August. 
Germany’s spring offensive had been a disaster and the 
army began to retreat (Cawood & McKinnon-Bell, 2001, 
p120). By September the German government had to admit 
that it had lost the war. No official statement was made 
to the Entente powers but the German chancellor contacted 
President Wilson and requested a meeting to negotiate 
peace based on his suggested fourteen points (Cawood & 
McKinnon-Bell, 2001, p120). Ferguson argues that a factor 
in the inability of the German army to continue as a 
fighting force was the outbreak of a particularly 
debilitating strain of influenza (Ferguson, 2006, p145).  
 
The first global pandemic 
 
The second week of November 1918 saw an end to the trench 
warfare of the Western Front. Absent from any celebration 
of the armistice were the fourteen thousand ‘Londoners’ 
who had died just a week before after falling victim to 
the pandemic referred to as ‘Spanish’ influenza (Brennan, 
2001). Though the infection was to become a global threat 
epidemiogical studies suggest that it originated in an 
over crowded American army camp in Kansas during the 
spring of 1918 (Hsiao, 2003, p77). A violent outbreak of 
influenza had hospitalised over a thousand soldiers and 
despite all being in the ‘prime of life’, forty-eight of 
the men died. These deaths were officially attributed to 




The logistics of total war demanded the ‘wholesale’ 
mobilisation of troops (Cawood & McKinnon-Bell, 2001, 
p43). Previously unheard of numbers of individuals had to 
be massed, corralled, fed and rested while being trained 
and transported. The war effort was paramount and was not 
to be jeopardised by niceties like comfort or sanitary 
arrangements (Rosenhek, 2005). When the troops from the 
camp in Kansas joined the two million strong American 
army that was ‘shipped off to Europe’ during the summer 
of 1918 they were accompanied by a ‘tiny, silent 
companion’ (Chowder, 1997, p3). Almost as fast as the 
troops were being deployed, incidents of influenza began 
being reported (Chowder, 1997, p4). The fatality rate 
among victims was in the region of eight per cent and 
many of those succumbed within twelve to forty eight 
hours (Mowat, 1955, p22). This deadly infection was 
twenty five times ‘more lethal than ordinary flu’ (Hsiao, 
2003, p83).  
 
By August 1918 outbreaks were appearing almost 
simultaneously at the main American disembarkation point 
of Brest in France, the military coaling port of Freetown 
in Sierra Leone and in Boston, Massachusetts (Phillips & 
Killingray, 2003, p7). The infection went on to claim 
victims in India, Australia and New Zealand (Ferguson, 
2006, p144). Fearing the morale damaging effect of such 
news it was suppressed by the governments of all of the 
belligerent nations. The world learned of the threat 
through uncensored health reports published by the 
newspapers of neutral Spain. Unfortunately the source of 
the information became associated with the source of the 
infection that has, ever since been known as ‘Spanish’ 
influenza (Hsiao, 2003, p78).  
 
From its first appearance, the mutated virus ‘travelled 
rapidly’ through the urban and rural populations adjacent 
to the main shipping and trade routes until it ‘circled 
the globe’ (Phillips & Killingray, 2003, p4). A world 
population caught up in its first global war also had to 
contend with the most virulent ‘outbreak of infectious 
disease’ in world history (Oxford, 2003, pxvii). The 
infection raged for a total of forty-six weeks, and then 
suddenly stopped (Langford, 2002, p4). The 
epidemiological view is that the pandemic simply ‘ran out 
of fuel’; there were no more susceptible victims 
(Chowder, 2003, p18). Previous plagues were 
geographically confined whereas the influenza pandemic, 
aided by efficient transport systems quickly attained 
rapid transmission and greater ‘global reach’ than even 
the Black Death (Phillips & Killingray, 2003, p4). There 
are no comprehensive figures for a total death toll and 
estimates are variable.  
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Total British deaths from influenza during 1918-1919 are 
estimated to have exceeded one hundred and fifty thousand 
(Mowat, 1955, p22). Estimates for the worldwide death 
toll suggest a figure of between thirty and fifty 
million, approximately four times the fatalities suffered 
by a combination of all belligerent nations during the 
Great War (Wisner et al, 2003, p37). One percent of 
American males in the twenty five to thirty five age 
group was lost to influenza (Ferguson, 2006, p144) as 
were an estimated fifteen million citizens of India 
(Roberts, 1999, p286). Stearns argues that here was a 
consequence of ‘global unity’ that could never have been 
anticipated (Stearns, 2010, p67).  
 
The war ends in Europe 1918 
 
Against German wishes Austro-Hungary sued for peace on 
September 15th followed on the 19th by the collapse of 
the Bulgarian army and the defeat of Turkey (Pitt, 1963, 
p246). Germany had no more allies and enormous ‘social, 
economic and political pressures’ were threatening 
internal collapse (Cawood & McKinnon-Bell, 2001, p126).  
On November 8th German representatives met with Marshal 
Ferdinand Foch, Supreme Commander of the Allied armies,  
at a railway siding deep in the Compiègne Forest near 
Réthonde (Pitt, 1963, p266). Marshall Foch wasted no time 
on pleasantries; the Germans were given the terms of an 
armistice and three days to discuss them (Goemans, 2000, 
p282). Allied demands included the withdrawal of all 
German troops from the Western Front, the surrender of 
the High Seas Fleet and the renunciation of the 
territories gained via the treaty with Russia (Cawood & 
McKinnon-Bell, 2001, p138; Goemans, 2000, p305).  
 
It was suggested to the Wilhelm II on November 9th that a 
government without a Kaiser might be free to ‘avert 
revolution’ and negotiate better peace terms. The Kaiser 
abdicated and a new German Republic was proclaimed 
(Cawood & McKinnon-Bell, 2001, p120). At first light on 
November 11th, in Foch’s railway carriage headquarters, 
an armistice was signed that would silence the guns on 
the Western Front at 11am (Lowry, 1996, p1). Britain had 
achieved its main war aim; Germany had to give up its 
battle fleet, was economically ‘crippled’ and was no 
longer a continental threat (Lowry, 1996, p163). The 
Fourteen Points structure, which the German people had 
thought inviolate, was considerably modified (Goemans, 
2000, p300). The apparent harshness of the new terms had 
been predicted by German nationalists who believed that 
their armies were ‘unbeaten’ and gave credence to the 
legend that Germany had not lost the war but had been 
betrayed by Communists and Jews (Bailey, 1947, p53).  
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The myth that the German army could, and should, have 
fought on, had it not been stabbed in the back ‘at the 
Front’ (Watson, 2008, p21) gave rise to a national 
‘dreamland’ where the ‘concept of defeat was rejected’ 
(Steiner, 2001, p18). It was a notion later built upon 
and applied to great effect by the Nazi party (Bailey, 
1947, p53). 
 
The Paris peace conference and the 
League of Nations  
 
Representatives of the Allied countries met in Paris on 
January 18th 1919 for what would prove to be months of 
discussion to finalise the details of the treaty 
(Steiner, 2001, p15). British economist John Maynard 
Keynes, then a treasury official, was sent to Paris to 
oversee relief for Germany and Austria, he was required 
to deal with numerous reports of ‘misery, disorder and 
decay’ (Keynes 1920, p7). It was a depressing experience, 
which left him with the most ‘pessimistic diagnosis’ of 
the Versailles Treaty (Clark, 1998, p36). Keynes was 
afterward to write ‘The Economic Consequences of the 
Peace’ in which he argued that the vengeful modification 
of the original Fourteen Points would allow the Allies to 
force Germany to pay back ‘the entire cost of the war’ 
(Keynes 1920, pp113-115). Keynes predicted that such 
retribution would lead to international financial 
disintegration and another world war (Sinclair, 1986, 
p11).  
 
President Woodrow Wilson arrived at the Paris peace talks 
with every intention of pushing through his personal 
ambition for a new international peace organisation 
(Crafford, 1943, p145). His ‘league of all the nations’ 
was intended to go beyond a simple ‘re-weaving’ of the 
old and plainly flawed diplomatic web (Walworth, 1986, 
p1). Wilson’s commission to draft a League of Nations 
covenant ran simultaneously with the peace conference and 
its members hurriedly accepted its clauses without 
pausing to ‘quibble over details’. There was little 
‘clear-headed opposition’ (Bassett, 1930, p2) and 
although Wilson was not adverse to reasoned argument, he 
rarely altered an opinion more than once. Keynes states 
that the President was much ‘harder to de-bamboozle’ than 
he had been to ‘bamboozle’ in the first place (Keynes, 
1920, p55). The League of Nations covenant was 
‘intertwined’ with the peace treaty so that both would 
come into effect together. By the time the double 
document was signed Wilson had left for home, with the 
exception of one short interlude, he been absent from the 
White House for six months (Bailey, 1947a, p163).  
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On his return President Wilson found the Republican Party 
objected strongly to any American involvement in the 
League of Nations (Powaski, 1991, p20). 1920 was a 
presidential election year and Wilson proposed that it 
should be considered as a ‘solemn referendum’ on the 
treaty (Kuehl & Dunn, 1997, p1). The American 
electorate’s choice of a Republican President ended 
Wilson’s plan for American membership of a League of 
Nations (Kuehl & Dunn, 1997, p18). The Treaty of 
Versailles was thrown out and in July of 1921 Congress 
officially ended the war with Germany and Austria on its 
own terms (Walworth, 1986, p556).  
 
America, in common with the rest of the world now just 
wanted to get back to a normal life But for many 
American’s the idea of ‘normal’ conjured, not the world 
of five years before but that of fifty years before. It 
was a sentimentalist’s ‘backward look’ to a nineteenth 
century when America remained undisturbed because the 
western world was ‘organised peacefully’ for the benefit 
of international trade and commerce by the ‘British 
system’. A political and diplomatic machine that 
maintained the balance of power in Europe and ‘policed’ 
the oceans. An all-pervasive system, so ‘smooth working’ 
that most people were unaware of it. Americans in 
particular were prone to assume that their largely 
idyllic isolation was a ‘law of nature’ rather than a 
‘temporary conjuncture of political and economic power’ 
(Ward, 1948, p102). 
  
Britain’s proxy hegemony  
 
The war had been long and expensive. International 
markets and investments were in turmoil and regardless of 
the apparent victory Britain emerged as ‘the greatest 
loser’ (Barker, 1994 p38). The country’s monetary 
reserves were significantly diminished and it had run up 
large debts (Clark, 1998, p57). The conflict that had 
sapped the strength of the British economy had 
considerably strengthened that of America (Allen, 1954, 
p743). Indeed the United States had become one of the 
world’s few creditor nations and was well placed to fill 
the economic and political power vacuum likely to be left 
by a ‘fading’ Britain (Berghahn, 2007). However, America 
chose to assiduously avoid the ‘responsibilities of 
hegemony’ (Cohen, 2001, p98). The ‘ordinary voters’ 
(Berghahn, 2007) had made their voices heard and their 
preference was for the United States to leave the 
‘policing’ of the world to others, exactly as they had 
done in the nineteenth-century days of ‘Pax Britannica’ 
(Ward, 1948, p105).  
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But the time for ‘extreme’ isolationism was past. The 
economic recovery of Europe became ‘vital’ to the 
American authorities after 1918, because without it they 
would have little chance of recouping their billions of 
dollars in war loans. In an effort to stimulate the 
European economy American commercial interests were 
encouraged to pursue a ‘vigorous policy’ of expansion in 
transatlantic trade and investment (Powaski, 1991, p28).  
 
Clark states that an ‘internationalised economy’ can only 
exist in the presence of a hegemon who will undertake the 
responsibility of leadership. The lack of such a leader 
will lead to economic instability and eventually market 
‘disintegration’ (Clark, 1998, p61). America so 
determinedly dodged the role of monetary world leader 
that when institutions, conventions and establishments 
were reconvened after the war, they did so on the basis 
that the pre-war model of British hegemony still existed 
(Molle, 2003, p22). It was a stay of execution that the 
British were eager to embrace. Their already considerable 
empire had been extended by the League of Nations who had 
‘awarded’ Britain custodianship of German colonial Africa 
and the lands that had once been ruled by the Ottomans 
(Walker, 2002, p39). This was to be the ‘territorial 
apogee’ of the British Empire but many of the additional 
regions were impoverished and/or politically unstable 
(Torrent, 2007, p536). They were more likely to prove a 
liability than a benefit to a country as yet unaware of 
the widening gap between ‘British power and British 
responsibilities’ (Walworth, 1986, p1).  
 
British wartime colonial recruitment propaganda was 
heavily laced with patriotic appeals to the idea of 
‘Empire’. It was a theme that would continue to be useful 
to Britain in its largely proxy hegemonic role. 
Imperialists were able to raise an image of empire for 
the greater good, to distract from the domestic ‘post-war 
quagmire’ of delayed demobilisation, unemployment and 
trade deficits (August, 1985, p20). The British Empire at 
its Victorian peak hardly impinged on the British people, 
everyone knew of it but the general population saw little 
beyond a ‘vague and ill-explained appendage to sea-power’ 
(Morris, 1979, p37). It was not officially taught or 
promoted, school classrooms did not display ‘red-
bespattered world maps’, the public were only dimly aware 
of its vast extent (Porter, 2004, pp46-47). That was 
changed by the Great War. The total mobilisation and 
management of available resources had seen ’large-scale’ 
state intervention across the home front and throughout 
the empire (August, 1985, p14).  
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The Empire Resources Development Committee was 
established in 1916 to coordinate the transport and 
distribution of natural resources from the colonies 
(August, 1985, p20). The ‘ideological cement’ of conflict 
had bound the imperial realm together with the 
Westminster government and a better informed British 
public (Hobsbawn, 1987, p70). 
 
This awareness of empire was promoted by a series of high 
profile and frequently ‘racialist... public rituals’ 
(Keane, 2003, p51). Most were designed to appeal to 
children, as they were most likely to develop a 
‘reverence for the institution of the Empire’ (Heathorn & 
Greenspoon, 2006, p100). Hobsbawn identifies ‘Empire Day’ 
as the most enduring of these efforts to 
‘institutionalise pride in imperialism’ (Hobsbawn, 1987, 
p70). Empire Day was launched in 1902 but failed to gain 
a national foothold until the start of the war in 1914 
(Judd, 1996, p209). By 1916 the government recognised the 
propaganda value of an imperial celebration and it was 
awarded ‘official status’ as an annual national event 
(Heathorn & Greenspoon, 2006, p100). Many schools 
incorporated Empire Day into the curriculum where it was 
expanded into an entire week of often ‘uninspiring’ 
(Judd, 1996, p209) flag waving, ‘patriotic songs, dance, 
tableaux, and lectures’ (Heathorn & Greenspoon, 2006, 
p100). Barnett argues that these developments in state 
education directly reflected the opinions of officials 
and teaching staff who had been ‘moulded by the Arnoldian 
public school and Newmanian Oxbridge’ (Barnett, 1987, 
p223).  
 
The 'myth-making' rituals that reinforced the empire also 
reinforced the notions of the public schools and Oxford 
and Cambridge universities as being the ‘custodians and 
transmitters of English culture’ (McCulloch, 1991, p16). 
No institution was immune from this idolatry and the high 
moral precepts and chivalric code of the liberally 
educated ‘gentleman’ trickled ‘all the way down to the 
broad current of British national schooling’ (Barnett, 
1987, p223). ‘Ordinary’ secondary schools adopted many 
public school features including the ‘house system, 
uniforms, games’, and in some cases the ‘teaching of 
classics’; the Oxbridge ethos of empire superiority 









Throughout much of the twentieth century generations of 
school pupils were handed textbooks intended to 
‘inculcate patriotism and good citizenship’. History, 
geography and religious studies were all potential 
vehicles for the message of ‘imperial nationalism’ 
(McClelland & Rose, 2006, p286). The very word 
‘imperialist’, previously only attached to 
inappropriately ambitious ‘foreign despots’, had been 
transformed from the ‘dubiously pejorative to the almost 
unarguably proper’ (Morris, 1979, pp23-26). Arnold and 
his followers used classical education to direct young 
minds toward the ideal of ‘privileged service’ within an 
empire that was widely considered the ‘new Rome’ (Morris, 
1979, p23). Indeed, in later years it was said to have 
'equalled, if not surpassed’ ancient Rome by virtue of 
the vast extent of land and sea that fell under Britain’s 
jusisdiction (Morris, 1979, p28). The world was enmeshed 
in the ‘chains and loops’ of a British bureaucracy 
(Keane, 2003, p130) that ensured the smooth running of 
colonies from Malta to Hong Kong and dominions from 
Canada to Australia and New Zealand (Ferguson, 2003, 
p163). 
 
Ferguson argues that the difficulty in maintaining 
British rule lay not in the dominions but in a country 
like India where the British represented a tiny 
percentage of the population (Ferguson, 2003, p190). In 
the mid-nineteenth century, barely a thousand British 
civil servants delegated numerous tasks and 
responsibilities to ‘tens of thousands’ of local 
subordinates for the administration of two hundred and 
fifty million Indians (Lloyd, 2001, p94). The only way in 
which a small distant island like Britain could govern so 
many in such distant lands was with the collaboration of 
the local, and often traditional, indigenous governing 
elite (Dodds, 2008, p513).  
 
The need for this educated ‘pro-British elite’, who would 
gladly do Westminister’s bidding, was met by the many 
outposts of higher education that sprang up throughout 
the empire (Ferguson, 2003, p188). Many of the sons of 
proserous traditional leaders were ‘eager for Western 
education’  and enrolled in whatever universities were 
available (Ferguson, 2003, p188). The British ‘higher 
education industry’ was on its way to becoming an 






English higher education 1918/1919  
 
Four years of war had changed Britain as a country. The 
war had drawn ‘an indelible line’ under a way of life 
that would never return (Upton, 2004, p10). Of the seven 
hundred thousand British combatants who died, almost 
twenty per cent were officers (Sinclair, 1986, p11). 
Trench conflict had developed into a deadly but static 
war of attrition; it required a hasty re-drawing of the 
etiquette of battle. Junior officers were expected to 
lead by example; their lives became ‘notoriously 
hazardous’ (Vernon, 2004, p180). Invariably leading an 
attack they would be the first to break from their 
earthwork cover and all too often they would be the first 
to face a hail of machine gun fire, hence a 
‘disproportionately high number’ of fatalities were ex-
public school and university students. Britain had lost 
much of its ruling-class-in-waiting; these were the men 
whom the universities were now expected to replace 
(Upton, 2004, p10). 
 
Men and women who wanted to study at university, either 
to resume interrupted work or as new students swelled the 
number of fulltime students to over twenty five thousand 
(Barnes, 1996, p277). The government encouraged higher 
education enrollment by offering generous funding on ‘the 
easiest terms’ (Dent, 1961, p64). It was a concerted 
effort on the part of the authorities to re-establish an 
intellectual elite and the funding programme ensured that 
within a year of the ceasefire all of Britain’s 
universities were ‘crammed to bursting point’ (Dent, 
1961, p64). This ‘represented something of a 
breakthrough’ for the civic universities who now enjoyed 
a new level of respect (Barnes, 1996, p285). Throughout 
the war their research departments had worked with 
industry to develop aircraft designs, gas masks and 
tanks, they had also made advances in orthopaedic surgery 
and psychiatric treatment as well as providing operatives 
for the murky world of intelligence gathering (Winter, 
1994, p9).  
 
The often unconventional approach of university 
researchers helped to produce imaginative plans and 
innovative uses for modern technology that did much to 
‘break the stalemate in military thinking’ (Sinclair, 
1986, p20). Britain’s strategic planners came to place an 
‘increasing reliance’ on university scientific and 
technical expertise; these expectations remained after 
the war and ‘highlighted the significance of higher 




After some post-war ‘anxiety’ prompted by the lack of 
specifically British ‘scientific and technological 
progress’ (Willson, 1957, p25), the temporary wartime 
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research was made 
permanent by the ‘Committee on the Machinery of 
Government’ (Chester & Willson, 1957, p80). The committee 
was headed by the irrepressible R. B. Haldane who had 
just returned to public office along with all of his 
‘previous fellow-conspirators’ (Vernon, 2004, p184). The 
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research provided 
grants for university researchers, for postgraduate 
scholarships and for the creation of new research 
facilities. Oxford, Cambridge and London became the 
‘privileged’ universities who gained most of the 
additional funding, the new facilities and resultant 
‘academic prestige’ (Vernon, 2004, p177).  
 
Many post-war higher education students found their 
university buildings damaged and neglected (Shattock & 
Berdahl, 1984, p472). Funding was an immediate concern; 
the government’s wartime budgets had ‘tapped every 
legitimate source of taxation’ and still it had been 
necessary to borrow almost seventy per cent of its 
expenditure (Grady, 1927, p120). The resulting lack of 
liquidity had increased prices and pushed up inflation 
(Grady, 1927, p286).  Institutions, such as universities, 
whose income was derived from a combination of endowments 
and student fees, saw an alarming decrease in income from 
both sources. The civic universities who had received 
some pre-war state assistance were now simply ignored 
(Anderson, 2006, p86), while the older universities who 
relied on investments were hit especially hard by 
inflation (Bond et al, 1955, p3). British servicemen 
returning to the Oxford colleges found that many rooms 
were still rented to ‘American cadets and soldiers’ in a 
flat fee deal which had been negotiated by the War Office 
(Winter, 1994, p10). University buildings in other parts 
of the country had also been either rented or 
requisitioned as barracks, hospitals, and factories or 
for storage (Vernon, 2004, p180). 
 
The University Grants Committee 
 
Following the ‘crucial contribution’ of the universities 
to the war effort these institutions were held in high 
regard (Vernon, 2004, p181). This, however, did little to 
alleviate the financial difficulties which most 
universities were experiencing despite accumulated 
wartime rents and some official ‘non-recurrent’ payments 




Higher education research in particular had moved into a 
‘more central place’ in British society (Barnes, 1996, 
p285), the universities were recognised as an important 
element in the country’s future and deserving of public 
funds (Vernon, 2004, p176). 
 
Some of the civic universities had been in receipt of 
government aid since 1889 and such payments had continued 
to be made at irregular intervals (Anderson, 2006, p80). 
This largely unplanned financial assistance was not 
subject to ministerial overview and had evolved into a 
myriad of ad hoc agencies that made uncoordinated awards 
of differing amounts. In 1911, the government decided 
that it was time for all these sources to be drawn 
together under the Board of Education and administered by 
the new Advisory Committee on University Grants (Owen, 
1980, p256). This grand plan, however, proved impractical 
because the Board had no jurisdiction in Scotland and 
would only be able to regulate for England and Wales. 
Even this reduced scheme was curtailed when Lloyd George 
who, in 1911 was Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced 
that he would be responsible for Welsh university grants 
which would be paid directly from the treasury (Owen, 
1980, p257). Lloyd George was later to claim that he was 
‘apprehensive’ about the effect of putting the 
essentially Anglican Board of Education in charge of 
Welsh finances (Owen, 1980, p257). The Anglican Church in 
Wales was unpopular with much of the Welsh population who 
preferred the more nationalistic doctrines of the 
Calvinistic Methodists, the Congregationalists, the 
Baptists and the Wesleyans (Morgan, 1999, p15). Under 
Lloyd George’s stewardship Welsh universities and 
colleges were frequently awarded a ‘much higher average 
grant’ than was enjoyed by their English counterparts 
(Owen, 1980, p257). 
 
The post-war period saw an enormous amount of 
‘administrative tidying-up’ and in 1918 it was decided 
that state aid to British universities would be more 
efficient if assigned to the responsibility of a single 
body (Anderson, 2006, p113). The ‘new appreciation’ of 
the role of higher education was accompanied by an 
increase in its financial assistance to about a million 
pounds a year. This was a dramatic sum and would require 
equally dramatic administration; the University Grants 
Committee (UGC) was created to regulate all university 
grants for England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland 
(Anderson, 2006, p113). This was purely a political 
initiative created by government ministers and civil 
servants as a ‘mechanism’ for allocating funds rather 
than as any kind of a convenience for the universities 
(Shattock & Berdahl, 1984, p472).  
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From the outset it was obvious that the English Board of 
Education, because of its limited jurisdiction, could not 
manage the new committee. So the creators of the UGC 
simply looked to the nearest administrative ‘umbrella’ – 
the Treasury. Here was a government department that had 
already successfully administered university grants for 
Wales and was invested with the required authority 
throughout the three kingdoms. The decision was taken 
that the University Grants Committee would adjudicate and 
then advise the Treasury on how the grants should be 
distributed. It was a simple solution that was quickly 
accepted because of its practicability (Owen, 1980, 
p258).  
 
During the decades that followed, the UGC was widely 
praised its maintenance of the universities’ autonomy. 
This benign non-interference was the ‘consequential 
advantage’ of a convenient solution that was further 
enhanced by the finely balanced membership of the 
committee (Owen, 1980, p258). The academicians prevented 
the state from exerting ‘direct control’ (Theisens, 2003, 
p208) while the civil servants kept a watch on the 
strings of the public purse. The result was the now 
widely documented ‘buffer’ effect between the providers 
and the recipients (Shattock & Berdahl, 1984, p471; 
Silver, 2003, p6). Anderson argues that however 
unintentional the developments that led to the UGC’s 
position as a ‘buffer’ between the State and the 
universities it has since been hailed as a ‘unique 
British contribution to public administration’ (Anderson, 
2006, p115).  
 
Despite the apparently large amounts of money involved 
each university never received more than twenty nine 
percent of its annual running costs from the UGC 
(Armytage, 1954, p305). The expectation that these funds 
would ultimately bring some ‘level of state direction’ 
was not a condition that Oxford and Cambridge 
universities chose to accept (Vernon, 2004, p176). 
Although inflation had ‘undermined’ the value of their 
investments, land and endowments (Winter, 1994, p24) both 
ancient institutions preferred to ‘remain aloof’ from the 
majority UGC government scheme (Barnes, 1996, p299). They 
hoped for the return of colonial and empire students; 
before 1914 twenty five per cent of Oxford’s students 
‘were born outside Britain’ and many of those attended 
under their own national scholarship schemes (Anderson, 
2006, p56). The Oxbridge institutions were not alone in 




The post-war economic slump 
 
The first use of the phrase ‘fed up’ was recorded in 1900 
but it was not widely used until 1919 when people had 
much more to be ‘fed up’ about (Havighurst, 1966, p156).   
The hope for a better post-war future had been dampened 
after only eighteen months, overseas trade slowed 
markedly and eventually slumped (Havighurst, 1966, p160). 
The boom evaporated so swiftly that that industrial, 
business and political leaders were caught ‘off guard’ 
(Havighurst, 1966, p161). The government was accused of 
relaxing its wartime economy controls too quickly; 
management of the coalmines and the railways had been 
retained although both were to prove a financial 
liability (Pelling, 1960, p95). 
 
David Lloyd George had called an election for December 
14th 1918. Although the result was ‘resounding victory’ 
for his Liberal-Conservative coalition (Sharp, 2008, 
p30), in reality the prize went to the Conservatives who 
won seventy percent of the government seats (Pearce, 
2007, p16). Lloyd George, a ‘nominal Liberal’ now found 
himself leading an overwhelmingly Tory government. It was 
a ‘rickety, makeshift’ coalition (Pearce, 2007, p17) that 
would tolerate Lloyd George’s leadership for only as long 
as he could ‘stem the rise of the Labour Party’ (Pugh, 
1998, p42). 
 
The country was riven with class conflict, industrial 
unrest, rising unemployment and crime (Havighurst, 1966, 
p162). Engineering, railway, textile and dock workers all 
began suffering wage cuts; trades unions ‘debilitated by 
fear of unemployment’ were reluctant to defend their 
members (Seaman, 1991, p114). The slump was most 
dramatically felt in the heavy industries of north. In 
areas like Clydeside, Tyneside, Lancashire and South 
Wales, the rise in unemployment was ‘rapid and alarming’ 
(Havighurst, 1966, p161). The years 1919-21 saw almost 
four thousand recorded strikes, which with their 
accompanying demonstrations, meetings and marches added 
to the atmosphere of conflict.  
Rumours of a Communist revolution in Scotland were taken 
so seriously that troops and tanks were deployed in the 
streets and squares of Glasgow (Pearce, 2007, p19). 
 
Lloyd George had been an undeniably effective war leader 
but in siding with the Tory’s he had alienated his 
Liberal supporters and become ‘a Prime Minister without a 
party’ (McGill, 1974, p110). With his popularity ‘rapidly 
disintegrating’ (Dawson, 1937, p58) Lloyd George and his 
coalition government struggled to prevent unemployment 
figures rising further (Pearce, 2007, p18).  
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Large grants were made to local authorities for house 
building programmes and by 1921 two hundred thousand 
state-subsided ‘council’ houses had been built (Seaman, 
1991, p119). As the number of public services escalated 
so did the cost of administration, subsidies and pensions 
required to provide them. Unemployment in 1921 went over 
a million and the cost of the new unemployment insurance 
payments and various poor relief schemes soared (Burrows 
& Cobbin, 2009, p201). How such a programme was to be 
funded was becoming a very serious problem. Standard rate 
income tax had already risen to a ‘ruinous’ thirty per 
cent (Burrows & Cobbin, 2009, p201). The country was 
closer to ‘national bankruptcy’ in the early 1920’s than 
ever before (Mowat, 1955, p131). The editors of some 
popular newspapers claimed that Britain faced bankruptcy 
because of the vast amounts of money wasted by 
government, a process they dubbed 'squandermania'(Seaman, 
1991, p117). 
 
1920’s higher education 
 
The cost to the tax payer of subsidising university 
education was minimal, few ever gave it a thought. It was 
simply an ‘elite affair’ (Anderson, 2006, p114). By 1922 
the post war ‘bulge’ was over and the total number of 
full time students at English universities had settled to 
just over forty thousand (Dent, 1961, p65). For most 
people, a university education, regardless of the 
institution, was an expensive and time-consuming luxury 
that, even when it was completed, did not guarantee 
equality of ‘life chances’ (Jones, 1998, p242). The 
British universities had risen in the estimation of the 
authorities but it was remembered how the teaching in 
pre-war ‘welfare-state’ German universities (Ash, 2006, 
p47) had become synonymous with ‘national aspirations’ 
(Anderson, 2006, p87). In post war Britain, German 
universities were no longer admired. They were now 
closely associated with what had been a ‘warmongering’ 
state (Vernon, 2004, p177). Britain’s autonomous 
universities did not like being ‘coaxed’ into producing 
the experts that would regenerate the industrial economy 
(Vernon, 2004, p184). They were in need of more funding 
but many felt that increased public money could lead to 
the kind of state interference that caused the 
‘perversions of national intellect and culture’ that had 
befallen the German universities (Vernon, 2004, p187).  
 
The British government did eventually agree to fund 
scientific research that lacked obvious nationalist 
purpose on the understanding that it would not benefit 
any single commercial venture either (Pollard, 1962, 
p93).  
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The Department of Scientific and Industrial Research 
would oversee the scheme, while the University Grants 
Committee would ensure that higher education institutions 
were sufficiently developed to provide a supply of 
suitable graduates (Vernon, 2004, p187). Although the UGC 
was founded as a mechanism to allocate funding it was 
increasing called upon to advise in a variety of 
institutional matters (Shattock & Berdahl, 1984, p472) 
and was becoming accepted as representative of a 
‘national system’ of higher education (Barnes, 1996, 
p299).  
 
Oxford and Cambridge universities had hoped that in five 
years their finances would have ‘recovered’ from the war 
(Savage, 1927, p72). They had not. In 1923 the ancient 
universities were forced to request state aid (Anderson, 
2006, p80). Barnes states that as soon as the Oxbridge 
institutions ‘deigned’ to be included in the UGC scheme 
they were not only awarded the ‘largest grants’ but also 
held up as ‘embodiments of the ideal’. They became the 
arbiters of a lofty standard to which all universities 
should aspire (Barnes, 1996, p299). Post-war fees at 
Oxford and Cambridge universities had been slightly 
reduced to increase ‘accessibility’ but in real terms 
both institutions remained ‘expensive and exclusive’ 
(Jones, 1998, p242). Scottish and civic universities had 
never provided accommodation and thereby increased 
accessibility by keeping costs down and by allowing 
students to live at home or find lodgings to ‘suit their 
pockets’. This pattern was also followed by the 
University of London (Vernon, 2004, p17). The ‘social 
formation’ of a collegiate and residential life that 
integrated Oxbridge students into 'total institutions' 
was considered one of the ancient universities most 
admirable features (Jones, 1998, p239). It was also one 
of the reasons why they were so expensive. 
 
To qualify for inclusion on the UGC grants list Oxford 
and Cambridge universities had been obliged to open their 
books and explain their arcane and otherwise ‘opaque’ 
accounting methods (Anderson, 2006, p86). Their 
compliance meant that, for the first time, inner workings 
of all English universities were available for ‘direct 
comparison’ (Barnes, 1996, p299). Most of the civic 
universities felt that to be compared with Oxbridge was 
inappropriate. Initially they had been created by the 
larger provincial towns to cater for local higher 
education needs and in almost every aspect they 
represented a ‘distinct alternative’ to Oxbridge (Barnes, 
1996, p271). The efforts of some of the provincial 
founders to compete with the ancient universities had 
been ‘doomed from the start’.  
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In consequence they strove to create a ‘new type of 
English university’; something that resembled the Scots 
institutions and the Humboldtian research innovations 
(Barnes, 1996, p272). After 1923 Oxford and Cambridge 
universities were aware of the danger of their own 
uniqueness being ‘engulfed’ by the growing number of 
institutions offering higher education. Institutions 
embarked on a programme of academic and institutional 
cooperation and exchange. Ostensibly, this was to enable 
a wider understanding of the ‘Oxbridge ideal’ but it also 
carried the special purpose of underlining their 
exclusivity (Halsey, 1992, p70). Annual Oxbridge sporting 
events, most of which had been staged for over a hundred 
years, were publically promoted for the first time. Major 
inter-university sporting contests such as the Boat Race, 
Rugby at Twickenham and Cricket at Lord's succeeded in 
becoming ‘events of national interest’ (Barnard, 1961, 
p125; Roberts, 1947, p33).  
 
This 'elitist' promotion underscored the Oxbridge 
perception of itself as the national provider of an 
educational experience that prepared the ruling elite for 
a ‘gentlemanly’ future in politics, administration and 
the professions (Halsey, 1992, p61). Oxford in particular 
had been described as that necessary interlude between 
Eton School and the Cabinet (Ferguson, 2004, p207). In 
contrast, the civic universities had sprung from a 
‘nonconformist and non-metropolitan culture’ and were 
intended to meet the professional and industrial needs of 
their own suburban and regional middle class (Halsey, 
1992, p66). The notion of Oxbridge being a ‘national’ 
institution led to the remainder of England’s 
universities, including London, being regarded as 
‘provincial’ (Halsey, 1992, p61) though they were 
generally referred to as 'civic' universities after R. B. 
Haldane had coined the term (Barnes, 1996, p276). Such 
perceptions bolstered the apparent superiority of 
Oxbridge and encouraged other institutions to treat its 
‘largely residential’ educational model as one to be 
emulated (McKibbin, 1998, p250).  
 
The most frequent criticism of the civic university 
educational experience was that it lacked communal 
spirit; a problem that it was assumed could be rectified 
by a 'vast increase' in residential facilities (Moberly, 
1949, p305). Educational commentators and church leaders 
alike, pressured civic universities to adopt the Oxbridge 
mode of residential education because they believed that 
the 'moral purpose' endowed by a 'stronger corporate and 
residential life' created committed students and better 
academic results (Jones, 1998, p239).  
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This chimed well with a pronouncement of Cardinal Newman 
that a residential ‘university which had no professors or 
examinations at all’ would be ‘more successful in 
training, moulding, enlarging the mind’ and more likely 
to produce ‘men whose names would descend to posterity’ 
than a non-residential institution which acquainted its 
students with ‘every science under the sun’ (Newman, 
1886, p145). Civic university officials who opposed the 
move declared that their responsibility was to spend 
available funds on teaching, research and equipment 
rather than student accommodation (Savage, 1927, p135). 
Regardless of this argument, many institutions followed 
the lead of Manchester and launched campaigns to raise 
money to provide student accommodation (Barnes, 1996, 
p281). So began a process of ‘academic drift’ (Barnes, 
1996, p271) with some civic universities accused of 
abandoning their founding ethos and 'distinctive 
provincial' character (Anderson, 2006, pviii) in order to 
imitate the ‘curriculum and academic style of elite 
institutions’ (Barnes, 1996, p271). Halsey comments that 
this ‘shift in scope’ by provincial universities was 
largely counter productive. Without political influence 
or ‘social status’ it was impossible for other 
institutions to pose either a serious challenge or 
achieve a viable imitation of the ancient foundations 
(Halsey, 1992, p71). 
 
While overseas students were attracted by the status of 
an Oxbridge education it was not an option available to 
all and many settled for one of the newer civics. Their 
fees and the differing perspectives that they brought 
were to become a sufficiently important component of 
university life that teaching and research methods were 
adjusted to attract them (Anderson, 2006, p108). 
Traditionally British postgraduate study involved a 
variety of doctorates, all of a ‘lengthy and demanding 
kind’. In 1919 these were condensed and organised into a 
‘shorter, standardised PhD’ (Anderson, 2006, p108). This 
was to make English higher education more attractive to 
overseas students, particularly the Americans whom, it 
was thought, would still prefer to avoid the ‘unhealthy 
atmosphere’ of German universities (Vernon, 2004, p184). 
Keane states a ‘global’ worldview was adopted by 
‘outward-looking’ higher education institutions before 
such a stance was recognised as advantageous by social 






Lloyd George, Bonar Law, Baldwin and 
MacDonald  
  
By 1922, Lloyd George had lost much of his appeal as a 
popular leader and was also having to defend his ‘brazen 
sale’ of honours (O’Farrell, 2007, p389). His coalition 
had created over fifteen hundred knights at a reputed ten 
thousand pounds each and ninety peers at fifty thousand 
each (Pearce, 2007, p22; Pelling, 1960, p104). The 
Conservatives were furious that the proceeds had gone 
into the Liberal coffers (Fekete, 2003, p12; Pugh, 1998, 
p42) and on October 19th 1922, they voted that Lloyd 
George should be ‘thrown from office’ (Pearce, 2007, 
p16). Four days later the very sick, sixty four year old, 
Andrew Bonar Law moved into Downing Street as 
Conservative leader and the new British Prime Minister 
(Nicolson, 1934, p279). Within six months Bonar Law 
became so ill that he was forced into hasty retirement 
(Lyman, 1957, p18; Havighurst, 1966, p179). Stanley 
Baldwin, only just appointed as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer was shuffled into the Prime Minister’s seat on 
the grounds that ‘no one better’ was available 
(Havighurst, 1966, p180).  
 
That Baldwin almost immediately called an election was 
contentious enough, but that he intended it be on an 
anti-free trade platform threw the Conservatives into 
turmoil (Havighurst, 1966, p181). Senior Tories struggled 
to ‘imagine a stupider decision’ than trying to win the 
electorate over to a protectionist policy with almost no 
warning at all (Baldwin, 1955, p125). The eventual vote 
was a Conservative Party disaster, the result was 
inconclusive but they had lost their ruling majority 
(Blake, 1960, p45). The Liberals held the balance of 
power but any thought of Baldwin inviting Lloyd George 
back into the cabinet was ‘beyond the realm of 
possibility’ (Havighurst, 1966, p182). This allowed 
Labour leader Ramsay MacDonald to form a minority 
coalition with the Liberals (Laybourn, 2002, p18). Thus, 
by default the first Labour government set out on its 
‘brief and storm-tossed voyage’ (Blake, 1960, p45).  
 
MacDonald was so unprepared for the task of appointing a 
cabinet that he had to consult an almanac for a list of 
the requisite ministers (Mowat, 1955, p172). The final 
group included Sidney Webb at the board of trade (Powell, 
2004, p126) and R. B. Haldane as Lord Chancellor (Mowat, 





While the new Labour ministers astutely refused to 
discuss publically any economic policies that might be 
deemed ‘controversial’ (Pugh, 1997, p604) they were 
courting trouble when within a week of taking office they 
offered formal recognition of the government of the 
Soviet Union (Havighurst, 1966, p185).  
 
This sympathetic view of Soviet Russia was to provide 
political opponents with ammunition in the late summer of 
1924. The editor of the British Communist Party 
newspaper, the ‘Workers Weekly’ had been arrested for 
publishing an apparently seditious article (Grant, 1967, 
p268). Later released without charge the editor thanked 
the Labour government for the ‘strong pressure’ they had 
applied on his behalf (Grant, 1967, p268). MacDonald 
strenuously denied any involvement but the Conservatives 
insisted that the government had interfered with the 
judicial process (Bar-Joseph, 1995, p303). They ‘tabled a 
motion of censure’ against the government (Powell, 2004, 
p131). MacDonald decided to consider the vote to be one 
of confidence in his government (Havighurst, 1966, p185). 
The Liberals, unenthusiastic about appearing 'soft on 
socialism’, voted with the Conservatives (Powell, 2004, 
p131) and the first Labour government were defeated. 
Their administration had lasted just ten months 
(Sinclair, 1986, p23). 
 
The general election that immediately followed saw the 
Conservatives back in government (Beers, 2010, p293).  
Baldwin, the ‘plain man in politics’ embarked on his 
longest term in office, with the same principle as 
before. His policy ‘was to have no policy’ (Mowat, 1955, 
p196). He often ignored the opinions of others and 
certainly did so when inviting the unpopular Winston 
Churchill in to the cabinet as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer (Havighurst, 1966, p189). Churchill returned to 
the Conservatives after twenty years a Liberal and was a 
‘staunch’ believer in free trade (Havighurst, 1966, 
p189). Alderman argues that Baldwin gave Churchill the 
Exchequer as a tactical move intended to appease Tory 
free traders (Alderman, 1997, p74). The principle of free 
trade needed political support; it had been in jeopardy 
since the First World War when most countries, including 
Britain had been forced to abandon the gold standard 
‘international monetary mechanism’ (Eichengreen, & 






Britain returns to gold 
 
For the leaders of London’s financial institutions the 
only hope of a return to pre-war ‘globalised liberalism’ 
was the reestablishment of the international gold 
standard (Amin, 2000, p3; Booth, 1982, p213). Motives 
were patriotic as well economic; the pre-war ‘gold pound’ 
was widely regarded as a ‘symbol of the British Empire’ 
(Anikin, 1983, p154). The gold standard was accepted as 
the basis of ‘economic orthodoxy’, it supported the 
country’s prosperity as a whole, and London’s prestige as 
a financial centre in particular (Cain & Hopkins, 1987, 
p9). Once in place, the mechanism worked so smoothly it 
was almost as if it was ‘governed by a law of nature’ 
(Rothermund, 1996, p19). It was a state to which those 
who revered Britain’s ‘past eminence’ would strive to 
return (Galbraith, 1975, p175). Winston Churchill, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, was an historian and was 
susceptible to the romance of ‘past glories’ (Galbraith, 
1975, p175). 
 
Churchill had no particular economic expertise and so 
relied on the ‘formidable’ roster of gold supporters 
presented to him by his advisors (Manchester, 1984, 
p646). These sources of ‘misty higher wisdom’ eventually 
convinced Churchill that it was not only in the country’s 
interest but also its ‘duty’ to go back onto the gold 
standard (Jenkins, 2002, p388). And even better, 
Churchill was told, the economy had stabilised 
sufficiently to allow the restoration of ‘convertibility 
at the pre-war rate’ (Eichengreen & Flandreau, 1997, 
p19). So in his first budget speech the new chancellor 
announced that Britain was to return to the gold standard 
and ‘tremendous cheers’ rang around the House 
(Manchester, 1984, p645). But there were also dissenting 
voices. When John Maynard Keynes learned that Churchill 
had agreed to put Britain back onto the gold standard he 
had assumed that the pound would be devalued and praised 
the decision (Moggridge, 1995, p430). After being 
informed that the pound was to be pegged at its pre-war 
value Keynes recanted and declared himself mystified that 
a minister of Churchill’s standing should do ‘such a 
silly thing’ (Galbraith, 1975, p177).  
 
If pre-war exchange rates were compared with 1925 prices, 
almost all of the world’s currencies could be shown to 
have lost purchasing power (Anikin, 1983, p154). The 
pound sterling had to be overvalued by approximately ten 
percent to enable it to re-enter the gold standard at 




Manchester argues that Churchill’s advisors ‘were living 
in the past’; they were attempting to re-create the 
circumstances of Britain's pre-war economic prosperity in 
the hope that history would repeat itself (Manchester, 
1984, p647). This was not a minority view; many other 
countries shared the belief that the gold standard had 
generated economic expansion in the nineteenth century 
and therefore could do so again (Clavin, 2000, p34). More 
than forty countries joined the new fixed rate gold 
standard and pledged to keep their economies balanced. 
The process of globalisation appeared to be recovering 
(Clavin, 2000, p34). Britain was the only country not to 
revalue, though even at the time, many considered this a 
‘fatal error’ (Anikin, 1983, p155). 
 
The immediate effect of the overvalued pound was a rise 
in unemployment and a drop in exports (Manchester, 1984, 
p648). Churchill considered that a national ‘tightening 
of belts’ was a price worth paying to improve the balance 
of payments deficit (Anikin, 1983, p154). When a long-
standing subsidy on coal was scrapped the coalmine owners 
compensated themselves by reducing their miners pay 
(Nearing, 1926, p27). The coal miners, who thought their 
belts were already tight enough, appealed to the Trades 
Union Congress (TUC) to take action (Nearing, 1926, p28). 
 
A general strike and a general 
election  
 
The TUC voted to support the miners and called for a 
general strike to begin on May 1st 1926 (Nearing, 1926, 
p40). The government quietly activated contingency plans, 
which complimented the Defence of the Realm Act, a 
temporary wartime measure made permanent, and the 1920 
Emergency Powers Act. Either could be invoked to allow 
the use of troops to combat any perceived threat to 
national security (Baldwin, 1995, p61). Prime Minister 
Baldwin was careful to keep these ‘strike-breaking’ plans 
to himself; as always, he felt that it would 
strategically advantageous to appear not to have a policy 
(Pugh, 2006, p44). 
 
The media portrayed the strike as a generally good-
natured affair with a scattering of violent incidents. 
Food convoys were attacked passing through London, 
strike-breaking trams were stoned in Leeds, a police 
station was attacked in Preston (Havighurst, 1966, p197; 
Pugh, 2006, p45). But while there may have been injuries 
there were no deaths directly attributed to the strike. 
In fact the distraction was ‘enjoyed by much of the 
population’ (Galbraith, 1975, p177).  
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Among those who may have considered the disruption 
something of ‘a lark’ were the heiresses who waited on 
tables, the Oxbridge undergraduates who were allowed to 
drive buses and some even trains (Havighurst, 1966, 
p197). Some of the strikers passed their time by playing 
football with the police or troops (Pugh, 2006, p40). 
Baldwin ‘brushed aside’ the opinion of George V that the 
soldiers should be considering a ‘military solution’ 
rather than playing football (Alderman, 1997, p74). 
 
Negotiations between the TUC and the government continued 
throughout the stoppage. Baldwin appealed to the 
‘moderate elements’ within the union movement to 
understand that the dispute could have no winners 
(Alderman, 1997, p74). After nine days of being told that 
the strike could achieve nothing the TUC abandoned its 
position unconditionally and declared the action to be 
over without the ‘slightest guarantee’ of any improvement 
in the miners situation (Nearing, 1926, p41). Baldwin’s 
policy of calm immobility had ‘paid handsome dividends’ 
(Alderman, 1997, p74). The disappointed miners attempted 
to remain on strike but they were eventually forced back 
to work by hardship (Pugh, 2006, p47-49). Although 
Baldwin's handling of the general strike was widely 
regarded as something of a ‘personal triumph’ the 
resulting prestige had all but evaporated before the 
approach of the next election (Havighurst, 1966, p199).  
 
The industrial uncertainty that followed the general 
strike significantly slowed the ‘wheels of trade' 
(Baldwin, 1955, p131). This reflected badly on the 
government who appeared to have done little to combat 
unemployment and had failed to bring prosperity back to 
the country (Baldwin, 1955, p131). As the May 1929 
general election approached, Baldwin’s general air of 
‘studious' unconcern translated into a lacklustre 
campaign (Pelling, 1960, p104). The Conservative record 
was unimpressive and their election slogan of ‘Safety 
First’ simply implied 'more of the same' (Powell, 2004, 
p147). The Conservatives had lost their way and the 
election resulted in a hung parliament (Blake, 1960, 
p50). Though trailing badly, the Liberals once again held 
the balance of power. However, this time, they preferred 
to step aside leaving the Labour Party as a minority 
government (Havighurst, 1966, p208). An international 
economic and social crisis was looming and Ramsey 
MacDonald’s ‘weak and inexperienced’ administration was 





The ‘Great Depression’  
 
The London stock exchange maintained close financial ties 
with its American counterpart on Wall Street, the New 
York stock exchange. The connection was often too close 
for John Maynard Keynes who, in 1925, warned of the 
dangers of fixed ‘rigidity’ between the two financial 
centres (Keynes, 1932, p233). The ‘roaring’ twenties saw 
an increasing number of Americans who could either 
afford, or could borrow money for such home comforts as 
telephones, radios, gramophones, vacuum cleaners, 
refrigerators, and cars. New owners could even become 
involved in the future development of these commodities 
by buying shares in the companies that manufactured them 
(Shiller, 2000, p104). Between 1921 and 1929, Wall Street 
share prices rose by an average eighteen percent a year 
(Dow, 1998, p165). As the price of shares moved ever 
upward it became obvious to those involved that ‘God 
intended the American middle classes to be rich’ 
(Galbraith, 1997, p6).  
 
Although there were indications of market instability as 
early as 1926, there was no stopping the ‘debt-fuelled 
boom’ (Smith, 2008). Such was the faith in the share 
market that speculators of the late 1920’s would buy 
‘practically any rubbish’ (Michie, 1999, p263). In 
September 1929 the New York Exchange hit an all time 
high, prices hovered for two days then began to fall 
(Geisst, 1999, p186). The ‘smart money’ began to move 
slowly but ‘safely out of the market’ (Galbraith, 1997, 
p108). Initially these sales were made quietly and in 
small amounts so as not to cause panic but the steady 
selling began to tell and prices started dropping more 
quickly. Once the market started to tumble on October 
23rd, the plunge was relentless. The ‘sell-at-whatever-
price’ stampede wiped five billion dollars off the share 
market in three days. By the end of October the loss was 
over sixteen billion dollars (Poitras, 2003, p2). In a 
matter of days the savings of millions of people had 
simply evaporated and with it the idyllic notion that 
‘American life’ had somehow ‘banished’ poverty (Efland, 
1983, p38). The Dow Jones Industrial Average continued to 
fall until July 1932, by which time a ‘staggering’ eighty 
nine percent had been wiped off the index. The Dow Jones 
would not return to its 1929 ‘peak’ until November 1954 
(Ferguson, 2009, p159). 
 
The economic disaster of Wall Street escalated until it 
enveloped much of the Western world; its impact was 
significantly more dramatic in countries within the new 
twentieth century version of the gold standard (Archibald 
& Feldman, 1998, p858).  
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In 1929 there were forty-two internationally trading 
nations who subscribed to the gold standard. But this was 
always at the cost of national economic autonomy. Member 
countries could not adjust the value of their currency to 
suit prevailing conditions. It was a 'golden vice' that 
enabled global trade but restricted independent fiscal 
planning (Clavin, 2000, p35). The perception of the gold 
standard as a simple self-regulating mechanism that was 
beneficial to all under any circumstances was a ‘tragic 
illusion’ (Rothermund, 1996, p19). The pre-1914 mechanism 
was not self-regulating. Britain, as the ‘world's 
hegemonic power’ had guaranteed the gold standard for 
decades (Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2003, p49); as long 
as the British remained the ‘prominent partner’ in the 
scheme, they were able to manipulate and control their 
vast overseas colonial and mercantile investments to 
ensure the continuance of the system (Keynes, 1932, 
p234). 
 
America emerged from the First World War as the new major 
world power but ‘isolationist tendencies’ (Molle, 2003, 
p22) prevented it from assuming the 'hegemonic 
responsibilities’ that Britain had previously carried 
(O'Brien, 1994, p27). The absence of any country prepared 
to adopt the mantle of international leader created a 
‘hegemonic interregnum’ (Clark, 1998, p72). This lack of 
economic leadership was to prove an 'inherent problem’ 
(Ferguson, 2009, p165) because it allowed the gold 
standard system itself to transmit the 'contractionary 
shocks' of the Wall Street Crash around the world 
(Archibald & Feldman, 1998, p858). 
 
Europe, which had already seen a large percentage of its 
financial liquidity diverted to Wall Street (Eichengreen 
& Portes, 1990, p74), now found that the flow of funds 
from American loans had ‘dried up’ (Clavin, 2000, p35). 
Not only was it more difficult for countries to borrow 
but also there was less gold with which to support 
national economies as most of it was ‘piled up' in 
American banks (Cole, 1965, p86). As well as reducing 
overseas financial commitments the United States 
government launched a series of ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ 
protectionist tariffs designed to improve its own 
situation but with little regard for international 
repercussions (Rothermund, 1996, p7). Imposing punitive 
tariffs to protect domestic industry becomes ‘self-
defeating’ as any advantage gained by the first nation to 
impose import duties is cancelled out by the next 
(Griffiths & O'Callaghan, 2002, p15). The retaliatory 
backlash was swift; countries that had imported American 
goods now taxed them beyond affordability.  
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American industrial output went unsold; a third of the 
workforce became unemployed. The ‘catastrophe’ was 
global. Almost every national economy went into decline, 
only the degree of the problem varied. Eventually so many 
countries were sheltering behind protectionist 
legislation there was no avoiding the collapse of the 
international financial system and with it the loss of 
two thirds of the worlds trade (Ferguson, 2009, p159). 
The notion that unregulated free trade would not only 
look after itself but also provide continuing ‘universal 
growth’ now appeared ‘discredited’. Adam Smith’s theory 
that collective self-interest would always channel market 
forces in the direction of collective benefit had 
‘obviously been upset’ (Rothermund, 1996, p2). The First 
World War may have prevented the further expansion of 
economic globalisation but it was the Great Depression 
that threw it ‘into reverse’ (Legrain, 2003, p91). 
 
One of the few aspects of American life that survived the 
early years of the depression remarkably well was higher 
education. University staff who had spent years on fixed 
salaries suddenly appeared in an enviable position when 
compared to a world where wages were falling and jobs 
were getting scarce (Willey, 1937, p3). Across America 
and throughout Europe the 1929 crash and subsequent 
depression was followed by a substantial increase in 
applications for university places (Willey, 1937, p3). 
Economic uncertainty was making a professional career 
look more inviting than the somewhat doubtful future 
offered by commerce (Anderson, 2006, p117). The Germanic 
university ideal was still overshadowed by the taint of 
war so it was to the British institutions of Oxford and 
Cambridge that the Americans looked for both a societal 
and an architectural model of higher education.  They 
adopted the principle of a balanced but ‘unspecialised’ 
education, a selected ‘elite’ body of residential 
students and surroundings that mimicked the ‘English 
Gothic collegiate style’ (Harrison, 1994, p81).  
 
This chapter has covered the origins of the First World 
War and how that conflict led to Britain’s universities, 
particularly the civics being held in greater esteem. 
America’s decision not to participate in the League of 
Nations indicated a return to isolationism that left 
Britain in the role of proxy world hegemon. During this 
period the British Empire covered a greater geographic 
area than ever before, giving the universities a greatly 
increased opportunity for placing graduates in positions 
of colonial and imperial influence that contributed to 




At home Britain’s institutions of higher education were 
operating at full capacity; approximately one third of 
their funding came from government via the newly formed 
University Grants Committee. Then in October 1929, 
greater levels of international financial integration 
transmitted the effects of America’s Wall Street Crash of 
1929 around the world. It destabilised the world’s 
financial markets to a disastrous extent, signaling that 































Chapter 3 1930-1944 
 
This chapter starts by examining the reluctance of Oxford 
and Cambridge universities to comply with the 
government’s higher education reforms. It explores how 
the University of London became Britain’s major producer 
of research graduates and how scientific research in the 
civic universities was gaining ground in the commercial 
world. This chapter also deals with the reexamination of 
UGC support for civic university residential facilities 
during the economic slump of the 1930’s and the British 
government’s decision to free itself from restrictive 
economic rules by leaving the gold standard. During the 
considerable international turmoil, which followed, other 
European nations and eventually America also abandoned 
the gold standard. 
 
I explore how continuing economic instability and 
declining international trade caused Italy, Germany and 
Spain to fall under the influence of ultra nationalistic 
leaders. Throughout the 1930’s, Germany and Italy refused 
to contain their aggressively expansionist policies and 
in 1939 Britain and France felt compelled to declare war. 
From the outset Britain looked to its institutions of 
higher education for the development of innovative 
methods of defence and enemy code breaking as well as 
more destructive weapons. For a year and a half America 
stood back from the fray but provided funds and equipment 
through Lend-Lease. After a surprise attack by the 
Japanese on Pearl Harbour, America joined the conflict 
and almost immediately began preparations for the postwar 
world. The Anglo-American ‘Atlantic Charter’ became the 
basis for the United Nations Organisation and the Bretton 
Woods agreements, these institutions became the bedrock 
of modern globalisation and enshrined the US dollar as 
the new global currency. Britain’s own postwar aim was to 
achieve a more egalitarian society through the creation 
of a universal welfare system, better housing and planned 
education. 
 
Oxbridge in the thirties  
 
Much of the modern perception of Oxford and Cambridge 
universities was created between the wars and reflects 
the manner in which they portrayed themselves at that 
time. Both institutions combined patriotic fervour and a 
pride of empire with their own traditional respect for 
the past to imbue their universities with a ‘sense of 




An idyllic setting in which a student might acquire a 
‘vague’ awareness of history, literature, art and a ‘few 
memorable anecdotes’ was too often the sum total of an 
English public school and Oxbridge education (Green, 
1977, 132). Oxbridge reveled in the ‘quasi-monastic, 
quasi-conventual’ single-sex college life that was 
subject to innumerable time honoured regulations and 
equally innumerable infringements (McKibbin, 1998, p249). 
The popular view of the carefree and languid off-spring 
of the upper classes moving from cosseted public school 
to elite university was later cemented by a ‘flood’ of 
published works from a variety of authors following the 
lead of Evelyn Waugh, Anthony Powell, Cyril Connolly and 
John Betjeman (Anderson, 2006, p120).  
 
This notion of a university as a tradition bound retreat 
where the sons of the wealthy ‘recovered from 
adolescence’ (Harrison, 1994, p91) was not universal but 
was common enough to be noted by Abraham Flexner, a 
respected observer of international university education 
between the wars (McKibbin, 1998, p249). Flexner’s 
published work is credited by Silver as having 
contributed ‘serious analysis’ to the study of the 
‘development’ of international higher education (Silver, 
2003, p25). Flexner appears to have come to the early 
conclusion that any attempt to reform Britain’s ancient 
universities was likely to be ‘hampered’ by ‘history, 
tradition’ and ‘vested interests’ (Flexner, 1930, p35). 
Moberly states that Flexner’s general approach was 
‘warmly eulogistic’ (Moberly, 1949, p233) but this did 
not stop him describing both Oxford and Cambridge 
universities as little more than ‘advanced secondary 
schools’ (Flexner, 1930, p265). Flexner had difficulty 
with precisely those values of ‘prejudices and customs’ 
that Oxbridge held so dear. He commented that both 
institutions were veiled by an ‘impalpable’ shroud of 
tradition that presented an almost deliberate obstruction 
to student learning (Flexner, 1930, p265).  
 
McKibbin confirms that the undergraduate teaching of the 
period consisted ‘overwhelmingly’ of ‘intensive’ 
tutorials that closely resembled the methods found in 
boarding schools. Awareness that graduate education might 
be better based on principles of research had been 
recognised, particularly at Cambridge, but the situation 
was still ‘embryonic’ (McKibbin, 1998, p249). Flexner 
acknowledged the distinction between the two universities 
when he commented that Oxford seemed less interested in 
students whose ambitions lay in philosophy, scholarship 
and science than in those who aspired to the global reach 
of a career in ‘parliament, the civil service, or the 
dominions’ (Flexner, 1930, p265). 
 124 
 
Even without Flexner’s observations, there were many who 
recognised that Oxbridge universities were unlikely to 
meet their ‘modern era’ responsibilities while they 
remained preoccupied with their own ‘distinguished past’ 
(Silver, 2003, p27). The ancient universities were able 
to avoid major reform by falling back on reputations for 
maintaining ‘social prestige’ rather than intellectual 
standards (McKibbin, 1998, p248). Most undergraduates 
were aware that mere association with an Oxbridge 
university was as useful in launching a career as a good 
degree (Harrison, 1994, pp91-92). These two ancient 
institutions were 'bound up' with a past of wealth and 
privilege (Moberly, 1949, p305) which they presented, 
during the 1930’s, as an element of ‘broad humanism' as 
opposed to the 'narrow professionalism’ of the other 
universities (Halsey, 1958, p65).  
 
The Oxbridge institutions of the period paid as much 
attention to the process of creating a 'gentlemen' of 
admirable 'character and physique' as to the exercising 
of brains (Halsey, 1958, p65). Most undergraduates had a 
background in public schooling where participation in 
sports and games was compulsory, so once at university 
they were able to make a ‘fairly conscious choice’ about 
how they might divide their time between physical and 
academic exercise (Savage, 1927, p76). Such a regime 
Harrison suggests ‘deterred’ the ‘industrious scholar’ 
from ‘over-valuing' academia while providing the 
enthusiastic sportsman with a 'certain intellectual 
polish’ (Harrison, 1994, p91). Oxbridge never had a 
‘firmer grasp' on its position at the 'apex’ of British 
university education as it achieved in the years between 
the wars (Halsey, 1958, p640), even though during that 
period higher education was not in 'high demand' 
(Harrison, 1994, p91). The increased student numbers of 
the early days of the depression had declined as money 
became tighter and industry had not yet seen the benefit 
in employing graduates (Anderson, 2006, p116-117). 
However highly regarded the residential university system 
may have been, it was very expensive. The well-to-do were 
not ‘obliged’ to have their off-spring educated. The 
elder sons of wealthy businessmen or aristocrats might 
expect to inherit either the title or the business, 
younger sons might go into the armed services; often it 
was only those bound for the church that attended 
university (Harrison, 1994, p91). 
 
Most undergraduates came from the middle classes, 
students whom the Oxbridge universities could accommodate 
with a minimum of 'modification' to their time honoured 
methods of educating 'gentlemen’ (Halsey, 1958, p67).  
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This was exactly the kind of experience that provided an 
'avenue of entry' into a prestigious occupation in the 
civil service or colonial administration (Halsey, 1958, 
p67). Halsey states that the 'high value' placed upon 
Oxbridge graduates by other countries was a 'powerful 
validation' of an education based upon 'classical studies 
and the liberal arts’ (Halsey, 1958, p67). If the 
graduates were valued then so were the institutes that 
had produced them. The Oxbridge universities were to 
provide a model for institutions of higher education 
throughout Britain and the dominions (McKibbin, 1998, 
p250). Balogh argues that in some less well-developed 
countries it might have been wiser to adopt a model that 
would better integrate with the community rather than 
reproducing an 'ill-fitting’ elitist system that would 
ultimately only create a ‘class apart’ (Balogh, 1955, 
p265). 
 
Although the idea of Oxford and Cambridge universities is 
often merged and referred to in ‘academic shorthand’ as 
Oxbridge, they are of course two different entities 
(McKibbin, 1998, p249). While maintaining their 
individuality, the two universities have sometimes been 
joined in common cause. In 1935 a joint committee was 
founded to avoid the ‘unnecessary duplication of academic 
courses and research’. There was also a joint 
‘isolationist’ stance in regard to the newer civic 
universities. Both institutions subscribed in principle 
to the ‘Universities' Bureau of the British Empire’. 
However, Halsey argues that this nominal presence was 
simply to ensure that the bureau could not be dominated 
by the University of London (Halsey, 1992, p69).  
 
The University of London in the 
thirties  
 
Oxbridge could not avoid noticing the increasing prestige 
of the University of London. Although still primarily an 
examining body, its area of authority encompassed the 
otherwise autonomous institutions of University College, 
King's College, the College of Household Science, 
Imperial College, the London School of Economics and a 
‘dozen teaching hospitals’ (McKibbin, 1998, p250). 
Calculated purely on student numbers London had become 
the largest university in Europe as well as being widely 
acknowledged as southern-most tip of the ‘golden 
triangle’ that made up the London-Oxford-Cambridge 'axis' 
(Anderson, 2006, p65; Halsey, 1958, p64). This increased 
credibility was, in part, due to the university finally 
acquiring a permanent campus in 1927.  
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An eleven-acre site adjacent to Bloomsbury had been 
purchased by the university authorities with some ‘lavish 
assistance’ from the Rockefeller Foundation (McKibbin, 
1998, p250). The campus, and much of the surrounding 
neighbourhood is overshadowed by an immense ‘beached 
whale' of a building that is the university’s Senate 
House (McKibbin, 1998, p250). This newly acquired 
physical presence granted the University of London, and 
the institutions and colleges that fell within its 
jurisdiction, a ‘much greater authority’ (Vernon, 2004, 
p178). The University, now with a ‘magnificent sense of 
its own identity’, set about coordinating and 
standardising the methods of universities that were 
outside of its official orbit (Vernon, 2004, p178). This 
was a step too far for the ever-critical Abraham Flexner, 
who looked carefully into the administration of the 
University of London and pronounced that it would do well 
to first reorganise itself (Silver, 2003, p26). Flexner 
argued that it could never be a ‘real’ modern spirited 
university, that London and the Empire could be proud of, 
until it had shed responsibility for the assorted 
technical and medical schools whose many external 
students it could never assimilate (Flexner, 1930, pp246-
247). 
 
Flexner's ‘critique’ may have prompted British 
universities to seek ‘more intellectual rigour’ 
(Anderson, 2006, p124) but the University of London 
remained the ‘powerful’ hub of many other colleges and 
institutions (Anderson, 2006, p65). During the 1930’s the 
university established affiliated institutes of 
Historical Research and of Archaeology. These provided 
London with a ‘framework for post-graduate research’ that 
was unavailable in other English universities. With post-
war Germany’s PhD courses ‘closed’, London University 
became a viable alternative to overseas students who 
wanted to do doctoral research. During the inter-war 
period, more students graduated from London University 
with research degrees than from any other university in 
the country (McKibbin, 1998, p251). 
 
The civic universities in the thirties  
 
The civic universities did not appreciate being seen as 
providers of a merely ‘non-conformist provincial’ higher 
education (Halsey, 1958, p66). They had greatly expanded 
their specialist facilities, their staff were encouraged 
to undertake meaningful research, academic rigor had been 
enhanced and their scientific progress frequently 




Researchers at the two ancient institutions considered it 
in their interest to keep abreast of the work of the 
civic university specialist departments. After an Oxford 
‘raid’ in which two of Manchester's leading organic 
chemists were lured away it was claimed that the ancient 
foundation viewed Manchester as a ‘first-class waiting 
room’ (Halsey, 1992, p71). 
 
Despite this back-handed acknowledgement that the civic 
universities had achieved technological pre-eminence, the 
ancient institutions refused to accept that it presented 
any ‘serious challenge’ to their long standing prestige 
(Barnes, 1996, p283). It was this monopoly of status that 
rankled with the civics and encouraged them to slowly 
adjust their range and approach to studies so as to 
conform to the ‘norms’ of Oxbridge (Halsey, 1992, p71). 
This strategy was particularly ironic when adopted by 
those institutions founded as both an alternative and a 
‘conscious reaction’ to the dominance of Oxbridge  
(McKibbin, 1998, p250). That the Oxford-Cambridge ‘ethos’ 
was so pervasive in the civics should come as no surprise 
(Anderson, 2006, p117); since their earliest days they 
had been staffed to a ‘very large extent’ by Oxford and 
Cambridge graduates (Flexner, 1930, p256). The recruits 
brought with them ‘traditional notions’ that would ensure 
that the development of the civic universities was at 
least ‘partially informed’ by Oxbridge sensibilities 
(Halsey, 1958, p67). 
 
Had it been possible for any of the civic universities to 
convincingly reproduce the whole ‘Oxbridge-type 
experience’ it would almost certainly have been 
inappropriate (Moberly, 1949, p305). The civics were 
intended to meet local needs, and their reliance upon 
local funding virtually guaranteed the provision of 
technical training that suited their benefactors. Flexner 
commented that 'technical development' in civic 
institutions was in danger of becoming more 'highly 
developed' and specialised than might be expected of a 
university. He was critical of programmes that included 
subjects like photography, brewing, dyeing and glass 
making. He decried courses in librarianship, journalism, 
civic design and automobile engineering as 'short-sighted 
and absurd'. Flexner thought it ‘deplorable’ that the 
civics granted diplomas and certificates in subjects that 
were 'largely technical in character' (Flexner, 1930, 
p255). When published, Flexner’s analysis was greeted as 
a work of ‘pioneering scholarship’ (Silver, 2003, p27). 
It ‘reinforced’ the view among observers of higher 
education, particularly those at Oxbridge, that only the 
ancients were capable of providing a ‘real' university 
education (Vernon, 2004, p178).  
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The qualities by which an 'elite' institution transformed 
undergraduates into potential 'leaders of society' were 
various but it was felt that the residential campus was a 
significant contribution (Anderson, 2006, p122) To this 
end the civics were encouraged to think in terms of 
communities, to increase the development of ‘unions, 
refectories and staff houses’ (Moberly, 1949, p305). 
Barnes states that the UGC, while largely ‘sympathetic’, 
was critical of the lack of residential facilities at 
civic universities (Barnes, 1996, p282). The members of 
the UGC firmly supported the notion that education was as 
much about developing the community as the intellect and 
actively encouraged Reading University and its ‘halls of 
residence movement’ (Anderson, 2006, p122). Reading 
University was chartered in 1926, the only institution to 
be elevated between the wars (McKibbin, 1998, p252). 
Vernon states that Reading's promotion owed a great deal 
to its ‘remarkably well-developed residential system’ 
(Vernon, 2004, p178).  
 
Other civic universities may have had ambitions to 
provide halls of residence but along with similar plans 
they were abandoned as Britain entered an economic 
downturn. The downturn became the 1930’s depression, 
businesses went bankrupt and ‘staple industries’ slumped. 
Sources of funding that had long been relied upon by the 
civics evaporated and the prospects for new endowments 
were non-existent (Anderson, 2006, p117). The civics now 
not only lacked the resources for residential centres, 
libraries and laboratories (Halsey, 1992, p71) but they 
could not even recruit ‘good staff’ (Silver, 2003, p27).  
 
The increase in student numbers signaled by the first 
days of the depression had proved temporary (Anderson, 
2006, p117) and soon settled at a ‘plateau’ of 
approximately thirty-five thousand full time students 
(Halsey, 1958, p68). This represented less than two 
percent of the eligible population (Anderson, 2006, 
p116). The respect accorded the civic universities during 
the 1920’s was evaporating and the 1930’s became a 
‘demoralizing period’ of restricted funds, reduced 
student numbers, ‘self-criticism and low esteem’ (Barnes, 
1996, p283). 
 
MacDonald’s second premiership 
 
The minority Labour government that was returned to 
office in 1929 produced no effective response to the 
economic crisis that followed the Wall Street Crash (Dow, 
1998, p136).  
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Ramsay MacDonald attempted to placate the trades unions 
by increasing dole payments (Bassett, 1958, p43) and by 
establishing a committee to explore possible solutions to 
rapidly rising unemployment (McElwee, 1962, p158). The 
committee met only twice and although the chairman 
claimed to have various progressive ideas ‘up his sleeve’ 
Havighurst states that is where they stayed (Havighurst, 
1966, p214). The government's ‘star turn’ was George 
Lansbury, who ordered the removal of railings around the 
Serpentine in Hyde Park so that the waterway might be 
used for mixed bathing (McElwee, 1962, p164). Mowat 
describes 'Lansbury's Lido' as this administration’s ‘one 
lasting memorial’ (Mowat, 1955, p356).  
  
Labour’s first year in office did little beyond adding 
another four hundred thousand to the jobless total 
(Havighurst, 1966, p214). In July 1931, an all-party 
investigation of the national economy announced that the 
only way to save Britain from disaster was to immediately 
reduce public expenditure. They recommended a number of 
cuts including a twenty percent reduction in unemployment 
benefit (Seaman, 1991, p218) which was racking up debt at 
the rate of forty million pounds a year (Bassett, 1958, 
p44). MacDonald knew that the parliamentary Labour party 
would never agree to reduce unemployment benefit 
(Bassett, 1958, p64) and nor was he going to fight them 
over it (Seaman, 1991, p220). On the morning of Sunday 
August 23rd, MacDonald went to Buckingham Palace to 
notify George V that his cabinet’s refusal to approve the 
reductions would force the government’s resignation 
(Mowat, 1955, p391).  
 
The king summoned Conservative and Liberal leaders to the 
palace (Seaman, 1991, p220) and they proceeded to discuss 
the possibility of representatives of all three parties 
serving in a National government which could provide the 
joint expertise to cope with the current economic crisis 
as well as generating a spirit of ‘national unity' 
(Clavin, 2000, p30). MacDonald would remain as Premier of 
the administration because the Conservatives preferred 
that a Labour leader announce the approaching 
‘unpalatable economies’ (Mowat, 1955, p391). 
 
On Monday 24th August MacDonald met with his cabinet and 
announced to their ‘utter stupefaction’ that they were 
‘out’ and ‘he was in’ (Mowat, 1955, p393). The formal 
resignation of the Labour government was tendered at the 
palace that very Monday afternoon (Havighurst, 1966, 
p223) and the change to National Government, with 
MacDonald as Prime Minister, was announced at 9.15 that 
evening (Mowat, 1955, p393).  
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MacDonald’s new ‘national’ cabinet featured the sixty-
four year old Conservative leader, Stanley Baldwin and 
just three members of the previous Labour cabinet 
(Havighurst, 1966, p223), MacDonald’s ‘defection’ to this 
Conservative dominated administration created much ill 
feeling and a long-term loss of morale in the Labour 
movement (Jupp, 1982, p4). 
 
Britain forced off gold 
 
The national government had been formed to deal with an 
emergency and now had to act quickly (Powell, 2004, 
p126). The dramatic reductions in spending were 
eventually diluted to a ten percent cut across all 
expenditure including unemployment benefits (Mowat, 1955, 
p402). Effective recovery from the economic depression 
was dependent upon a revival of international trade. The 
reinstatement of the gold standard had been central to 
Tory plans for increased exports and the provision of 
British jobs, albeit at reduced wages. These aims, 
however, were ‘largely frustrated’ by a significant 
change in the social landscape (Pugh, 2006, p47). No 
longer could governments opt for an economic policy which 
relied upon employers cutting workers wages because the 
trades unions would attempt to prevent it (Ferguson, 
2009, p161).  
 
Workers wages were the only adjustable element in the 
gold standard mechanism. If the government were denied 
that adjustment then Britain could not remain on the gold 
standard. On September 19th 1931, the Bank of England 
requested a suspension of gold convertibility (Mowat, 
1955, p403).  
 
This second incarnation of the gold standard had not been 
a success; it had done little to revive the pre-war 
global trading system (Bernstein, 2000, p326) but had 
succeeded in transmitting America’s economic instability 
throughout the industrialised world (Kessler, 2005, 
p138). Before the national government had a chance to 
publish its budget or pass an economy bill it had to 
announce an abandonment of the gold standard (Mowat, 
1955, p403). The expected furore did not materialise. 
Britain left the international exchange mechanism that it 
had itself devised with hardly a murmur (Mowat, 1955, 
p404). 
 
Within days twenty-four other countries had also 
‘suspended convertibility’ of their currencies into gold 
(Bernstein, 2000, p315). Many of those who left the 
system did so because their own economies were closely 
connected to that of Britain.  
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This led to the formation of a new grouping of countries 
that traded within the ‘sterling bloc’ (Clavin, 2000, 
p37). Soon becoming reliant upon each other as trading 
partners, the sterling bloc comprised the British Empire 
and Commonwealth countries and Scandinavia (Mowat, 1955, 
p436). The main aim of the national government was to 
demonstrate some level of ‘domestic economic recovery’; 
indeed as the money supply was ‘unshackled’ from the 
constraints of the gold standard it did once again begin 
to turn the wheels of industry (Kessler, 2005, p138). 
Britain was one of the first countries to show evidence 
of recovery from the Great Depression (Clavin, 2000, 
p37). As each of the remaining gold standard countries 
turned their backs on the system, so began their economic 
recovery (Ferguson, 2001, p336; Weber, 2007, p135). 
 
The price for Britain’s improved trading position was a 
significant weakening of the hitherto overvalued pound 
(Bernstein, 2000, p315). Conservative backbenchers urged 
an election; they desperately wanted to introduce 
protective import tariffs (Mowat, 1955, p406) before 
sterling found a permanently lower level on the 
international money markets (Youngs et al, 1999, p402). 
The backbench calls were heeded and an election was 
called for October 27th 1931. The national government was 
returned with a landslide five hundred and fifty six 
seats, though as four hundred and seventy one of these 
were Conservative, it was in effect a win for Baldwin 
(Havighurst, 1966, p224). The Labour Party, still 
‘shattered by MacDonald’s betrayal’ (Youngs et al, 1999, 
p402), was all but wiped out by a ‘torrent of anti-
socialism’ (Howe, 1997, p283).  
 
MacDonald was allowed to remain as ‘puppet Premier’ 
(Jones, 2010) while Baldwin and Chamberlain, having 
resolved to maintain the ‘National façade’, set about 
forming a cabinet (Seaman, 1991, p224). Baldwin 
considered that he now had a mandate to do what he 
thought was necessary – and that was to tax foreign 
imports (Baldwin, 1955, p170). In February of 1932 
Neville Chamberlain, now at the Exchequer, announced that 
all imports except food, raw materials and empire goods 
would incur a ten percent duty (Havighurst, 1966, p234). 
This rose to sixty percent for cutlery, typewriters, 
woolen and cotton items, paper, bottles, cameras, and 
electrical appliances (Mowat, 1955, p415). There was 
little objection. No one was prepared to stand against 
the Cabinet’s ‘strong man’, the haughty and distant 
Neville Chamberlain (Mowat, 1955, p414). Thus MacDonald 
and Baldwin’s administration ‘shambled its unimaginative 
way’ through the 1930’s (Mowat, 1955, p413).  
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It was, in effect, a ‘one-party system’ masquerading as a 
national government but it was far from the ‘one-party 
state’ of the sort that was coming to the fore in some 
continental countries (Seaman, 1991, p231). 
 
Fascism in Europe 
 
The years between the wars have been described as 
Europe’s ‘age of fascism’ (Blum, 1998, p3). The First 
World War came to a sudden, muddled and unsatisfactory 
end; it was closely followed by the hardship of economic 
depression. Europe’s political systems seemed incapable 
of dealing with domestic problems such as poverty and 
unemployment and often further alienated their own 
populations by continuing to invest abroad and by seeking 
international, rather than national solutions. This 
growing discontent created a crisis of public confidence 
that, in some cases, allowed charismatic ultra 
nationalist leaders who normally occupied the political 
fringes to seize power (Berlet, 1992; Lyons, 2010). 
Morgan argues that the origins and influences that became 
the foundations of ‘fascism’ can be traced back to 
Europe’s pre-war ‘turn-of-the-century counter-culture' 
(Morgan, 2002, p16). This mix of café and club society 
was populated by avant-garde writers, artists and 
intellectuals who rejected mainstream notions of progress 
and instead championed philosophies of nationalism and 
‘radical’ conservatism (Morgan, 2002, p17).  
 
Such political views became more extreme when blended 
with the pseudosciences of phrenology and spiritualism 
and were frequently ‘tinged’ with social Darwinism (Blum, 
1998, p4).  
 
Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution was published in ‘On 
the Origin of Species’ in 1859. Within three years social 
scientist and writer Herbert Spencer had applied Darwin’s 
theory to human society and coined the phrase ‘survival 
of the fittest’ to describe a worldview in which ‘entire 
races’ competed for survival (Pauley, 2003, p9). 
Extremist politicians and ‘pseudo-scientists’ went on to 
distort Darwin’s ideas almost ‘beyond recognition’ in 
their efforts to discover ‘evidence’ of the cultural and 
racial superiority of white Europeans (Ferguson, 2003, 
p263). The concept of ‘Social Darwinism’ was honed by a 
series of 'respected' authors until it became 
‘sufficiently elastic to justify or explain anything’ 






Charles Darwin’s cousin Francis Galton (Sewell, 2009), a 
Cambridge mathematician, compared photographs of people 
of African and Asiatic origin to those of criminals and 
‘other degenerate types’ to illustrate his theories on 
racial intelligence. Galton single handedly transformed 
social Darwinism into the ‘scientific snake-oil’ that 
became internationally accepted as ‘eugenics’ (Ferguson, 
2003, p264). This was an entirely bogus ‘science’ that 
was given an additional veneer of academic respectability 
when, in 1911, University College London appointed its 
first Galton Professor of Eugenics (Ferguson, 2003, 
p264). Europe's Fascist regimes would later 'embrace' 
both social Darwinism and eugenics. Their leaders were 
glorified as best fitted to their role because they had 
‘struggled to the top’ (Adams & Dyson, 2003, p179). 
Italian Fascists cited eugenics as evidence for selective 
breeding. Mussolini's ‘difesa della stirpe’, the ‘defence 
of the stock’ would become an important element of 
Fascist ideology by the 1930’s (Stepan, 1991, p117). 
 
Mussolini used his occupation as newspaper editor to draw 
Italy’s unemployed 1918 war veterans together and to 
ferment an ‘inordinate fear’ of an armed uprising (Fermi, 
1966, p153). By March 1919, Mussolini had founded the 
‘Fascio di Combattimento’ - literally ‘the combat group’, 
ostensibly to save Italy from revolution (Pauley, 2003, 
p25). The word ‘Fasci’ from which ‘Fascist’ was derived 
described a bundle of sticks bound around an axe – an 
ancient Roman badge of office that had been invoked by 
previous Italian revolutionary groups (Blum, 1998, p5). 
Mussolini's Fascist Party adopted other symbolic gestures 
from a variety of sources, the straight-arm salute of 
ancient Rome (Howells, 2011, p1), the wearing of black 
shirts from the anarchists of northern Italy and the flag 
of the Italian Army Commandos (Hibbert, 1962, p29).  
 
Within two years the Fascists could officially boast over 
a quarter million members, they were becoming a ‘mass 
movement’ (Blum, 1998, p22). In the 1921 election they 
won thirty-five seats (Pauley, 2003, p26). Mussolini was 
now the leader of a legitimate political party and on his 
way to becoming a national figure (Hibbert, 1962, p31). 
The Blackshirts extended their regime of intimidation and 
violence to territories they were unable to gain via the 
ballot box (Blum, 1998, p6). Italy’s network of largely 
socialist local government offices were administratively 
crippled by a series of deliberately destabilising 
attacks (Hibbert, 1962, p28). This enabled Mussolini to 
announce that if the country’s elected representatives 
were incapable of governing, he and his Blackshirts would 
‘March on Rome’ and seize power (Pauley, 2003, p26).  
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Neither the police nor the army made any attempt to 
prevent the Blackshirts from reaching the capital. On 
arrival Mussolini accepted the invitation of King Victor 
Emmanuel to form a government (Blum, 1998, p24). During 
the following months Mussolini’s political rivals 
ominously disappeared and Fascist opposition ceased, 
national turmoil subsided and most Italian people were of 
the opinion that Il Duce could do no wrong (Hibbert, 
1962, p40). Italy was moving out of the doldrums as its 
new leader proclaimed that large scale industrial 
projects would be developed to provide the ‘economic 
muscle’ on which national unity depended (Morgan, 2002, 
p19). However the often-quoted boast that Mussolini was 
able to so regulate Italian life that the trains ran on 
time is a myth (Ward, 1978, p262). Benito Mussolini, 
self-styled Il Duce, had become the world’s first Fascist 
dictator; the word ‘totalitarian’ was coined as a 
descriptor for his regime (Adams & Dyson, 2003, p178). 
 
Adolf Hitler, the ambitious leader of an extremist 
political group in Germany was ‘an admirer’ of Mussolini 
and his achievements (Rejai, 1991, p60). The success of 
Il Duce inspired Hitler’s group to make their own ‘bid 
for power’ (Blum, 1998, p27). In 1923 they launched an 
incredibly ill conceived coup without significant 
military or political backing. Their attempted kidnapping 
of three prominent government officials ended in a 
gunfight with the police (Rosenberg, 2011a, p1). Hitler 
was arrested, tried and sentenced to a five-year prison 
term in a ‘large pleasant room’ in the Landsberg prison 
(Eubank, 2004, p27). Here he dictated the first volume of 
his memoir, ‘Mein Kampf’ to his loyal scribe Rudolf Hess 
(Welch, 1998, p18). After serving only nine months 
Hitler’s political allies saw to it that he was paroled 
(Rosenberg, 2011). 
 
Hitler’s rise to political prominence had started in 1919 
when as a destitute war veteran he had been paid to spy 
on the activities the extremist German Workers Party 
(Welch, 1998, p11). Within a month he had abandoned his 
low key monitoring and was addressing the group at 
meetings (Welch, 1998, p11). Hitler was a ‘mesmerising 
performer’ (Rejai, 1991, p60); he was a ‘thoroughgoing 
hysteric’ who had the ability to transmit his ‘absolute 
faith’ in himself to his audience (Machtan, 2001, p123). 
By 1920 Hitler was party secretary and the movement had 
added ‘National Socialist’ to the ‘German Workers Party’ 
becoming the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche 
Arbeiterpartei. They would be known as the Nazi Party 




Hitler’s speeches fulfilled his audience’s need for 
confirmation of the injustice of the Versailles treaty, 
and of the subversive behavior of Bolsheviks and Jews 
(Eubank, 2004, p26). Any dissenting voices were swiftly 
dealt with by Hitler’s ‘strong bodyguard’ (Binchy, 1933, 
p37). By February 1920, Hitler’s oratory was drawing 
enthusiastic crowds of over two thousand – he had ‘found 
his platform’ (Binchy, 1933, p37). During July 1921, 
Hitler became Nazi party president with ‘unlimited 
powers’ (Blum, 1998, p27). Hitler’s first act was to 
transform his ‘bodyguard’ into brown shirted ‘storm 
trooper’ paramilitaries (Marzani, 1990, p5).  
 
Hitler was released from prison having created a 
sufficiently strong ‘personality cult’ to cast himself as 
the central ‘Führerfigure’ that he believed must be the 
focus of an aspirant national movement (Welch, 1998, 
p16). The botched coup made it obvious that the Nazi 
Party could not succeed by violence alone. Early in 1925 
Hitler began to think about adopting the more 
conventional elements of the ‘constitutional process’ 
(Pearson, 2008, p29). Hitler relentlessly lambasted the 
Weimar Republic as the source of Germany’s ‘political 
humiliation and economic failure’ while promoting the 
‘quasi-religious’ myth of himself as the all-powerful 
Fuhrer (Welch, 1998, p23). The ‘receptive ability’ of a 
mass audience, wrote Hitler, is ‘very limited’, 
‘effective propaganda’ must restrict itself to the 
dramatic repetition of a ‘very few points’ (Hitler, 1939, 
p234). To this the Nazi Party added the theatrics of 
torch lit parades, uniforms, elaborate banners and 
military bands, the dramatic result ‘captured the 
imagination of the masses’ (Welch, 1998, p27). In the 
1932 election the Nazi’s won thirty seven percent of the 
vote to become the largest party in the Reichstag 
(Simkin, 1997).  
 
On January 30, 1933, Germany’s President Hindenburg 
invited Hitler to become Chancellor (Rosenberg, 2011). 
Hitler accepted and began taking Germany ‘towards a 
dictatorship’ (Pearson, 2008, p29). The German 
constitution was suspended and the Reich Cabinet awarded 
itself ‘unlimited’ power (Pearson, 2008, p29). Hitler was 
no longer concerned with the opinion of the electorate, 
he did not intend there to be another election for a 
‘thousand years’ (Wiskemann, 2008, p494).  
 
Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler finally met in 1934. 
Hitler flew to Venice at Mussolini’s invitation to 
discuss the Nazi plans for Austria, part of which was now 
Italian territory.  
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Mussolini was scornful of the Nazi’s vision of themselves 
as a master race and was convinced that they envied 
Italy’s 'thirty centuries of history' (Hibbert, 1962, 
p76). Hitler's plane was met by Il Duce, who wore a 
ceremonial uniform with much gold braid, a dagger and 
silver spurs (Hibbert, 1962, p77). Hitler, stepped from 
his plane in a rumpled mackintosh, blue serge suit and 
clutching a floppy felt hat (Hibbert, 1962, p77). He ‘was 
embarrassed’ (Knickerbocker, 1941, p5) and Mussolini 
‘disliked him’ from the first (Hibbert, 1962, p77).  
 
The visit lasted three days and included several 
conferences as well as official tours and concerts, 
Mussolini quickly tired of the ‘idiotic’ ranting about 
racial supremacy (Hibbert, 1962, p76). At one stage a 
difference of opinion developed into a loud argument, 
which had the two dictators ‘barking’ at each other like 
‘two mastiffs' (Hibbert, 1962, p77). They each led 
violent authoritarian regimes but had little else in 
common; Hitler’s favourite film would be Gary Cooper in 
‘The Lives of a Bengal Lancer’ (Ferguson, 2003, p334) 
while Mussolini preferred the comedies of Laurel and 
Hardy (Hibbert, 1962, p44). H. R. Knickerbocker, who 
witnessed the awkward Venice encounter, described Adolf 
Hitler as a pretentious actor whose villainy was only 
recognised after he started ‘shooting at his audience’ 
(Knickerbocker, 1941, p2).  
 
Chamberlain’s troubled premiership    
 
As the influence of the German-Italian fascist ‘menace’ 
spread across continental Europe (Churchill 1948 p284) 
Britain’s financial problems were beginning to dissipate; 
the ‘worst of the depression’ appeared to be over (Mowat, 
1955, p532). In June, Ramsay MacDonald and Stanley 
Baldwin exchanged government posts making Baldwin Prime 
Minister, although Neville Chamberlain continued to guide 
policy (Mowat, 1955, p534). Those policies were tested 
when in July, Nazi Germany introduced compulsory military 
service and began rearming (Mowat, 1955, p539) and again 
in October when Italian forces invaded the African 
country of Ethiopia. Chamberlain attended a League of 
Nations tribunal at which Hitler’s infractions were set 
aside as ‘domestic’ and some inconsequential sanctions 
were imposed on Italy (Brierly, 2008, p259). Britain and 
France, as the most influential members of the League 
advised against ‘strong action’ for fear of alienating 
Italy and driving Mussolini into closer cooperation with 
Hitler (Kaarbo & Ray, 2005, p42). Baldwin believed in the 
League, ‘up to a point’, but thought it prudent to start 
a rearmament programme (Mowat, 1955, p536).  
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The increase in weapons manufacture created a 
‘significant rise’ in employment (Morgan, 2000, pp36-39). 
In May 1936, came the news that Ethiopia’s ill-trained 
and poorly equipped troops had been defeated. Mussolini 
claimed Ethiopia in the name of his new Italian ‘Fascist 
empire’ (Mowat, 1955, p561). Mussolini’s use of aircraft 
for the ‘indiscriminate’ dispersal of poison gas during 
the conflict (Brierly, 2008, p260) prompted the British 
Home Office to publish its first air raid precautions 
booklet (Mowat, 1955, p535). 
 
Baldwin resigned the premiership in May 1937. Chamberlain 
became Prime Minister just as the intentions of Italy, 
Germany and Japan were starting to dominate the political 
landscape. All three countries had recently resigned 
their membership of the League of Nations and all three 
denied any sinister intent (Mowat, 1955, p586). 
Chamberlain suffered the ‘unfortunate illusion’ that 
these countries were led by ‘reasonable men’ who could be 
trusted (Kitchen, 1990, p3). Two million Britain’s, who 
did not share Chamberlain’s faith, made space in the back 
garden for a sheet steel ‘Anderson’ air raid shelter 
(Havighurst, 1966, p286). 
 
Despite assurances to the contrary, Nazi troops crossed 
the border into Austria on March 11th, 1938. Two days 
later Hitler made a ‘victorious’ entry into Vienna 
(Mowat, 1955, p600) and Austria was incorporated into 
Germany as a new province named ‘Ostmark’ (Kitchen, 1990, 
p5). Hitler next turned to the Sudetenland, a German-
speaking region of Czechoslovakia that had once been part 
of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire (Edgerton, 2011, 
p30). Chamberlain felt moved to protest that previously 
agreed international borders were being violated (Morgan, 
2000, p42). Hitler invited Chamberlain and France’s 
Édouard Daladier to Munich to discuss the Sudetenland. 
Fearing that obstructing Hitler would prompt war, the 
British and French leaders agreed to step aside and allow 
a German annexation of the Sudetenland (Kitchen, 1990, 
p8). Chamberlain, knowing his acquiescence would result 
in a hostile reception in London, asked Hitler to sign a 
declaration of Anglo-German friendship. Chamberlain 
produced this paper on his arrival back in Britain and 
read aloud that the agreement was ‘symbolic of the desire 
of our two peoples never to go to war with one another 
again’ (Hoggan, 1989, p90). 
 
Chamberlain seemed to have achieved 'peace with honour' 
and was received as a hero (Kitchen, 1990, p8). Then in 
early October the Nazi’s began bombing Prague; the 
‘obstinate’ Czechs had refused to abide by an agreement 
in which they took no part (Kitchen, 1990, p8).  
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Suddenly ‘peace with honour’ looked like an ‘abdication 
of responsibility’ and it was critics like Churchill who 
appeared more in step with ‘popular sentiment’ (Morgan, 
2000, p42). That Chamberlain was able to promote 
‘reasonable’ appeasement while accelerating the 
rearmament programme made little difference to the 
British public (Edgerton, 2011, p30). They saw only a 
weak Prime Minister who had been duped by a Fascist 
dictator (Morgan, 2000, p42).  
 
Britain declares war 
 
By March Czechoslovakia had been over run and Hitler 
claimed the country as the 'German Protectorate of 
Bohemia and Moravia'. It was an audacious act that served 
Britain by bringing the Dominions 'on side' (McKibbin, 
2007, p51). Their reluctance to become involved in 
Britain’s European arguments was overcome by a 'moral 
repugnance' for Hitler and Nazism (McKibbin, 2007, p51). 
They also expressed concern that no more territory should 
fall under German rule, Chamberlain, eager to present a 
united empire front was 'stampeded’ into taking a stand. 
He assured the Dominions that Britain would defend Poland 
should it come under the Nazi threat (Morgan, 2000, p43).  
 
Hitler invaded Poland on September 1st 1939 (Morgan, 
2000, p43) having first agreed a Nazi/Soviet non-
aggression pact with Stalin who wanted a Polish 
thoroughfare to the Baltic (Kitchen, 1990, p9). On 
September 3rd Chamberlain was under pressure to make good 
his pledge to Poland and so sent an ultimatum to Hitler. 
He demanded that German troops be withdrawn from Poland 
by eleven that morning or war would follow. The troops 
did not stand down and later that day Chamberlain 
broadcast to the nation that Britain and Germany were at 
war (Morgan, 2000, p43). There was in reality little that 
could be done to save Poland and by September 17th it had 
been overwhelmed and partitioned into German and Russian 
portions (Havighurst, 1966, p287). In October the half a 
million troops that comprised the British expeditionary 
force were sent to France where they were positioned 
along the Belgian border (Kitchen, 1990, p24). At home 
the winter of 1939 became a period of civilian and 
military preparation that seemed so anticlimactic as to 
become known as the ‘phony war’ (Havighurst, 1966, p288). 
 
From the first days of the war America’s President 
Roosevelt had made it very clear that his country would 
remain neutral. However both the President and the 
American industrialists were keen to export all they 
could to Britain without violating the Neutrality Act 
(Kitchen, 1990, p36).  
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Roosevelt did encourage an infringement by pointing out 
that unassembled ‘instruments of war' could be legally 
exported to a belligerent country (Kitchen, 1990, p37). 
When concerns were raised that America was being drawn 
into a foreign conflict, Roosevelt explained that 
supporting the British war effort did, in effect, defend 
America (Clarke, 2008, p11). The President was wholly 
against Hitler’s Nazi regime and wanted to see it 
overthrown. Whenever Joseph Kennedy, American ambassador 
to London, recommended that Roosevelt and Hitler come to 
terms he was dismissed as 'a pain in the neck' (Kitchen, 
1990, p36).  
 
On April 4th, 1940, Neville Chamberlain smugly announced 
that all Britain’s defences were up to strength and that 
Hitler had ’missed the bus’ (Kitchen, 1990, p207). Just 
five days later Germany invaded Norway and a British 
military base there was easily overrun (Morgan, 2000, 
p47). Chamberlain’s detractors multiplied, not only in 
the House but also in the streets; the public detected 
the sense of ‘total failure’ (Havighurst, 1966, p292). 
Chamberlain clung to office for another month but after 
eighty of his own MP’s voted against him in the House he 
admitted defeat and resigned. He died just six months 
later (Morgan, 2000, p47).  
 
Churchill becomes Prime Minister 
 
The outgoing Prime Minister advised the king to call upon 
Winston Churchill to head the new government (Havighurst, 
1966, p293). Churchill may not have been the obvious 
choice but his ‘inspiring oratory’ and traditional 
patriotism might be required to summon the ‘reserves of 
national will-power’ (Morgan, 2000, p47). Importantly, he 
was not seen as one of the ‘old regime’ that had so 
misjudged Hitler and Mussolini (Havighurst, 1966, p294). 
Churchill commanded cross party support and had no 
trouble putting together what he called a ‘National 
Coalition’ government that included eight Labour 
ministers; his five member ‘War Cabinet’ included 
‘unassuming’ Labour leader, Clement Attlee, as Deputy 
Prime Minister (Carter, 1997, p554). While Churchill 
dealt with the actual prosecution of the war, Attlee 
became the ‘most powerful figure on the home front’ 
(Dutton, 1997, p63). Together with the coalition’s other 
Labour ministers, Attlee played a ‘highly visible and 
constructive’ role in planning for a post war Britain 
(Carter, 1997, p554). Massive reforms in housing and 
education were planned as well as the surreptitious 
laying of foundations for a post-war ‘welfare state’ 
(Kitchen, 1990, pp208-210).  
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On the same day as Churchill became Prime Minister, 
Hitler began his westward ‘march of conquest’ with 
invasions of Holland and Belgium (Kitchen, 1990, p24). By 
May 14th the Dutch army had surrendered and with the 
Belgians fairing no better, the Germans turned their 
attention to France (Morgan, 2000, p47). The Allied 
defence force and the opposing invaders were roughly 
equal in manpower but the Germans had air superiority. 
The Allies were conducting a ‘purely defensive campaign’ 
that was being hampered by a ‘woefully deficient’ French 
communications system (Kitchen, 1990, p25) By May 23rd 
German armoured columns had crossed France and reached 
the channel coast. The British Expeditionary Force were 
now fighting in a narrow corridor that only led toward 
the sea (Havighurst, 1966, p295). On May 24th the French 
army ‘broke up in disorderly retreat’ (Morgan, 2000, p47) 
and the order was issued for the British troops to 
‘retreat across the Channel’ (Kitchen, 1990, p27). Called 
'Operation Dynamo' the evacuation from the beaches of 
Dunkirk was an ‘organisational triumph’. Three hundred 
and forty thousand men were transported back to Britain 
in a naval and commercial fleet that even included 
pleasure craft (Havighurst, 1966, p295). The exercise 
rescued ten times the number of men that even Churchill 
had hoped for. A near miracle transformed a ‘shattering 
defeat’ into the stuff of legend; the 'spirit of Dunkirk' 
passed into national mythology (Kitchen, 1990, p28) 
 
Churchill’s radio broadcast of June 18th proclaimed the 
Battle of France to be over, and the Battle of Britain 
beginning (Havighurst, 1966, p296). German aircraft 
started bombing London that very night, and would be 
attacking somewhere in Britain every night for months to 
come (Havighurst, 1966, p299). This aerial bombardment 
known as the ‘Blitz’ was intended to destroy civilian 
morale prior to invasion (Havighurst, 1966, p304). At the 
same time on the French coast barges and landing craft 
were being assembled to ferry troops across the channel.  
The invasion was set for September 21st and on August 1st 
Hitler gave the order to commence the destruction of the 
RAF, radar stations, the docks, shipping and industrial 
centres (Havighurst, 1966, p299). ‘Wave after wave’ of 
Luftwaffe bombers and fighter aircraft crossed the 
British coast (Morgan, 2000, p48). They were met by anti-
aircraft fire from the ground and in air-to-air combat by 
RAF Spitfires and Hurricanes. Britain’s, Poles, Czechs, 
and Canadians piloted these fighters with a mix of skill 
and recklessness that inflicted disproportionately heavy 
losses on the German flyers (Morgan, 2000, p48). The 
battle in the air lasted until early September with 
German fatalities more than double those of the RAF and 
escalating (Havighurst, 1966, p300).  
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Then on September 14th Hitler cancelled the whole 
operation. The Luftwaffe had not been able to destroy the 
RAF and was suffering catastrophic losses that Germany 
could no longer afford. The following weeks saw the 
invasion fleet dismantled and by the end of September the 
British high command were prepared to tell Churchill that 
the Battle of Britain had been won (Havighurst, 1966, 
p303). 
 
This was to be the period that lodged in the national 
memory, when the British people ‘stood alone’ and won the 
day against a brutish and better-prepared foe. Kitchen 
argues that this is ‘almost pure myth’; Britain did not 
stand alone but was supported, not always willingly, by 
the vast populations of the countries of the empire 
(Kitchen, 1990, p218).  From its essentially European 
beginnings the war had ‘rapidly turned into a broader 
effort’. Troops from Australia, New Zealand, Canada, 
South Africa and again, vitally, from India were drafted 
into the conflict (Morgan, 2000, p49). There were British 
military installations and communication stations all 
over the world that required defending.  
 
A large number of British bases were in the Middle East 
paying special attention to the Suez Canal and the oil 
fields of Persia (Morgan, 2000, p50). The numerous 
independence movements within the countries of the empire 
eagerly received reports of Britain’s near bankruptcy and 
military defeats. They were cheered by the knowledge that 
their imperial masters were not infallible (Kitchen, 
1990, p218). 
 
Lend-Lease and the ‘Atlantic Charter’ 
 
In February, while the bombs were still falling, the BBC 
transmitted a speech from Churchill that was relayed to 
its intended audience in America. After praising the 
United States for its assistance in a noble cause he 
finished, ‘put your faith in us... give us the tools and 
we will finish the job’. Roosevelt was aware of Britain’s 
financial position and knew that the stress was on the 
word ‘give’ (Edgerton, 2011, p74). In March, the American 
Congress passed the ‘lend-lease’ bill. Although one 
senator commented that the idea of loaning military 
equipment was as ‘absurd’ as loaning chewing gum, once 
used, neither was worth having back (Ambrose & Brinkley, 
2011, p12) The senator had missed the shrewdness of 
Roosevelt’s ‘masterstroke’ - supplies that were either 
‘on loan’ or were being ‘leased’ would never actually be 
owned by the belligerent country and would not therefore 
contravene the Neutrality Act (Clarke, 2008, p10).  
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Roosevelt provided great assistance to Britain. Not only 
in providing the Lend-Lease lifeline but also in ensuring 
that supplies were safely shipped in convoys escorted in 
part by the US navy (Brogan, 2008, p581). America also 
‘accepted’ long term ‘rent-free bases’ on British 
possessions like Bermuda and Guyana in return for a 
donation of fifty American destroyers (Ambrose & 
Brinkley, 2011, p11). Here was ‘neutrality of a totally 
novel kind’ (Brogan, 2008, p581). The President brought 
America as ‘close to direct involvement’ as a ‘neutral’ 
country dare get (Wasserstein, 2007, p325). He and 
Churchill arranged to meet to discuss ‘precise peace 
aims’ (Louis, 1978, p130). The occasion required the 
Prime Minister to cross the Atlantic by battleship and 
rendezvous with the American carrier USS Augusta off the 
coast of Newfoundland (Smellie, 1962, p356). Churchill 
himself admitted that this was premature as the end of 
the war was as yet not in sight (Louis, 1978, p130), but 
the talks reached a conclusion which was later described 
by the London Daily Herald as an 'Atlantic Charter' 
(Kelly, 2011). The document was not a charter, but simply 
a ‘press release’ issued by Roosevelt and Churchill to 
describe their plans for the post war world.  
Roosevelt specifically avoided a more formal framework to 
prevent it being ‘interpreted as an alliance’ (Louis, 
1978, p122). The President held the traditional American 
distrust of colonialism and British imperialists who 
would colonise every available island, harbour, ‘rock or 
a sandbar' in the interest of empire (Judd, 1996, p319).  
 
These misgivings were carried into the drafting of the 
declaration, which stated categorically that ‘all 
peoples’ had the right to choose their own ‘form of 
government’ (Louis, 1978, p123). This was a reworking of 
a clause in a First World War pronouncement by Woodrow 
Wilson in which he had tried to encourage colonial powers 
to transform their territorial control into a 
‘trusteeship’ (Judd, 1996, p318). The 'Atlantic Charter' 
was an attempt clarify and to reiterate the notion that 
all subject colonies should eventually be made 
independent (Louis, 1978, p3) Churchill left the meeting 
claiming to have understood that the clause only applied 
to the ‘conquered nations of Europe’ whereas Roosevelt 








The international war  
 
Between January and December 1941 the war would change 
dramatically in character and scope. On June 20th, German 
troops attacked their erstwhile allies, the Russians.  
Hitler had written of his intention to perpetrate this 
‘act of betrayal’ in the pages of ‘Mein Kampf’ (Ferguson, 
2006, p429). Nazi generals were unconcerned that their 
attack was so widely anticipated; they thought the Red 
Army would be ‘easy meat’ for their superbly equipped and 
battle hardened elite troops (Ferguson, 2006, p430). But 
the victory did not materialise and the invasion proved a 
miscalculation. Almost every item of intelligence on 
which the German plan was based was false. Although slow 
to mobilise the Red army was large, well trained and well 
equipped. Their twenty three thousand tanks easily out 
numbered the German Panzers. While the speed of the Nazi 
invasion meant early victories, once the huge soviet 
military machine was in motion the tide began to turn. 
Germany’s swift attack was turned into a war of attrition 
that dragged on into a vicious winter for which Hitler’s 
troops were not equipped (Kaarbo & Ray, 2005, p46). 
 
On December 7th, the Imperial Japanese Navy sprang a 
surprise two-pronged attack. Firstly on British bases in 
Malaya and Hong Kong and secondly on the American naval 
base at Pearl Harbour (Clarke, 2008, p17). Sixteen 
American warships were sunk or damaged, almost two 
hundred aircraft were lost and two thousand four hundred 
personnel were killed. The Japanese battle plan had been 
kept a close secret, not only from the United States, but 
also from Germany. Hitler would not have approved the 
plan; he wanted Japan to maintain a ‘menacing posture’ to 
keep America busy, not draw it into the fray (Kaarbo & 
Ray, 2005, p46). On the following day, Britain and 
America simultaneously declared war on Japan. Germany and 
Italy retaliated with declarations against America 
(Havighurst, 1966, p314). Within just a few weeks the 
conflict had been joined by the Soviet Union, Japan and 
the United States of America; the war would once again be 
‘a world-wide one’, with fighting on ‘every continent and 
every ocean’. It was a global event and a global tragedy 
(Morgan, 2000, p49). 
 
Declaration of the United Nations 
 
With America as an official combatant Roosevelt wanted a 
formalised strategy and command structure with clear post 
war aims. All interested parties were swiftly informed 
that a wartime summit conference would convene at the 
White House on December 22nd 1941 (O'Neill, 1999, p21). 
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Represented at the meeting were the ‘big four’ America, 
Great Britain, Russia and China, and an international 
cadre of allies including the British Dominions and eight 
governments in exile. The total was twenty-six countries, 
collectively referred to by Roosevelt as the ‘United 
Nations’ (Clarke, 2008, p18). The talks lasted throughout 
the Christmas period and into the New Year, although 
Churchill managed to slip away to Florida for a few days 
‘in the sun’ (Sherwood, 1948, p444).  
 
At the first official discussion Roosevelt dispelled 
fears that America’s war effort would be directed solely 
at Japan.  American Chiefs of Staff confirmed that 
Germany was considered the ‘prime enemy’ whose defeat 
would cause Italy and Japan to collapse (Sherwood, 1948, 
p444). This intention had been added to the Allied war 
aims stated in the ‘Atlantic Charter’ and Roosevelt gave 
his assurance that America intended to pursue policies 
that would rebuild the post-war world as it was 
‘envisioned’ in that charter (Moore & Pubantz, 1999, 
p30). The document was signed by the twenty-six countries 
that Roosevelt, at that time, considered to be the 
‘United Nations’ (Moore & Pubantz, 1999, pp30-31). This 
was the first in a series of agreements that was to 
establish the international regulatory institutions most 
closely ‘associated’ with contemporary globalisation 
(Goldman, 2007, p20). 
 
Roosevelt and Churchill communicated frequently and 
appear to have been on friendly terms, despite both 
having an undeniable ‘blind spot’ when it came to the 
British Empire (Moore & Pubantz, 1999, p31). Roosevelt 
wanted to see the ‘dismemberment’ of all colonial empires 
(Moore & Pubantz, 1999, p31) while Churchill was 
determined not to oversee the ‘liquidation’ of Britain’s 
empire (Havighurst, 1966, p390). However, Churchill was 
fighting the war of the moment and, with no wish to 
jeopardise the Anglo-American relationship, he was 
‘obliged’ to fall in with the President's plans (Judd, 
1996, p318). Germic argues that Roosevelt ‘had the 
British over a barrel’, he knew that the empire was 
unlikely to survive without American help but he wanted 
to see an end to the ‘special trade agreements’ that 
extended British influence ‘across the globe’ (Germic, 
2009, p128). When a copy of the ‘United Nations’ document 
was examined by the British foreign office, senior 
figures voiced fears that the agreement might be used by 
subjects of the Empire as a lever for self government 
(Louis, 1978, p125). Consequently Churchill disappointed 
many Indian nationalists when he made it ‘emphatically 
clear’ to Parliament that the self-determination clause 
did not apply to India (Vohra, 2001, p163).  
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Within a month of Churchill’s return to London he had to 
deal with the news that Japanese troops had advanced with 
remarkable speed through the European ‘colonial' states 
of South East Asia (Vohra, 2001, p163). Japan had overrun 
and occupied Burma, the Dutch East Indies and Malaya 
(Blouet, 2001, p112). Worst of all they had successfully 
seized Britain's ‘lynch-pin’ naval base in Singapore 
(Ferguson, 2003, p339) and captured eighty thousand 
British and colonial troops (Morgan, 2000, p51). This 
was, Churchill admitted grimly, a ‘far-reaching military 
defeat’ (Havighurst, 1966, p315). British morale was 
temporarily lifted by increased bombing raids against 
Germany but in retaliation came the ‘Baedeker’ raids on 
the tourist cities of Bath, Bristol, Canterbury, Exeter, 
Norwich, and York (Gilbert, 1947, p16). June 1942 brought 
Britain another military defeat, this time in the North 
African desert. A surprise attack planned and led by 
German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel succeeded in capturing 
Tobruk, an important British administrative and supply 
base that guarded the Middle Eastern and Persian oil 
fields (Morgan, 2000, p50). 
 
The tide starts to turn 
 
In February 1943 came news that a Russian counterattack 
at Stalingrad had succeeded in retaking the city and that 
the German forces were beginning to fall back 
(Havighurst, 1966, p321). Eager to have Hitler’s 
attention diverted, Stalin pressured for a speedy start 
to the planned Allied invasion of France. Churchill was 
reluctant as he needed troops to defend British oil 
supplies and the Suez Canal (Perret, 2007, P365) but in 
March, he asked his planning staff to formulate a Dunkirk 
style evacuation in reverse (Kitchen, 1990, p292). 
Churchill’s proposal only utilised those resources he 
wanted to spare, it was therefore, ‘hopelessly flawed’, 
but Roosevelt accepted it. The Americans were not looking 
for a finished battle plan but sufficient acknowledgment 
of the operation to justify assembling the ‘largest 
amphibious operation in history’ (Perret, 2007, P365). 
Roosevelt wanted his own planning team to stay in 
Washington, so the ‘relatively unknown’ Brigadier General 
Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Allied 
Commander for operation 'Overlord' (Kitchen, 1990, pp292-
293).  
 
In June 1943 the Allies successfully invaded Sicily and 
the Italian military realised that they could no longer 
rely on German support. The bombing of Rome confirmed 
their worst fears; the Fascist Grand Council discharged 
Mussolini as war leader and ordered his arrest. Fascism 
in Italy ‘evaporated overnight’ (Lightbody, 2004, p183). 
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Germany was by now being subjected to continual aerial 
bombardment, whole cities were being obliterated by 
American flying fortresses (Havighurst, 1966, p340). The 
‘massed armour, artillery, and air power’ of the Red army 
was conducting ‘rolling offensives’ that advanced 
inexorably across Eastern Europe (Carley, 2006, p436). 
Allied troops were slowly fighting their way up the 
length of Italy (Carley, 2006, p436). Largely American 
forces in the Pacific were beginning to reduce the 
‘perimeter of Japanese control’ (Havighurst, 1966, p338). 
The Axis powers were being contained, there was no longer 
any doubt as to the ‘ultimate outcome of the war’ 
(Carley, 2006, p434).  
 
On January 14th, 1944 Eisenhower arrived in London with 
Churchill’s first stage proposal for a 'puny little 
attack' (Kitchen, 1990, p294). With his unlimited access 
to troops, transport and equipment, Eisenhower 
immediately trebled the size of the invading army and 
expanded the landing zone (Havighurst, 1966, p338). 
Normandy was the chosen landing zone precisely because it 
was not ideal, it had no usable harbour and was not 
conveniently situated. The German high command expected 
any invasion attempt to use the short Dover-Calais 
channel crossing. This idea was encouraged by a build-up 
of ‘dummy tanks, lorries, guns and supply dumps’ in the 
Dover area (Perret, 2007, p365).  
 
In early June, the English Channel was hit by a spell of 
particularly bad weather (Havighurst, 1966, p341). After 
Eisenhower was assured the storm would get no worse he 
ordered Overlord to commence on the night of June 5th 
with parachute drops and the next day with beach landings 
(Kitchen, 1990, p296). American, British, and Canadian 
troops landed in their thousands (Morgan, 2000, p51). 
Remarkably, for so vast an operation the Germans were 
taken by surprise. Of the troops at their disposal only 
half could be moved at any speed toward Normandy and no 
tanks were available until the following day (Carley, 
2006, p436). As had been arranged with Stalin, troops at 
the Eastern Front were kept occupied with a synchronous 
Red army offensive that drove forward with such firepower 
that the German line was broken and scattered (Carley, 
2006, p436). After ten days of ‘unexpectedly dogged 
German resistance’  (Clarke, 2008, p67) the French coast 
was considered safe enough for Churchill to visit 
Montgomery on June 10th and for the king to walk the 






On June 17th Hitler visited his commanders in France. He 
assured them that England would soon be destroyed by his 
new ‘wonder weapons’ and absolutely refused to allowed 
troops to be removed from Calais to prevent the Allied 
forces from extending their bridgehead (Kitchen, 1990, 
p299). Within three weeks the Allied armies were on their 
way to Paris and the Red army was approaching Warsaw. 
‘Nazi Germany was doomed’ (Carley, 2006, p436). 
 
The Bretton Woods agreements 
 
Two weeks after the Allied landings in Normandy, a 
British delegation boarded the Queen Mary enroute for New 
York (Moggridge, 1995, p739). They were going to finalise 
a set of economic arrangements that would shape the 
world’s financial future. Within three months of the 
United States entry into the Second World War a US 
Treasury official, Harry Dexter White, had produced a 
plan for the ‘post-war economic order’ (Skidelsky, 1997, 
p336). On the British side of the Atlantic, John Maynard 
Keynes was working on a similar plan. Keynes was by now 
considered the ‘greatest economist of the twentieth 
century’, a fact of which everyone, including Keynes 
himself was aware (Ferguson, 2003, p353).  
 
He was the know-all who really knew it. In negotiations 
with the Americans he either dazzled them with his 
‘extraordinary eloquence’ or belittled them with 
‘extraordinary rudeness’ (Skidelsky, 1997, p337). Outside 
of the negotiations Keynes referred to the Jewish 
officials of the US Treasury as the ‘rabbinics’ (Buchan, 
2008, p26) and complained of lawyers jabbering in  
‘Cherokee’ (Ferguson, 2003, p353). Such remarks may not 
have been intentionally racist but as one of the 
directors of the British Eugenics Society Keynes 
certainly had views on such things (Buchan, 2008, p28).  
 
The two major players presented their proposals, the 
‘White plan’ intended to achieve stability through 
traditional fiscal remedies, harked back to the gold 
standard (Clarke, 2008, pp30). The ‘Keynes plan’ was full 
of ‘clever dodges’ and intended to bypass the old gold 
standard by introducing a new unit of international 
credit to be called the ‘Bancor’ (Clarke, 2008, pp30-31).  
The American negotiators were dismissive of the Bancor 
(Ferguson, 2003, p353) but were wary of Keynes; they did 
not want to be made to look ‘suckers’ by a British 
economist however ‘diabolically clever’ he was said to be 
(Skidelsky, 1997, p337). The British were deeply in debt 
to the Americans and had little choice but to allow the 
US treasury to ‘call the tune’ (Skidelsky, 1997, p337).  
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The ‘White plan’ was inevitably accepted, although Keynes 
remained a ‘key player’ (Clarke, 2008, p29). The ‘United 
Nations Monetary and Financial Conference’ took place at 
a somewhat rambling two hundred and thirty-four-bedroom 
New Hampshire hotel. The nearby railway halt of ‘Bretton 
Woods’ gave its name to the proceedings (Buchan, 2008, 
p26).  
 
The conference was to enable the seven hundred and thirty 
finance ministers, officials and clerks that represented 
the forty-four allied countries (Anikin, 1983, p159) to 
reach a consensus on the details of the ‘Anglo-American 
Draft Statement of Principles’ (Moggridge, 1995, p728).  
The delegates slowly approved the many clauses and 
caveats of the plan and as the weeks passed the initially 
icy atmosphere between the British and American 
contingents noticeably thawed (Moggridge, 1995, p743). 
Keynes continued to press for as liberal an international 
economic order as possible and White rarely objected 
(Skidelsky, 1997, p260). Unknown to anyone at that time, 
White’s financial ideas were often tilted by his extreme 
leftist sympathies (Clarke, 2008, p30). It later emerged 
that he had passed all of America’s financial planning 
details to the Soviets (Buchan, 2008, p27). Not until 
1948 was White’s ‘subversive activity’ suspected. He was 
summoned to explain himself before the Un-American 
Activities Committee but suffered a fatal heart attack 
two days before his scheduled appearance (Anikin, 1983, 
p160).  
 
The collective opinion of the nations represented at 
Bretton Woods was that the Second World War was ‘made 
possible’ by the international economic collapse that 
preceded it (Johnson, 1991, p659). The aim of the 
conference was to reestablish some form of international 
economic equilibrium by setting a multi-national seal of 
approval on a new currency conversion mechanism (Judt, 
2005, p107). There were two elements to the plan; a 
stabilisation fund to provide balanced exchange rates and 
a reconstruction and development fund that would 
facilitate the rebuilding of ‘war-torn economies’ and war 
damaged cities (Legrain, 2003, p105). The stabilisation 
fund was very similar to Keynes proposal for an 
international clearing bank based on the bancor except 
that it would now be based on the US dollar.  
Keynes had worked hard on the ‘ultimate synthesis’ of the 







The proposed scheme leaned toward the old British gold 
standard, except where that had been managed by private 
financial interests, the Bretton Woods system would be 
controlled by its own institutions (Hardt & Negri, 2001, 
p265). It was plain from the start that the new plans 
would revolve around the US dollar; it was the only 
currency in the mechanism backed by enough gold to 
maintain the confidence of convertibility. Using the 
dollar as a ‘world currency’ avoided both the rigidity of 
the gold standard and the insecurity of a floating 
currency (Legrain, 2003, p105). Ahmad states that the 
Bretton Woods accords made a ‘significant contribution’ 
to economic globalisation because they were based upon 
the US dollar as a world currency (Ahmad, 2006, p3). Each 
nation would determine the trading value of its currency 
against the dollar, which was permanently pegged against 
gold at thirty-five dollars an ounce (Cundiff, 2007, 
p29). While international exchange had not entirely 
escaped the ‘long shadow’ of the gold standard it did 
offer world currencies the opportunity to ‘realign’ their 
dollar parity without having to devalue (Eichengreen & 
Flandreau, 1997, p24). While this was more flexible than 
previous systems, it did in effect, simply replace the 
‘classical’ gold standard with the ‘gold dollar standard’ 
(Anikin, 1983, p161). The United States would guarantee 
the gold dollar standard by making the largest 
contribution to the stabilisation fund which would offer 
short-term loans to other contributors should they 
encounter balance of payments difficulties (Schifferes, 
2008; Skidelsky, 1997, p336). This ‘modest adjustment 
facility’ was re-named the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) (Skidelsky, 1997, p336). 
 
The fund for reconstruction and the recovery of monetary 
stability has since evolved into the ‘World Bank’ 
(Buchan, 2008, p26). Milgate and Stimson argue that the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are the 
‘unprecedented features’ which identify contemporary 
globalisation as being more than the mere continuance of 
a ‘centuries-old trend’ (Milgate & Stimson, 2009, pp29-
30). The combination of these Bretton Woods institutions 
was to prove ‘potent brew’ (Clarke, 2008, p29). Keynes 
would have preferred that the IMF be based in London and 
run by ‘decent English chaps’ but he recognised that 
aggressive negotiating could jeopardise Britain’s 
continuing need for American financial assistance 
(Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2000, p14). What the IMF did 
have in London were its critics, those who claimed that 
the agreements ended any illusion of British ‘economic 




Internationally the IMF scheme was welcomed as a ‘more 
global’ solution than anything previously attempted 
(Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2000, p14). Ahmad argues that 
the inauguration of the Bretton Woods institutions 
represented the start of the ‘more encompassing’ 
globalisation of the sort that we understand today 
(Ahmad, 2006, p3). 
 
The United Nations Organisation 
 
In February 1945, the leaders of the major Allied 
governments, Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill, met at the 
Black Sea coast resort of Yalta. They discussed post-war 
territorial control and border changes (Johnson, 1991, 
p101) Churchill attempted to restrict Russian European 
claims as he knew these would be pushed to the limit by 
the apparently ‘unstoppable’ Red Army. Roosevelt, 
however, was inclined to allow many of Stalin’s demands 
because Russia had agreed to join America in the fight 
against Japan and because he needed to be coaxed into 
supporting the United Nations Organisation (Carley, 2006, 
p437). Roosevelt's scheme had previously been agreed in 
principle but both other leaders were wary - Churchill 
because an institution that encouraged the self-
determination of ‘colonial peoples’ could adversely 
affect the British Empire - and the ‘ever-suspicious’ 
Stalin because he never liked American proposals on 
principle (Moore & Pubantz, 1999, p27). However, as the 
League of Nations had indisputably failed, a new 
international arrangement based on a ‘wider global 
context’ was required (Clark, 1998, p80). The charter of 
Roosevelt's new foundation took the Covenant of the 
League of Nations as a start point but care was taken to 
ensure its independence. The ‘big three’ approved the 
structure of national representation and that the 
inaugural meeting of the United Nations Organisation 
should be held in San Francisco in two months (MacLaurin, 
1951, p8). 
 
Franklin Roosevelt did not enjoy good health. He had 
suffered a fever in 1921 that had left him weak and 
paralysed. During his presidential career the ‘most 
elaborate care’ was taken to prevent the public from 
learning just how debilitated he was. Throughout his 
hectic wartime schedule of speechmaking, international 
meetings and conferences both his mental and physical 
state suffered a steady deterioration. Roosevelt managed 
to attend the Yalta conference although already exhausted 
and recently diagnosed with a ‘moderate degree of 
arteriosclerosis’. When back in the White House he 
collapsed and was forced to take a complete rest leaving 
Vice President Truman in office.  
 151 
Roosevelt never returned. He died of a cerebral 
hemorrhage on April 12th, 1945 (Flynn, 1948, pp398-412). 
Truman was now President, an enthusiastic ‘anti-
communist’ whose most frequent reply to any mention of 
Soviet Russia was that ‘they can go to hell’ (Carley, 
2006, p437).  
 
Two weeks after Roosevelt’s death, delegates from fifty 
nations met in the San Francisco Opera House for the 
United Nations Conference on International Organisation 
(Urofsky & Finkelman, 2002, p749). Forty-four of the 
representatives were from countries that had previously 
been members of the League of Nations (Myers, 1948, 
p322). Roosevelt had constructed the event with great 
political care (Havighurst, 1966, p354). He had witnessed 
the diplomatic manoeuvring required to create the League 
of Nations and then the ‘tragic failure’ of the Senate’s 
refusal to ratify America’s membership (Moore & Pubantz, 
1999, p28). The League had adjourned in 1940 when its 
activities were ‘interrupted’ by hostilities (Myers, 
1948, p323).  
 
Gerwarth states that those activities included the 
promotion of ‘healthcare, drug control, economic 
cooperation’ and ‘labour legislation.’ While the League 
of Nations may have appeared ineffective in preventing 
conflict it did set the stage for ‘European and global 
cooperation’ (Gerwarth, 2007, p2). Roosevelt had started 
discussing the possibility of the United States taking an 
'active role' in establishment of a new 'league' as early 
as 1942 (Urofsky & Finkelman, 2002, p749). To avoid 
another Senate rejection, Roosevelt promoted his vision 
as an American initiative that was integral to the 
nations ‘post-war strategy’ (Moore & Pubantz, 1999, p27). 
At a Congressional session in late 1943 both houses 
accepted Roosevelt’s resolution for some form of 
‘international machinery’ to manage and maintain a 
'lasting peace’ (Urofsky & Finkelman, 2002, p749). 
 
The American Secretary of State opened the San Francisco 
proceedings with a speech that implied a totally new 
international concept and never once mentioned that the 
League had ever existed (Goodrich, 1947, p3). The 
assembly was then required to approve a new ‘distinctly 
American sounding' United Nations charter (Micklethwait & 
Wooldridge, 2000, p13). It had been drawn up by a Harvard 
professor whose enthusiasm for eighteenth-century English 
literature had provided the ornate egalitarian tone 
(Moore & Pubantz, 1999, p24). All were agreed that a 
General Assembly made up of all member countries would 
meet annually.  
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Each national delegation was entitled to one vote on any 
measure taken by the organisation (MacLaurin, 1951, p9). 
For swifter action there would be a resident Security 
Council of eleven member nations. Five would be 
permanent, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, 
China, and the Russian Federation and another six would 
be elected for two-year terms (Urofsky & Finkelman, 2002, 
p749). After the charter was signed it was legally 
required that the League of Nations terminated its 
existence (Goodrich, 1947, p3) and on September 20th 1945 
there was an official transfer of the League’s  
‘functions, activities and assets’ to the United Nations 
(Myers, 1948, p327). By October 24th 1945 the United 
Nations charter had been ratified by the majority of its 
signatories and therefore came into force as a legally 
acceptable international organisation (UN Publications, 
1995, p15). Hobsbawn identifies this event as a pivotal 
moment in the ‘globalisation of the world's political 
pattern’ (Hobsbawn, 1987, p336).  
 
Initially a European institution, the United Nations 
Organisation has ‘progressively became completely global’ 
and although its members are sovereign states the 
institution encourages the acceptance of a 
‘supranational’ style of decision making (Hardt & Negri, 
2001, pp4-5). Singer states that so many developing 
countries have gained independence and joined the UN that 
on the ‘one-country-one-vote’ principle they have a 
‘controlling majority’ in the General Assembly. However, 
much of the ‘supranational’ decision-making, requires 
some input from the IMF or the World Bank whose ‘one-
dollar-one-vote’ system makes the United States as the 
highest dollar contributor the most powerful member 
(Singer, 1995, pp348-349). 
 
The Bretton Woods institutions and the many facets of the 
United Nations Organisation would not only rebuild the 
international economy but ultimately accelerate the 
‘globalisation of economic and social relations’ (Hardt & 
Negri, 2001, p8). That such farsighted plans were being 
made while war still raged across Europe and Asia 
illustrates the ‘remarkable optimism’ with which the 
allied nations determined the shape of the post-war world 
(Cohen, 2001, p97). These ambitions were strengthened on 
April 15th 1945 when the Red army captured Vienna; a day 
later they advanced on Berlin (Carley, 2006, p437). 
Despite fierce German resistance, the Russians had the 
city surrounded by April 25th and were closing in 
(Havighurst, 1966, p355). On April 30th the Soviet army 
hoisted a red flag over the bomb-ruined Reichstag, Hitler 
avoided capture by committing suicide.  
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His death prompted the unconditional surrender of many 
German military leaders and the rapid collapse of the 
Nazi infrastructure (Morgan, 2000, p51). Britain 
celebrated Victory in Europe Day on May 8th, although 
Japan was yet to face defeat and terrible destruction 
(Thackeray & Findling, 2002, p158). 
 
The atom bomb 
 
Goldman identifies the process that transformed atomic 
power into international energy production as one of the 
key ‘technological manifestations’ of globalisation 
(Goldman, 2007, pxi). The process began early in the 
twentieth century when experiments with radioactive 
material were conducted in France and Germany (Edgerton, 
2011, p118). By the interwar period many of the 
theoretical advances behind the atomic devices that were 
to force the Japanese surrender were being explored by 
British university research groups (McKibbin, 1998, 
p249).  
 
Cambridge University’s Cavendish Laboratory, already a 
resource of 'international standing’ (McKibbin, 1998, 
p249) provided an apparatus costing an ‘outrageous’ five 
hundred pounds which enabled two research physicists, 
Cockcroft and Walton, to successfully split the atom in 
1932 (Johnson, 1991, p406). In the same year, James 
Chadwick, also at Cavendish, discovered the neutron an 
atomic particle that was neither positively nor 
negatively charged (Gosling, 1999, p1; Ball, 2002, p77). 
Neutral particles proved less liable to deflection and 
could be made to penetrate and split the nuclei of an 
atom more easily (Atkins, 2000, p76). It was a discovery 
of ‘first importance’  (Smellie, 1962, p379) and it 
provided particular assistance to Enrico Fermi, a 
physicist working in Fascist Italy (Gowing, 1979, p51; 
Johnson, 1991, p407). In Berlin in 1938 radio chemists 
Hahn and Strassmann also split the atom and discovered 
that the resulting ‘halves’ weighed less than half the 
weight of the whole. Their conclusion was that the lost 
mass had been converted into energy in the form of heat. 
Their colleague Otto Frisch, who had fled Nazi Germany to 
live in Sweden, verified the findings and named the 
process after the biological term for cell division – 
nuclear ‘fission’ (Gosling, 1999, p2). The level of 
international interest provoked by this success soon 
persuaded the British government that the details of such 
progress should be jealously guarded and were thereafter 





After Hitler had seized power in Germany, the trickle of 
predominantly Jewish scholars leaving the country turned 
to a steady stream. In Britain, the Academic Assistance 
Council (AAC) was set up to help refugee academics find 
suitable employment in universities or scientific 
institutes (McKibbin, 1998, p254). Rudolf Peierls, who 
had fled from Berlin, was elected professor of 
mathematical physics at the University of Birmingham. 
Otto Frisch later joined Peierls at that institution 
(McKibbin, 1998, p255). In the late thirties Peierls and 
Frisch drew up specific plans for an atomic fission 
'super-bomb'. Their designs were completed in 1939 and 
discreetly circulated among the British scientific 
community as the ‘Frisch-Peierls Memorandum on the 
practicality of an atomic weapon’ (Atkins, 2000, p227). 
In just three pages the memorandum described in logical 
and succinct detail how an atomic bomb could be built and 
then summarised the ‘horrors’ that would be unleashed 
during and after detonation (Gowing, 1979, p51). 
Physicists who studied those fateful pages confirmed that 
it did indeed show an enriched uranium bomb as both a 
theoretical and technical possibility (McKibbin, 1998, 
p255). The British government’s scientific adviser 
brought the Memorandum to the attention of ministers, who 
within two months organised a committee of investigation 
(Atkins, 2000, p227). The first meeting brought a few 
British politicians together with a large group of well-
informed international scientists (Gowing, 1979, p52). 
The ‘nuclear’ Committee’s first unanimous, and rather 
whimsical, decision was that they would be known 
collectively as ‘Maud’, after Maud Ray, a nanny who was 
looking after the children of one of its members (Atkins, 
2000, p228).  
 
At subsequent meetings the project advanced at a 
miraculous pace; the right people were asked the ‘right 
questions’ and the answers were intelligently fitted 
together (Gowing, 1979, p51). British dominions provided 
many of the physicists, with Canada proving a rich source 
of both personnel and uranium ore. The British Empire 
‘was on the way to becoming the world’s first atomic 
power’ (Edgerton, 2011, p119). By the middle of 1941 
Churchill could see the ‘war-winning’ potential of the 
atomic bomb. Without consulting the Cabinet or other 
political advisors he instructed his chiefs of staff to 
begin developing such a weapon (Edgerton, 2011, pp118-
119). Although the work was to be conducted in secret 
Churchill decided that there would be political advantage 
in passing Maud reports to the, then still neutral, 




America had no official atomic bomb programme but Albert 
Einstein had advised the setting up of an investigative 
'Uranium Committee' in 1939 (Atkins, 2000, p386). This 
committee was ‘jolted into activity’ by the amazing 
progress being made by 'Tube Alloys', which was the cover 
name of the British atomic programme (Johnson, 1991, 
p408). 
 
The Manhattan Project 
 
Overtures were immediately made for a joint Anglo-
American project. The British declined. They were doing 
very well alone and excused themselves by saying they 
‘mistrusted’ America’s ability to keep any such project 
secret (Gowing, 1979, p52). However the smooth progress 
was not to last and the British team soon ran into 
wartime ‘industrial and engineering problems’ (Johnson, 
1991, p408). Churchill considered completing the project 
in Canada, but such a move would add to the already 
crippling cost. At a meeting with Roosevelt, it was 
agreed that if the United States would fund the work, 
Churchill would arrange for Tube Alloys to ‘abandon’ its 
British base and transfer its material and expertise to 
America.  
 
The understanding was that the two countries would work 
'together on equal terms’ (Nicholas, 1963, pp58-59). The 
British nuclear programme was duly ‘closed down’ (Gowing, 
1979, p52) and a team of its ‘first rank scientists’ was 
sent to the United States under the leadership of William 
Penney, a mathematician who had become an authority on 
nuclear weapons (Sublette, 2007). They went first to 
Columbia University, in New York City where the logistics 
of what was now a military operation were being overseen 
by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers who were based at the 
Manhattan Engineer District headquarters (Gosling, 1999, 
p13). Thus Tube Alloys was absorbed into the ‘Manhattan 
Project’ and eventually moved to its central research 
facility at Los Alamos in New Mexico (Sublette, 2007). 
 
Roosevelt managed to keep the bomb an ultra-secret. Not 
even Vice President Truman was told (Lavoy, 2003, p26). 
Similarly, Churchill never spoke of the atomic bomb in 
War Cabinet meetings; he did confide in a few close 
associates, but his Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee, 
was not one of them (Atkins, 2000, p61). Not even comrade 
in arms Joseph Stalin was informed (Siracusa, 2008, p14). 
At least not officially. There were Soviet spies at Los 
Alamos with access to very sensitive material. Klaus 
Fuchs, of the British contingent sent Russia a copy of 
all of the data that came his way (Gowing, 1979, p52; 
Wang, 1999, p203).  
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‘Compartmentalising’ reduced the usefulness of such 
material; only a few scientists with the highest possible 
security clearance were allowed overview of the whole 
plan (Nicholas, 1963, p60). 
 
Churchill complained to Roosevelt in 1943 that he was not 
being kept informed; his being aware of the project’s 
progress was the only way of maintaining the British 
stake in nuclear research (Atkins, 2000, p61). After some 
months Roosevelt agreed to forward reports of the ‘joint’ 
enterprise to London (Nicholas, 1963, p60). The two 
leaders did keep written records of these ‘agreements’ 
but the papers never progressed beyond scribbled notes 
and Atkins suggests they were never intended to do more 
that ‘soothe’ Churchill’s ‘wounded feelings’ (Atkins, 
2000, p61). Britain had resigned from running the world’s 
‘largest bomb project’ and would have to accept that its 
significant contribution to atomic bomb development would 
henceforth be vastly ‘underplayed’ (Edgerton, 2011, 
p118). Since Britain’s Deputy Prime Minister, Clement 
Attlee, was not burdened by knowledge of these events, he 
was able to apply himself to the ‘challenges of the post-
war world’ (Dutton, 1997, p63). 
 
The Beveridge Report 
 
Possibly the greatest of these challenges was created by 
a report that had been published at the height of the 
war. It had described how the health, education and 
welfare needs of the British people could be provided 
through a national insurance scheme. The notion of 
‘cradle to the grave’ support for an entire nation was an 
ambitious undertaking that sprang from the political 
machinations of one man - Sir William Beveridge (Lang, 
2006, p353). 
 
Beveridge was a protégé of Sidney and Beatrice Webb. They 
had found a publisher for his study of unemployment 
insurance after recognising it as a potential ‘classic 
text on unemployment’ (Harris, 1997, p166). Beveridge 
later spent eighteen years as director of the Webb’s 
brainchild, the London School of Economics (Beveridge, 
1955, p167). Beveridge wrote that many in the world of 
politics were inclined to underestimate the Webb’s but 
they wielded a great deal of influence precisely because 
‘no one suspected them of power’ (Beveridge, 1955, p251). 
After the LSE, Beveridge returned to his own academic 
research as Master of University College, Oxford 
(Beveridge, 1955, p258). There he took up various 
unemployment insurance projects and was happy to have 
found a ‘first-rate’ research assistant in the young 
economist Harold Wilson (Beveridge, 1955, p260).  
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When war broke out in September 1939, Beveridge was eager 
to play his part but difficult to employ. He was a very 
prominent, sometimes formidable man, who was inclined to 
be tactless. He was contemptuous of many ‘administrative 
procedures’ and often treated government ministers as if 
they were still his junior lecturers – as many of them 
once had been (Harris, 1997, p356). Beveridge was 
eventually invited to investigate manpower requirements 
from an office in New Scotland Yard. Harold Wilson, it 
was agreed, should assist and he was drafted from the 
relative quiet of Oxford to the midst of the London Blitz 
(Harris, 1997, p358).  
 
Beveridge grumbled a good deal about the insignificance 
of his task and of the inefficacy of the civil service 
(Harris, 1997, p362). By the time he delivered his 
findings in June 1941, his colleagues were ‘anxious to 
get rid of him’ (Harris, 1997, p362). Beveridge’s 
‘welcome had run out’ and he was diplomatically shifted 
into the chairmanship of an inquiry into social insurance 
(Beveridge, 1955, p297). Beveridge felt that he had again 
been sidelined and determined that regardless of the 
committee’s remit, under his chairmanship it would 
produce findings on which policy could be based 
(Beveridge, 1955, p296). He believed that the promise of 
a universally secure future would be a real contribution 
to the war effort (Harris, 1997, p374). At the first 
meeting Beveridge adopted the kind of civil service 
‘subterfuge’ of which Sidney Webb would surely have 
approved. He refused to prescribe any limits, he would 
brook no argument and simply ‘monopolised’ the 
proceedings (Harris, 1997, p373). The committee quickly 
recognised that Beveridge intended to use the inquiry as 
‘vehicle for his own preconceptions’ (Barnett, 1987, 
p26). By the autumn of 1941 it was widely known 
throughout the corridors of Whitehall that Beveridge’s 
‘tidying up’ exercise was getting out of hand. He had 
adopted a deliberately ‘ambitious interpretation’ of his 
terms of reference and he now intended to reform the 
whole of Britain’s social policy (Harris, 1997, p374). 
There were official attempts to rob the report of 
authority by reducing the status of the committee 
(Harris, 1997, p376), but Beveridge worked on and was 
able to complete a first draft in July 1942 (Beveridge, 
1955, p300). It recommended a far-reaching social welfare 
scheme that was free at point of delivery but paid for by 
compulsory contributions. Beveridge argued that ‘want, 
disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness’ were the ‘five 
giants’ that prevented people from feeling secure. The 
purpose of a ‘policy of social progress’, he wrote, must 
be to address these giants (Beveridge, 1942, p6). 
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Beveridge judiciously sought the advice of his friend, 
fellow academic and ‘high-ranking’ Treasury adviser, John 
Maynard Keynes while redrafting  (Harris, 1997, p399). 
Beveridge and Keynes conducted their meetings in the 
‘highly convivial’ surroundings of a ‘series of West End 
clubs’; the inclusion of some Keynesian ideas greatly 
enhanced the chances of Beveridge’s scheme being 
considered viable (Harris, 1997, p400). The two men 
eventually arrived at a ‘deal’ whereby Keynes would 
officially support Beveridge’s plan as long as its start 
up costs could be shown not to exceed one hundred million 
pounds a year for the first five years (Beveridge, 1955, 
p309). 
 
As Beveridge neared a final draft in October 1942, most 
government ministers hoped that the document could be 
published quietly and then shelved. However others would 
have preferred it to be quashed entirely (Beveridge, 
1955, p316). Beveridge had insured against either outcome 
by assiduously cultivating expectations of the report in 
the popular press. Barnett states that Beveridge’s 
‘brilliant Oxford intellect’ combined with his high 
opinion of himself provided an image of such 
‘authoritarian arrogance’ and eccentricity that newspaper 
editors were always happy to print an interview (Barnett, 
1987, pp26-27). By leaking tempting details in ‘masterly 
style’, throughout the inquiry process he was able to 
protect his report from official abandonment (Barnett, 
1987, p27). Sir William Beveridge was becoming a national 
figure, never reluctant to air his views on social 
policy, and much else, in newspapers, magazines and 
cinema newsreels or as a panel member on the BBC radio 
programme, the Brains Trust (Beveridge, 1955, p312).  
 
After several somewhat contrived delays Beveridge’s 
findings were given reluctant approval and publication 
was fixed for December 1st 1942 (Evans, 1994, p19). At 
almost the last moment the Minister of Information 
decided that if the report was to be published anyway 
they might as well make best use of it. Beveridge’s 
vision of a brighter future had just the mix of 
‘optimism’ and ‘patriotism’ to boost the flagging morale 
of a war-weary public (Page, 2002, p166). It was the 
minister himself who suggested that the report be 
promoted as ‘The Beveridge Plan’ as opposed to the work 
of a ‘routine’ committee (Harris, 1997, p415). It was an 
immediate best seller, eventually clocking up sales in 
excess of six hundred and thirty five thousand copies 
without taking into account the cheaper edition produced 
for the armed services (Adelman, 2001, p32).  
 
 159 
Churchill was given a copy; he remained extremely 
sceptical about the success of welfare programmes but was 
in need of Home Front support (Evans, 1994, p20) and had 
to concede that there was a popular clamour for the 
‘early implementation’ of Beveridge’s scheme (Parrott, 
1995, p204). 
 
The publication of the Beveridge Report came just days 
after news of a long awaited Allied military victory 
(Parrott, 1995, p207). Beveridge’s optimistic post-war 
view matched the mood of a jubilant public; military 
success abroad and the end of poverty at home seemed both 
synonymous and possible (Harris, 1997, p416). This 
fortuitous timing illustrated that a national war effort 
required not only military success but also the intellect 
of men like Beveridge and Keynes (Barnett, 1987, p26).  
 
The wartime ‘Redbrick’ critic 
 
During the First World War the potential of higher 
education institutions had been largely wasted with many 
provincial universities providing only requisitionable 
buildings (Vernon, 2004, p180). By 1940 the universities 
had been recognised as a source of recruits for 
‘administrative and advisory roles’ as well as more 
discreet ‘expert services of the state’ (Edgerton, 2011, 
p230). Despite most universities losing a ‘good 
proportion’ of their research and development staff 
(Edgerton, 2011, p230) a concerted effort was made to 
maintain programmes that could demonstrate a contribution 
to the war effort (Silver, 2003, p51). Government funding 
for these institutions was proportionately increased. The 
University Grants Committee provided on average one third 
of university running costs in 1939; by 1946 that had 
risen to two thirds (Scott, 1995, p15). To better manage 
these financial increases the UGC’s responsibilities were 
extended to a closer involvement with university 
planners. The UGC commented on the 'healthy spirit' 
displayed by many wartime academics who were continuing 
with vital research as well as maintaining a degree of 
'criticism and reflection'. A good deal of both was to be 
found in the work of ‘Bruce Truscot’ (Silver, 2003, p51).  
 
'Truscot' published two wickedly observant critiques of 
English higher education as the ‘Redbrick University' in 
1943 and ‘Redbrick and these Vital Days’ in 1945 (Dent, 
1953, p329). The books were written by Edgar Allison 
Peers, a professor of Spanish at Liverpool University 





H. C. Dent, who knew Peers, suggests that the writer was 
not hiding his identity but creating a fictional 
character who could ignore the niceties of scholarly 
behavior and became a ‘lambasting controversialist’ who 
loudly proclaimed an entirely one sided argument (Dent, 
1953, pp330-332). Silver states that Truscot’s 
‘outspoken’ views gave the work a ‘popular appeal’ that 
extended far beyond the world of higher education 
(Silver, 2003, p57). The first book popularised 
‘Redbrick’ as a collective term for the provincial or 
civic universities, many of which were housed in 
Victorian buildings of distinctive redbrick (Anderson, 
2006, p78; Halsey, 1992, p39). Truscot’s views were 
dominated by two recurring themes. The first maintained 
that civic universities had been ‘starved’ of funds by 
the treasury and of the brightest students by Oxbridge, 
and were therefore unable to achieve even ‘a tenth’ of 
their potential (Truscot, 1945, p13). His solution was 
that the ‘hierarchy of prestige’ that had created 
Oxbridge should be abolished and the country served by a 
network of regional universities of equal status 
(Anderson, 2006, p125). The second theme dealt with the 
possibility of universities that undertook no teaching 
but became research institutions devoted ‘exclusively to 
the pursuit of knowledge’ (Truscot, 1951, p70). This 
combination of institutional equality and the acceptance 
of acquiring learning simply for its ‘intrinsic value' 
(Truscot, 1951, p65) made ‘Redbrick University' the ‘most 
influential university treatise’ of the forties 
(Anderson, 2006, p125).  
 
It is likely that much of the success of the book rests 
on the anonymity of its author and the ‘academic manhunt’ 
that it prompted (Watson, 2003, pxi). Professor Peers 
laced the work with fictional biographical detail so as 
to mislead the enthusiastic ‘amateur detectives’ (Dent, 
1953, p327). The real identity of Bruce Truscot remained 
a closely guarded secret until after the author’s death 
in 1952 (Silver, 2003, p57). Dent acknowledges that 
‘Redbrick University’ will never be considered a 
literarily classic but it did place higher education 
under a national spotlight just as the UGC, the 
universities and the government began thinking about 
‘post-war university expansion’ (Dent, 1953, pp328-329). 
 
In this chapter I have looked at early attempts to reform 
Oxford and Cambridge universities, the successes of 
University of London and the civic universities, 
particularly in the areas of research. I have argued that 
the Great Depression destablised the world economy and 
helped to drive Italy, Germany and Spain toward fascist 
leaders who ultimately provoked a Second World War. 
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Britain initially took the lead in prosecuting the war 
and only after America had joined the conflict was there 
time for postwar planning such as the founding of the 
United Nations Organisation and the Bretton Woods 
agreements. These insituitions signaled a new American 
alienment for modern globalisation. Britain’s post war 
plans included the implementation of social welfare 
reforms, for example an extensive house building 













































Chapter 4 1944-1974 
 
This chapter examines how Britain’s post war government 
struggled to launch the welfare state while attempting to 
maintain the country’s industrial status by rapidly 
expanding the higher education system. Chapter four also 
explains how, during the 1950’s, US financial assistance 
introduced Europe to many facets of American life. These 
would later be identified as elements of a process, that 
by the end of decade, would be for the first time 
described by the word 'globalisation’.  
 
I will explore how the independence of India in 1947 
foreshadowed a British withdrawal from many previously 
important imperial territories and effectively signaled 
the end of the empire. This impacted on English higher 
education by curtailing much of its overseas influence 
and concentrating attention on the increasingly 
overcrowded domestic universities. This expansion had 
also been advocated by two post-war inquiries and had 
continued as a largely ad hoc process. In 1963 another 
investigative committee endorsed a more regulated, and 
more expensive, expansion and recommended that Britain 
should follow other western countries that were already 
investing heavily in university education. The government 
immediately agreed. 
 
This chapter finally deals with a dire international 
economic crisis that by the early 1970’s became so 
serious as to compel the American government to abandon 
the Bretton Woods agreements. Without this stable 
framework, world currencies floated against each other 
creating a new speculative market. Britain’s 1973 entry 
into the European Economic Community extended the reach 
of London’s financial services and helped set the stage 
for the later deregulation of the global capital markets. 
The chapter starts with a look at the impacts of 
contemporary perceptions of the orgins of the Second 
World War.  
 
The ‘guilty men’ and the 1945 election 
 
When the members of the House of Commons had supported 
the declaration of war in 1939 (Adelman, 2001, p30) many 
did so, with a mixture of resentment and dread. There was 
a widely held perception that the terrible sacrifices of 
the First World War had been 'betrayed' by those with a 
political or business interest in the continuation of 




This theme was central to the 1940 publication, ‘Guilty 
Men’; a book which listed the fifteen men considered most 
responsible for having taken a ‘great empire... to the 
edge of national annihilation’ (Cato, 1940, p15). The 
book was written under the collective pseudonym ‘Cato’ by 
a ‘cross-party’ trio of Fleet Street journalists, Michael 
Foot, Frank Owen and Peter Howard (Mellini, 2002, p38).  
 
After Victory in Europe Day Britain’s Prime Minister and 
his deputy were thrown into opposing corners. Churchill 
wanted to continue governing as head of a coalition until 
Japan had also surrendered (Havighurst, 1966, p364). On a 
personal level Attlee was inclined to agree but Labour 
Party members wanted immediate reforms and were 
‘suspicious’ of Conservative delays. Ultimately Attlee 
backed his members and the political 'truce' was 
dissolved. Churchill resigned and an election was called 
for the 5th July (Williamson, 2004, p140). Throughout the 
war years Britain had witnessed a growth in ‘popular 
radicalism’ (Dutton, 1997, p63). This was utilised by 
Attlee and the Labour Party who portrayed themselves as 
the party who stood for a ‘better post-war Britain’ 
(Adelman, 2001, p31). The Conservatives complacently 
viewed themselves as the party of traditional values; 
they saw little need to explain what they stood for 
(Havighurst, 1966, p364). The election result was delayed 
by three weeks to allow for the balloting of Britain’s 
scattered armed service men. During these weeks Churchill 
was quietly confident while Attlee ‘remained pessimistic’ 
(Adelman, 2001, p32).  
 
The Conservative election campaign had inevitably 
revolved around Winston Churchill as the ‘man who had won 
the war’. Churchill himself made great play of denouncing 
his erstwhile Labour colleagues as supporters of a 
socialist regime that would turn the country into a 
totalitarian ‘Gestapo-like state’ (Adelman, 2001, p32). 
It was a miscalculation; the electorate reacted with 
‘amused scepticism’ at this attempt to resurrect the 
‘moth-eaten’ communist scares of the 1930’s (Havighurst, 
1966, p366). Attlee was returned to Downing Street in a 
landslide win for Labour (McCallum & Readman, 1947, 
p281). Churchill later wrote with some bitterness of 
having been 'dismissed by the British electorate’ 
(Churchill, 1948, p771), it was a defeat from which he 
would never ‘fully recover’ (Havighurst, 1966, p363). 
Labour polled almost half the popular vote, some voters 
wanted social change and some simply blamed the 
Conservatives for the ‘nation’s ills’ (Evans, 1994, p22). 
Harold Macmillan later commented that Churchill lost the 
1945 election because he had ‘the ghost of Neville 
Chamberlain' standing beside him (Macmillan, 1969. P32). 
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The 1945 Labour government 
 
Clement Attlee was able to enter the House of Commons as 
the first Labour Prime Minister to lead a majority 
government (Adelman, 2001, p33). McCulloch argues that 
Attlee was in many ways a strange choice for party leader 
(McCulloch, 1991, p117). Labour members tended to be 
distrustful of the overly confident, highly educated 
style of pre-war political leadership. Many in the wider 
Labour movement considered those with a public school and 
Oxbridge background to be 'tainted’; and yet Attlee had 
both (McCulloch, 1991, p117). After graduating from 
Oxford, Attlee had trained as a lawyer but instead of 
taking up that potentially lucrative career had 'opted' 
for voluntary social work among the poor of London's East 
End (Lawton, 2004, p50). Whilst working as an assistant 
to Beatrice Webb he began lecturing at the London School 
of Economics. By 1912, Attlee had begun thinking of 
himself as a socialist. McCulloch argues that Attlee’s 
Webb endorsed pedigree coupled with his own 'ostentatious 
modesty’ allowed the Labour movement to forgive him his 
education (McCulloch, 1991, p117).  
 
The Labour movement was united in the view that the main 
objective of their government was reconstruction. They 
were determined to avoid the ‘badly managed’ return to 
peace of 1918 (Bruce, 1961, p262). Their ‘New Jerusalem’ 
was to be built on two major ideals (Micklethwait & 
Wooldridge, 2000, p16). The first being the 
nationalisation of essential industries, a proven policy 
that had worked well during two world wars, and the 
second was a welfare state, which would provide 
subsidised public health care, housing and education 
(Simkin, 1997). These principles had considerable support 
from the public and from prominent establishment figures.  
The eighty six year old Sidney Webb, now Baron Passfield, 
stood in the House of Lords and enthusiastically endorsed 
the Labour government’s economic programme (Simkin, 
1997). Beatrice Webb had died two years earlier but 
Sidney was still a respected and influential political 
figure within the Labour movement and the Fabian Society. 
He unflaggingly promoted the notion that a centrally 
planned economy could generate the funds for more 
efficient public services (Bocock & Taylor, 2003, p225). 
The sixty two year old John Maynard Keynes had also been 
elevated to the Lords where, despite extreme ill health, 
he regularly appeared on the Liberal bench as Baron 
Keynes. He was on friendly terms with Webb and had always 
been ‘sympathetic’ to the Fabian view of a government and 
an economic system that was overseen by ‘experts’ 
operating the 'appropriate levers’ (Micklethwait & 
Wooldridge, 2000, p16). 
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Barely three weeks after Attlee replaced Churchill as 
prime minister the Japanese city of Hiroshima was 
destroyed by the uranium bomb ‘Little Boy’ (Ball, 2002, 
p104). Three days later Nagasaki was similarly laid waste 
by the plutonium device ‘Fat Man’. Over three hundred 
thousand people died in the immediate blasts and the 
casuality figures rose in the following months as victims 
succumbed to horrific burns and radiation sickness (Ball, 
2002, p105). On August 15th Japan surrendered to the 
Allied Powers. The Americans were first to perfect the 
bomb; both the Japanese and the Russian nuclear 
programmes had floundered for want of funds. Germany had 
abandoned atomic research because Hitler was loath to 
acknowledge that anything involving Einstein’s 'Jewish 
physics' could be worthwhile (Johnson, 1991, p409).  
 
The British bomb 
 
As Attlee got to grips with his new responsibilities he 
learned of the ‘prominent part’ played by British 
scientists in the development of America’s atomic bomb 
(Blackwell, 1993, p133). Soon after the destruction of 
Hiroshima, Attlee contacted Truman suggesting that, as 
they were to jointly control this ‘great force’, they 
should declare their intention to use it to maintain 
‘peace and justice’ (Blackwell, 1993, p133). Truman’s 
reply was vague and noncommittal. Attlee’s actions were 
based on his reading of the ‘Quebec Agreement’, which was 
a typed up version of one the scribbled notes that 
Roosevelt and Churchill were fond of (Nicholas, 1963, 
p61). But Attlee persisted and eventually Truman agreed 
to a meeting (Blackwell, 1993, p133).  
  
After talks at the White House, Attlee was buoyed up by 
promises of ‘full and effective co-operation’ but the 
following months provided no evidence of any such 
support. Stalling US officials explained that the release 
of nuclear data was subject to the outcome of a 
congressional hearing (Nicholas, 1963, p64). American 
politicians were under the impression that they alone had 
developed and now held the ‘secret’ of atomic bomb 
building (Gowing, 1979, p53) and they did not want 
‘their’ secret shared with Britain’s socialist government 
(Blackwell, 1993, p133). In 1946 Congress passed a law 
that placed American atomic research under tight military 
control, the few American politicians who knew of the 
‘great British contribution’ to the development of the 






Although he was able to produce Churchill’s copy of the 
Quebec agreement, American officials doubted its 
authenticity (Nichols, 1987, p177) and Roosevelt’s copy 
had been ‘conveniently lost’ (Blackwell, 1993, p133). Any 
earlier hint of cooperation was now dismissed as a 
misunderstanding and the US military strictly forbade the 
dissemination of any information relating to nuclear 
weapons or power generation (Gowing, 1979, p53). 
 
However ‘unjust’ Attlee may have thought the situation, 
it had to be accepted that America had seized what was a 
‘joint invention’ (Blackwell, 1993, p135). He and his 
angry Cabinet had to face a stark choice (Cawood, 2005, 
p39). Either they shut down British nuclear research and 
rely on the protection of the United States, or develop a 
British bomb whose vast expense would disrupt their plans 
for post-war recovery. Attlee favoured the second option 
because possession of the atomic bomb would confer 
‘first-class status in international relations’ 
(Blackwell, 1993, pp134-135). Some of the elements for a 
British nuclear programme were already in place, in 
anticipation of American assistance; the Ministry of 
Supply had started building research establishments in 
Lancashire and Berkshire (Blackwell, 1993, p134). Given 
that some groundwork had been done and that the British 
nuclear scientists had returned from Los Alamos, the 
cabinet ordered the restart of Britain’s nuclear 
programme (Cawood, 2005, p39; Atkins, 2000, p61). It was 
also decided that levels of security and secrecy 
surrounding the project should be ‘especially thick’ 
(Gowing, 1979, p52). 
 
In 1947 American officials found Roosevelt’s copy of the 
Quebec Agreement in an ‘irrelevant file’ (Nicholas, 1963, 
p62). The document was secretly examined by a Congress 
committee who were disturbed to learn that Roosevelt and 
Churchill each had a veto over the others’ use of atomic 
weapons (Gowing, 1979, p53). It was declared both 
‘astounding’ and ‘unthinkable’ that Roosevelt should have 
entered into such a pact (Nicholas, 1963, p66). Gowing 
argues that, had this agreement been accepted at the time 
of the Attlee-Truman talks, Britain’s claims could ‘not 
have been so blatantly ignored’ (Gowing, 1979, p53). 
Attlee was informed of the veto and since America could 
not possibly allow it to stand, the British Prime 
Minister was momentarily in a position to drive a hard 
bargain. Very reluctantly the Americans allowed Attlee to 
trade his right of veto for a ‘limited’ amount of nuclear 
technology (Gowing, 1979, p53) and the delivery to 
Britain of some ‘un-assembled’ atomic bombs for study 
purposes (Nicholas, 1963, p66).  
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Welfare and education 
 
Attlee’s government had achieved power in the expectation 
that wide ranging welfare reforms would become reality. 
The Beveridge Report was at the heart of a reform 
programme that included implementation of R. A. Butler’s 
1944 Education Act. He was a Conservative Member of 
Parliament and wartime President of the UK Board of 
Education (Martin, 1979, p94). Butler considered the 
provision of state funded education provision to be 
woefully inadequate and was determined that it should be 
improved (Chan et al, 2001, p1). By 1944 he had managed 
to push a bill through Parliament that was greatly 
influenced by the ‘Norwood Report’, a recent inquiry into 
education (McKibbin, 1998, p224). Butler’s legislation 
called for compulsory secondary education in which pupils 
could be directed toward schools best ‘suited to their 
abilities’ (Chan et al, 2001, p1). This notion assumed 
that pupils of around eleven years old could be separated 
into three easily identifiable ‘types’ (Mackintosh, 1995, 
p121). Pupils judged to be capable of ‘connected 
reasoning' were selected for grammar schools where the 
curriculum included enough Latin to permit possible 
university entry. Pupils who appeared to have some 
insight into the ‘intricacies of mechanism’ but not the 
‘subtleties of language’ would attend secondary modern 
schools and those least comfortable with abstract ideas 
would be consigned to technical schools (The Norwood 
Report, 1943, pp2-4; Stapleton, 1999, p255; McKibbin, 
1998, p224).  
 
This ‘tripartite system’ was an important element of 
Butler’s 1944 Act, although he made no suggestion as to 
how it might work in practice (McKibbin, 1998, p233). 
This lack of practical detail was of little consequence 
to the Labour leadership who believed that the Beveridge 
recommendations would be more instrumental in ‘changing 
society’ than would an educational reform (Lawton, 2004, 
p48). The tripartite system was anyway a contentious 
issue; the Labour Party membership objected while 
Attlee’s Ministers of Education supported it. Lawton 
argues that Attlee had a preference for the status quo; 
he wanted a ‘non-controversial education programme’ 
(Lawton, 2004, p49). The tripartite system was intended 
to provide a ‘universal’ secondary education with the 
grammar school as the only state school route to 
university (Anderson, 2006, p132). Butler’s Act intended 
a 'parity of esteem' between all three types of school 
but there were so few technical schools that the grammar 
and modern schools dominated the system (Chan et al, 
2001) which, even at this ‘binary’ level, proved unable 
to affect a 'parity of esteem' (Quinault, 2001, p15).  
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The most academically able pupils went to grammar schools 
and the secondary moderns ‘took the rest’ (Chan et al, 
2001). Although the network of secondary modern schools 
was improved and extended it never managed to shake off 
the public perception of being an ‘educational settling-
tank’ (Barnett, 1987, p302).  
 
Attlee’s Cabinet decision to leave educational reform to 
take ‘its place in the queue’ deprived many local 
authorities of the funds to maintain schools (Lawton, 
2004, p48). A survey of educational facilities within the 
London County Council area reported that ‘not a single 
building’ was of the required legal standard (Havighurst, 
1966, p418). The Labour government was assisting the 
construction industry in house building; schools would 
have to wait (Kyte, 1951, p145). In 1945, the public 
purse was all but empty and any allocation of funds had 
to be balanced against Britain’s formidable wartime debt. 
A total of fourteen and a half billion dollars was owed 
to the constituents of the Empire with more than half of 
that owed to India alone (Clarke, 2008, p313). With only 
‘vague’ ideas of how such debt could be reduced (Clarke, 
2008, p399) Maynard Keynes was sent to America to secure 
‘as many dollars’ as he could (Clarke, 2008, p315). 
Keynes raised a loan of three and three quarter billion 
dollars which was to be paid back at two percent over 
fifty years (Clarke, 2008, p598). To better facilitate 
the repayment of this new debt, the ‘lease’ part of 
‘lend-lease’ was reconsidered and the Americans 
generously agreed to cancel ninety seven percent of 
Britain’s wartime liability (Clarke, 2008, p315).  
This was Keynes’ last appearance on the international 
stage; he died the following year (Cornish, 2006, p110). 
 
Attlee had no choice but to accept the Keynes deal 
(Skidelsky, 1997, p329); it was a massive financial 
burden but without it nothing could be achieved (Derry & 
Jarman, 1970, p271). Attlee’s Cabinet were determined to 
fulfil the post-war egalitarian expectations of the 
electorate. William Beveridge’s scheme was attractive 
because it increased equality without the redistribution 
of wealth; all members made similar contributions and 
could expect similar benefits - regardless of differences 
in income (Page, 2002, p176). These concepts of 
universality raised many hackles and led the British 
Employers Federation to declare that the scheme made no 
sense as a ‘corporate strategy’ (Barnett, 1987, p239). 
The Labour cabinet paid little heed; they were creating a 
‘more equal... society’ not a commercial enterprise 




The Treasury warned that the running costs of the 
Beveridge Welfare Services would escalate and jeopardise 
‘other state expenditure’ (Barnett, 1987, p239). The 
solution was to fund the creation of the welfare state 
with the American loan (Barnett, 1987, p241). 
 
Attlee’s cabinet decided that as the loan was intended 
for the recovery and reconstruction of trade, its purpose 
would be best fulfilled by producing a workforce whose 
health and security was secure (Barnett, 1987, p241). The 
American Treasury did not stipulate how the loan should 
be used, only that it should not be used for the 
repayment of the Indian debt. American politicians were 
determined that their dollars would not be subsidising 
the ‘wretched Empire’ (Clarke, 2008, p383). This left the 
British negotiators in the Dominions struggling to reduce 
the Empire debt (Clarke, 2008, p314). India, as the 
largest creditor was also the largest problem. The 
British negotiators had to deal with politicians who were 
using the debt reduction talks as a manoeuvre to upgrade 
their relatively small ‘measure of self-government’ to 
full independence (Clarke, 2008, pxv).  
 
Beginning of the end of Empire 
 
Indications of a political shift in India date from 1857 
when a significant number of the population took part in 
the ‘Great Rebellion’; an uprising still known in Britain 
as the ‘Indian Mutiny’ (Shridharani, 1942, p221). This 
revolt followed Britain’s 1840’s declaration of free 
trade, which included the lifting of import tariffs 
throughout its overseas territories (Nayyar, 2006, p139). 
The East India Company, a commercial enterprise that had 
achieved virtual sovereignty over the subcontinent 
(Lawson, 1993, p160), ensured that all regions of the 
country opened their markets to ‘international economic 
integration’ (Nayyar, 2006, p139). However, this new 
international trade was almost all ‘export-oriented’ and 
relied heavily upon cash crops and mineral mining; the 
‘benefits of globalisation’ in this case went largely to 
the East India Company and on a lesser scale to local 
elites (Nayyar, 2006, p152). In 1857 widespread 
resentment against such exploitation turned to violence. 
The Company’s troops managed to contain the conflict but 
it took six months to quell and almost a year to 
extinguish completely (Lawson, 1993, p106). The East 
India Company was revealed to be no longer capable of 
maintaining order and was dissolved to allow the British 




Thus, the British Parliament came to govern two thirds of 
the subcontinent directly and the remaining third 
indirectly, via a network of princes, rajahs and 
maharajas (Judd, 2006, L5). The Westminster 
administrative hierarchy saw decisions made by the 
Secretary of State in London pass to a Viceroy in Delhi 
and then finally percolate down to the Indian Civil 
Service (Brown, 1999, p423). Universal governance was 
hampered by the variety of India’s religions; about 
seventy per cent of the population were Hindu, while 
twenty per cent were Muslim with the remaining ten 
percent a mix of Sikhs, Buddhists, Christians, and Jains 
(Judd, 2006, L5). The Indian National Congress was a 
largely Hindu-driven movement whose single aim was the 
‘termination of foreign rule’ (Lawrence, 1998, p544). 
Opposing them in almost every respect was the All India 
Muslim League, which was broadly supportive of the 
British administration (Birkey, 2003). This was because 
they feared that an India, dominated by the Hindu 
majority, would condemn the Muslim minority to 'perpetual 
subordination' (Lumby, 1962, p89).  
 
Lumby states that the ‘foreign influence’ of British 
traders in overseas territories was often resented by the 
traditional leadership until they were replaced by a new 
home-grown elite who had been educated by the ‘foreign 
influence’ (Lumby, 1962, p87). This ‘new intelligentsia’ 
then sought the rights and freedoms of which they had 
been taught (Lumby, 1962, p87). Demands for 
constitutional reform in India became more insistent as 
Indian professionals became adept at negotiating at a 
diplomatic level (Brown, 1999, p426). Johnson argues that 
this ‘new elite’ monopolised the dialogue with the 
British and reduced the role of the ordinary Indian 
population to that of a ‘gigantic walk-on crowd’ 
(Johnson, 1991, p470). Successive British governments 
chose to ignore petitions from India for independence, 
often citing the view that to lose so valuable an 
overseas possession would reduce Britain to ‘a second-
rate power’ (Lawrence, 1998, p556).  
 
However, the military and economic muscle that allowed 
such posturing had ‘not survived the war’ and by 1946 
Britain’s grip on India was impossible to maintain 
(Clarke, 2008, p425). Prominent Indian nationalists 
further upset the economic balance by demanding the 
immediate payment of Britain’s war debt; fifteen hundred 
million pounds owed for Indian goods and labour (Clarke, 
2008, p402). Attlee’s Labour government took a steady, 




They had a longstanding commitment to Indian 
independence; it had appeared in their election manifesto 
and was also alluded to in the King's speech (Read & 
Fisher, 1999, p360). Thus Labour was publically committed 
to the ‘principle of self-determination’ and unlike the 
Conservatives was prepared to accept the Commonwealth as 
a ‘substitute for Empire’ (Clarke, 2008, p430).  
 
India’s nationalists were encouraged by the news of 
Labour’s election (Read & Fisher, 1999, p359) and 
heartened to hear that a parliamentary team was to travel 
to India and make an ‘on the spot’ assessment of the 
situation (Knaplund, 1956, p434). The ten delegates duly 
arrived and toured the country compiling a report that 
largely duplicated existing information (Read & Fisher, 
1999, p372). When their return to London failed to 
provide Attlee with a new basis for action, he suggested 
that a previously rejected attempt to unify the Indian 
leaders should be revised repeatedly ‘until it became 
acceptable’ (Read & Fisher, 1999, p372). An offer of four 
years earlier that had suggested limited dominion status 
for India was selected for resubmission by Attlee’s new 
high power ‘three-man Cabinet mission’ (Brown, 1962, 
p100).  
 
The chief negotiator was to be Sir Stafford Cripps, a 
nephew of Beatrice Webb, through whom he was already 
familiar with the Congress leaders. Cripps was a left 
wing lawyer and as ‘dogmatic a Marxist as only a 
millionaire can be’ (Ferguson, 2003, p347). The trio 
arrived in Delhi on March 24th 1946 with the sole purpose 
of eradicating the difficulties that made the 1942 offer 
unacceptable (Knaplund, 1956, p434). Cripps and his 
colleagues had scheduled meetings with India’s three most 
influential leaders, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Mohandas 
Karamchand Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru.  
 
Jinnah was president of the Muslim League, this despite 
his being a nonpractising Muslim with a ‘fondness’ for 
whiskey, the occasional ham sandwich and at least fifty 
‘Craven A’ cigarettes a day, (Tunzelmann, 2008, p91). In 
1923 he had politely refused a knighthood, saying that he 
preferred to remain ‘plain Mister Jinnah’ (Ahmed, 1994, 
p38). The somewhat aloof ‘Mister Jinnah’ was equally at 
home in Bombay or London where he might be seen wearing 
his monocle and an immaculately cut Savile Row suit of 
which he owned over two hundred (Read & Fisher, 1999, 
p96). He was named by an American magazine as ‘one of the 
best dressed men in the British Empire’ (Tunzelmann, 




Jinnah spoke only English (Gandhi, 1986, p123; Panigrahi, 
2004, p161)) and yet managed to lead a widely diverse 
electorate who were bound together only their Islamic 
religion.  
 
Gandhi was a central figure within the Indian National 
Congress but would only accept political responsibility 
when it ‘suited his book’ (Clarke, 2008, p332). He had 
returned to India in 1914 after twenty-one years of 
fighting the ‘supremacist’ attitude of the British 
authorities toward Indians in South Africa (Judd, 2009, 
p38). His most effective campaigns had utilised 
‘satyagraha’, a traditional and culturally acceptable 
Hindu method of making life difficult for the perpetrator 
of a ‘perceived injustice’ by continually obstructing 
their wishes in a strictly non-violent manner (Ferguson, 
2003, p331). Back in his homeland Gandhi met with the 
leaders of the Indian National Congress and they 
sanctioned an overtly ‘religious appeal’ to mobilise the 
population for a campaign of satyagraha (Brown, 1999, 
p433). Knowing that large gatherings were only permitted 
for religious purposes (Johnson, 1991, p472) Gandhi 
travelled through India on foot and, wearing the 
loincloth of a ‘traditional holy man’ (Ferguson, 2003, 
p331), he spoke at every opportunity, inciting the 
general population to civil disobedience. The Congress 
Party officially endorsed Gandhi's policy of ‘non-violent 
resistance’ and embraced the new recruits that came with 
it (Cavendish, 2009, p13). Gandhi was building an image 
as a charismatic leader; his spiritual attitude and 
appearance seemed to put him above factional political 
bickering and caused his followers to hail him as a 
‘Mahatma, or great soul’ (Gandhi, 1986, p132). He also 
cultivated the valuable support of influential landowners 
and industrialists and was careful not to condemn the 
‘wickedness of capitalism’ (Knaplund, 1956, p215). 
Johnson states that, from its beginning, the Gandhi 
‘phenomenon’ exuded a ‘strong aroma of twentieth-century 
humbug’ (Johnson, 1991, p471).  
 
While Jinnah, Gandhi and Nehru were all London trained 
lawyers; only the latter found a place in London society. 
Nehru had the educational background of an English 
gentleman, a private tutor, followed by Harrow, then 
Trinity College, Cambridge (Zachariah, 2004, pix). He was 
an acknowledged intellectual, often seen in the company 
of Leonard and Virginia Woolf or Sidney and Beatrice 
Webb. Jawaharlal Nehru was impressed by the passion of 
political idealism and swallowed the whole 
‘pharmacopoeia’ of European socialism without question 
(Johnson, 1991, p473).  
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He returned to India in August 1912, as an idealistic 
‘Bloomsbury figure’ who believed that India’s population 
could solve all of its problems by reading the works of 
Bertrand Russell (Johnson, 1991, p472). Unsurprisingly he 
felt out of place (Zachariah, 2004, px). On the advice of 
friends, Nehru joined the Indian National Congress and 
‘drifted into politics’ (Johnson, 1991, p472). He was 
assigned to assist Gandhi and the initially sceptical 
Nehru became caught up in the older man’s 'fearless' 
vision (Brown, 1997, p25). He was won over by Gandhi's 
unique combination of charm and legal expertise 
(Zachariah, 2004, p41). Nehru was soon thoroughly 
‘converted’ to Gandhi’s brand of nationalism (Lloyd, 
1996, p309) and, as the Mahatma’s protégé, was later 
elected president of the Indian National Congress (Brown, 
1997, p26).  
 
In Delhi, Attlee’s ‘Cabinet mission’ faced an immediate 
setback. Their meetings with Jinnah and Gandhi had been 
arranged but Nehru was out of the country (Read & Fisher, 
1999, p374). In a bizarre piece of bureaucratic cross-
purpose planning, the Viceroy had sent Nehru to Malaya to 
help quell unrest among its Indian labourers (Tunzelmann, 
2008, p140). While the British delegation read the 
Congress leader’s previously prepared notes (Read & 
Fisher, 1999, p377), Nehru himself was making a huge 
success of his role as an ‘emissary of calm’ (Tunzelmann, 
2008, p140). After completing his mission to Malaya, 
Nehru moved onto Singapore. On arrival he was immediately 
detained. Local officials were aware of his socialist 
leanings and suspicious of his motives. However, Lord 
Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander of South East 
Asia intervened and insisted that Nehru be treated as a 
visiting head of state. The whole of Singapore was then 
‘thrown open’ to him (Read & Fisher, 1999, p375).  
 
Mountbatten had played an effective role in planning the 
fight against the Japanese to win back Burma and 
Singapore, but his appointment as Supreme Allied 
Commander had been ‘controversial’ (Boatner, 1999, p380). 
He was very much a ‘royal playboy’, often described as 
tactless and pushy, and criticised for the ‘shameless’ 
way in which he exploited his royal connections (Boatner, 
1999, p379). Churchill considered Mountbatten’s ‘love of 
the grand gesture’ and lack of ‘concern for human lives’ 
to be useful qualities  (Tunzelmann, 2008, p115). When 
America’s General Eisenhower specifically requested that 
Mountbatten be promoted to Chief of Combined Operations 





Tunzelmann argues that since Eisenhower had never met the 
Prince it is possible that the General was overly 
impressed by the fictionalised Mountbatten played by Noel 
Coward in the feature film ‘In which we serve’ 
(Tunzelmann, 2008, pp111-116). However, in Singapore, 
Nehru, Dickie and Edwina Mountbatten became great 
friends. Nehru dined at Government House, was driven 
about in an official car (Read & Fisher, 1999, pp375-376) 
and feted in the streets as if a visiting film star 
(Tunzelmann, 2008, p140). 
 
Nehru’s absence from India made it even more critical for 
Cripps and his colleagues to speak with Gandhi (Read & 
Fisher, 1999, p377). When the old man arrived in Delhi 
for the talks he insisted on staying among the cities 
‘untouchable’ street sweepers. Amid the ramshackle 
shanties Gandhi moved into a temple rest house that had 
been fitted with electric light, fans, telephones and a 
bathroom (Read & Fisher, 1999, p376). One of the merchant 
princes who provided funds for such occasions, observed 
that it cost a ‘great deal of money’ to keep the Mahatma 
‘in poverty’ (Johnson, 1991, p471). In this event the 
money was not well spent, the talks made no progress. The 
main protagonists had no intention of adjusting their 
demands or even of meeting each other. Jinnah maintained 
his ‘two nation’ stance, claiming that Indian Muslims 
were descended from the Mughals, and as a different race 
from the Hindu’s, should have their own country 
(Panigrahi, 2004, p152). Nehru’s Congress representative 
pressed for a whole and independent India (Read & Fisher, 
1999, p374) and the cantankerous Gandhi claimed to be an 
unable to offer an opinion as he was ‘not even a member’ 
of the Congress Party (Read & Fisher, 1999, p377).  
Cripps and his colleagues returned to London in despair 
(Blackwell, 1993, p124). Cripps reported the deadlock to 
Attlee, the Muslims would continue to demand Bengal and 
the Punjab as a separate country and the Hindu’s would 
remain ‘resolutely opposed’ to such a proposition 
(Knaplund, 1956, p435). Cripps feared that the situation 
was volatile enough to lead to civil war (Clarke, 2008, 
p455). He was also concerned that the incumbent Viceroy 
was preparing his own response to the escalating violence 
(Clarke, 2008, p466). Code-named ‘Operation Madhouse’; 
the Viceroy’s scheme was for a wholesale withdrawal and 
escape of the British Indian army (Kulke & Rothermund, 
2004, p320). Such a retreat would prove a ‘political 
disaster for India, Britain and the Labour party’ 
(Lawrence, 1998, p548). Cripps was determined that the 





In a personal attempt to break the destructive deadlock, 
Clement Attlee invited both Jinnah and Nehru to London in 
early December 1946 (Knaplund, 1956, p435). It failed. 
After three days neither man would give way (Clarke, 
2008, p465). The die was cast, India was on the brink of 
chaos and Britain had ‘lost control’ (Johnson, 1991, 
p473). If civil war did break out in India, Britain 
simply did not have the money or the troops to mount the 
‘major military effort’ necessary to contain it 
(Blackwell, 1993, p124). Attlee’s key ministers were 
inclined to the view that if Britain’s presence was 
unenforceable, it was time to get out (Ferguson, 2003, 
p356). Cripps added that if British rule in India were to 
be brought to a ‘speedy end’, it would best be carried 
out under the auspices of a new Viceroy (Clarke, 2008, 
p464). Before Nehru left London, he and Cripps met 
‘covertly’ to discuss the options for the last Viceroy; 
Nehru was enthusiastic that his Singapore friend Lord 
Louis Mountbatten should be approached (Clarke, 2008, 
p466).  
 
The next Cabinet meeting was in agreement that India must 
accept a set of ‘second-best solutions’ (Clarke, 2008, 
p478). Cripps then proposed Mountbatten as India’s last 
Viceroy, describing him as the ‘perfect candidate’ to 
deliver this potentially unpalatable fait-accompli 
(Clarke, 2008, p466). Judd argues that Prince Louis was 
an ‘inspired’ choice, despite a tendency for ‘ruthless 
self-aggrandisement’ he had a distinguished war record 
and through his Asian command had acquired a working 
knowledge of Indian affairs (Judd, 1996, p337). Attlee 
put the idea to the King, who agreed. Neither of them 
realising that Nehru not only already knew but also had 
actually influenced events (Clarke, 2008, p467). Only 
then, was Mountbatten summoned to Downing Street (Read & 
Fisher, 1999, p410). Cripps and Attlee explained the 
situation; Mountbatten was initially very surprised, then 
very reluctant (Bolitho, 1954, p177). Not only did the 
task appear practically impossible but would also 
interrupt his naval career (Campbell-Johnson, 2002, p43). 
Cripps and Attlee were persuasive and a Viceroyalty did 
have its attractions. Mountbatten mulled it over for a 
few days and then returned to Downing Street with a list 
of conditions (Read & Fisher, 1999, p417).  
 
In later years Mountbatten would recall being given 
'carte blanche' in India, but the claim has been 
dismissed as a characteristic exaggeration (Louis, 1999, 
p334). Cripps and Attlee were to remain 'firmly in 
control’ but they did allow the Prince some freedom over 
details, such as ‘tinkering’ with the timetable (Clarke, 
2008, p479).  
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The time required for Britain to prepare an orderly exit 
from India was widely understood to be about two years; 
Mountbatten said that a ‘strict time limit’ must be 
announced that would allow for no more than fifteen 
months (Campbell-Johnson, 2002, p43). He was ‘astute 
enough’ to realise that his chances of success would be 
greatly increased by an absolute deadline that gave 
India’s political leaders no time to argue (Read & 
Fisher, 1999, p418). This suited Cripps and Attlee who 
had already been informed that Britain would be unable to 
police India beyond the end of 1948 (Lloyd, 1996, p324). 
On February 20th 1947, Attlee announced to the House of 
Commons that Britain would leave India no later than June 
1948, and that this would be overseen by Admiral Lord 
Louis Mountbatten as Viceroy (Read & Fisher, 1999, p420). 
 
The last Viceroy and Indian 
Independence 
 
Mountbatten arrived with his wife and daughter, at the 
Viceroy’s House, in Delhi on March 22nd 1947 (Menon, 
1957, p350). Great Britain and India were poised at the 
‘crossroads of history’ (Ghosh, 1985, p39) and he was to 
preside over the ‘largest upheaval of perhaps any empire 
in history’ (Engdahl, 2004, p85). Mountbatten was 
international news and many American politicians viewed 
his appointment as the last Viceroy with glee. They 
believed that Britain’s success in international trade 
was based upon ‘control, constraint, and coercion’ 
(Black, 2005, p365) and were ‘especially enthusiastic’ 
about Indian independence (Ghosh, 1985, p30).  
President Truman continued the ‘unrelenting pressure’ to 
see an end to Britain’s ‘monopoly possession of the 
colonies’ (Ghosh, 1985, p32). He shared the view that the 
sterling bloc and imperial preference impeded ‘free trade 
and the unfettered movement of money’ (Black, 2005, 
p364).  
 
Such international considerations not only fell outside 
of Mountbatten’s remit but also would have seemed 
peripheral as the Viceroy toured his new three hundred 
and forty-room home with its seven thousand staff (Read & 
Fisher, 1999, p425). Dickie and Edwina immediately 
transformed the dreary mansion with a series of 
‘information gathering’ garden, lunch and dinner parties; 
British India’s last act was to be played out with 
‘panache’ (Lawrence, 1998, p551). India’s political 
leaders were invited to more discreet interviews with 
Mountbatten. Nehru was made so welcome that he took up 
lodgings in the Viceroy’s House.  
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Not only were Nehru and Mountbatten great friends but the 
Indian leader was also resuming his affair with Edwina 
(Ferguson, 2003, p357; Judd, 1996, p338). Nehru’s 
relationship with the Viceroy’s wife appears to have 
started in Singapore, but it was in Delhi that it 
‘ripened into a full-scale love affair’ (Read & Fisher, 
1999, p446). Judd argues that this ‘triangular 
friendship’ may, ultimately, have been beneficial to the 
process of Indian independence (Judd, 1996, p338). 
 
Jinnah did not share Nehru’s easy access to the Viceroy, 
but he did exploit every available opportunity to state 
his case. Jinnah was by this time, seventy years old and 
‘slowly dying’, but was not to be underestimated 
(Bolitho, 1954, p178). After a five day negotiating 
session an exhausted Mountbatten admitted that he had 
‘failed utterly’ to get Jinnah to reduce his demands for 
a Muslim homeland (Read & Fisher, 1999, p438). Gandhi’s 
visit to Mountbatten was a lengthy diatribe about it 
being better for India to make a ‘bloodbath’ of its 
religious differences than have the British leave the 
country divided into ‘two armed camps’ (Read & Fisher, 
1999, p430). Gandhi frequently espoused the dangers of 
partition in such inflammatory terms (Greenberg, 2004, 
p11) and while Congress High Command still considered him 
a useful ‘figurehead’, his eccentrically subversive ideas 
were reason enough for the Mahatma to be increasingly 
‘sidelined’ (Read & Fisher, 1999, p430). 
 
Mountbatten quickly tired of such ‘acrimonious 
negotiation’ (Bolitho, 1954, p182) and informed London 
that he would formulate a proposal of his own (Moon, 
1962, p65). He discussed the available options with V. P. 
Menon, the highest ranking Indian in government service 
and a constitutional adviser of genuine talent (Campbell-
Johnson, 2002, p48). The result was a plan in which India 
and the provinces of Bengal and Punjab would gain self-
rule as separate states and then later decide the status 
of their independence by referendum. Partition would be 
achieved by democratic vote. Britain would be absolved of 
any responsibility (Menon, 1957, p354). By the end of 
April, Nehru and Jinnah had provisionally accepted 
‘partition by self-determination’ (Read & Fisher, 1999, 
p441). Jinnah complained that the regions set aside for a 
Muslim state had been reduced but was gratified to know 
that however ‘moth-eaten’ (Gandhi, 1986, p160) Pakistan 
‘was in the bag’ (Read & Fisher, 1999, p434).  
 
Encouraged by this success, Mountbatten ill advisedly 
extended the partition plan to its ‘logical’ conclusion 
(Kulke & Rothermund, 2004, p322).  
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He instructed Menon to draw up a new multiple partition 
plan that would grant independent self rule to each of 
India’s twenty-one provinces and five hundred and sixty 
five princely states (Tunzelmann, 2008, p191). Menon 
warned Mountbatten that if the plan were changed, the 
Indian leaders would withdraw their approval (Menon, 
1957, p358). Although the Viceroy tried to ignore this 
warning (Read & Fisher, 1999, p444) he later resolved to 
break with ‘protocol’ and show Nehru the new draft 
(Tunzelmann, 2008, p190). As Menon had predicted, Nehru 
rejected the plan ‘outright’ (Kulke & Rothermund, 2004, 
p322). Nehru ranted that the draft was quite different to 
the one he and Jinnah had accepted (Tunzelmann, 2008, 
p190) and that he would never agree to India being broken 
into hundreds of small and ‘potentially antagonistic’ 
independent sovereign states (Tunzelmann, 2008, p191).  
 
Mountbatten was to have made the plan public in just 
three days, and narrowly avoided disaster and humiliation 
(Campbell-Johnson, 2002, p48). Now ‘severely rattled’, he 
turned again to Menon (Read & Fisher, 1999, p447). The 
constitutional advisor calmly explained that as the new 
plan had not been offered for approval they could simply 
revert to a modified partition plan (Read & Fisher, 1999, 
p448). The referendum element, Menon suggested, should be 
removed (Read & Fisher, 1999, p448). Mountbatten was now 
decisive; he took Menon for an immediate meeting with 
Nehru, who despite everything was still a ‘guest’ at the 
Viceroy House (Bolitho, 1954, p184). After several 
telephone calls to Congress officials Nehru was able to 
confirm that the revamped plan was acceptable 
(Tunzelmann, 2008, p192). 
 
Mountbatten knew that the British ministers wanted to get 
India off their hands as quickly as decently possible 
(Read & Fisher, 1999, p451) and so set a meeting with the 
Indian leaders for June 2nd (Menon, 1957, p365). As the 
men who would separate Britain from India gathered around 
a table in the Viceroy’s study (Tunzelmann, 2008, p197). 
Mountbatten launched straight into a well-rehearsed 
briefing. He finished by saying that the plan was not 
expected to meet complete approval but that in the 
interests of their country he advised them ‘simply to 
accept’ (Campbell-Johnson, 2002, p48). Only Jinnah looked 
doubtful. As the meeting broke up Mountbatten held him 
back and repeated dramatically that whole basis of the 
agreement was that all parties accept it simultaneously; 
any delay and the fragile union would flounder 
(Tunzelmann, 2008, p198). There was no choice, the  




The future leaders of India and Pakistan assembled in the 
Viceroy’s study next morning. Mountbatten brought the 
meeting to order and was gratified to learn that the plan 
was to be ‘unanimously endorsed’ (Bolitho, 1954, p187). 
It was the ‘first time in history’ that a scheme for an 
independent India had not raised any objections 
(Tunzelmann, 2008, p199). India’s thousand mile wide 
‘wedge’ shaped landmass was to have its two most 
northerly corners partitioned. East and West Pakistan 
would be separated by hundreds of miles but joined by the 
Islamic faith and a ‘fierce wish’ to be free of Hindu 
‘domination’ (Bolitho, 1954, p187).  
 
The first task for the subcontinent’s new leaders would 
be to grapple with the logistics of splitting the 
administrative assets of a single territory between the 
two new sovereign states. To this end Mountbatten 
produced a slim document entitled 'The Administrative 
Consequences of Partition'. Drawn up by his staff it was 
a thirty four-page ‘masterpiece of compression’ intended 
to provide a method of dividing the administrative 
facilities between the two new countries (Read & Fisher, 
1999, pp457-458). Everything had to be ‘shared out’ from 
aircraft, ships and fuel to hospital equipment, drugs, 
even ‘desks and typewriters’ (Bolitho, 1954, pp188-189). 
The new boundaries would mean ‘tens of millions’ of 
people being uprooted and moving home rather than 
remaining where they had been made a religious minority 
(Lloyd, 1996, p325).  
 
As the men around the table began to realise the enormity 
of the task, Mountbatten dropped his bombshell. It would 
all have to be achieved in ten weeks. He had advanced the 
official date for the transfer of power from June 1948 to 
August 15th 1947. Everyone was frozen with ‘shock’ 
(Tunzelmann, 2008, p199). Ferguson states that it was the 
Labour cabinet’s enthusiasm to ‘get shot of India’ that 
allowed Mountbatten, who had a ‘lifelong fondness’ for 
accelerating agreed arrangements, to speed up the 
transfer process (Ferguson, 2003, p356). London had 
approved this earlier withdrawal date despite knowing 
that ‘no one was ready’ (Greenberg, 2004, p7). The Indian 
leaders were so ‘obsessed with the dangers of delay’ that 
they did not require to be ‘bludgeoned’ into accepting 
the earlier date (Campbell-Johnson, 2002, p46). So 
circumstances were set in train for a collapse into 
‘chaos’ (Ferguson, 2003, p356). 
 
Later that day Mountbatten and three of the ‘bewildered’ 
leaders made a ‘distinctly un-  triumphant’ broadcast on 
All-India Radio (Tunzelmann, 2008, p199).  
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The Viceroy explained that the boundaries between the new 
countries would be announced in due course (Read & 
Fisher, 1999, p458). Within ‘an hour’ of this 
announcement people began packing their possessions for a 
move to the east or to the west. There were multitudes on 
the move; all forms of transport became jammed with 
‘frenzied’ refugees, most of whom were armed (Bolitho, 
1954, p189). Mountbatten’s ‘hurried arrangements’ 
precluded any chance of a safe, well-organised transfer 
of power (Lloyd, 1996, p325). Brown argues that the blame 
must be shared; the ‘short-sightedness’ of Congress, the 
League’s ‘intransigence’ and Mountbatten’s undue haste 
all combined into a lethal combination that ‘set the 
stage’ for brutality and carnage (Brown, 1962, p103). 
Millions of Hindu’s living in what would become Pakistan 
‘fled toward India’ and in the opposite direction 
Muslims, fearing persecution in India, packed up and 
headed for the ‘emerging state of Pakistan’ (Greenberg, 
2004, p8). Bolitho argues that the creation of two new 
countries without credible law enforcement whose 
populations were ‘intent on killing each other’ made 
bloodshed unavoidable (Bolitho, 1954, p177). The number 
of deaths is impossible to calculate but estimates 
indicate a total of between two and five hundred thousand 
(Brown, 1962, p102; Campbell-Johnson, 2002, p44; 
Lawrence, 1998, p554)  
 
Throughout the ten-week period the Indian Civil Service, 
although also ‘torn by internal strife’ struggled to 
apportion administrative and public service facilities 
(Bolitho, 1954, p177). Remarkably on August 14th, British 
radio listeners were able to tune in at seven thirty that 
evening and hear a midnight broadcast from Delhi by 
India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru 
(Havighurst, 1966, p394). His words were ‘carefully 
selected’; jubilation in the face of continuing riots 
would be both irresponsible and inappropriate. He spoke 
optimistically but somberly of a ‘tryst with destiny’ and 
of freedom gained (Zachariah, 2004, p138). By the end of 
Nehru’s speech India did indeed have freedom - ‘of a 
kind’ (Zachariah, 2004, p139).  
 
The creation of a formally independent government 
progressed relatively well, only three of over five 
hundred princely states failed to immediately join one of 
the new dominions (Havighurst, 1966, p394). Prime 
Minister Nehru conceded that India would be difficult to 
govern and attempted to maintain some continuity by 
inviting Mountbatten to become India’s first Governor-




Since very few were aware of Jinnah’s failing health it 
had been widely assumed that he would become Pakistan’s 
first Prime Minister, but he chose to delegate the role 
to the ‘younger and stronger Liaquat Ali Khan’ (Bolitho, 
1954, p191). Jinnah did however, agree to be Pakistan’s 
first Governor-General (Havighurst, 1966, p394). 
Mountbatten had always seen himself being presented with 
the duel title of Governor-General of India and Pakistan 
and fumed that he was to be denied a ‘second crown’ by 
that ‘bastard’ Jinnah (Ahmed, 1994, p40). Judd states 
that Mountbatten's ‘transformation’ from autocratic 
Viceroy, to influential but relatively powerless 
Governor-General ‘neatly illustrated’ the changing status 
of the British Empire  (Judd, 1996, p323). The 
imperialists who had created the ‘international commodity 
markets’ that were the ‘roots’ of modern globalisation 
(Guttal, 2007, p525) had been undone by the ‘deadweight’ 
debts of war (Clarke, 2008, p314). 
 
Although the end of Britain’s Indian Raj had been ‘swift 
and involuntary’ it was constitutionally acceptable and 
Attlee’s claim that it represented the ‘triumphant 
completion of a long-matured plan’ was allowed to stand 
as a ‘pleasing if transparent fiction’ (Darwin, 2009, 
p539). From almost his first day in office the 
‘charismatic’ Nehru began playing the international field 
(Berger, 2004, p70). He flaunted socialist principles for 
Russian consumption, although his knowledge of the 
country was entirely based the Webbs’ blinkered reports 
(Johnson, 1991, p475) and simultaneously hinted that 
India might ‘hitch its wagon to America's more 
resplendent star’ (Ghosh, 1985, p42). The leaders of both 
India and Pakistan exercised their new national status by 
enthusiastically joining international organisations and 
were among the first to recognise the General Agreement 
of Tariff and Trade (GATT) (Nayak et al, 2004, p1). 
 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 
 
On October 30th 1947, the representatives of fifty-three 
countries assembled in Havana, Cuba, to finalise the 
details of the International Trade Organisation (ITO) 
(Srinivasan, 1998, p10). Roosevelt had been an ardent 
supporter of free trade and before his death had proposed 
the founding of a permanent international institution to 
broker continuing tariff reduction. The ITO was proposed 
as a ‘politically neutral’ organisation that would 
nurture a new global market by easing the processes of 
importing and exporting manufactured goods (Seavoy, 2003, 
p214).  
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The foundation was intended to join the IMF and the World 
Bank as a trio of ‘global governance institutions’, 
which, together, would integrate the international 
economy (Douglas, 1997, p6). The ‘framework’ of the 
Atlantic Charter was used as a basis for the new 
regulatory accord (Howe, 1997, p305).  
 
During the previous year Truman had proceeded with 
Roosevelt’s plan for a preliminary trade conference in 
Geneva. Twenty-three of the attending countries had 
agreed to reduce import tariffs (Beresford, 2000, p82) 
but could not reach agreement on the ITO charter (Hoekman 
& Kostecki, 1995, p17). The Havana Conference endorsed 
the Geneva tariff reductions but the ITO sticking points 
were so numerous that it threatened the whole project 
(Srinivasan, 1998, p10). The Truman administration feared 
that the accord so far achieved ‘might unravel’ if left 
without some binding confirmation (Srinivasan, 1998, 
p11). They proposed that tariff reductions agreed in 
Geneva should be given ‘temporary’ legal status 
(Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2000, p14). This ‘stopgap’ 
measure was named the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) (Legrain, 2003, p107). 
 
With dreams of an International Trade Organisation 
temporarily abandoned GATT was considered a reasonable 
‘interim’ alternative. Though lacking an ‘institutional 
structure’ it was an internationally accepted trade 
agreement and would serve as a basis for governmental 
cooperation for the next forty-seven years (Hoekman & 
Kostecki, 1995, p13). GATT facilitated a worldwide 
exchange of tariff reductions during a period of 
'breathtaking economic integration’ (Micklethwait & 
Wooldridge, 2000, p14). GATT slowly developed its own 
trading, negotiation and dispute settlement practices 
until it emerged in the 1990’s as a ‘well-oiled’ machine 
with a viable organisational structure (Hoekman & 
Kostecki, 1995, p13). By this time GATT could no longer 
continue as simply a ‘multilateral trade agreement’, it 
had evolved an infrastructure of trappings and 
responsibilities (Agarwal, 2005, p15) that had to be 
anchored in international law. At the 1994 International 
Trade Conference in Marrakesh, GATT was officially 
transformed into the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
(Hoekman & Kostecki, 1995, p14). Almost immediately the 
WTO began to pursue the international and ‘regional free-
trade and investment agreements’ that would place it with 
the World Bank and the IMF as the creators of the 
‘economic and financial architecture for gobalisation’ 




Roosevelt’s vision of an organisation to formalise the 
reduction of international import duties took almost 
fifty years to achieve because it had to wait for the 
‘expanding world economy’ to reach an actionable level 
(Aldous, 1997, p34). Truman pursued Roosevelt’s free 
trade initiatives because a strong, solvent Europe was 
seen as ‘good for America’ not only in trade terms but 
also as a bulwark against Soviet expansion (Mann, 2008, 
p16). The Truman administration determined that peace and 
`collective security' was achievable through ‘self-
determination, liberal democracy and free trade’ and set 
about creating a world in which such qualities could 
flourish (Aldous, 1997, p34). In the two decades 
following world war two international trade witnessed a 
‘phenomenal economic growth’, which did indeed promote 
‘political stability and increasing social equality’ 
(Mann, 2008, p18). This post-war economic recovery was 
enabled by the American government’s abandonment of 
isolationism, its adopted role as the global ‘caretaker 
of democracy’ and its financial assistance (Aldous, 1997, 
p34).   
 
The Marshall Plan  
 
In 1947, the ‘entire fabric’ of the European economy was 
in tatters (Mills, 2007, p35). Many cities were 
disfigured by physical destruction that could not be 
repaired because of a severe shortage of raw materials, 
fuel and food. Germans and Austrians were literally 
starving in the streets and the British continued wartime 
rationing (Thompson, 2003, p317). European governments 
were forced to import essential supplies with money that 
should have been invested in the reconstruction of their 
economies and infrastructure (Mills, 2007, p36).  
The problem was beyond the scope of the newly formed IMF 
and the World Bank and yet the  ‘vicious circle’ could 
not be broken without economic assistance (Mills, 2007, 
p36).  
 
General George C. Marshall, President Truman’s Secretary 
of State, examined possible solutions and with his 
economic advisors began to formulate what he called the 
‘European Recovery Program’ (Keene, 1998, p155). On June 
5th 1947, Marshall used a Harvard university award 
ceremony to deliver a carefully crafted ten minute speech 
containing the ‘suggestion’ that America could afford to 
‘jump-start’ Europe's post-war recovery (Ellwood, 1998, 
p33). However the offer was not made purely ‘out of 
altruism’ (Hutton, 1995, p278). America was concerned 




France and Italy had well-established communist parties 
and the Russians were undoubtedly encouraging unrest in 
Greece, Turkey and Iran (Aldous, 1997, p34). A Europe 
left in financial ruin could so easily become the 
‘fertile ground’ (Thompson, 2003, p317) so avidly sought 
by Stalin to extend his ideological empire (Hutton, 1995, 
p278). In the final analysis it was the potential spread 
of communism that convinced the most ‘resistant’ members 
of Congress that they should assist in Europe’s economic 
recovery (Thompson, 2003, p319). A communiqué officially 
offering American financial aid for a period of four 
years was sent to each of the European governments 
(Mills, 2007, p39). The suggested procedure was for each 
nation to calculate their own requirements, then for all 
of the nations involved to apply for one joint grant 
(Thompson, 2003, p319). Just twenty-two days after 
Marshall had first mooted the European Recovery Program 
at Harvard, a meeting was called in Paris for European 
leaders to discuss this potential ‘lifeline’ (Thompson, 
2003, p319). 
 
In September 1947 Truman made a formal request to 
Congress and the US treasury to authorise a total grant 
of seventeen billion dollars to be paid over four years 
to the sixteen European countries (Thompson, 2003, p320). 
This non-repayable grant enabled the nations of Europe to 
concentrate on reconstruction while importing much needed 
materials and food from America. American exporters were 
provided with a market for goods of which they had a 
massive surplus (Johnson, 1991, p440), American 
politicians were provided with the hope that a Europe 
united in free trade would provide a bulwark against 
communism (Hutton, 1995, p278). The Marshall Plan made 
‘excellent sense’ for Western Europe and the United 
States (Johnson, 1991, p440).  
 
America’s European ‘anti-Communist crusade’ was not an 
unsophisticated barrage, it was a subtle appeal aimed 
directly at the people whose lives were being improved by 
Marshall aid (Ellwood, 1998, p38). Though America was 
ostensibly funding economic recovery it also expected 
‘cultural change’ but was prepared to allow the time for 
a slow transformation (Berghahn, 2007 p2). This process 
was designed to imbue European ‘hearts and minds’ with an 
‘Americanised vision’ of the future (Ellwood, 1998, p33). 
Europe was officially provided with American food, 
appliances, radio programmes, books and films (Ellwood, 
1998, p35), less official provision included popular 





Nor were the children forgotten; ‘Operation Bambi' was 
endorsed by the relevant national education ministries to 
provide young Europeans with American flavoured cartoons, 
comics and puppet shows (Ellwood, 1998, p36). 
 
By 1950 the Marshall Plan was being declared an 
‘overwhelming success’ (Johnson, 1991, p440). Not only 
had it succeeded in curbing communist expansion but also 
as an economic ‘stabilising mechanism’ it had given 
capitalism a ‘human face’ (Mann, 2008, p17). When the 
scheme had run its course the nations who had received 
Marshall aid showed an average increase on pre-war 
production figures of forty percent in industry and 
eleven percent in agriculture (Aldous, 1997, p36; 
Thompson, 2003, p322). The plan had also succeeded in 
creating a ‘revolution of rising expectations' among the 
general populace (Ellwood, 1998, p40) but those 
Washington politicians who had hoped to see all the 
European governments together in an American style 
congress were disappointed. Most of the European 
governments had taken subtle but evasive steps to prevent 
such an administrative shift. The British government had 
been careful to ‘show enough enthusiasm’ to be included 
in the Marshall Plan but ‘enough detachment’ to avoid any 
lingering entanglement (Glynn & Booth, 1996, p236). The 
French had avoided integrated trade by using most of the 
Marshall aid to ‘finance their colonial wars’ (Mann, 
2008, p18). Indeed many in Congress were coming to the 
conclusion that they had been ‘led up the garden path' by 
France and by Germany and Italy, their very large dollar 
investment was not likely to return much in the way of 
‘visible social or political dividends’ (Ellwood, 1998, 
p39). Though many European industries and businesses 
benefited from technical modernisation it was their 
governments who resisted. Almost none of the American 
‘modernising methods’ proposed for national 
administrations and economies was ‘ever adopted’ 
(Ellwood, 1998, p40). 
 
It was American ‘cultural hegemony’ that really made a 
global impact. The ‘Operation Bambi’ generation grew up 
with a broader understanding of, and acceptance for the 
American lifestyle than did their elders. In Britain many 
transatlantic ideas were filtered into a ‘youthful and 
anti-authoritarian... cultural revolution’ (Ellwood, 
2002, p20). The impact of American films and music led to 
English becoming the ‘dominant foreign language’ taught 
in European ‘education systems’ (Phillipson, 2001, p191) 
and has given rise to the most ‘visible cultural 
expressions of globalisation’ being identified with 
Americanisation (Giddens, 2002, p15). 
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Marshall Aid enabled the Labour Government to deal with 
an acute housing shortage by announcing that local 
authorities would be subsidised to build three hundred 
thousand new houses a year (Pollard, 1962, p403). The 
requirement of foreign funding for a domestic building 
programme should have ‘erased any lingering hope’ of 
Britain regaining its position as a global power (Darwin, 
2009, p537) but with American money Britain could 
continue to ‘play the banker’ to the ‘invisible empire’ 
of the sterling bloc (Barnett, 2011, pp2-3). Darwin 
states that this ‘mirage of continuities’ diverted both 
social and financial resources from the recovery process 
(Darwin, 2002, p59). The expense of maintaining this 
apparent ‘world role’ when added to that of launching the 
welfare state and importing building material for the 
‘council-house’ project impeded other ‘much-needed 
modernisation’ (Barnett, 2011, pp2-3). Barnett argues 
that this ‘parlours before plant’ policy diverted funds 
from the reconstruction of industry and the expansion of 
technical and higher education (Barnett, 1987, p246).  
 
Two higher education inquiries 
 
The provision of ‘adequate facilities for further 
education’ was made the responsibility of local 
authorities by R. A. Butler’s 1944 Education Act (Butler, 
1944, p33). Even as the Act was being drafted, Butler was 
aware that there was no authoritative body to oversee and 
coordinate such facilities on a national scale. It was a 
concern that he raised when reading the Bill to the 
Commons and as a result a committee under Eustace Percy 
was set up to examine the issue (Silver, 2003, p145). In 
early 1946 the Cabinet launched another inquiry into 
virtually the same area under Alan Barlow. Both were to 
investigate the prospects for higher education with 
special attention being paid to technology and science 
(Evans, 2009, p2). 
 
Both committee’s concluded that the post-war demand for 
trained scientists and technicians would dramatically 
outstrip the available supply (Walklaad, 1964, p389). The 
Percy Committee revealed that the ‘output’ of British 
graduate engineers averaged just seven hundred per year; 
their recommendation for increasing this number was a 
network of upgraded technical colleges offering full-time 
technology courses to university level (Divall, 1990, 
p99). The Barlow committee offered similar advice but 
favoured the expansion of technology courses in existing 





Barlow indentified Britain's ‘inferiority in professional 
training’ (Barnett, 1987, p293) and bluntly declared that 
the number of graduating engineers and scientists must be 
doubled ‘as soon as possible’ (Zuckerman, 1958, p241). It 
was understood that this would entail an eighty percent 
increase in university places (Halsey, 1958, p68) 
and a corresponding increase in government funding 
(McKibbin, 1998, p259).  
 
The Barlow committee recommended that as the University 
Grants Committee continued to supervise State aid to 
higher education via its ‘elaborate conduit’ of grants 
and allowances (Armytage, 1954, p306), and would be 
responsible for vastly increased amounts of public money, 
its traditionally ‘passive’ role should be replaced by a 
more robust managerial style which would allow 
intervention into university policy (Shattock & Berdahl, 
1984, p473). The UGC membership recognised that they 
would be subject to a ‘greater measure’ of government 
‘guidance’ (Owen, 1980, p264) and declared that they 
would always observe the ‘principle of academic autonomy’ 
(Bond et al, 1955, p10) as well as their own traditional 
‘tactful and measured manner’ (Owen, 1980, p264). 
 
Attlee’s acceptance of the Barlow recommendations served 
a duel purpose. Firstly the dramatic increase in 
university places would produce the ‘professionally-
trained’ scientists and engineers that were essential to 
postwar reconstruction (Zuckerman, 1958, p241). Secondly 
the extra places would soon be needed by Butler’s free 
grammar school pupils who would qualify for university 
entry (Halsey, 1958, p69). A university place was 
theoretically free of charge since the state was pledged 
to pay the fees for all successful applicants 
(Havighurst, 1966, p419). But about thirty percent of 
England’s universities had opted for the residential 
model of higher education; so if living expenses were not 
covered by the means tested maintenance allowance it 
could still prove expensive (McKibbin, 1998, p259).  
 
McKibbin argues that this is one of the main reasons why 
a university education continued to remain ‘socially 
exclusive’ (McKibbin, 1998, p259). Once the Labour 
government had fully endorsed the Barlow findings and 
rallied the collective forces of the universities and the 
UGC, the task of doubling graduate output was achieved in 
‘only four years’ – and this, claims Zuckerman, without 
any perceptible lowering of academic standards 





The UGC were confident at the outset that this objective 
could be achieved by expanding ‘existing universities’ 
(Bond et al, 1955, p12), and without asking students to 
resort to ‘shift working’ (Silver, 2003, p145). 
 
The civic universities, by now widely known as 
'Redbrick’s', bore the brunt of the expansion with most 
doubling both student intake and their physical size 
(McKibbin, 1998, p259). Two colleges were made full 
universities and one new university was founded (Barnett, 
1987, p293). Only Oxford and Cambridge Universities took 
no part in the initial expansion (Havighurst, 1966, 
p419); both cited ‘physical and educational constraints’ 
as obstructions to their involvement (McKibbin, 1998, 
p258). Thus the ‘baneful domination’ of Oxbridge over the 
redbrick universities was perpetuated (Bocock & Taylor, 
2003, p235). The cost of expanding higher education 
provision presented the Labour government with yet 
another of the many ‘economic headaches’ that were 
threatening their administration (Carter, 1997, p554). 
 
Attlee in difficulty 
 
When Keynes negotiated the Washington loan it had been 
intended to cover the ‘financial gap’ in Britain’s 
balance of payments for at least three years. Keynes did 
not live to discover that he had misjudged the 
recuperative quality of the dollar, which rapidly gained 
strength at the expense of other world currencies 
(Clarke, 2008, p471). However, British demand for 
American products like Virginia tobacco and Hollywood 
films was unabated, they were considered acceptable as 
‘petty luxuries in a bleak world’ (Clarke, 2008, p472). 
By 1948, the purchase of goods imported from ‘dollar 
areas’ had trebled and pushed the balance of payments 
deficit to six hundred and thirty million pounds 
(Havighurst, 1966, p405). The government tightened the 
economy by controlling imports, fixing prices and getting 
trades union and management agreement on freezing profits 
and wage rises (Clarke, 2008, p472). Just as things 
looked to be as bad as they could get, a ‘mild recession’ 
hit the American economy and the extremely fragile 
British export market crumbled (Pollard, 1962, p361).  
The balance of payments deficit became unbridgeable; the 
British economy had descended into ‘shambles’ (Studlar, 
1996, p25). 
 
The dollar continued gaining ground and the prospect of 
Europe sliding into deficit loomed. Instead of adjusting 
the dollar the Americans hoped that Attlee’s government 
could be ‘cajoled’ into devaluing the pound and that 
Europe would follow suit (Glynn & Booth, 1996, p221). 
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Taking optimum advantage of Britain’s financial crisis, 
the US Treasury ‘pressed strongly for devaluation’ (Glynn 
& Booth, 1996, p221). Since it was American aid that was 
keeping the British economy from bankruptcy there was 
little choice but to comply (Havighurst, 1966, p407).  On 
September 18th Labour’s Chancellor of the Exchequer 
announced that the value of the pound was to be reduced 
against its dollar equivalent by almost one third 
(Pollard, 1962, p361). As the Americans had hoped, most 
of the ‘non-dollar countries’ also devalued though none 
cut quite so deeply as did the British (Glynn & Booth, 
1996, p222). Pollard states that the Labour government's 
ruthless response was intended to signal their 
‘determination’ to control the economy (Pollard, 1962, 
p362). But there was no disguising this resounding 
‘defeat’ for Labour’s financial policies (Judd, 1996, 
p341) and it left the Party with only five months before 
the upcoming general election to repair the damage 
(Havighurst, 1966, p407). 
 
The election was called for February 1950. All of its 
political contenders professed agreement that Britain’s 
current problems were simply ‘short-term weaknesses’ of 
the sort that might be expected after so many ‘wartime 
sacrifices’ (Barnett, 1987, p304). Such claims were at 
the time difficult to refute. The joint Commonwealth 
economy and the sterling trade bloc served to 
‘camouflage’ Britain's decline as an ‘economic and 
political’ world power (Judd, 1996, p342). Barnett argues 
that the politicians were themselves ‘deluded’ by wartime 
victory and honestly believed Britain to be a ‘first-
class power’ that could be favourably compared with that 
of America (Barnett, 2011, p1). The election campaign 
produced few changes in the positions of the main parties 
but improved radio and television technologies, allowed 
far greater domestic and international scrutiny of the 
process (Nicholas & Butler, 1951, p265). Television news 
cameras captured both large political events and smaller 
personal moments such as Clement Attlee and his wife 
setting off alone on a thirteen hundred mile campaign of 
speaking engagements in their pre-war family car 
(Havighurst, 1966, p427). 
 
The Labour Party ultimately polled forty six percent of 
the popular vote; only one percent less than their 
landslide win of 1945 (Pearce, 2008, p64). But due to the 
vagaries of the British electoral system this translated 
into a seventy-eight seat loss (Havighurst, 1966, p427). 
Neither Labour, nor any other political group could claim 
enough support for effective government and the result 
was considered a ‘stalemate’ (Havighurst, 1966, p428). 
Eighteen months later Attlee tried again.  
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This time the Labour Party polled more votes than any 
other single party in British political history; but the 
extra votes went to safe-seat candidates and the election 
was lost (Pearce, 2008, p23). Churchill and the 
Conservatives, supported by the Liberals were returned to 
power with a sixteen seat majority (Pearce, 2008, p22). 
Back in familiar territory, Churchill picked up the reins 
in flamboyant but authoritative style. He declared 
himself ‘astonished' to find that Britain was in 
possession of its own atomic bomb (Vincent, 1998, p197) 
and refused a request for an inquiry into higher 
education claiming that there was ‘no reason to be 
dissatisfied’ with the universities (Shattock & Berdahl, 
1984, p475). 
 
The fifties: higher education goes to 
market  
 
University authorities however, were deeply dissatisfied. 
The expansion of British higher education had been a 
political success in fulfilling the national need for 
more graduates (Halsey, 1992, p64). But it had also 
created an ongoing demand for university places that 
could barely be met. Projections from the period indicate 
that full time student numbers were set to double every 
nine years as opposed to a prewar figure of every twenty-
four years (Pratt, 1992, p32). By 1952, student numbers 
were straining the system to such an extent that 
universities became unwilling to discuss further 
expansion (Richardson, 2002, p13). The University Grants 
Committee was also reticent, claiming that ever-
increasing student numbers would make it impossible to 
maintain standards (Ross, 2003, p32). 
 
In 1953, while the universities struggled to accommodate 
increasing numbers of students and preserve teaching 
quality (Lowe, 2002, p82) the government expressed its 
satisfaction with the state of higher education (Shattock 
& Berdahl, 1984, p475). Then in 1956 the launch of the 
Russian satellite 'Sputnik' caused questions to be asked 
about the international standing of British technology. 
Because most universities were already at full capacity 
government ministers began considering alternative 'élite 
technological institutions' (Scott, 1995, p16). Within 
the year a hundred million pounds had been allocated for 
what would become a network of advanced technology 
colleges (Barnett, 1987, p292). These institutions were a 
government higher education initiative; they remained 
under ministry management and were deliberately kept 
outside of the university sector and away from UGC 
control (Pratt, 1992, p32).  
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These measures greatly excited the ‘radical 
expansionists’ who advocated wider participation in 
university higher education and now began gleefully 
predicting a future when there might be as many as ten 
percent of the relevant age group studying at a 
university at any one time (Halsey, 1992, p64). By 1957 
total numbers of students were indeed approaching this 
figure and after further expansion, upgrading and the 
granting of new charters, Britain had unprecedented 
numbers of students attending its meagre twenty-one 
universities (Halsey, 1992, p64). 
 
This continuing rise in demand for university places was 
not restricted to Britain; applications were increasing 
throughout Western Europe (Rourke & Brooks, 1966, p155). 
In America, statisticians observing a similar rise were 
able to demonstrate a direct correlation between national 
economic growth and the expansion of university education 
(Johnson, 1991, p641). These conclusions were accepted in 
Britain because they underscored an already widely held 
view that most of society’s problems could be solved by 
‘universal education’ (Johnson, 1991, p641). Stevens 
states that it is ‘unclear’ whether the universities or 
government research departments first identified a link 
between higher education and economic growth. However, 
once made, the connection was to provide a powerful 
political motive for transforming what had been an elite 
liberal education into training for the ‘benefit of the 
economy’ (Stevens, 2004, p33). Economic growth is reliant 
upon foreign commerce and capital; any government in a 
global economy that expects to attract them must provide 
an adequate supply of skilled labour (Carnoy, 2005, p5). 
After the founding of the European Economic Community 
(EEC) in 1957, international trade and finance became 
more integrated and Britain found its ‘post-Sputnik’ 
competitors to be organised, industrialised and educated 
(Rietbergen, 1998, p404). Increasingly the notion of 
‘knowledge’ as capital was gaining ground (Carnoy, 2005, 
p5); ‘information and innovation’ are ‘highly portable’ 
and assimilate easily into existing national cultures 
(Carnoy, 2005, p3).  
 
By 1959 the homogenising process of international 
cultural and commercial exchange, combined with growing 
financial interdependence was recognised and described by 
the word 'globalization' (Scholte, 2005, p50). Within a 
year the word was appearing in specialist journals 
(Guillén, 2001, p5) and within two years a definition of 
‘globalization’ was added to Webster’s Dictionary 
(Webster, 1961, p965; Scholte, 2005, p50). 
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The recognition by ‘global markets’ of knowledge as a 
capital commodity had a ‘profound impact’ on the 
providers and transmitters of that knowledge because they 
were required to produce much more of it. ‘Globalisation 
increases the demand for education, especially university 
education’ (Carnoy, 2005, p3). Dodds argues that the 
international expansion of higher education institutions 
encouraged ‘cross-border flows... and global trends such 
as marketisation’ to such an extent that they are 
‘implicated in the promotion of globalisation’ (Dodds, 
2008, p505). This ultimately created a circular pattern 
in which the actions of the universities underpinned 
globalisation which then put ‘pressure on the educational 
system to expand’ (Carnoy, 2005, p8). Political opinion 
makers paraded the benefits of the international market, 
enhanced educational opportunities and the welfare state 
as the drivers of Britain’s slow but steady economic 
recovery (Ross, 2003, p34). Resurgent industries were 
able to provide a sufficiently wide range of relatively 
well-paid jobs for their employees to participate in a 
‘new consumer society’ (Ross, 2003, p34). The City of 
London was able to claim back something of a world role 
when in the late fifties it established a new global 
market in Eurocurrency, Eurobonds and Euroloans (Scholte, 
1999, p28). Rubinstein states that the international 
reputation of British bankers for ‘honesty and 
gentlemanly behaviour’ coupled with ‘time-zone 
centrality’ and the laissez-faire attitude of successive 
governments promoted the City as a centre for this, 
essentially EEC business (Rubinstein, 1994, p39).  
 
The ‘optimism’ of the early fifties had, by the end of 
the decade, become a solid expectation of higher living 
standards that included such previously unattainable 
opportunities as a university education (Pratt, 1992, 
p32). These expectations led the civic universities, in 
particular, to draw their students from ever widening 
geographic areas. Many of the civics were disengaging 
from their local origins and transforming from regional 
into national institutions (Lowe, 2002, p82). Higher 
education was receiving unprecedented amounts of state 
funding. Local ‘social reform’ was marching in time with 
national ‘economic growth’ (Pratt, 1992, p32).  
No longer were less wealthy students likely to be 
obstructed by ‘economic exclusion’ (Stevens, 2004, p16); 
by the late fifties, three quarters of all full time 
university students were in receipt of a scholarship or 
similar form of financial assistance (Ross, 2003, p36). 
Although most scholarships were competitive there were 
additional state and local grants, ‘awards, scholarships 
and bursaries’ (Anderson, 2006, p139).  
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The actual amounts, the intended use and the degree of 
monitoring were extremely varied and depended as much on 
local politics as they did on ‘economic circumstances’ 
(Ross, 2003, p26). A total grant to cover fees, 
accommodation and expenses might come from several 
different providers all of whom had to be applied to 
separately. In 1958 a decision was made to amalgamate 
this 'jungle' of piecemeal payments (Anderson, 2006, 
p139). Sir Colin Anderson was appointed to head a 
‘scholarship’ committee whose task was to gather together 
all available sources of financial assistance for 
students and then to create a less complicated ‘unified 
and uniform national system’ (Longden, 2001, p163).  
 
By 1959, the UGC declared the physical expansion of 
existing universities had reached its limit (Lowe, 2002, 
p82) and proposed the building of six new universities 
(Moodie, 1983, p331). After approval was gained, building 
commenced on the first institution at a site near 
Brighton in Sussex (Collini, 2003, p4). When selecting 
sites for potential universities, the UGC imposed rigid 
guidelines. The ‘nine-to-five ethos’ was to be avoided in 
favour of all residential campuses (Anderson, 2006, p137) 
and each new institution should occupy a plot of at least 
two hundred acres set in an ‘attractive’ landscape for 
the benefit of both students and staff (Clarke & Quill, 
1999, 548). For the first time a small, but noticeable, 
fraction of the students on such campuses were the off 
spring of black immigrants from the ‘former colonies and 
the new Commonwealth countries’ (Grenville, 2005, p540). 
Webster argues that at this time the British attitude 
toward Asian and West Indian immigrants, in particular, 
was still deserving of the ‘liberal and tolerant 
reputation’ that prevailed during the Second World War 
(Webster, 2005, p97). However, with decolonisation and 
the dismantling of empire came both public and government 
unease at the large percentage of the world’s population 
with an entitlement to a British passport (Grenville, 
2005, p540).  
 
The Empire ebbs away 
 
The ‘man in the street’ seems not to have been 
particularly concerned about the independence of British 
overseas territories until those foreign born ‘subjects 
of the Crown’ chose to ‘settle in the home country’ 
(Grenville, 2005, p540). Both Labour and Conservative 
governments were concerned about this process of 
‘colonisation in reverse’ and ‘secret’ inquires were 




Lockhart argues that the end of the British Empire was 
irrevocably signalled by internationally perceived ‘loss 
of face’ that followed the Second World War capture of 
Singapore by the Japanese (Lockhart, 1993, p8). However, 
Whitehall’s Colonial Office had been considering the 
implications of an imperial finale for very much longer. 
The conclusions of an inquiry conducted in the 1930’s 
were published in the 1939 pamphlet ‘Where are we going?’ 
(Walsh, 2009, p22). The question did not faze Attlee’s 
post war government who were going in any direction that 
would relieve them of colonial responsibility. After 
granting Indian independence in 1947, the government 
vehemently denied that it was planning the ‘dissolution 
of the Empire’ (Clarke, 2008, p470). Almost immediately 
afterward independence was granted to Ceylon and Burma, 
military commitments to Greece and Turkey were cancelled 
and the politically messy abandonment of Palestine was 
begun (Schwarz, 2005, p486). This was the end of the 
empire and it came with ‘astonishing’ speed; once 
decisions had been made the British authorities were on 
the ‘first boat home’ often irrespective of the political 
chaos they left behind  (Ferguson, 2003, p356).  In 1949, 
the British Commonwealth was ‘reinvented’ as simply the 
Commonwealth to enable the Indian Republic to remain a 
member without accepting a British monarch as head of 
state (Darwin, 2011; Ovendale, 1999, p258). 
 
Britain’s retreat from ‘colonial dominance’ continued 
into the fifties with independence for Malaya, Singapore 
becoming a self-governing state. International opinion 
was considerably relived to see an imperial power shed 
its ‘responsibilities and burdens’ while maintaining 
dignity and honour (Grenville, 2005, p539). The mid-
fifties saw the retirement of both Churchill and Attlee, 
with Eden and Gaitskell, respectively, taking up office. 
Anthony Eden came to the premiership with a reputation 
for successful international diplomacy and was in the 
process of improving Anglo-Egyptian relations by agreeing 
to withdraw British troops from Egypt’s Suez Canal area 
(Grenville, 2005, p543). As the departure proceeded it 
was closely observed by ‘rivals’ eager to take Britain’s 
place, in this case it was the Americans and the Soviets 
who vied for the attention of Egypt’s Colonel Gamal Abdel 
Nasser (Grenville, 2005, p536). However, Nasser had his 
own agenda. He sent Egyptian troops to occupy the British 
base at Suez, and then declared that the canal, his 
country’s ‘only major economic asset’ was to be 
nationalised (Lang, 2006, p360). France and Britain held 
all of the Suez Canal Company shares, with a French 
majority so slim that the waterway had long been 
considered under joint ownership (Ferguson, 2003, p355). 
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Claiming to have secret intelligence that warned of an 
impending Israeli-Egyptian war, an Anglo-French 
‘peacekeeping’ force was sent to seize the canal (Morgan, 
2000, p70). Before the invasion force could impose its 
authority Egyptian troops sabotaged the canal by blocking 
it with sunken ships. The Anglo-French insurgents were 
made to look incompetent and the subsequent loss of 
confidence in British international capabilities caused a 
run on the pound (Perrett, 2007, p401). The crashing 
currency could only be saved by devaluation or a dollar 
infusion (Ferguson, 2003, p356). The British government 
opted for the latter and asked the Americans to bail them 
out. The Americans would not ‘sanction Nasser’s 
overthrow’ but offered to underwrite a billion dollar IMF 
loan dependant on the unconditional withdrawal of all 
British and French troops (Ferguson, 2003, p356). Britain 
had no choice but to agree. It was a ‘savage revelation’ 
of Britain’s decline and severely undermined what little 
influence the British still had in the Middle East 
(Darwin, 2011). 
 
In early January 1960, British Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan spent six weeks visiting Britain’s African 
territories. He was aware that the British public were 
either ‘uninterested’ in the future of these colonies or 
were in favour of their independence (Walsh, 2009, p30) 
Macmillan also had to consider the implications of 
Africa’s ‘rising tide of nationalism’  (Ovendale, 1999, 
p269). He addressed the South African Parliament in 
February and spoke of the coming of a ‘wind of change’ 
which was taken as a warning that Britain was going to 
‘free itself’ of its African ties (Walsh, 2009, p30). 
Without the Indian trade routes to protect there was no 
longer any justification in keeping the African 
territories on which military bases were maintained 
(Walsh, 2009, p22). Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika had 
already gained elements of self-government and became 
independent within two years (Darwin, 2011). ‘Realistic’ 
Conservatives did little to hinder these decolonisation 
policies (Grenville, 2005, p540) while others, in both 
Westminster and Cape Town, objected to what they 
considered an abdication of British responsibilities and 
a ‘cynical abandonment’ of white colonials (Ovendale, 
1999, p270). The ‘multiracial’ Commonwealth soon found 
itself at odds with these ‘white colonials’ and their 
apartheid policy; South Africa was ‘forced’ to leave 
(Grenville, 2005, p539). 
 
After India there were no more ‘set-piece 
confrontations’, the empire ebbed away through an 
uneventful ‘process of political and administrative 
decision-making’ (Schwarz, 2005, p482).  
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Decolonisation became faster as it progressed; many newly 
independent countries ceased doing business with Britain, 
trade routes and seaways became redundant along with 
their attendant ‘outposts and colonial offices’ 
(Ovendale, 1999, p272). Darwin states that the map of the 
empire was rolled up in the mid-sixties ‘leaving only the 
ghost of the British world-system’ (Darwin, 2009, p655). 
The impact of the final passing of the imperial era on 
the British public was ‘minimal’ (Schwarz, 2005, p482). 
Lowe argues that this was also the case for many 
institutions, including those universities, which seemed 
incapable of forgetting or escaping their ‘Victorian 
origins’ (Lowe, 2005, p281). 
 
Higher education in the sixties 
 
Rubinstein argues that Macmillan’s Conservative 
government also seemed rooted in the past. Their benches 
were crammed with ‘landed aristocracy’, the 
personification of the ‘traditional ruling elite’ given a 
‘new lease of life’ (Rubinstein, 1994, 17). Macmillan 
thought this no bad thing and as he led the Conservative 
Party to a third successive election victory he smugly 
informed the British public that ‘they had never had it 
so good' (Ross, 2003, p34). The universities however, had 
never had so many. While still attempting to appear 
‘impervious’ to outside pressures, some institutions were 
hiding the prospect of being overwhelmed by increasing 
student numbers (Havighurst, 1966, p526). But the process 
would continue. The massification of higher education had 
wide popular support and was promoted by the Trades Union 
Congress and the Fabian Society who both saw continuing 
university expansion as a basis of 'equality of 
opportunity' (Ross, 2003, p36). Not all responses were so 
enthusiastic; concerns that the expansion was too 
haphazard were followed by calls for a responsible body 
to orchestrate a cohesive plan (Ross, 2003, p36).  
 
This was the task that the University Grants Committee 
was supposed to fulfil after being promoted to a 
managerial role by the Barlow recommendations (Bond et 
al, 1955, p10). However, the UGC had managed to sidestep 
many contentious issues as well as avoid oversight of its 
actions by any specific government department; it still 
floated informally between the universities and the 
Treasury (Tapper & Salter, 1995, p61). This ‘cosy 
arrangement’ and its attendant lack of ministerial 
management was thought inappropriate by the Department of 





Most government ministers agreed that the UGC did a 
creditable job, there was also the ‘uneasy suspicion’ 
that the committee’s own ‘surprisingly satisfactory’ 
reports of itself were masking an inability to cope 
(Shattock & Berdahl, 1984, p475). In late 1960 these 
doubts prompted Prime Minister Macmillan to commission an 
all encompassing inquiry into the future of higher 
education (Clarke & Quill, 1999, 548; Lawton, 2004, p59). 
The investigation would cover the complete range of 
'full-time higher education' rather than specifically 
'university education' (Dent, 1964, p233). Professor 
Lionel Robbins of the London School of Economics was 
invited to chair the committee whose preparitory 
arrangements were briefly overshadowed by the publication 
of Sir Colin Anderson’s report on ‘Grants to Students’ 
(Longden, 2001, p163).  
 
Anderson recommended the replacement of the dauntingly 
complex process with a scheme based on the single 
principle of ‘equality of opportunity’ (Ross, 2003, p36). 
This directed that any student reaching the qualifying 
standard, for whom there was a university place 
available, would be provided with financial assistance as 
a ‘standard entitlement’ (Anderson, 2006, p139). The 
award was to cover all student fees, plus all or part of 
a living allowance, depending on the parent’s financial 
position. The offer of free university places was also, 
generously, if controversially, extended to overseas 
students (Ross, 2003, p36). Anderson wanted fees and 
maintenance to be provided universally without any 
conditions but the government insisted on a ‘means-tested 
parental contribution’ to defray the massive expense 
(Anderson, 2006, p139). Even so, Anderson’s conclusions 
seem to have been arrived at ‘without an awareness’ of 
either the scale of the financial commitment or the speed 
with which higher education was expanding (Longden, 2001, 
p163). The committee’s deliberations were slanted toward 
the view that a university education would forever remain 
a privilege ‘for the few’ (Stevens, 2004, p19). Hence the 
economic plan that would support their scheme occupied 
just three pages of the final report (Anderson, 2006, 
p140).  
 
The committee made no request for Treasury guidance and 
inexpertly estimated the cost for the first year of 
grants and allowances to be twenty one million pounds. 
The actual first year cost was in excess of forty million 
pounds (Longden, 2001, p163). During the following two 
years, previously allocated higher education funding was 
committed to a building programme that saw the 
commencement of those university projects whose names are 
said to resemble a Shakespearean cast list, York, Essex, 
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Kent, Warwick, Lancaster – and East Anglia (Halsey, 1992, 
p64; Lowe, 2002, p82; Ross, 2003, p33). Constructed of 
1960's materials and in the ‘modern’ architectural style, 
these became known as the ‘plate-glass’ universities 
(Clarke & Quill, 1999, 548), though Anderson suggests 
that ‘brutalist concrete’ might have been more apt 
(Anderson, 2006, p136). These institutions are often 
thought to have been launched in the ‘wake of the Robbins 
Report’ (Barnett, 1987, p303) and are therefore also 
sometimes referred to as ‘Robbins universities’ (Butler & 
Robson, 2003, p138). But the plans for the ‘plate-glass’ 
institutions were laid before 1960 (Collini, 2003, p4) 
and the Robbins Committee began its investigation in 
February 1961 (Niblett, 1981, p1).  
The inquiry took three years and one hundred and eleven 
meetings to interview expert witnesses, examine written 
statements and consider the various implications  
(Robbins, 1963, p1).  
 
In 1963, Macmillan was forced by ill health to step down 
as Prime Minsiter and Sir Alec Douglas-Home became 
Conservative ‘stop-gap leader’ (Ross, 2003, p45). When 
Harold Wilson, the new leader of the Labour Party, 
addressed his party conference that year, he promised 
that a ‘New Britain’ would shortly be 'forged in the 
white heat of a technological revolution' (Weir & 
Beetham, 1999, p108). Days later the Robbins Committee 
finally published. It was not a ‘good moment’ (Ross, 
2003, p45). Public and politicians alike were distracted 
and shocked by the assassination of America’s President 
Kennedy. The leaders of the three major British political 
parties flew to Washington and Parliament was adjourned 
for the day of the President’s funeral (Havighurst, 1966, 
pp474-475). It is doubtful that the recommendations of 
the Robbins Committee were an ‘immediate government 
priority’ (Ross, 2003, p45). 
 
The Robbins Report 
 
There were however, many in the ‘educational world’ eager 
to examine Robbins’ findings (Morris, 1964, p5). The main 
thrust of the report was enthusiastically supportive of 
the measures taken since 1945 and advised that the 
expansion should continue because the expected demand for 
university places was ultimately likely to exceed fifty 
percent of the relevant age group (Pratt, 1992, p32; 
Anderson, 2006, p129). The committee observed that most 
Western industrial societies were increasing their 
investment in higher education facilities and there was 
an expectation that the British government would do the 
same. The demand existed and it was logical that it 
should call ‘forth the supply' (Crick, 1990, p21). 
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Robbins gathered together Britain’s ‘loose collection’ of 
universities, colleges and academies to create a 
nationally directed ‘system’ (Scott, 1988, p34). The 
Committee wanted to see the wider availability of 
different ‘kinds’ of higher education and advocated an 
extension to an existing programme whereby non-university 
institutions were able to award nationally recognised 
degrees (Lowe, 2002, p83). To this end, it was suggested 
that a Council for National Academic Awards should be 
established (Robbins, 1963, p142) to oversee a 
'systematic co-ordination' of qualifications policy in 
institutions of higher education that would be, in all 
other respects, autonomous (Robbins, 1963, p265). There 
was also the recommendation that all Colleges of Advanced 
Technology (CAT's) be elevated to university status 
(Pratt, 1992, p32). This measure alone would increase the 
total number of university level institutions by ‘at 
least’ twenty-eight (Carswell, 1988, p25). 
 
The unique position of the UGC was ‘fervently endorsed’ 
by Robbins (Anderson, 2006, p115), although the 
conveniently close relationship between the universities, 
the UGC and the Treasury was generally thought to be a 
‘weakness’ (Fowler, 1973, p199). The main concern was 
that, although the UGC handled public money, it was able 
to escape the ‘obligation of public accountability’ 
because it was under Treasury rather than ministry 
management (Robbins, 1963, p236). The greatly enlarged 
network of higher educational institutions recommended by 
the committee would place the UGC in command of a vastly 
increased budget for which some form of ‘ministerial 
responsibility’ would be a political necessity (Robbins, 
1963, p275). Robbins determined that the structure of the 
UGC should remain an ‘essential ingredient’ of future 
plans (Robbins, 1963, p237) but that it would be better 
considered as a ‘grants commission’ with supervisory 
power rather than an overall authority (Lowe, 2002, p83).  
 
The committee thought that the process should be overseen 
by a single authoritative body but did not feel that 
either the Treasury or the Ministry of Education could be 
considered appropriate managers for the 'guardianship of 
higher culture' (Anderson, 2006, p154). Their suggested 
alternative was that all of the cultural ‘advisory and 
distributing intermediaries’, such as the research 
councils, the Arts Council, the BBC and the UGC be 
brought together under the management of a specially 
created ministry of arts and science (Anderson, 2006, 





The government sidestepped the idea of a ministerial-arts 
connection and instead bundled all of the education 
affiliates into the newly created Department of Education 
and Science (Ross, 2003, p45). The UGC had been brought 
into the political fold (Fowler, 1973, p199).  
 
The Robbins Report was ‘promptly accepted’ by Douglas-
Home (Havighurst, 1966, p527) and six hundred and fifty 
million pounds was allocated to cover ‘capital 
expenditure’ over ten years (Lawton, 2004, p60). For any 
government to commit so quickly to educational funding 
was ‘exceptional’ (Clarke & Quill, 1999, 549) and in this 
case remarkable in that it came from an administration 
with an eight hundred million pound balance of payments 
deficit (Laybourn, 2002, p135). This swift and 
unquestioningly acceptance was widely seen in the light 
of the approaching general election and considered an 
attempt by ‘ailing’ Conservatives to appear ‘populist 
rather than elitist’ (Clarke & Quill, 1999, 549). As the 
1964 election loomed, Wilson, Beveridge’s one time 
reseacher and an economics don (Stevens, 2004, p26), was 
able to ridiclue the Conservative’s muddled economic 
planning with ease (Laybourn, 2002, p135). Wilson’s 
financial acumen impressed the electorate, particularly 
after Douglas-Home’s admission that he favoured working 
out economic problems with matchsticks (Laybourn, 2002, 
p135; Pimlott, 2000, p34).  
 
The 1964 election campaigns were the first in Britain to 
feature significantly on television with opposing party 
leaders obligingly granting both formal and informal 
interviews. Wilson appeared most confident. He was the 
‘meritocratic whizzkid’ who subtly confirmed the viewer’s 
perception of Douglas-Home as the ‘aristocratic 
throwback’ (Plowright, 2006, p142). When it came to the 
vote the result was dramatically close, it was a Labour 
victory but they were just fourteen seats ahead of the 
Conservatives and had an overall majority of only four 
seats (Lawton, 2004, p66). Within six months Alec 
Douglas-Home was replaced as Conservative leader in part 
because of his poor television performances (Mughan, 
2000, p26). 
 
Along with the reins of government, the Labour Party was 
handed a very large overseas debt (Laybourn, 2002, p56).  
This forced a diversion of the funding intended the 
expanding higher education sector on which the 'white hot 
technological revolution’ was heavily reliant (Lowe, 
2002, p83). The dilemma of how to provide more 
universities without additional cost was solved by 
Robbin’s recommendation that colleges of advanced 
technology (CATS) be granted university status.  
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This posed no logistical problem because they were 
already ‘so much like universities’ (Pratt, 1992, p32). 
It could not however, be regarded as a long term 
solution. While it might be cost effective to simply 
rename existing institutions it would also increase the 
number of ‘university’ students, who would then be 
eligible for financial support. Since such an obligation 
would have ‘dire consquences for the public purse’ (Lowe, 
2002, p83) government ministers and senior civil servants 
formulated a viable alternative. Their scheme hinged upon 
another Robbins recommendation; the Council for National 
Academic Awards (CNAA) (Bell, 1999, p188). The idea 
called for the permanent separation of the university-
style ‘academic education’ from the more college based 
‘vocational education’ (Ross, 2003, p48). One higher 
educational group would comprise the newly expanded 
universities while the other would handle technical and 
vocational subjects and be known as ‘polytechnics’ 
(Collini, 2003, p5). Some seventy colleges of 
‘technology, art and commerce’, were selected for 
combination into thirty larger units to be designated as 
polytechnics (Ross, 2003, p47). Study in an institution 
of either group of a university level course would earn a 
university level degree because the polytechnics would be 
backed by the ‘degree awarding status’ of the CNAA 
(Johnston, 1998, p260). With the two sectors separated by 
a ‘binary’ line, Wilson’s government could provide the 
thousands of higher education places recommended by 
Robbins while keeping the polytechnics in the ‘public 
sector’ which obliged local authorities to fund them in 
same way as they had the colleges (Pratt, 1992, p34; 
Watson & Taylor, 1998, p3). 
 
The Labour government proudly promoted the ‘strangely 
unsocialist’ binary line (Bell, 1999, p188), while 
critics indicated that it was simply a numbers and names 
game to provide ‘inferior’ higher education ‘on the 
cheap' (Lawton, 2004, pp60-69). Lord Robbins declared the 
strategy a ‘perversion’ of his committee’s intentions 
(Pratt, 1992, p34). But, for the government, this 
manoeuvre achieved several desirable objectives. By 
designating ‘university’ and ‘public’ higher education 
facilities as two halves of a single system, the sector 
was practically doubled ‘overnight’ (Driver, 1972, p329). 
This allowed the ‘financially-distraught’ Labour 
Government to claim that the recommended higher education 
expansion was progressing as planned (Driver, 1972, p329) 
and that there were no plans for more universities for at 




Attempts at educational equality  
 
With higher edcation temporarily pushed into the 
background, the Labour administration turned its 
attention to its election commitment to eliminate 
selection for secondary schooling (Halpin et al, 1996, 
p20). Labour’s leaders were determined to abolish the 
‘dreaded’ eleven plus examination and their party 
membership had officially committed to a comprehensive 
schooling policy in 1951 (Stevens, 2004, p28). By the 
time they were returned to office in 1964 it had became 
part of Labour’s overall education strategy. Many Labour 
Party members felt that the lack of equality in education 
was due to the ‘continued existence’ of public and 
grammar schools (Lawton, 2004, p62). Serious 
consideration was given to the possibility of integrating 
the public schools into the ‘state comprehensive system’ 
and a feasibility study was commissioned (Halpin et al, 
1996, p20). Most of the great Victorian public schools 
were experiencing falling student numbers and financial 
difficulties. The study, when it appeared, reported that 
it was ‘not worth doing much’ with these schools as they 
appeared to be in terminal decline; the advice was ‘to do 
nothing’ and simply let them close (Stevens, 2004, p27). 
With some relief that this thorny problem had solved 
itself, the report was ‘quietly shelved’ (Halpin et al, 
1996, p20). Ironically the elements that were to save the 
Victorian public schools were now all in place. Parents 
who believed that their children would have benefited 
from attending one of the now endangered grammar schools 
began to look to the public schools. If they could afford 
to ‘spend heavily’ on education it made sense to do so on 
their child’s secondary school as any university 
education would be paid for by the state. Within five 
years, most of the public schools were ‘thriving again’ 
(Stevens, 2004, pp27-30).  
 
Faced with the ‘continued exclusion’ from higher 
education of those in ‘lower income groups’; a Labour 
Party study group began considering a universally 
accessable ‘University of the Air’ in March 1963 (OU 
website, 2012). Distance learning was not a new idea 
(Lawton, 2004, p71). Children in Australia’s remote 
outback had received primary and some secondary education 
by radio as pupils of the ‘school of the air’ since 1951 
(Barker, 2000, p272). The University of South Africa had 
long used similar methods to provide academic degree 
courses (Altbach, 2004, p20). Harold Wilson was 
enthusiastic about a ‘home study’ university whose 
courses could be delivered via television or radio (OU 
website, 2012).  
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When Labour came to power in 1963 Jennie Lee, Minister 
for the Arts, was given responsibility for moving the 
‘University of the Air’ into the realm of reality 
(Lawton, 2004, p60). She was determined that the project 
should provide higher educational opportunities that were 
free of the ‘grant and selection system’ but would still 
maintain the academic rigor required for its degrees to 
be considered the equal of those obtained from a 
‘conventional’ university (Anderson, 2006, p141). 
 
Lee’s Advisory Committee presented its finished proposal 
in February 1966 (OU website, 2012). Wilson had by that 
time sensed that the Labour government’s popularity had 
peaked and called a snap election in March (Lawton, 2004, 
p66). The ‘open university’ was included in Labour’s 
manifesto as an election commitment (OU website, 2012). 
The final vote revealed another Labour victory with an 
increased majority of ninety-eight seats (Lawton, 2004, 
p66). Wilson afterward acknowledged that the result may 
have been assisted by England’s winning of the football 
World Cup (Lang, 2006, p364). The mandate enabled Wilson 
to pursue his ‘enthusiasm’ for technology (Stevens, 2004, 
p26) and by now the promise of an open university had 
become a ‘pet scheme’ (Lawton, 2004, p70). Jenny Lee 
remained at the helm, while Wilson fended off attempts by 
the Treasury to reduce its funding (Lawton, 2004, p70). 
Key members of the new university’s administrative staff 
were appointed during 1968 and offices in Milton Keynes 
was selected for the the main administrative hub of the 
institution (OU website, 2012). In 1969, the Open 
University was officially opened and granted its Royal 
Charter (Trowler, 2002, p75) its first students were 
enrolled in 1971 (Anderson, 2006, p141), external 
examination results for the end of that year showed a 
‘remarkably high’ seventy five percent pass rate (Driver, 
1972, p339). Clarke and Quill cite the Open University as 
Wilson’s ‘greatest political legacy’ (Clarke & Quill, 
1999, 549). Lawton argues that it was one of those ‘rare’ 
occasions when socialist ideals were imposed upon the 
‘elitist world’ of higher education with ‘great success’ 
(Lawton, 2004, pp70-76).  
 
The Open University established a winning formula that 
was duplicated around the world (Lawton, 2004, p71). It 
expanded the concept of ‘distance learning’ beyond 
previous expectations to deliver university level 
courses. The model has become ‘increasingly global’ and 
provides students, particually those in developing 
countries, with ‘new opportunities to access knowledge’ 
(Potashnik & Capper, 1998, p42). Satalite television and 
the internet have greatly accelerated the ‘globalization 
of distance education’ (Potashnik & Capper, 1998, p45). 
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This process has raised questions of accreditation and 
quality control, an internationally recognised body 
capable of providing a ‘stamp of approval’ was required 
(McBurnie, 2000, p23). In 1996 representatives from 
UNESCO and a range of international educational 
institutions gathered in London for an inaugural 
conference to launch the Global Alliance for 
Transnational Education (GATE) (McBurnie, 2000, pp23-24). 
This organisation has been granted the responsibility for 
the ‘global certification and review process’ that is 
applied to education that is ‘delivered across borders’ 
(Potashnik & Capper, 1998, p45). 
 
Harold Wilson, would not have been aware of this ongoing 
international impact. Ironically, for him the Open 
University never quite fulfilled expectations. This was 
partly because it clashed with the almost immovable 
‘traditional culture’ of higher education but was also 
due to a lack of funds (Lawton, 2004, p71). The Labour 
government was unable to escape the massive burden of 
debt they had inherited from the preceding Conservative 
administration (Newton, 2010, p912). Wilson had avoided 
devaluing the pound when first elected but this continual 
‘aching tooth’ seemed to present an obstacle to every 
scheme to stabilise the economy (Pimlott, 2000, p34). 
Labour had been forced to abandon domestic modernisation 
in favour of shoring up sterling overseas. However, by 
November 1967 the Cabinet had to accept that their 
economic position was untenable; they agreed to devalue 
the pound by fourteen percent (Newton, 2010, pp912-914). 
This did alleviate the immediate pressure but the 
‘fillip’ was short lived; within two years most of 
Britain’s trading partners had also devalued thus re-
establishing the unfortunate status quo (Wasserstein, 
2007, p534).  
 
Many Britain’s saw devaluation as a ‘national 
humiliation’ (Wasserstein, 2007, p534) and in an effort 
to dispel the growing atmosphere of ‘gloom and cynicism’, 
Wilson made a televised address to the nation. He assured 
viewers that devaluation was intended to strengthen the 
position of British currency abroad (Pimlott, 2000, p34) 
and would not reduce the value of the ‘pound in your 
pocket’ (Lang, 2006, p364). But he was wrong and prices 
increased. Wilson’s ‘ill-advised’ words hung ‘round his 
neck like an albatross’ for the rest of his political 
career (Pimlott, 2000, p34).  
 
The next general election was due in 1970 and Wilson 
called it for June. Like almost everyone else he put his 
faith in the opinion polls and expected another Labour 
win.  
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He was disappointed (Pearce, 2008, p5). After the count 
it was the Conservative’s who claimed victory with a 
majority of thirty seats and it was Edward Heath who 
became Prime Minister (Lawton, 2004, p77). His 
premiership was to be four years of ‘exceptionally bad 
luck’ (Pearce, 2008, p8), dogged as it was by industrial 
disputes, economic upheaval and an international oil 
crisis (Wasserstein, 2007, p534). 
 
Britain joins the European Economic 
Community 
 
In 1950, Edward Heath was elected to Parliament; his 
maiden speech explored the rather unpopular theme of 
greater European unity (Pearce, 2008, p2). Despite 
Britain’s post-war economic problems, it was still the 
‘wealthiest country in Europe’ (Carreras, 2006, p273), so 
saw no need to consider ‘unity’ with its neighbours or 
even its erstwhile enemies. Heath’s speech was not well 
received and he did not speak again in the Commons for 
nine years (Pearce, 2008, p2). The rest of Europe spent 
the next decade struggling to re-establish their inter-
continental trade (Black, 2009, p24). The British played 
little part in this process, having convinced themselves 
that they had no need of assistance from the rest of 
Europe (Lang, 2006, p360). Instead, they were counting on 
what little remained of their fast diminishing empire and 
the extensive overseas network of the Commonwealth. This 
proved to be illusory. Within a very few years the 
British economy was lagging behind that of every other 
major Western country (Carreras, 2006, p272). The intra-
European exports market, in which Britain played no 
significant part, was developing well and delivered a 
‘huge boom’ to continental economies (Black, 2009, p24).  
 
 
In 1958, six of these successful trading countries became 
officially bound by the Treaty of Rome as the European 
Economic Community (EEC). This was a free trading area 
protected from non-member countries by import tariffs 
(Carreras, 2006, p318). British Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan thought this was a fine idea; if Britain joined 
the EEC its European trade would be tariff free and 
imperial preference could be relied upon to provide a 
supply of cheap food from the Commonwealth. The existing 
EEC countries refused to accept this duel arrangement and 
Britain was turned away (Lloyd, 2001, p195).  
 
This rejection rankled with Macmillan and shortly 
afterward he sanctioned the launch of a ‘rival’ 
initiative, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). 
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Six non-EEC countries agreed to join, but none profited 
greatly. The countries involved were not traditional 
trading partners or in some cases not traders at all 
(Lang, 2006, p360). The undeniable economic advances 
being made by EEC member countries convinced Macmillan 
that Britain must become part of it. It was a 
controversial decision, which generated considerable 
parliamentary debate. Questions were raised in support 
and opposition of British EEC involvement and the future 
of existing trade arrangements (Falshaw, 2004, p49). 
Macmillan promised that he would endeavour to gain a 
concession that would allow British imports of 
Commonwealth produce (Lloyd, 2001, p195). In July 1961 
the EEC was approached with an official request for 
British membership (Johnson, 1991, p601). It was 
rejected. A variety of reasons were given, a variety of 
adjustments were made Britain reapplied and was again 
rejected (Carreras, 2006, p318). The most vocal 
objections came from President de Gaulle of France who 
simply did not wish to see Britain as a member. He vetoed 
the membership requests because he was convinced that 
Britain was acting as a ‘Trojan Horse’ for American 
businessmen who wanted a foothold in Europe (Caddick-
Adams, 2001, p250).  
 
Two unconnected events brought about a rapid change in 
the situation. First, in 1969, de Gaulle resigned the 
French Presidency. Second in 1970, Edward Heath, whose 
‘number one priority’ was British EEC membership, became 
Prime Minister (Pearce, 2008, p5). Heath’s assurances of 
the sincerity of Britain’s application appeared to be 
supported by the coincidental decimalisation of the 
British currency in February 1971 (Weale, 2000, p78). 
The components of the pound sterling were changed into 
the European decimal system as the final phase of what 
had been a ten-year plan. The original intention had not 
been to align with continental neighbours but to aid 
financial integration with the already successfully 
decimalised markets of South Africa, Australia and New 
Zealand (Weale, 2000, p78). 
 
Although Heath did not have to face de Gaulle, there were 
still considerable problems. He not only had to ‘calm 
French fears’ over Britain’s relationship with America 
but also had to win over a sizable faction of his own 
Parliamentary party who were against Britain’s entry 
(Pearce, 2008, p5). Both Conservative and Labour 
politicians gloomily predicted a loss of Parliamentary 
authority (Falshaw, 2004, p49). The bulk of the British 
public were largely unconcerned, their European interests 
being restricted to continental holidays, cars, food and 
football matches (Morgan, 2000, p84).  
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Regardless of this lack of enthusiasm Heath was prepared 
to trade off some ‘national interests’ to gain acceptance 
for British EEC entry (Black, 2009, p173). The Bill for 
application came before Parliament as a free vote; Heath 
was hoping that Conservative objectors would be 
outnumbered by the party traditionalists who preached 
‘loyalty to the leader’ regardless of personal view 
(Gifford, 2008, p60). This assumption was correct and the 
Bill was passed. Heath’s campaign moved onto Europe where 
he ‘played down’ connections with America and assured the 
French that the British were ‘trustworthy’ (Falshaw, 
2004, p50). It was a success. In July 1972 it was agreed 
that Britain should be admitted in January 1973 (Black, 
2009, p173). There was no public consultation but a post-
legislative referendum held in 1975 (the first to include 
the whole the United Kingdom) revealed that sixty seven 
percent of those who voted were in favour of continued 
EEC membership (Morgan, 2000, p84). Lang argues that this 
apparent approval was simply the nation expressing the 
view that ‘now-we’re-in-it-we-might-as-well-stay’ (Lang, 
2006, p360). Gifford agrees, and states that, warned of 
approaching economic turmoil, the British public did not 
so much endorse the EEC as the sense of comfort and 
security it brought at a time of further ‘decline and 
crisis’ (Gifford, 2008, p63).  
 
The end of the Bretton Woods system 
 
Throughout this period the world’s trading nations were 
conducting international business via a fixed rate 
exchange mechanism that was pegged to the United States 
dollar (Carreras, 2006, p318). This was the carefully 
crafted economic heart of the 1944 Bretton Woods accord 
which, although it had never operated exactly as 
intended, provided the principles of international 
‘economic policy-making’ and supported a ‘lively economic 
exchange’ (Osterhammel & Petersson, 2005, p123). To 
ensure stability the US dollar had been fixed at the 1934 
gold price and was convertible at the rate of thirty-five 
printed dollars to one ounce of the yellow metal 
(Wasserstein, 2007, p628). Initially America’s commitment 
to maintain this ratio generated enough confidence in 
international trade to create a boom; a ‘golden age’ in 
which the income of almost every industrialised country, 
including those in the Soviet bloc, showed a significant 
increase (Carreras, 2006, p318). Though the Bretton Woods 
system relied on stability, its component countries were 






National governments retained the freedom to control 
their own overseas trade and to exercise domestic 
financial policies ‘without excessive concern’ for how 
these impacted on the global markets (Milgate & Stimson, 
2009, p29). The days of such independent action were 
numbered. 
 
America’s post war economic supremacy attracted foreign 
investors, success breeds success, and by 1950 the US 
treasury was holding seventy percent of the world gold 
reserve, a total of almost twenty two thousand tons 
(Anikin, 1983, p163). As European and Japanese 
manufacturing recovered and began exporting, they found a 
ready market in America. The massive US treasury gold 
holdings coupled with acceptance of the US dollar as the 
‘world’s reserve currency’ created a complacency about 
balance of payments (Quinlan, 2011, p10). US imports rose 
and exports dropped until by 1969 there were enough paper 
dollars in ‘foreign hands’ to buy the now depleted 
contents of Fort Knox ‘three times over’ (Albritton, 
2009, p68). The Bretton Woods system rested on the belief 
that the dollar was ‘as good as gold’, but with the 
suspicion that gold might actually be ‘better’, European 
national banks began to covert (Anikin, 1983, p163). 
France was first to cash in its dollar holdings. West 
Germany not only liquidated its dollars but also resigned 
from Bretton Woods. The floating Deutsche Mark quickly 
rose in value against the dollar (Wasserstein, 2007, 
p628). America was losing its financial grip on Europe at 
the same time as becoming more deeply involved in war in 
Vietnam. As national expenditure rose, America’s economy 
began to ‘overheat’. This encouraged inflation, which bit 
into deficit payments and widened the gap still further 
(Cohen, 2001, p100). 
 
The United States dollar was coming under increasing 
strain; after Switzerland announced its withdrawal from 
Bretton Woods the US Congress began recommending 
devaluation (Fulcher, 2004, p94). Under the Bretton Woods 
‘rules’ the US treasury could not devalue on the 
recommendation of Congress, but as the most powerful 
player in the game the American government could simply 
‘change the rules’ (Cohen, 2001, p100). Appeals were made 
to the European countries to revalue their currencies 
against the dollar to re-establish equilibrium. They 
refused (Ferguson, 2001, p158). In August 1971, President 
Richard Nixon was left with no other choice but to 
suspend the convertibility of the dollar with immediate 
effect. This closing of the ‘gold window’ at the US 
treasury signaled the abandonment of the entire Bretton 
Woods financial system (Anikin, 1983, p163; Bordo, 1993, 
p136; Quinlan, 2011, p10).  
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The world currencies went into free fall. They floated 
against each other until all parties arrived at a 
mutually acceptable level of exchange (Cohen, 2001, 
p100). Bretton Woods had effectively ‘caged’ the global 
financial markets, protecting member countries from 
economic instability and ‘financial anarchy’ (Quinlan, 
2011, p11). Global capital was no longer to be 
restricted. Quinlan argues that although President Nixon 
is not widely remembered for fostering the spread of 
economic globalisation and the opening up of the free 
markets, this was exactly the result of his decision 
(Quinlan, 2011, p9). Bretton Woods was a regulatory 
control intended by Keynes and White to ‘suppress capital 
mobility’ and to restrict the activities of banks to the 
countries in which they were based (Quinlan, 2011, p11). 
Severing the link between gold and the dollar signaled 
the disintegration of Bretton Woods and its replacement 
by floating exchange rates and unbridled currency 
speculation (Cohen, 2001, p100). These were the 
foundations on which British and American politicians 
would encourage the building of globalised ‘unregulated 
capital markets’ (Osterhammel & Petersson, 2005, p126).  
 
Britain’s Heath government 
 
While Richard Nixon contemplated the impact of his 
‘momentous decision’ (Quinlan, 2011, p10), Edward Heath 
imposed a range of inflation controls that included an 
eight percent pay claim limit (Gildar, 2001, p112). The 
National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) was the first to 
challenge government pay guidelines with a deliberately 
provocative demand for a twenty five percent increase 
(Gildar, 2001, p112). The government, via the National 
Coal Board, offered seven and a half percent, the NUM 
turned it down and their members voted to strike 
(Beckett, 2011). The industrial action started on January 
9th 1972. It introduced the previously unseen manoeuvre 
of mass picketing to prevent the normal working of almost 
any facility connected with fuel processing or 
distribution (Johnson, 1991, p603). The impact of the 
strike was increased by dockworkers who refused to unload 
imported coal and truck drivers who would not cross 
picket lines at power station gates. The ‘contingency 
plans’ to have the army requisition and distribute coal 
and other fuel stocks were abandoned for fear of totally 
alienating the trade unions (Travis, 2002). On February 
9th Heath declared a state of emergency and imposed a 
three-day working week on British industry to conserve 
fuel (Pearce, 2008, p6). Nine days later the government 
offered the mineworkers a twenty percent pay increase. 
The NUM’s executive, ‘sensing weakness’ refused.  
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They would settle for nothing less than twenty five 
percent, plus free transport to and from the pithead, 
free work clothing and ‘increased overtime payments’ 
(Beckett, 2011). By the end of the following day every 
demand had been conceded, the NUM’s industrial action had 
been ‘wholly successful’ (Morgan, 2000, p78). After 
another ballot to officially accept the deal the miners 
returned to work on February 28th (Beckett, 2011). 
 
The miners might have been satisfied but Heath would find 
little solace in the economy. The absence of the Bretton 
Woods controls was beginning to tell. Unpredictable 
commodity prices and international currencies that 
‘gyrated wildly’ had ‘transformed terms of trade’ 
(Wasserstein, 2007, p627). Businesses hedged against the 
fluctuating market by increasing prices and 
industrialised countries began to experience inflation 
(Cohen, 2001, p100). Britain’s 'cool' and 'groovy' 
nineteen-sixties ‘growth in consumerism’ (Falshaw, 2004, 
p47) disguised the reality of a country that simply 
‘lurched’ from one financial crisis to the next (Morgan, 
2000, p77). Prime Minister Heath struggled with rising 
inflation growing unemployment and his ‘savagely’ 
deteriorating relations with the trades unions (Pearce, 
2008, p6).  
 
If Edward Heath was having a bad time, his ministers 
certainly fared no better. His Education Secretary, 
Margaret Thatcher, was desperate to move to another 
department but, as the Cabinet’s ‘token woman’, was 
trapped in this ‘harmless’ post (Batteson, 1997, p364). 
Thatcher refused to keep quiet, she roundly condemned 
Education as an ‘awful’ department (Stevens, 2004, p35) 
whose ‘self-righteously socialist’ staff were obstructive 
and insubordinate (Stevens, 2004, p37). Equally 
infuriating for Mrs Thatcher was the procession of 
comprehensive school schemes requiring approval. The 
process of combining grammar and secondary modern schools 
into comprehensive’s was by this time well underway and 
had the support of most local authorities as well as 
parents and the teaching unions (Lawton, 2004, p78). 
Regardless of Thatcher’s attempts ‘to slow the trend’ 
(Lowe, 2005, p286), she was obliged to approve more than 
two thousand five hundred comprehensive schools  
(Plowright, 2006, p290) and in the process closed more 
grammar schools than any previous minister (Lawton, 2004, 
p78). 
 
Ten years had passed since the government had accepted 
the Robbins Committee’s advice to continue the expansion 
of the ‘traditional university experience’ (Anderson, 
2006, pviii).  
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The polytechnics provided over two hundred thousand new 
higher education places (Anderson, 1992, p195), but 
reaching numerical targets did not automatically improve 
the national economy. Government ministers complained 
that the universities were not adapting fast enough to 
keep the country competitive. It was this ‘imbalance’ 
that the polytechnics were expected to correct (Bocock & 
Taylor, 2003, p227). Lawton argues that, from inception 
it was ‘almost inevitable’ that the polytechnics would be 
regarded as ‘second best’ (Lawton, 2004, p70). Many 
polytechnic management teams fought this denigration by 
attempting to realign their institutions more closely 
with the prestigious Oxbridge model (Lowe, 2002, p84). 
The Robbins recommendation that a student’s university 
experience should be ‘traditional’ was taken to heart 
(Anderson, 2006, pviii). The polytechnics followed the 
Redbrick universities into the ‘classic pattern of 
academic drift’ (Barnes, 1996, p283); they sought to 
improve their status by replacing science and technology 
courses with the ‘arts, humanities and social sciences’, 
subjects that had not been intended to be taught on the 
public side of the binary line (Lawton, 2004, p70).  
For decades the Victorian civic universities had tried to 
‘ape the Oxbridge model’ (Stevens, 2004, p12), it was a 
status that received further endorsement when the sixties 
plate-glass universities strove to attain similar goals 
(Anderson, 2006, pviii). Then the 1970’s polytechnics 
ambitiously sought to ‘mop up’ the overwhelming demand 
for arts and humanities courses that the universities 
could not cope with. The whole higher education network 
was starting to look ‘strangely like Oxford and 
Cambridge’ (Lowe, 2002, p84). 
 
These ‘ambitions’ were expensive and the combination of 
post-Robbins expansion and increasing prices ominously 
signalled the ‘financial trouble’ that was to come 
(Anderson, 2006, pviii). The Department of Education and 
Science published a white paper, ‘The Framework for 
Expansion' in late 1972; it was a ten-year plan for a 
‘programme of educational advance’ (Thatcher, 1972). The 
paper predicted that three quarters of a million students 
would be in higher education by 1981; this included 
overseas students who were now required to pay a 
contribution toward their fees. Education was beginning 
to be appreciated as a ‘reasonable economic export’ 
(Clarke & Quill, 1999, 549). Although the ‘Framework’ 
praised higher education for the contribution it made 
toward the ‘personal development’ of its students there 
was concern among politicians that universities provided 
too much social study and not enough vocational training 
(Stevens, 2004, pp39-40).  
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Hence the White Paper stressed that it would be the 
‘polytechnics and other non-university colleges’ who 
would be required to increase their student places, but 
they would have to do so without additional funding. The 
DES instructed that ‘scope must be found for economies’ 
(Thatcher, 1972). Lawton states that 'Framework’ white 
paper led to a programme of reorganisation in which 
polytechnics and universities were either closed or 
merged causing ‘large numbers of redundancies’, and that 
plans for new school buildings and reduced class sizes 
had to be abandoned (Lawton, 2004, p80).  
 
The UGC, once a welcome protector and simple conduit of 
funding now also delivered ministerial warnings. Higher 
education was told to support both continued expansion 
and reduced expenditure (Stevens, 2004, p40). For over 
half a century university administrators had applied to 
the UGC for a four-year grant two years in advance, but 
this practice was being slowly undermined by inflation 
(Scott, 1978, p35). As each of the awards fell due, some 
marginal increase was added to take account of rising 
prices but future costs became so difficult to predict 
that in 1974 the UGC was forced to abandon its 
quinquennial grant scheme (Anderson, 2006, p160). Shortly 
afterward the UGC lost its management of academic 
salaries to the National Incomes Commission, and the 
future control of university fees to the Department of 
Education and Science (Clarke & Quill, 1999, p549). While 
Heath’s  administration was quietly neutering the UGC 
(Lawton, 2004, p80) the Premier himself was preparing for 
his ‘finest political hour’ (Falshaw, 2004, p50). On 
January 1st 1973, Britain officially became a fully-
fledged member of the European Economic Community. This 
despite the disgruntled ‘mutterings’ of some 
parliamentary factions and with only the halfhearted 
‘acquiesce’ of the British public (Wasserstein, 2007, 
p662).  
 
Almost as soon as Britain entered the EEC, the 
‘continuously rising prosperity’ that had powered the 
European post-war boom, began to slump (Eley, 2002, 
p406). The period of ‘social peace’ and economic 
stability enjoyed by most western industrialised nations 
had been deteriorating since the mid 1960’s (Carreras, 
2006, p320). By the early 70’s, many European economies 
were ‘teetering’ and for much the same reasons; 
prosperity had nurtured inflation, which had led to 
rising unemployment and labour unrest (Eley, 2002, p406). 
Europe’s ‘long boom’ had relied on the recently abandoned 
Bretton Woods accords to ensure the availability of the 
cheap petroleum products that supported its economic 
stimulus (Albritton, 2009, p56).  
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These fuel requirements were largely met by the rapidly 
expanding oil fields of the Middle East with few imports 
from the newly discovered oil fields in Southeast Asia 
and Africa (Hervey, 1994, p1). The international 
extraction, transport and refining of crude oil was 
dominated by a group of seven western multinational oil 
companies known as the ‘Seven Sisters’. These companies 
had become extremely wealthy by ensuring an abundance of 
cheap fuel to the customer while depressing prices at 
source (Trumbore, 2012). In 1960 delegates from five oil-
producing countries assembled in Baghdad to found the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 
This organisation claimed ‘permanent sovereignty’ on 
behalf of its members over any resources that existed 
within their borders. However, they could not control 
international pricing because the amount of crude oil 
they were producing far exceeded demand. Within ten years 
another five countries had joined OPEC and the demand for 
crude oil had risen exponentially (Hervey, 1994, p2).  
 
The United States, whose own oil reserves were 
‘dwindling’  (Hervey, 1994, p2), was now importing thirty 
five percent of its petro-chemical products (Trumbore, 
2012). The Seven Sisters ‘ruled the roost’ (Trumbore, 
2012) throughout the fifties and the sixties. They had 
manipulated the oil supply to make sure it remained 
‘plentiful and cheap’ (Hervey, 1994, p1). Despite the US 
and the Western world being drawn ever deeper into an 
'inflationary spiral’ the price of crude oil remained 
remarkably stable (Trumbore, 2012). Thus, the ‘stage was 
set’, for the increasingly disgruntled oil producing 
countries of the Middle East to exploit their advantage 
(Hervey, 1994, p2).  
 
In October 1973, Egypt and Syria attempted to regain 
territory lost in their 1967 war with Israel by launching 
a surprise attack to coincide with the Israeli observance 
of the religious festival of Yom Kippur (Black, 2009, 
p161). Initial Israeli losses were reversed when their 
troops took to the field armed with superior American 
military hardware. This 'interference' was strongly 
resented by the OPEC Arab states and it was decided that 
the 'pro-Israel stance' taken by many Western countries 
deserved retaliation (Carreras, 2006, p320). Before the 
end of October OPEC announced that no more oil would be 
sold to the United States. They would continue to sell to 
Western Europe but at twice the previous price (Knes, 
2012). The Israeli counter-offensive was successful and 
for a second time the invaders were defeated. A ceasefire 
officially ended the war in November (Trumbore, 2012). 
The reaction of OPEC was to double the price of oil bound 
for Western Europe yet again (Hervey, 1994, p2).  
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The countries of Western Europe had no choice but to 
reduce their consumption of crude oil (Falshaw, 2004, 
p50). Britain had missed the European economic boom and 
was now starved of the energy to run its industries; the 
national decline was beginning to look ‘terminal’ 
(Morgan, 2000, p78). Living standards were sliding and 
the more militant trades unions were making industrial 
unrest and strikes a ‘fixture’ (Falshaw, 2004, p49). The 
United States and much of Europe were experiencing the 
miserable combination of zero economic growth and 
inflation, since described by some economists as 
‘stagflation’ (Black, 2009, p161). ‘Rocketing’ fuel 
prices (Macalister, 2011) forced Heath to cut oil imports 
by a further fifteen percent (Falshaw, 2004, p50). The 
government decided that fuel for industry was a greater 
priority than for motorists. Long queues at petrol 
filling stations led to serious consideration of the 
reissue of wartime ration books (Macalister, 2011).  
There was good reason to hope that some relief might be 
provided by the 1969 discovery of oil and gas beneath the 
North Sea. However, huge rigs and pipelines first had to 
be designed, built and located in an inhospitable 
environment. The most optimistic prediction suggested 
that it would be seven years before Britain would see 
either oil or any benefits to public finance (Kemp, 
2003). The North Sea venture was unlikely to bother the 
oil-exporting states of the Middle East in the short 
term. The cost of imported crude oil, refined petroleum 
products and associated commodities continued to escalate  
(Gildar, 2001, p122). 
 
As the cost of living ratcheted up, so the trades unions 
demanded proportionally higher pay for their members 
(Macalister, 2011). The National Union of Mineworkers 
claimed that their membership had slipped from being 
Britain’s best-paid industrial workers to the eighteenth 
(Cook, 2004, p9). To restore the status quo the NUM 
demanded a thirty five percent pay increase (Cook, 2004, 
p9). Unsurprisingly, the National Coal Board refused to 
even consider it and equally unsurprisingly, the NUM, 
‘emboldened’ by the crippling price of crude oil 
(Wasserstein, 2007, p633), began balloting for their 
second strike in two years (Gildar, 2001, p122). In 
November 1973, they decided to take full advantage of the 
situation by announcing an immediate overtime ban and a 
national strike to start on February 9th 1974 (Gildar, 
2001, p122). For a second time Heath was forced to cope 
with the disruption of a miners strike without having 
been allowed the time to take ‘adequate precautions’ 
(Plowright, 2006, p140).  
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The country was already short of oil and coal; the 
government had no time to ‘dither’ (Cook, 2004, p9). 
Heath made a television broadcast declaring both an 
immediate state of emergency and a three-day working week 
for business and industry to start on January 1st 1974 
(Cook, 2004, p9). Apart from the profound economic and 
political repercussions of the three-day week, Falshaw 
states that there were social implications caused by 
factory, shop and school closures, people living by 
candlelight, a 50mph speed limit and no television after 
10.30pm (Falshaw, 2004, p50).  
 
Official talks quickly broke down with the miners 
defiantly maintaining their ‘bloody-minded but principled 
ground’ (Eley, 2002, p390). A series of secret 
discussions established that the miners’ demands could be 
met by extra payments for travel time to the coalface and 
bath time at the end of a shift. Since these payments had 
not previously existed they could be added to the 
previous pay offer without breaching the government’s 
income policy (Cook, 2004, p10). On December 21st gleeful 
NUM officials explained this clever compromise to Harold 
Wilson (Cook, 2004, p10). He was furious that the NUM, 
the ‘elite troops’ of the trade’s union movement 
(Plowright, 2006, p291) could be bought off by a 
floundering Tory government. The next day Wilson held a 
press conference to publically announce the Labour 
Party’s ‘solution’ to the miners strike. It was the ‘bath 
time’ compromise. Since no government would agree to a 
measure suggested by an opposition party the measure was 
effectively ‘sabotaged’ (Cook, 2004, p11). Heath was left 
with no choice but to call a snap election for February 
1974 (Lawton, 2004, p77). 
 
This chapter had dealt with the changes in British 
society wrought by the aftermath of the Second World War. 
Most notably these included the birth of the welfare 
state and the loss of imperial territory but there was 
also an important expansion of higher education 
provision. After research had shown links between the 
amount of money spent on higher education and the 
national economy, the government had pledged a 
considerable increase in financial support. It was also a 
period in which Americanisation as an element of 
'globalisation' had become observable and was becoming a 
subject of study. Britain entered the European Economic 
Community as the abandonment of the Bretton Woods 
agreements left the world currencies floating in an open 





Chapter 5 1974-1989 
 
This chapter deals with the rise of neoliberalism and the 
commodification of English higher education. I discuss 
how Britain’s government shed much of its public sector 
responsibility and permanently recast universities as 
elements of the national economy. I also explore how the 
successful outcome of the Falklands war and the defeat of 
the coal miners union assisted Margaret Thatcher to three 
consecutive election victories and provided a powerful 
mandate for change. Few areas of British life were 
unaffected and higher education became an early target. I 
explain how Thatcher’s view of knowledge for its own sake 
being an unaffordable luxury led to the notion that 
university investment should show acceptable dividends. 
This new approach paved the way for the abolition of the 
UGC and provided a powerful motive for the governmental 
management of the universities. In the quest for more 
‘useful’ graduates, ministers pressured the English 
universities, once the inspiration for educational 
institutions throughout the empire, into adopting 
managerial methods that might more commonly be associated 
with manufacturing. The experience of a university 
education was transformed into a measurable and 
purchasable service, in which the institutions would have 
to complete with each other to survive.  
 
I also describe how America’s President Reagan and Mrs 
Thatcher not only genuinely liked each other but also 
shared a neoliberal ideology. The collective economic and 
political power of two leaders was ultimately wielded to 
hasten the fall of Soviet Russia and to convince many of 
the world’s governments of the benefits of neoliberalist 
free trade. The end of the Cold War removed major 
obstacles to the international deregulation of the 
financial markets, the greater economic, cultural 
educational integration that is now firmly associated 
with the processes of globalisation. This chapter begins 
by examining the impact of the 1974 general elections.  
 
Labour returns to office  
 
The cold weather closed in, the power cuts increased and 
people were asked to save energy by washing, shaving and 
cleaning 'their teeth in the dark’ (Wasserstein, 2007, 
p633). Political opponents rushed out hasty manifesto’s 
for an election date calculated not for ‘electoral 
advantage but by the circumstances of the strike’ (Kriesi 




An atmosphere of fatalism surrounded the Conservative’s 
and their ‘ill-judged’ campaign question (Falshaw, 2004, 
p50), 'Who Rules Britain - The Government or the Miners?' 
(Lawton, 2004, p78). Heath was gambling on the 
electorate’s awareness of his difficulties (Wasserstein, 
2007, p635). He was correct in that the Conservatives 
polled the most votes but they were bunched into the 
wrong constituencies and the Labour Party won by just 
four seats (Pearce, 2008, p7). Heath tried to arrange 
Liberal support for a minority Conservative government 
but was unable to meet their ‘price’ of electoral reform 
(Wasserstein, 2007, p635). Heath stepped aside and Harold 
Wilson found himself once again occupying number ten 
Downing Street, but this time he lacked an overall 
majority (Pearce, 2008, p7).  
 
Some British businessmen and Conservative party members 
did not consider this a bad outcome. A minority Labour 
government would be better placed to get union 
cooperation but would be too weak to ‘pursue extreme 
policies’ (Frank, 1980, p115). Wilson's first act was to 
settle with the miners. For the second time in two years 
virtually all of their demands were conceded. They had 
achieved increased pay and overtime rates as well as a 
change of government. Entirely satisfied, they returned 
to work on Monday, March 11th, 1974 (Lawton, 2004, p88). 
In the same month OPEC members decided that sufficient 
diplomatic efforts were being made to ease tensions in 
the Middle East to lift the embargo on exporting oil to 
America. This would however, be at the same hugely 
increased price that Europe was already paying (Knes, 
2012). Fuel costs added considerably to Wilson’s 
problems, the country was already facing the ‘most 
intractable economic difficulties’ since the 1940’s 
(Wasserstein, 2007, p635). The Labour Party had not 
expected to be returned to office so soon. They had no 
long-term economic plan (Wasserstein, 2007, p634) and had 
campaigned on a ‘collection of slogans’ rather than a 
planned manifesto (Lawton, 2004, p88).  
 
This lack of preparation was of little consequence since 
it was practically impossible for a minority 
administration to frame major legislative change.  Within 
months Wilson accepted the ‘inevitability’ of another 
general election and it was called for October 1974 (Burk 
& Stokes, 1999, p83).  
 
This time the Labour Party were ready and they launched a 
robustly socialist campaign. Heath’s attempts to curb 
trades union power had united the factions of the left. A 
‘strong alliance’ had developed between the TUC and 
Labour’s left wing (Kerr, 2001, p116).  
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Throughout 1973, the TUC and the opposition Labour Party 
had discussed a provisional ‘social contract’ (Tarling & 
Wilkinson, 1977, p395). By the time of the October 
election this contract had become part of their election 
manifesto. It committed the Labour Party to a programme 
of socialist measures that included the control of 
prices, rent, transport, housing and a redistribution of 
wealth. For their part, the TUC promised that wage 
demands would be no more than was required to stay in 
line with rising prices (Tarling & Wilkinson, 1977, 
p395). Kerr argues that the heavily socialist programme 
promised in the manifesto is evidence of the left having 
‘seized control' (Kerr, 2001, p116). This re-run election 
produced a Labour victory but without a required improved 
mandate, they had gained a very slender majority of three 
seats  (Wasserstein, 2007, p634). It was not the result 
that Wilson was hoping for (Lawton, 2004, p88). The 
electorate was losing faith; none of their political 
leaders seemed able to alleviate the economic chaos 
(Kerr, 2001, p115). Heath had now contested four 
elections and lost three of them (Pearce, 2008, p7). His 
party were ‘ruthless’ in opposition (Sampson, 2004, p47) 
and there was ‘much dissatisfaction’ with his leadership 
(Plowright, 2006, p140). Edward Heath would have to go 
(Frank, 1980, p114). 
 
Conservative opinion makers turned their attention to 
Heath’s Secretary of State for Social Services, Sir Keith 
Joseph. As minister, Joseph had encouraged Heath to share 
his vision of 'modernising' Britain through the 
establishment of a ‘social market economy’ (Turner, 2008, 
p95). Initially, Heath was sympathetic to Joseph's views 
but the spectre of rising inflation panicked him into 
resorting to traditional state interventionist remedies 
(Turner, 2008, p96). Heath had tried to reduce 
unemployment by bailing out ‘lame duck’ industries; he 
tried to control the economy with a restrictive prices 
and incomes policy (Eccleshall, 1990, p207). Joseph was 
highly critical of Heath for refusing to consider 
anything other than the accepted Keynesian theories 
(Kerr, 2001, p115). Although Keynes had died many years 
before his recommendations still dominated the economic 
thinking of most Western governments (Ebeling, 2004, 
p15). In the case of an economic downturn Keynes would 
have the government in question borrow money so as to 
maintain a vigorous public sector. This would alleviate 
unemployment and provide spending money to ‘prime the 
pump’ by stimulating the market for private sector goods, 
thus encouraging investment in further manufacturing and 




Keynesian orthodoxy had evolved during the Great 
Depression and, although it remained a standard 
governmental response to financial difficulties, there 
were economists who questioned its effectiveness (Bowles, 
2007, p27). In 1956, Milton Friedman, a University of 
Chicago economics professor published a lengthy critique 
of Keynesian theory and suggested its replacement with 
‘monetarism’. He proposed that when faced with an 
economic downturn a government should reduce its public 
spending and focus on inflation control while 
deregulating the competitive markets which could be 
relied upon to invest, expand and provide employment 
(Bowles, 2007, pp27-28). This was similar to the 
eighteenth century ‘Adam Smith’ view later identified by 
Lerner as a non-interventionist, economic liberalism that 
had been known as ‘laissez-faire’ (Lerner, 1937, pviii). 
This modern reliance upon the ‘efficiency’ of the market 
to provide its own checks and balances would become known 
as ‘neo-liberalism’ (Howard & King, 2008, p2). Treanor 
argues that the term ‘neo-liberalism’ has since been 
‘used interchangeably’ with the term 'globalisation'; 
both, Treanor suggests, imply aspects of ‘social and 
moral philosophy’ as well as economics (Treanor, 2005, 
p1). Champions of ‘monetarism’ like Sir Keith Joseph, 
were not motivated by the creation of a philosophical 
movement but of a deregulated liberal free market (Howard 
& King, 2008, p2). 
 
Sir Keith Joseph 
 
Milton Friedman’s treatise on monetarism appeared in 
1956, the same year as Sir Keith Joseph was elected a 
Conservative member of Parliament (Yergin & Stanislaw, 
1998, p45). Joseph admired the work of Friedman and his 
colleague, Friedrich Hayek who had taught at the London 
School of Economics for nineteen years, before joining 
Friedman in Chicago (Howe, 1997, p275). Hayek, like 
Friedman, evangelised the works of Adam Smith; he 
believed that trade and profit making were ‘natural’ 
human traits (Bowles, 2007, p30) and that any official 
intervention was restrictive and therefore ‘incompatible 
with individual freedom’ (Eccleshall, 1990, p203).  
 
Even during wartime Hayek spoke out against the British 
government’s schemes for central economic planning 
(Rubinstein, 1994, p76) claiming that these were the 
methods of ‘socialism and totalitarianism’ (Wasserstein, 
2007, p632). Hayek continued to call for less government 
intervention; he wanted more economic liberalism with the 
least possible ‘market regulation and social welfare’ 
(Wasserstein, 2007, p632).  
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These principles caught the attention of Keith Joseph and 
he became an enthusiastic advocate of the ‘anti-Keynesian 
creed’ (Howe, 1997, p275). His maiden speech to the 
Commons warned that the existing economic strategy was 
prone to inflation and that it would be more prudent to 
control the demand for money than its supply (Yergin & 
Stanislaw, 1998, p95). There were many in the House who 
took notice. Keith Joseph, the ‘ivory tower intellectual’ 
had begun his climb up through the party ranks (Thompson 
& Thompson, 1994, p36). 
 
The 1974 election left Edward Heath clinging to his 
precarious position as the leader of a party that really 
no longer wanted him (Yergin & Stanislaw, 1998, p100). 
Sir Keith Joseph was already becoming widely accepted as 
Heath's most likely successor (Eccleshall, 1990, p234). 
In office Joseph had been a loyal minister who would 
occasionally ‘bombard’ Heath with economic ideas, which 
he knew, would ultimately be ignored (Denham & Garnett, 
2001, p98). In opposition however, he became more vocal, 
preaching the free market and monetarist 'gospel' at 
every available opportunity (Eccleshall, 1990, p211). 
Joseph’s 'radical' economic views began to be taken 
seriously and slowly gained ground (Lawton, 2004, p88). 
He maintained that economic intervention by the 
government could never permanently reduce unemployment 
(Bowles, 2007, p27) and that it was control of inflation 
that must come first (Gran, 1996, p270). His words had 
appeared to be born out during the darkest days of the 
oil crisis. The industrialised world suffered a wave of 
inflation that was quickly followed by increased 
unemployment (Backhouse, 2009, p21). Milton Friedman 
seized upon the oil crisis as a circumstance that 
Keynesian economic modeling could not be expected to 
accommodate. Keynes could never have anticipated that the 
increased cost of any single commodity would so 
destablise national economies. Friedman maintained that a 
Keynesian economy would enlarge its public sector on 
borrowed money and then be pressured by trades unions for 
wages that kept pace with the increasing cost of that 
vital commodity.  
 
 
If the government yielded to the unions it would have to 
increase its borrowings, the result would be a yawning 
balance of payments deficit, a 'wage-price spiral', and 






The rise of the free market think 
tanks and Margaret Thatcher  
 
In the late 1940’s, Friedrich Hayek advised wealthy 
entrepreneur, Anthony Fisher that the most effective way 
of furthering the cause of ‘economic freedom’ would be 
the creation of a ‘scholarly research organisation’ 
(Backhouse, 2009, p18). An institution with an academic 
pedigree so impressive that its studies could be 
universally accepted and applied to global economic 
problems (Backhouse, 2009, p18). During the following 
years Fisher spent time in America where he developed an 
interest in the Foundation for Economic Education (FEE) 
as well as in battery chicken farming. Fisher returned to 
Britain and by 1955, had applied his US experience to the 
running of the hugely successful ‘Buxted Chicken’ 
business as well as founding and funding the Institute of 
Economic Affairs (IEA) (Spring, 1998, p125). Fisher’s 
institute was based on the American model and unlike 
earlier ‘think tanks’, which pursued social and 
scientific research, both Fisher’s IEA and the American 
FEE were specifically created to promote free market 
ideas (Backhouse, 2009, p18). Keith Joseph was indebted 
to the IEA for the assistance and expertise they provided 
while he was developing his own free market ideals 
(Turner, 2008, p95). Joseph discussed these ideals with 
like-minded colleagues, one of whom was Margaret 
Thatcher. She thought it a practical alternative to the 
Keynesian stance and quickly became thoroughly 
‘converted’ (Spring, 1998, p125). Thatcher became reliant 
on Joseph as her political ‘mentor’ (Eccleshall, 1990, 
p212) and many of the ‘key themes’ that appeared in his 
speeches of the period would later be transformed and 
presented as 'Thatcherism' (Denham & Garnett, 2001, p99). 
During the months between the 1974 general elections 
Keith Joseph launched the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) 
(Turner, 2008, p95) and invited Margaret Thatcher to 
serve as vice chair (Yergin & Stanislaw, 1998, p99). This 
Joseph-Thatcher enterprise was to provide a platform for 
the expression of 'hitherto unfashionable views' 
(Maclure, 1988, p153) and a powerbase for the creation of 
Joseph's 'enterprise culture' (Desai, 1994, p29).  
 
Through the CPS Joseph and Thatcher were able to convince 
selected political colleagues of the ‘folly’ of state 
intervention (Eccleshall, 1990, p234) and of the wisdom 
of ‘social market policies' (Turner, 2008, p95). Think 
tanks were to proliferate both in Britain and America; 
they became the primary vehicles through which the ideas 
of neo-liberalism, monetarism and free market ‘solutions’ 
were broadcast (Spring, 1998, p125).  
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Turner argues that the CPS was not strictly a think tank 
as the ‘thinking had already been done’; it was an 
organisation that had been set up to ‘change people’s 
minds’ (Turner, 2008, p96). 
 
Joseph’s target audience was ready for an alternative to 
the ‘Heathite policies’ which were not only not working 
but appeared as simply a ‘bluish version’ of the Labour 
Party’s policies (Eccleshall, 1990, p204). Confidence in 
the orthodox Keynesian policies was being ‘undermined’ by 
the oil crisis, increasing inflation and unemployment, it 
was an opportune moment for the CPS to step up with its 
free market option (Denham & Garnett, 2001, p100). 
Joseph’s critical assaults on Heath’s apparently 
ineffectual policies were slowly gaining ground 
(Eccleshall, 1990, p234). Faced with mounting hostility 
Heath was obliged to call a leadership election for 
February 1975. Joseph, with Thatcher as his ‘unofficial’ 
campaign manager, took up the challenge (Yergin & 
Stanislaw, 1998, p100). Strangely, Joseph had no ‘burning 
ambition’ to be party leader, he regarded himself as an 
ideas man who had been overtaken by events (Yergin & 
Stanislaw, 1998, p100). Once the leadership race was 
announced it attracted just the kind of media attention 
that Joseph found uncomfortable. But the media, 
particularly the newspapers, found him a very interesting 
prospect. Keith Joseph was an ‘unworldly’ eccentric, who 
refused to own a television (Yergin & Stanislaw, 1998, 
p95), a man whose friends thought he was ‘lacking 
political antennae’ (Eccleshall, 1990, p234) while others 
thought he was ‘lacking in common sense’ (Thompson & 
Thompson, 1994, p36). 
 
Joseph expressed a ‘genuine concern’ for children living 
in poverty and actively supported many charities 
including the Child Poverty Action Group (Welshman, 2006, 
p4). The basis for Joseph’s concern was a detached, 
intellectual and superior attitude that sprang from his 
own understanding of the ‘cycle of deprivation’; (Denham 
& Garnett, 2001, p102) a theory of social reproduction in 
which child poverty and some forms of anti-social 
behavior were identified as ‘inter-generational 
continuities’ that occurred in poorer financial and 
educational backgrounds (Welshman, 2006, p2).  
Given the brusque and ‘insensitive manner’ in which many 
of Joseph’s speeches were delivered (Eccleshall, 1990, 
p234) and the repetitious nature of phrases involving the 
’undeserving poor’, benefit frauds, malingers and the 
‘unemployables’ (Welshman, 2006, p4) the press sensed a 
source of colourful copy and began hounding him to 
provide it (Yergin & Stanislaw, 1998, p100). In October 
1974, their hopes were fulfilled.  
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During a speech to a Conservative club in Edgbaston, 
Joseph ill advisedly commented on the propensity of the 
‘lower social categories’ to have illegitimate off spring 
(Hennessy, 1991, p494). He then compounded his error by 
advocating that such people be provided with effective 
contraception to avoid a dilution of the ‘human stock’ 
(Eccleshall, 1990, p234). The press howled in outrage, 
the speech was reported in terms that invoked accusations 
of racism, eugenics and Social Darwinism, Joseph was even 
accused of attempting to create a 'master race' (Denham & 
Garnett, 2001, p102). However inaccurate, unjust, or 
simply exaggerated these reports may have been, they 
revealed a naivety, so profound, that any hope of Joseph 
becoming the leader of a major political party were 
‘effectively ended’ (Plowright, 2006, p290). After a 
month of ‘rude and hostile questions’ he explained to 
Thatcher that he could take no more of this ‘merciless’ 
public scrutiny (Yergin & Stanislaw, 1998, p100) and 
would be resigning from the Conservative leadership 
contest (Denham & Garnett, 2001, p102). Many 
Conservative’s were dismayed; the need for a new leader 
was so urgent that they would accept ‘anyone but Heath’ 
(Thompson & Thompson, 1994, p36). Margaret Thatcher was 
quick to recognise the opportunity. With Keith Joseph and 
his supporters behind her she ‘stepped into the breach’ 
(Denham & Garnett, 2001, p102). After three months of 
campaigning and two rounds of voting a ‘stunned’ Heath 
conceded that he had lost and stepped down (Yergin & 
Stanislaw, 1998, p100). Margaret Thatcher was the new 
Conservative Party Leader (Pearce, 2008, p7). 
 
Thatcher opposes the Labour government  
 
As opposition leader, Thatcher faced Harold Wilson across 
the dispatch box. Labour’s ‘wafer-thin’ majority allowed 
very little to be done about the country’s economic woes 
and Thatcher berated them for doing it badly (Plowright, 
2006, p140). Wilson took the traditional Keynesian view 
of the economy, his remedies were remarkably similar to 
Heath’s, but were applied with increased 'vigour’ (Kerr, 
2001, p116). The situation continued to deteriorate and 
by 1975 Britain had inflation rates approaching thirty 
percent, a three billion pound balance of trade deficit 
and over a million unemployed (Gifford, 2008, p64). 
Despite the social contract with the unions fifteen 
million working days were lost through strike action 
(Frank, 1980, p114). When accused of driving up inflation 
and not honoring their part of bargain (Frank, 1980, 
p116) the unions countered that the government were not 
implementing the promised union-friendly ‘socialist 




During his previous premiership Wilson had soured trades 
union relations by criticising excessive wage demands. 
Once again pay disputes were ‘becoming commonplace’ and 
again Wilson was ‘at odds with the unions’ (Falshaw, 
2004, p48). His majority was so slim that his government 
could not impose even diluted socialist policies and this 
was developing into a ‘major rift’ (Kerr, 2001, p116). 
Sensing that the position was unwinnable, Wilson 
sidestepped and drew attention to Labour's election 
pledge to renegotiate the terms of Britain’s EEC entry. 
Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, was at the forefront 
of negotiations (Burk & Stokes, 1999, p83) but his 
efforts were something of a ‘sham’ (Gifford, 2008, p61). 
It was widely recognised that membership conditions had 
already been agreed and that sweeping retrospective 
changes would not be allowed. However, other EEC 
countries allowed the pretence because they understood 
the need for Labour to undertake this ‘face-saving’ 
exercise (Gifford, 2008, p61). Several very small 
adjustments to the British terms of entry were eventually 
agreed and Wilson was pleased to announce a ‘victory for 
the Labour government and the British people’ (Gifford, 
2008, p61). This apparently successful piece of horse-
trading provided a ‘suitable distraction’ while the most 
ardent supporters of the left wing manifesto were quietly 
reassigned to less sensitive areas (Kerr, 2001, p119). By 
the end of 1975 the government had effectively abandoned 
the most contentious elements of its election agenda 
(Kerr, 2001, p120) and the party’s leading left-wingers 
had been ‘put out to pasture’ (Frank, 1980, p117). When 
asked for his reaction to memo’s questioning this 
apparently non-socialist stance Wilson claimed 
indifference, he had no time to read views with which he 
did not agree (Stone-Lee, 2005). 
 
Wilson’s ‘major preoccupation’ was the economy. All 
social policies had been ‘eclipsed’ by a series of plans 
intended to freeze wages, protect sterling and reduce 
unemployment (Newton, 2010, p912). Most were ineffectual 
and amid rumours that Wilson was losing his ‘spark’ 
(Falshaw, 2004, p48) came the ‘surprise’ announcement in 
March 1976 that he was to resign (Lawton, 2004, p88). The 
Labour Party replaced Wilson as premier with the 
‘avuncular’ James Callaghan (Falshaw, 2004, p48). 
Callaghan was known as a leftish union sympathiser who 
was ‘right aligned on everything else’ (Batteson, 1997, 
p366). He had apparently been forgiven for being the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer who had presided over the 
‘national humiliation’ of devaluing the pound in 1967 
(Wasserstein, 2007, p534).  
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The party Callaghan inherited was in dire need of ‘fresh 
initiatives’ and when he entered Downing Street as leader 
he was faced with a palpable sense of ‘panic’ (Batteson, 
1997, p368). 
 
Fears that Callaghan might once again devalue sterling 
shook creditor confidence and caused widespread selling 
of the pound (Newton, 2010, p912). Public sector 
borrowing was almost out of control and, coupled with the 
run on sterling, was threatening nation bankruptcy 
(Gifford, 2008, p64). The pound needed outside financial 
support and by June, Callaghan’s Cabinet had arrived 
‘slowly and painfully’ at the conclusion that a 
significant foreign loan must be sought (Frank, 1980, 
p117). The German government had proposed a monetary 
system for the EEC; it was intended to provide the 
stability of the Bretton Woods agreement but would be 
based on the deutschmark (Gifford, 2008, p65). For 
Britain to become dependant on an EEC loan may have 
strengthened European economic ties but it would also 
have split the parliamentary Labour Party (Gifford, 2008, 
p66). Gifford states that although the EEC would have 
been more likely to offer generous terms to aid a British 
economic recovery, Callaghan chose to apply to the 
International Monetary Fund in the interest of 
maintaining ‘public and party support’ (Gifford, 2008, 
p66). This ‘Europhobia’ was to come at a price (Porter, 
2004, p5), the IMF was very much within the American 
sphere of influence and monetarism was very much in the 
‘ascendancy’ (Kerr, 2001, p120). The Labour government 
was still pursuing Keynesian economic policies similar to 
that of its Conservative predecessor and they were not 
working. Economists were beginning to agree that the 
usefulness of such ‘techniques had been exhausted’ 
(Eccleshall, 1990, p212). 
 
The British application to the IMF was for a loan of two 
and a half billion pounds (Lang, 2006, p364). It was the 
most any country had ever requested and it revealed the 
government’s action as a ‘policy of despair’ (Stone-Lee, 
2005). While the IMF organised the loan, political 
‘interests’ on both sides of the Atlantic ‘seized’ the 
opportunity to make sure that ‘tight controls’ would be 
imposed on the Labour government (Kerr, 2001, p120). The 
conditions of the loan were very strict and Callaghan was 
forced to accept some decidedly ‘unsocialist policies’ 
(Lawton, 2004, p89). The main thrust of the IMF demands 
was intended to steer the British economy, via a 
monetarist route, toward ‘deflationary goals’ (Gifford, 
2008, p65). Much to dismay of the Labour left, public 
spending was to suffer its most draconian cut since 1945 
(Gifford, 2008, p65).  
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The impact would be felt across the range of public 
expenditure, from the large nationalised industries and 
local authorities through to public housing projects and 
‘school lunches’ (Frank, 1980, pp117-118). At the 1976 
Labour Party Conference, Callaghan spoke of current 
economic conditions having overtaken the accepted wisdom 
and that it was now no longer possible for a government 
to ‘spend its way out of a recession’ (Plowright, 2006, 
p42). This was as close as any ministerial representative 
came to a public statement of Labour’s ‘abandonment of 
Keynesianism’ (Kerr, 2001, p120).  
 
In series of statements and speeches Callaghan warned the 
TUC that any chance of a ‘cooperative relationship’ 
between government and the unions had been reduced to 
zero (Gifford, 2008, p64). The quid pro quo of the social 
contract required that the government vastly increase its 
public sector spending; this aim was totally reliant on a 
policy of ‘radicalized Keynesianism’ (Eley, 2002, p389).  
Callaghan’s actions rendered the TUC’s economic ambitions 
unachievable and the social contract was dissolved 
(Lawton, 2004, p89). Labour’s austerity measures combined 
with revenues now flowing from North sea oil produced 
positive results remarkably quickly, the economy 
reflated, the balance of trade improved and levels of 
unemployment steadied (Gifford, 2008, p65). This 
unexpectedly effective outcome allowed the government to 
scale back its IMF loan and the full amount was never 
drawn (Falshaw, 2004, p48). Milton Friedman was jubilant, 
the economic theories that he championed had been 
successfully applied; he published an open letter to 
President Carter appealing for the US to follow 
Callaghan’s lead (Frank, 1980, p118). Callaghan was more 
interested in political survival than in trail blazing 
and a by-election result had just taken the last of his 
initial three-seat majority. He was prepared to lead a 
minority administration but needed assurance that the 
Liberal members of the House would support him on major 
issues (Falshaw, 2004, p48) The resulting uneasy 
alliance, known as the ‘Lib-Lab pact’ would help 
Callaghan’s Labour administration ‘negotiate increasingly 
choppy industrial waters’ for the next two years (Jones, 
2010). 
 
The main consequence of Callaghan’s minority government 
accepting the conditions of the IMF loan was that it had 
been forced to adopt an economic policy that marked a 
shift away from a thirty-year tradition of Keynesian 
techniques (Frank, 1980, p117). The chancellor’s ultimate 
economic aims were no longer full employment and social 
welfare but the control of inflation and expenditure 
(Falshaw, 2004, p48).  
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The steady but fragile recovery nurtured by this 
monetarist approach also encouraged a new wave of pay 
demands. Callaghan warned that union ‘militancy’ could 
bring down the whole Labour movement and he pleaded for 
pay rises to be kept below five percent (Frank, 1980, 
p119). With an annual inflation rate of around ten 
percent this was deemed ‘unrealistically low’ (Eley, 
2002, p388) and the 1978 Trades Union Congress threw the 
proposal out (Lawton, 2004, p89). 
 
Unions claimed that they were being pressured into making 
higher pay demands by their members, who in some cases 
simply bypassed union officials and made forceful 
requests on their account (Frank, 1980, p119). Judt 
argues that some union officials actually preferred these 
nineteenth-century style ‘shop floor confrontations’ 
because they had a better chance of winning than if they 
relied upon national agreements (Judt, 2005, p538). In 
November 1978 the British subsidiary of the Ford Motor 
Company ended a two-month strike by its British workers 
by agreeing to a pay increase of sixteen percent. In 
January 1979 the Transport and General Workers Union then 
secured a fifteen percent increase for its lorry driving 
members, after which a further two hundred companies 
broke the government’s pay policy (Eley, 2002, p388). 
Public sector employee’s did not have the leverage of 
privately employed workers but anyway embarked upon a 
long series of short but coordinated strikes.  
 
These developed into months of ‘publicly disastrous 
stoppages’ (Eley, 2002, p388) that affected schools, 
hospitals, transport and the BBC (Frank, 1980, p119). 
Public sector workers from dustmen and gravediggers to 
civil servants became embroiled in national industrial 
action, the dead went unburied and rubbish piled up in 
the streets (Lang, 2006, p364; Morgan, 2000, p80). An 
economics journalist borrowed the phrase ‘winter of 
discontent’ from Shakespeare to describe ‘those long cold 
months of industrial chaos’ but only after Callaghan used 
it in a speech did it get picked up and passed into the 
national vocabulary by the Sun newspaper (Thomas, 2005, 
p84). The same publication was instrumental in an airport 
interview with the Prime Minister as he returned from an 
economic conference in the West Indies.  
When asked how he intended to deal the mounting chaos, 
the sun-tanned Callaghan adopted a look of ‘smug 
unconcern’ and said he doubted that many people viewed 
the current situation as ‘mounting chaos’ (Wasserstein, 
2007, p636). The Sun newspaper reported these comments 




Thatcher wins the ‘Crisis’ election 
 
Even without newspaper prompting, the electorate wanted 
no more of the ‘rats and the rubbish’ (Sandbrook, 2008, 
p36); ‘public indignation’ was building against the 
unions and the government’s seeming inability to control 
them (Wasserstein, 2007, p636). There was a growing 
perception that Britain was becoming ‘ungovernable’ 
(Weir, 1990, p8). The normally ebullient ‘Sunny Jim’ 
Callaghan (Jones, 2012, p256) saw his public and 
parliamentary support slipping away and he decided to 
force the issue by calling for a vote of confidence 
(Lang, 2006, p364). That the ballot date coincided with a 
pay and conditions strike by disgruntled House of Commons 
catering staff did not bode well; their dissatisfaction 
was shared by the hungry MP’s, most of whom voted against 
the Labour government (Yergin & Stanislaw, 1998, p104). 
Having lost the confidence of the House, the Labour 
administration had no choice but to submit to a general 
election, which they called for May 3rd (Lang, 2006, 
p364). From the first day of the campaigning, the Tories 
had an opinion poll lead, because they were not seen as 
being responsible for the ‘winter of discontent’. The 
press and the public seemed so ‘set against the unions’ 
that Thatcher was ‘winning by default’ (Frank, 1980, 
p119). Callaghan’s gloomy prediction of an approaching 
‘sea-change’ in British politics would prove to be both 
correct and understated (Page, 2002, p169). 
 
The Conservatives won the election with a forty three-
seat majority (Johnson, 1991, p740). Margaret Thatcher 
accepted the role of Britain's first woman Prime Minister 
and with it the authority to exercise her own 
‘evangelical’ style of neoliberal philosophy (Gran, 1996, 
p269). A ‘transatlantic network’ of economic theorists 
and businessmen were ‘primed’ to advise in Thatcher’s 
‘new approach’ (Jones, 2012, p216). Working in the 
‘shadow of Milton Friedman’ (Lowe, 2005, p289) she set 
about assembling a Cabinet that would cooperate in making 
Britain an international ‘testbed’ for monetarism and its 
attendant neoliberal economic and social policies (Frank, 
1980, p120). Alongside these economic plans rested the 
declared political intention of ‘rolling back the 
apparatus of the state’ (Lowe, 2005, p293). Thatcher’s 
declared intention was to increase individual freedoms 
while imposing ‘more authoritarian’ governmental controls 
on established institutions (Aas, 2007, p144). That many 
individuals were connected to, or otherwise involved in 
institutions in a way that might constitute an important 
element of society was of no consequence to Mrs Thatcher 
who famously asked ‘who is society?’ and then insisted 
that ‘there is no such thing’ (Wasserstein, 2007, p636). 
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The Cabinet agreed that reforms to the welfare state, 
education and nationalised industries were necessary and 
that nothing should be ‘sacrosanct’ (Johnson, 1991, 
p740). This aggressive new attitude was first experienced 
by a delegation of union officials who were ‘rather taken 
aback’ to be refused a future planning meeting on the 
grounds that there was nothing to discuss (Judt, 2005, 
p539). The trades unions had already been identified as 
one of the major ‘obstacles to governability’ (Ryan, 
1998, p61) and Thatcher’s first move to ‘rein in’ their 
power was the full implementation of a much-delayed 1971 
Industrial Relations Act (Blanpain et al, 2007, p360).  
 
Education also came under scrutiny and the legislation 
that obliged local authorities to continue phasing out 
grammar schools in favour of comprehensives was abolished 
(Lowe, 2005, p288). Despite some reduced university 
funding in the wake of the 1970’s oil crisis, many higher 
education institutions were still enjoying the ‘post-
Robbins bonanza’ (Anderson, 2006, p159). Thatcher had 'no 
love for universities' (Stevens, 2004, p38). She thought 
that they had ‘expanded too quickly’, recruited unwisely, 
and were now thoroughly tainted by the ‘ethos of the 
loony left' (Stevens, 2004, p38). It was an impression 
that seemed born out by the behaviour of some university 
students and occasionally staff who adopted political 
causes that discomforted the establishment and involved 
the staging of high profile sit-ins, walk-outs, rallies, 
and protests (Anderson, 2006, p163). These institutions 
had undertaken large publically funded expansion projects 
for an expected rush of students that had ‘failed to 
materialise’ (Murphy, 2000, p13). Robbins had wrongly 
anticipated that grants and inflation would rise 
proportionately; in the event it was only inflation that 
rose, making full time employment a more attractive 
option than full time education (Murphy, 2000, p13).  
Mrs Thatcher ‘despised’ the universities as she found 
them in 1979 (Stevens, 2004, p45). With Keith Joseph she 
was of the opinion that the main purpose of higher 
education to assist the government in achieving ‘economic 
stability’ (Murphy, 2000, p17).  
 
They claimed that the Robbins ‘investment’ had failed to 
generate its promised economic return having instead 
created an ‘unmanageable’ system that was into the 
bargain ‘ruinously expensive’ (Murphy, 2000, pp13-17). 
With expanded universities housing fewer students some 
taxpayers became concerned that their money was doing 
little more than fund a much publicised ‘student 




The alleged ‘moral flabbiness’ of the universities 
(Eccleshall, 1990, p205) was ‘nourished by the right-wing 
press’ (Anderson, 2006, p163) to the extent that it began 
to erode public confidence in higher education (Stevens, 
2004, p45). The universities were set up to appear as 
‘natural targets’ (Anderson, 2006, p163) which the 
Thatcher government could ‘undermine’ with impunity 
(Stevens, 2004, p45). The first ‘sharp effect’ was a four 
hundred million pound reduction in the annual support 
grant and the abolition of subsidised fees for overseas 
students. These measures were to be only a precursor of 
‘further swingeing economies’ to come (Lowe, 2005, p293).  
 
Thatcher was committed to drastic reductions in public 
spending and was ‘bolstered’ through the unpopularity 
caused by these cuts by Keith Joseph (Yergin & Stanislaw, 
1998, p105) and the enthusiastic support of the Institute 
for Economic Affairs, the Centre for Policy Studies and 
the Adam Smith Institute (Jones, 2012, p257). Although 
Thatcher had all the ‘anti-Keynesian’ economic advisers 
she could want (Wasserstein, 2007, p636), Keith Joseph 
was still the ‘forerunner’ (Howe, 1997, p275), the 
politician who had made free market ideology in Britain 
‘intellectually respectable' (Denham & Garnett, 2001, 
p103). Joseph was appointed Secretary of State for 
Industry where his monetarist ideals came to the fore in 
a dramatic plan to divest the government of a wide range 
of state owned industries and local authority housing 
(Denham & Garnett, 2001, p103). 
 
During this first year of the Thatcher administration, a 
variety of monetarist policies ‘directly influenced’ by 
Hayek and Friedman were ‘incrementally’ imposed (Jones, 
2012, p258). Jones argues that the introduction of 
monetarism to the British economy as a condition of the 
Labour government’s IMF loan considerably eased this 
Conservative strategy (Jones, 2012, p262). It allowed 
Thatcher and Joseph to activate a neoliberal philosophy 
that ‘elevated free market competition above all else’ 
(Blanpain et al, 2007, p333). They formulated policies 
that would stimulate British commercial interests to look 
to an international potential that was being shaped by 
the ‘competitive pressures of globalisation’ (Zohlnhöfer, 
2007, p52).  
Awareness of the concept of globalisation had previously 
been restricted to a ‘narrow circle of intellectuals and 
businesspeople’ (Scholte, 1999, p28) but Scholte states 
that during this period it became an identifiable 
‘significant trend’ that analysts began to factor into 




Thatcher’s second year in office 
 
The party that had elected Margaret Thatcher their leader 
was largely comprised of ‘old school’ Conservatives who 
accepted the post-1945 view that government had a 
responsibility to promote ‘full employment and social 
equality’ (Bowles, 2007, p145). By 1980, after five years 
of ‘remodelling’, Thatcher had changed this philosophy to 
more closely coincide with her own; the traditional 
Conservative now appeared a distinct outsider (Anderson, 
2006, p163). In the interests of democracy, ‘dissidents’ 
were tolerated, even within the Cabinet, but were 
marginialised and ‘disparagingly’ referred to as the 
‘wets’ (Jones, 2012, p256). As Thatcher approached her 
second year as Prime Minister, the wets could afford 
certain smugness, her ‘far-reaching transformation' of 
the economy did not seem to be working (Zohlnhöfer, 2007, 
p51). Public spending cuts had allowed reductions in 
direct taxation but indirect taxes and interest rates had 
soared. The economy was being thrown 'into reverse', 
unemployment was rising and Britain’s growth rate was the 
lowest in Europe (Jacobs, 1998, p1520). It was an 
economic climate in which some sectors of society 
suffered genuine hardship and led to opinion polls naming 
Mrs Thatcher as the most unpopular British Prime Minister 
in the history of such polls (Plowright, 2006, p290). 
 
Some Conservative’s were losing their nerve, the 
monetarist approach was apparently failing, the 'wets' 
appealed in vain for a return to traditional economic 
measures. Thatcher treated such pleas with a contempt 
that was observed as either 'implacable resolve' or 
'mulish obstinacy' (Wasserstein, 2007, p638). She made 
the position clear to her detractors at the 1980 
Conservative Party conference, when in an 
uncharacteristically playful speech she offered 'you turn 
if you want to. The lady's not for turning' (Judt, 2005, 
541).  
 
The beginning of 1981 saw the inauguration of Ronald 
Reagan as President of the United States. Promising that 
America would once again ‘stand tall’ in the world, 
Reagan would provide Thatcher with one of her most 
powerful allies (Grenville, 2005, p796). This ‘distinctly 
odd couple’ had struck up a friendship in London some 
years previously; they not only liked each other but also 
held ‘almost identical political views’ (O'Sullivan, 
2008). Although different in temperament, neither Reagan 
nor Thatcher was overly concerned with political subtlety 
and both tended to ‘paint in primary colours’ (Smith, 
1991, p258).  
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Within days of his arrival at the White House, Ronald 
Reagan was enthusiastically launching a neoliberal 
strategy formulated by a council of leading economists in 
which Milton Friedman played a prominent role (Jones, 
2012, p265). Cautious political advisors warned the 
President against becoming closely associated with 
Friedman, monetarism and the unpopular Mrs Thatcher. The 
President ignored the advice and publicly endorsed 
Britain’s monetarist plans declaring that the economic 
programmes of both nations would soon be ‘home safe’ 
(O'Sullivan, 2008). 
 
In Westminster, Keith Joseph was overseeing preparations 
for industrial privatisation while Thatcher orchestrated 
the fight against inflation (Bowles, 2007, p147). Little 
interest was taken in achieving full employment as it was 
no longer seen as a ‘state responsibility’; not having a 
job was beginning to be projected as a ‘personal failing’ 
(Bowles, 2007, p147). It was a stance that offered no 
hope to the long term unemployed whose ranks included 
almost an entire generation of ‘disaffected black youth’. 
In April 1981 their anger was demonstrated during several 
days of serious street rioting (Lawton, 2004, p100). The 
first outbreak in Brixton, South London, was emulated in 
the inner city areas of ‘Liverpool, Birmingham, 
Wolverhampton, Luton and Preston’ (Lawton, 2004, p100). 
The empire was gone and most people thought it ‘best 
forgotten’ but here were the British born offspring of 
‘imperial subjects’ having to struggle for ‘equality and 
recognition’ (Hall & Rose, 2006, p4). The riots prompted 
numerous ‘after empire’ questions and focused attention 
on the ‘emergence of new forms of globalisation’ (Hall & 
Rose, 2006, p4). An inquiry reported that ‘unemployment 
and poor housing’ had sparked the violent disturbances 
and that ‘racial disadvantage' had played a significant 
part (Lawton, 2004, p100). However the inquiry made no 
attempt to link the origins of this disadvantage and its 
attendant unemployment with the precarious economic 
climate that surrounded the government’s ‘monetarist 
experiment’ (Bowles, 2007, p147). 
 
In America, President Reagan was about to face a crisis 
of his own. In line with Friedman’s neoliberalist 
theories, Reagan pushed a law through Congress that 
rewarded his electorate with the ‘largest tax cuts in 
American history’ (Jones, 2012, p266).  
The trades union that represented America’s air traffic 
controllers saw this largesse as an indicator of 
available funds and on August 3rd, took their members out 




Reagan claimed that the controllers had put the public at 
risk by breaching their no-strike agreement and they must 
either return to work or lose their jobs (Jones, 2012, 
p266). The controllers doubted the word of the President 
and announced that the strike would continue. Without 
further hesitation in a ‘truly devastating application of 
executive power’ Reagan fired all eleven thousand of the 
union’s members (Rollins, 2003, p403). The airline 
traffic controllers union was ‘dissolved’ (Engdahl, 2004, 
p183), the strike was defeated and Reagan had signaled 
that he would not tolerate what he considered 
opportunistic industrial action (Jones, 2012, p266). 
Thatcher and her advisors watched this skirmish play out; 
they admired Reagan’s decisive action and ‘drew comfort’ 
from his success (Jones, 2012, p267). 
 
Joseph moves to Education 
 
Keith Joseph was not comfortable as Secretary of State 
for Industry. The office required him to negotiate 
‘financial lifelines’ for shipbuilders, railways and 
motor manufacturers, the very industries that he wanted 
to see in private hands (Biffen, 1994). In 1981, Joseph 
requested that he be transferred to another ministry 
(Denham & Garnett, 2001, p103). Although the full extent 
of his eventual privatisation and deregulation programme 
was ‘still but a political glimmer’, he felt that he had 
completed the preliminaries (Hennessy, 1991, p495) and 
now sought an office that would present problems of a 
more ‘intangible and philosophic’ nature (Biffen, 1994). 
In September Joseph was appointed Secretary of State for 
Education (Denham & Garnett, 2001, p103). He ‘welcomed 
the move’, but academics viewed the prospect ‘warily’ 
(Biffen, 1994). The teaching professions had witnessed a 
succession of ‘lack-lustre’ education ministers 
(Batteson, 1997, p363) and were concerned at the 
appointment of an established political figure and 
‘prophet of the free market’ like Joseph (Stevens, 2004, 
p46). 
 
Joseph and Thatcher considered that universities ‘had 
lost their way’ (Stevens, 2004, p47). Their view was 
based on the belief that funds awarded to higher 
education were intended as an ‘investment in industry’ 
(Ryan, 1998, p15). These institutions were supposed to 
‘transform Britain's economy’ (Anderson, 2006, p165) but 
they returned no substantial ‘dividends’ (Ryan, 1998, 
p15). Thatcher was confident that Joseph could make the 
university authorities aware of their ‘economic goals’ 




The solution suggested by her new Minister of Education 
was a monetarist restructuring of the entire system, a 
new model that would stress ‘economic functionality and 
business methods’ (Anderson, 2006, p165). Joseph’s scheme 
was informed by data adapted by the IEA from generic 
business methods; no ‘knowledge or experience of 
educational administration’ was involved or thought 
necessary (Maclure, 1988, p164).  
 
Following a government statement in which it was alleged 
that higher education was ‘failing the nation’ (Anderson, 
2006, p166), the university authorities were given four 
weeks to cut their budgets by eighteen percent and to 
identify redundant academic posts (Stevens, 2004, p47). 
Joseph believed that state funds were keeping professors 
‘secure in tenured positions’ to do nothing but ‘pure 
research' (Murphy, 2000, p21). Initially three thousand 
of these ‘redundant’ academic posts were identified and 
‘eliminated’ (Stevens, 2004, p47). Joseph ‘invited’ 
government economists to find ways of trimming higher 
education costs still further; he wanted ‘fewer students’ 
and those he wanted in polytechnics rather than 
universities (Stevens, 2004, p48). Where previous higher 
education budgets had been adjusted to suit the 
prevailing economic climate, the cuts imposed by the 
Thatcher administration were driven by ‘internal, 
political and ideological’ motives (Anderson, 2006, 
p169).  
 
An overseas diversion... 
 
Thatcher, ‘single-minded, and impatient of criticism’ 
(Wasserstein, 2007, p636), continued unswervingly in her 
attempts to reduce the power of the state, to reduce the 
status of other traditional institutions and above all to 
reduce the country’s ‘double-digit inflation’ (Jenkins, 
2013, p28). October 1981 brought a party conference that 
was ‘alive with dissent’. Since it was apparent that the 
lady ‘really would not turn’ (Hennessy, 1991, p495), the 
‘wets’ began ‘openly conspiring against her’ (Jenkins, 
2013, p28). Cabinet meetings, at which Thatcher routinely 
allowed only ‘one and a half minutes’ for each of her 
ministers to make their point (Wasserstein, 2007, p636), 
took on a dispirited air. That year’s budget had taken 
the ‘unheard-of action’ of increasing income taxes 
‘during a recession’ (Laybourn, 2002, p216). In its wake 
three Cabinet members had considered resigning but were 
concerned that their protest would further destabilise 
sterling (Lloyd, 1994, p648). Thatcher was losing the 
support of her party and very few Conservatives believed 
that she could win another election (Jenkins, 2013, p28). 
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By 1982, Thatcher trailed badly in the opinion polls 
(Laybourn, 2002, p216) and was widely considered a one-
term premier whose government teetered ‘on the brink of 
collapse’ (Jenkins, 2013, p28). Then came news of a 
diversion. One of the Falkland Islands in the South 
Atlantic had been seized by belligerent Argentinean 
forces (Knight, 2010, p106). The public at large may not 
have been aware of this tiny residue of empire, but it 
had been a long-term problem for the British Foreign 
Office, who were not at all surprised by the ‘invasion’ 
(Jenkins, 2013, p28). The Falkland Islands had once been 
a valuable asset to Britain’s global shipping network, 
providing the most southerly South Atlantic repair and 
coaling station as well as dominating the Cape Horn route 
to the Pacific Ocean (Jackson, 1922, p7). As Britain’s 
international shipping interests declined and the empire 
dissolved, the now ‘valueless’ Falklands (Morgan, 2000, 
p86) had become home to around two thousand British 
citizens and a great many sheep (Knight, 2010, p106). 
British Foreign Office officials had for years been 
struggling to find a mutually acceptable method ‘to 
transfer the islands to Argentina’ (Welch, 1997, p483). 
The sticking point was always the absolute refusal of the 
islanders to accept Argentinean sovereignty (Welch, 1997, 
p484). 
 
Tiring of this, Argentina’s military Junta declared that 
by January 1983, the ‘Malvinas’ islands would be simply 
claimed as Argentine territory (Welch, 1997, p484). When 
Thatcher’s military advisors pressed her to ‘reinforce 
the islands’ she chose to turn a ‘deaf ear’ preferring to 
concentrate on Britain’s economic problems (Jenkins, 
2013, p28). The Argentine campaign started in April 1982 
when military personnel were illegally landed on the 
British island of South Georgia (Welch, 1997, p484). 
Thatcher ordered the only Royal Navy ship in the 
vicinity, the ‘lightly armed’, HMS Endurance to intercede 
(Welch, 1997, p485). In a second operation Argentinean 
forces invaded the largest of the Falkland Islands in a 
‘bloodless touch-an-go’ raid, the object was to seize 
Port Stanley and then quietly leave. The Junta would use 
this as the basis of an appeal to the United Nations for 
recognition of Argentina’s right to the sovereignty of 
these undefended and apparently abandoned islands (Welch, 
1997, p486). However, before the troops had a chance to 
withdraw, President Leopoldo Galtieri became so ‘overcome 
with emotion’ at the adulation of the people hearing the 
news of the successful invasion that he cancelled the 
withdrawal and proclaimed that Argentina would never 




Thatcher had also made a big mistake. She had been aware 
of the Junta’s threat but did nothing to ‘defend the 
islands’ (Jenkins, 2013, p28). When the news of Port 
Stanley’s capture broke, Thatcher knew that her initial 
lack of action could now lead to ‘humiliation and 
possible resignation’ (Jenkins, 2013, p28). The political 
fallout was potentially ‘calamitous’ (Sheridan, 2013). 
Thatcher’s Foreign Secretary and three Foreign Office 
officials immediately resigned, admitting that they had 
failed to foresee the implications of Argentina’s 
intentions (Johnson, 1991, p750). Thatcher bypassed all 
of her military advisors and met immediately with the 
First Sea Lord. A ‘lifeline’ was provided; all available 
naval resources would be  committed to ‘recapture the 
islands’. In just two days a task force was assembled and 
put to sea (Jenkins, 2013, p28). The Argentinean 
government were not only ‘unprepared’ for Britain’s 
vigorous military response but also for a United Nations 
demand for a withdrawal of their troops (Norpoth, 1991, 
p36). Expectations of diplomatic intervention from 
President Ronald Reagan left the Junta equally 
disappointed (Welch, 1997, p488). The United States 
Congress opposed the war but supported their President. 
Through Reagan, Thatcher was able to prevent the Junta 
from receiving American military supplies (O'Sullivan, 
2008) while ensuring that American fuel, weapons, food 
and even an aircraft carrier were on standby in case the 
task force met with difficulty (Jenkins, 2013, p28). 
Although diplomatic channels remained open, Galtieri’s 
refusal to order a ‘retreat from the Falklands’ (Norpoth, 
1991, p36), and Thatcher’s certain knowledge that ‘only 
total victory’ would save her political career, meant 
that the chance of avoiding a military clash was very 
thin indeed (Jenkins, 2013, p28). 
 
Both countries were propelled by circumstance, a ‘tragi-
comic war' over a handful of barren rocky islands that no 
longer offered any strategic or material gain  
(Wasserstein, 2007, p638). The situation was later 
described by Argentinean writer, Jorge Luis Borges as a 
‘fight between two bald men over a comb’ (Borges, 1983). 
The fighting when it came was short, sharp and bloody.  
The Argentineans surrendered on June 14th (Laybourn, 
2002, p216). Mrs Thatcher took a huge political and 
military gamble because she ‘had no option’ (Jenkins, 
2013, p28). Her approval rating as Prime Minister before 
the Falkland’s invasion was abysmal (Norpoth, 1991, p29), 
while afterward it was higher than it had ever been 
(Norpoth, 1991, p40). The conflict appears to have been 
‘immensely popular’ with the British public who took 
pride in their forces triumph over ‘dictatorship’ 
(Morgan, 2000, p86).  
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Overseas military victory had ‘not lost its wallop’, even 
while the country was deep in economic recession and with 
unemployment figures approaching three million (Norpoth, 
1991, p29). Thatcher’s Conservative administration had 
been snatched from disaster, she personally achieving her 
highest approval rating as well as ‘global celebrity’ 
(Jenkins, 2013, p28). 
 
Thatcher’s second term in office 
 
Not only was Thatcher ‘buoyed’ by this newfound status 
(Judt, 2005, 546) but her political policies also 
appeared vindicated when, at the beginning of 1983, the 
economy began to show signs of a ‘modest’ recovery 
(Carreras, 2006, p325). The closure of inefficient 
industries, the ‘muffling of the unions’ and increased 
competition was contributing to a rise in ‘business 
productivity and profits’ (Judt, 2005, 542). Inflation, 
which in the late 1970’s had risen as high as twenty one 
percent, had been reduced to around four percent by 1983 
(Laybourn, 2002, p216). These economic improvements 
combined with the Falklands ‘khaki factor’ greatly 
strengthened the Conservative position as they approached 
the 1983 general election (Porter, 2004, p304). Thatcher 
having ‘wrapped herself in the flag’ (Jenkins, 2013, 
p28), campaigned as if her Conservatives had a ‘monopoly 
upon patriotism' (Judt, 2005, 546).  
 
The Labour Party had become angered and divided by the 
advent of Thatcherism; the split had allowed their 
‘increasingly leftwing’ National Executive Committee to 
take control of both policy and the 1983 Labour Manifesto 
(Laybourn, 2002, p106). They called for Britain’s 
withdrawal from the EEC, a return to full employment, 
more social benefits, the repeal of trades union controls 
and nuclear disarmament (Grenville, 2005, p855; Laybourn, 
2002, p107). After the count the Labour Party was found 
to have ‘lost over three million voters’. This translated 
into the loss of one hundred and sixty seats and a ‘near 
record’ win for the Conservatives (Judt, 2005, 546).  
 
Labour Party supporters attributed Thatcher’s victory to 
the ‘Falklands factor’ (Grenville, 2005, p855) although 
many in the Parliamentary Labour Party saw their own 
unguardedly leftwing manifesto as unwise and unrealistic, 
a virtual ‘suicide note’ (Laybourn, 2002, p104). Margaret 
Thatcher was indeed ‘fortunate in her enemies’ (Judt, 






As the Falklands ‘jingoism’ faded, the attention of the 
British public was returned to continuing industrial 
strife, ‘economic decline, and social discontent’ 
(Morgan, 2000, p87). The universities continued to 
struggle with administrative philosophies better suited 
to ‘industry and commerce' (Ryan, 1998, p23). Some Vice-
Chancellors attempted a show of principled resistance 
(Anderson, 2006, p170) but stepped swiftly back into line 
when the government ‘threatened’ that uncooperative 
universities ‘would be demoted to polytechnics’ (Stevens, 
2004, p53). The Committee of Vice-Chancellors and 
Principals became so eager to show compliance that in 
April of the following year they volunteered to have 
their efficiency measures inspected (Walford, 1988, p55). 
The government agreed and set up an investigation under 
Sir Alexander Jarratt, a successful businessman, who had 
just been appointed Chancellor of the University of 
Birmingham (Anderson, 2006, p170). The Vice-Chancellors 
and Principals hoped that the exercise would show British 
higher education to be such good 'value for money' that 
no further funding cuts would be required (Walford, 1988, 
p55). Their optimism was to prove misplaced when all the 
enthusiastic cooperation was turned into ‘something of an 




Thatcher’s political observers and advisors kept a close 
eye on the National Union of Mineworkers; they had 
brought down the Heath government and were expected to 
eventually attempt to repeat the episode (Sheridan, 
2013). The catalyst was to be ‘Thatcher devotee’, Ian 
MacGregor, who became chairman of the National Coal Board 
in March 1983 (Wasserstein, 2007, p637). He had moved 
from British Steel where his relentless drive for 
efficiency had increased profitability while reducing the 
workforce by over fifty percent (Dibblin, 1985, p110). 
MacGregor soon began ‘rationalising’ the coalmines, again 
by laying off workers and notifying unprofitable pits to 
prepare for closure (Dibblin, 1985, p110). The NUM, led 
by the ‘articulate but politically inept’ Arthur 
Scargill, called the colliery workers out on strike in 
March 1984 (Wasserstein, 2007, p637).  
 
The NUM membership downed tools and walked out to save 
the threatened collieries and the communities that relied 
upon them. However, Plowright argues that the NUM’s 
’militant leadership’ wanted nothing less than to ‘topple 
Mrs Thatcher’ (Plowright, 2006, p291). Times had changed; 
the energy industry was no longer solely dependant on 
coal. Power stations ran on oil or gas and some used 
nuclear fuel.  
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Those that did burn coal had amassed vast stockpiles. 
Regardless of how long the miners chose to remain on 
strike there would be no shortage of electricity 
(Dibblin, 1985, p108). Thatcher denounced those miners 
who believed that they were entitled to a well-paid job 
regardless of demand; it was, she said, contrary to the 
‘requirements of market forces’ (Beynon et al, 1999, pp5-
6). Her administration wanted to bring the NUM ‘to its 
knees’ and Thatcher took up the challenge as if it were 
an extension of the Falklands war (Dibblin, 1985, p109). 
Public sympathy for the NUM was eroded by Scargill’s 
apparently undemocratic refusal to ballot his members 
(Plowright, 2006, p291) and by the revelation that an NUM 
official had made a ‘foolish trip’ to Libya seeking 
financial support from the decidely anti-British Colonel 
Muammar Gaddafi (Dibblin, 1985, p111). 
 
Despite various coal board inducements and a severe NUM 
leadership split, the bulk of the miners refused to 
return to work (Dibblin, 1985, p111). Increasingly 
violent clashes between police and strikers at 
demonstrations and colliery blockades created a palpable 
‘atmosphere of class warfare’ (Wasserstein, 2007, p637). 
Public opinion was divided between those who would ‘see 
the unions humbled’ at ‘any price’ (Weir, 1990, p8) and 
those who sympathised with those communities that faced a 
bleak future without a coal pit (Beynon et al, 1999, p6). 
This ‘test of strength’ went on for almost a year before 
real poverty began driving ever-greater numbers of miners 
back to work (Wasserstein, 2007, p637). In March 1985, 
the NUM ‘capitulated’ without gaining any agreement or 
even the offer of an agreement (Plowright, 2006, p291). 
With the strikers ‘brought decisively to heel’ the Coal 
Board was able to close unprofitable collieries and 
transform the remainder into ‘high-yield, low-cost’ 
production lines (Wasserstein, 2007, p637). Thatcher was 
satisfied with the outcome, she knew that ‘breaking the 
miners’ was an important step in the containment of the 
trades union movement (Dibblin, 1985, p109).  
 
An honour withheld... 
 
Conversely Thatcher was less happy with the outcome of a 
vote taken at a meeting of the Oxford University 
Congregation earlier that year (Hilton, 2013). Initially 
the Oxford University Gazette had announced that Margaret 
Thatcher, Oxford alumni, was to be awarded an honorary 
doctorate of civil law, as had all post-war Oxonian Prime 





Two hundred and seventy five ‘furious dons’ issued a 
joint statement demanding that the doctorate should not 
be conferred on a Prime Minister whose government had 
such ‘done deep and systematic damage to the whole public 
education system’ (Young, 1989, p8). Over five thousand 
students signed a petition objecting to the honour and 
seventy percent of the university Congregation voted 
against the proposal (Sheridan, 2013). The honour was 
withheld and a statement afterward explained that 
awarding Mrs Thatcher the doctorate would be to ‘ignore 
the effects of her policies’ and would constitute a 
‘bitter blow for everyone in public education’ (Hilton, 
2013).  
 
Three months later the Jarratt Committee on Higher 
Education published its report. If any of its readers 
expected the slightest echo of the views of Thomas Arnold 
and Cardinal Newman their hopes were soon dashed. 
Jarrett’s conclusions were based on the statistical 
interpretations and opinions of ‘management consultants’; 
his committee had measured the efficiency of the higher 
education system as it would a ‘commercial or 
manufacturing organisation’ (Walford, 1988, p56). Ryan 
argues than Jarratt was not seeking to improve, but to 
impose the ‘prevalent Tory style’ (Ryan, 1998, p23). 
Jarratt’s committee acknowledged the ‘outstanding 
contribution’ of the universities to the ‘quality of 
national life’ (Stevens, 2004, p56) before recommending 
that they become more 'business-like' with recognisable 
‘management structures’ and chains of command (Walford, 
1988, p56). Staff management, they suggested could be 
improved by the introduction of ‘performance indicators, 
staff development, appraisal and accountability’ 
(Walford, 1988, p56).  
 
In late 1984 Keith Joseph announced that to trim the 
education budget still further he intended to disqualify 
university students with wealthy parents from gaining fee 
and maintenance grants by lowering the means test 
thresholds (Stevens, 2004, p50). The prospect of a 
government minister deliberately targeting ‘Middle 
England’ had Conservative backbenchers denouncing Joseph 
as a ‘secret socialist' (Stevens, 2004, p50).  
When Thatcher, who had initially supported the proposal, 
learned of the outcry she withdrew immediately ‘claiming 
that she had not been properly briefed’ (Stevens, 2004, 
p51). This further undermined Joseph’s credibility within 
the Cabinet where many suspected that he remained only 
because of his ‘loyalty to Margaret’ (Stevens, 2004, 




Despite her post-Falklands enthusiasm for Britain’s 
imperial past she was busily supporting her ministers in 
their efforts to shed Britain’s last ‘substantial’ 
overseas territory (Porter, 2004, p297).  
 
A second overseas diversion...  
 
The British had extorted Hong Kong as a ‘gift’ from a 
militarily overmatched Chinese Emperor in 1842 (Bowles, 
2007, p53). Expanding businesses soon required a larger 
harbour so in 1898, a ninety-nine year lease was arranged 
to add the adjoining ‘New Territories’ to Hong Kong 
island (Grenville, 2005, p656). This addition so greatly 
extended the area under British administrative control 
that the 1997 expiry of its lease risked leaving the 
relatively small Hong Kong Island economically and 
culturally isolated. The British Foreign Office began to 
explore the possibility of including Hong Kong in the 
arrangements for the expiration of the New Territories 
lease (Galikowski & Min, 1997, p3). The British 
government wanted to leave Hong Kong with an ‘elected 
legislature’, but any suggestion of democracy was an 
‘anathema to Beijing’ (Grenville, 2005, p657). The ‘one 
country, two systems’ compromise was eventually reached, 
whereby the Chinese government would allow the 
‘capitalist system’ to continue within the previously 
leased area for a period of fifty years (Galikowski & 
Min, 1997, p3). In December 1984, Margaret Thatcher and 
the Chinese Premier signed the declaration that created 
the Hong Kong ‘Special Administrative Region of the 
People’s Republic’ (Grenville, 2005, p621). Although the 
British public showed little interest the event was 
widely reported in imperial terms, Britain’s 
‘irreversible retreat’ (Morgan, 2000, p85), or the moment 
at which the empire ‘finally fell’ (Porter, 2004, p297).  
 
That the agreement with China came just months after the 
successful conclusion of the Falklands conflict 
contributed greatly to Mrs Thatcher’s internationally 
‘significant’ status (Sheridan, 2013). However, Smith 
argues that she could not have convincingly ‘cut the same 
figure’ without the friendship of Ronald Reagan (Smith, 
1991, p263). The American president was ‘inspired’ by her 
prompt action to regain the Falklands; it was a response 
which served to remind America of its role as the world’s 
‘leading democracy and defender of the rule of law’ 
(Johnson, 1991, pp749-751). Despite the obvious 
‘disparity in power’ between their two countries, Johnson 
states that Reagan considered Thatcher something of a 
’mentor’, her friendship was genuinely important to him 
(Johnson, 1991, p750).  
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Whereas Thatcher was aware that Reagan was ‘comfortable 
in the exercise of power’ and could only envy the 
apparently effortless manner in which he projected ‘his 
charm across a nation’ (Smith, 1991, p261). To the dismay 
of political subordinates on both sides of the Atlantic, 
the President and the Prime Minister were comfortably 
ensconced in a ‘mutual admiration society of two’ 
(Johnson, 1991, p749). 
 
The neoliberal principles of this ‘Anglo-American’ 
partnership ‘spearheaded’ (Bowles, 2007, p145) a 
‘reorientation of capitalism’ in which the more 
‘compassionate elements’ of society were displaced by a 
necessity for greater profits and efficiency  (Falk, 
2003, p281). That prestigious leaders like Reagan and 
Thatcher fostered free markets as an ‘international 
movement’ gave credence to monetarist economic theories 
which appeared to be increasing the prosperity of most 
people ‘for most of the time’ (Smith, 1991, p259). The 
neoliberalist view that productivity thrives in 
competitive free markets unhindered by the state was 
beginning to pay dividends (Bowles, 2007, p146) This 
optimism was reinforced in January 1986 when Saudi Arabia 
defied OPEC, deciding to increase production and sell oil 
independently on the world market (Carreras, 2006, p325) 
Other OPEC countries followed suit, the ‘price of crude 
oil plummeted’ greatly benefitting the economies of 
Western Europe  (Carreras, 2006, p325). This improving 
economic climate triggered Thatcher and Joseph’s long 
planned ‘national auction’ of publically owned utilities; 
water, gas, electricity, telephones as well as road, rail 
and air transport were prepared for privatisation (Judt, 
2005, 542).  
 
Privatisation: Joseph’s last bow 
 
When industries that had previously been nationalised 
were sold to private owners they often came with 
inefficient or technologically outmoded processes, these 
were quickly jettisoned along with their associated 
workers. Unemployment peaked in 1986, at three point 
three million. Despite a variety of ‘back to work’ 
schemes and nineteen changes to the way that unemployment 
figures were calculated, it was a total that would remain 
the highest in Europe for the rest of Thatcher’s term in 
office (Jacobs, 1998, p1520). Bowles argues that the 
government’s dismantling of the public sector was in line 
with monetarist thinking and was intended to ‘restore 
profitability’ to all sections of the economy (Bowles, 




When British markets began to show signs of slow but 
steady economic growth, Reagan’s economists advised that 
America’s neoliberal ‘experiments’ could be extended 
(Denham & Garnett, 2001, p104). Spring argues that the 
theories had been proved; it was a ‘triumph’ for 
‘Hayekian economics and conservative think tanks’ 
(Spring, 1998, p126). 
 
Keith Joseph had every reason to be satisfied. Once 
considered a ‘loose cannon’ (Denham & Garnett, 2001, p99) 
he had become the government’s ‘policy supremo’ (Biffen, 
1994) and his neoliberal philosophy was slowly winning 
the ‘soul of the Conservative Party’ (Eccleshall, 1990, 
p213). As Secretary of State for Industry he had prepared 
the way for a strategic ‘pruning’ that would create a 
more ‘market-oriented’ public sector (Eccleshall, 1990, 
p215). Although he felt more comfortable as Secretary of 
State for Education, here his ideas were less well 
received. His term in office was marked by allegedly 
‘hare-brained schemes’ such as education vouchers and 
students loans, he fought a long and acrimonious battle 
over teacher’s pay and later used Jarrett’s 
recommendations to saddle higher education with 
managerial methods many thought ‘more appropriate to a 
chocolate factory’ (Eccleshall, 1990, p235). The lack of 
Cabinet support that led to the enforced abandonment of 
his plan for parental contributions to university tuition 
fees left an ‘indelible mark’ (Biffen, 1994). Joseph had 
long suffered ill health, ‘his reputation was low’ and he 
was weary of political battling. He resigned from the 
Cabinet in May 1986 (Denham & Garnett, 2001, p103) and 
did not stand for re-election. Joseph had never promoted 
himself as the ‘main architect’ of Thatcherism but he was 
a ‘key figure’ (Denham & Garnett, 2001, p104).  Together 
with think tank colleagues he had fostered the 
‘intellectual climate’ that allowed Thatcherism to 
flourish (Rubinstein, 1994, p76).  
 
Joseph had ‘created the package’ (Yergin & Stanislaw, 
1998, p92) but aware of his own ‘flaws as a politician’ 
he required Margaret Thatcher to deliver it (Eccleshall, 
1990, p234). The man whose epithets ranged from the 
‘minister of thought’ (Yergin & Stanislaw, 1998, p95), to 
the ‘mad monk' (Stevens, 2004, p47) and who once referred 
to himself as a ‘convenient madman’ (Denham & Garnett, 






The ‘Big Bang’ 
 
Joseph and Thatcher had considered the mid-nineteenth 
century to have been the commercial pinnacle of Britain’s 
international ‘entrepreneurial success’ (Eccleshall, 
1990, p211). Thatcher often urged a return to the ‘self-
reliance, thrift and discipline’ of that Victorian era 
(Eccleshall, 1990, p205). Anderson argues that Thatcher’s 
frequent allusions to 'Victorian values' were 
‘historically shallow’ as her ‘values’ were derived from 
modern economic liberalism (Anderson, 2006, p164). The 
policies that were driving Britain’s steady economic 
improvement were underpinned by revenues from North Sea 
oil and the sale of ‘nationalised industries’ 
(Wasserstein, 2007, p638). A sense of growing affluence, 
particularly in England’s southern counties, was born out 
by the rise in numbers of people who not only owned their 
own home but also held company shares (Morgan, 2000, 
p89). The newly privatised utilities and industrial 
companies often awarded shares to employees and sold the 
balance through well publicised share issues. These 
transactions were handled by Britain’s already successful 
financial services sector (Morgan, 2000, p88). Free 
marketeers claimed that the ‘entrepreneurial zeal’ of 
those in the business of money management, stock-broking 
and merchant banking could be better used if it were not 
restricted by bureaucratic regulations. They wanted 
deregulation to release the ‘genius of the market’ 
(Sachs, 2012, p61). 
 
Thatcher’s economists agreed. They advised that a 
deregulation of financial services would benefit the 
government’s privatisation programme as well as 
stimulating an international market for commercial 
finance (Clarke & Clegg, 1999, p18). Arrangements were 
made for the City of London’s investment bankers and 
stockbrokers to be ‘emancipated’ on 27th October 1986; 
the expectation of an immediate transaction explosion 
caused the event to be dubbed the 'Big Bang' (Judt, 2005, 
544).  It was a doubly transformative measure; as 
Britain's financial markets deregulated, its Stock 
Exchange dealers moved their business onto a ‘highly 
sophisticated computer-based network’ (Morgan, 2000, 
p88). This telecommunications breakthrough promised an 
unprecedented integration of the financial markets, ‘time 
and space collapsed’ and financial transactions could be 
‘virtually instantaneous’ (Clarke & Clegg, 1999, p19). It 
was a ‘true economic revolution’ that would permit an 
expanding internationalised market without the hindrance 




London was already a leading financial centre but, after 
deregulation, the level of its overseas business ‘began 
to develop extraordinarily quickly’ (Osterhammel & 
Petersson, 2005, p143). To maintain a stake in 
international finance, foreign governments had little 
choice but to follow suit and with remarkable rapidity  
London’s deregulation was ‘imitated by stock exchanges 
worldwide’ (Carreras, 2006, p325). National governments 
‘abandoned’ the restrictive laws and conventions that had 
kept financial transactions local and unleashed the 
‘liberalisation of new geographical markets’ (Clarke & 
Clegg, 1999, p18).  
 
London’s foreign-exchange business soon exceeded that of 
New York (Wasserstein, 2007, p638). This prompted 
President Reagan, who wholeheartedly supported Thatcher's 
privatisation and deregulation strategy, to accelerate 
his own plans to relax the laws that prevented 
transference of ‘economic power from the state into 
private hands’ (Smith, 1991, p258). In deregulating the 
American financial services industry, the Reagan 
administration also swept away many of the safeguards 
imposed after the Great Depression designed to ‘curb 
fraud and excessive leveraging of risk’ (Sachs, 2012, 
p62). As had been predicted, the deregulation of the 
international financial sector was followed by a 'rapid 
expansion' of 'international trade and finance' 
(Osterhammel & Petersson, 2005, p143). Large 
multinational corporations were transformed into even 
larger 'global transnational’s' in a relatively short 
burst of 'spontaneous economic globalization' 
(Osterhammel & Petersson, 2005, p143). Clarke and Clegg 
state that during this period ‘financial engineering’ was 
recognised as an ‘important art form’ albeit a process 
that could facilitate ‘unprecedented financial dangers’ 
(Clarke & Clegg, 1999, pp18-19). 
 
Despite criticisms that the Thatcher administration was 
‘selling off the family silver’ only to add a little 
short-term glitter to the exchequer, the privatisation 
programme was doggedly continued (Hall, 2012, p16). 
Privatisation did generate substantial financial returns 
but the strategy was fundamentally ideological; the 
‘wasteful, inefficient and unproductive’ public sector 
was being replaced by a competitive free market in which 
companies would have to be ‘efficient, effective and 
responsive’ (Walford, 1988, p49). Paradoxically, as the 
state shed publically owned industrial and commercial 
enterprises, its control of the universities became 




Exit the UGC 
 
The University Grants Committee was directed to reduce 
further the funds awarded to those universities with the 
lowest number of graduates in full time employment. Out 
of either deference or defiance, the UGC effectively 
signed its own ‘death warrant’ by doing exactly the 
reverse. Reductions of up to forty percent were imposed 
on some very successful universities, while Oxbridge, 
with a much less ‘impressive graduate employment 
statistics’, escaped with only a five percent cut (Lowe, 
2005, p293). At a stroke the UGC lost the support of its 
‘political masters' (Anderson, 2006, p169) and the 
confidence of the universities (Scott, 1995, p18). The 
Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals were 
sufficiently vexed with the UGC that they commissioned an 
inquiry into its inner workings, the findings of which 
were published in February 1987 (Walford, 1988, p56).  
 
The report was mildly ‘managerial’ and recommended that 
the existing arrangements for block grants should remain 
(Stevens, 2004, p59) but that the University Grants 
Committee be renamed the University Grants Council and 
its membership adjusted to half academics and half 
professional managers (Walford, 1988, p56). The 
government dismissed the recommendations as mere 
‘constitutional tinkering’ (Scott, 1995, p19); they were 
looking for ‘deeper changes’ as later announced in the 
White Paper of April 1987 (Walford, 1988, p57). The UGC 
would be replaced by the University Funding Council 
(UFC), a body that would be ‘directly accountable to 
ministers’ and would involve few academics (Stevens, 
2004, p56). The notion of any kind of grant, block or 
otherwise, was to be abolished. Instead the universities 
would be contracted and paid by the government as 
suppliers of teaching and research services (Walford, 
1988, p59). Each higher education institution would be 
treated as one of a number of suppliers and would have to 
compete in an ‘open market’ for students and for 
commercial buyers of their research services (Walford, 
1988, p47).  
 
Although the House of Lords insisted on amendments to 
this legislation, it still left the government in the 
position of a powerful buyer able to pressure its 
suppliers to provide ever greater quality at an ever 






Thatcher’s third election victory 
 
Despite some apparently unpopular policies, Thatcher 
gained and retained enough support to comfortably win the 
general election of June 1987 (Plowright, 2006, p291). 
Conservative campaign managers had presented Thatcher as 
serious international figure, an image greatly helped by 
the Soviet’s ‘Iron Lady’ sobriquet, her genuinely 
‘special relationship’ with President Reagan (Plowright, 
2006, p291) and the signing of a channel tunnel agreement 
with France (Morgan, 2000, p85). She was returned to 
Downing Street as Britain’s longest-serving twentieth 
century Prime Minister and the only one to win three 
consecutive terms. She was in an ‘almost unassailable 
position’ (Laybourn, 2002, p218). The economy was 
improving; there was less ‘anti-Europeanism’ among voters 
as the EEC appeared to be producing ‘economic benefits’  
(Morgan, 2000, p85). Incidents of industrial unrest were 
less frequent following a ‘substantial decline’ in both 
the power and the membership of trades unions (Blanpain 
et al, 2007, p360). Next on the ‘Thatcher agenda’ was the 
welfare state or the 'dependency culture' as her 
administration were encouraged to think of it (Hennessy, 
1991, p496). She denigrated the system as having deprived 
its beneficiaries of ‘individual responsibility’; a 
situation she claimed that could ‘do nothing but harm’ 
(Spring, 1998, p128). Hennessy argues that having 
‘disposed of Keynes’ she was now ‘determined to see off 
Beveridge’ (Hennessy, 1991, p496). Hayek’s free market 
ideology recommends ‘eliminating the welfare state’ 
(Spring, 1998, p122) as a method of promoting the 
‘individual responsibility and self-reliance’ considered 
necessary for the establishment of an ‘age of global 
neoliberalism’ (Kurasawa, 2007, p127).  
 
Judt argues that the privatisation of many ‘publically 
owned industries’ was a good thing. These enterprises had 
been protected from competition and consumer complaints, 
they lacked the investment to modernise and their 
managers were often ‘hamstrung by bureaucratic inertia 
and political meddling’ (Judt, 2005, 543). However, the 
combination of privatisation, the ‘individualist ethic’ 
and the improving economy caused a societal ‘meltdown’ by 
transforming citizens into either ‘shareholders or 
stakeholders' (Judt, 2005, 543). Thatcher’s policies 
often ‘jarred’ with the views of other European leaders 
but in international economic terms it was difficult to 
deny her success. By 1988 many of those leaders ‘found 
themselves forced’ to keep pace with the British and 
American economic recovery by adopting similar polices 
(Wasserstein, 2007, p640).  
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Most western European country’s ‘succumbed in some 
degree’ to the promotion of a neoliberal free market. 
Only geography dictated whether this ‘ascendant social 
philosophy’ was identified as ‘Thatcherism’ or 
‘Reaganomics’ (Wasserstein, 2007, p640). The commentaries 
on this spread of a recognised unifying economic 
ideology, which initially appeared in business and 
economic journals, created the beginnings of a ‘boom in 
globalization literature’ (Lang, 2006, 930).  
 
Lowe states that the ‘grand climax’ of Thatcher’s plan 
for education was laid out in the 1988 Education Reform 
Act. In its stated intention to go ‘further in education 
than ever before’, the bill introduced league tables 
which compelled schools to compete for the student 
numbers on which their funding depended (Lowe, 2005, 
p289). The market environment was intended to stimulate 
healthy competition with ‘inefficient’ schools becoming 
unpopular, then starved of funds and eventually forced to 
close (Davies, 1999, p5). Schools were thrown into 
'institutional survival' mode by this imposition of the 
'invisible hand' of market forces, a combination 
described by Ball as 'Adam Smith meets Walt Disney' 
(Ball, 1995, pp105-107). The requirement to publish 
academic performance results became a 'promotional 
opportunity' (Symes, 1998, p135) as schools vied with 
each other to gain the confidence of parents or proclaim 
their 'status' in glossy school advertising and 
prospectuses (Symes, 1998, p134). Symes argues that the 
appearance of ‘Good School Guides’ indicated the degree 
to which education became commodified (Symes, 1998, 
p139). School management teams and students alike found 
boundaries increasingly blurred by an 'uneven convergence 
of education, advertising and entertainment' (Kenway & 
Fitzclarence, 1999, p300). In America particularly, large 
corporations recognised the advantage in sponsoring 
school and college programmes that built product 
familiarity, this generosity created research chairs 
associated with corporate endowments from Taco Bell, 
Lego, K-Mart and Yahoo (Klein, 2000, p101). In Britain 
universities looked to ‘chief executives' for  
‘functionality’ and ‘accountability’ reports while their 
researchers spent more time looking back over their 
‘shoulder than peering into the unknown’ (Ryan, 1998, 
p5).  
 
Winston argues that education managers were required to 
strive for academic excellence while improving the 
ranking of institutions whose status was increasingly 




When Margaret Thatcher insistently promoted education as 
‘one of the keys to national recovery’, she 
simultaneously evoked an imperial past where higher 
education ‘transmitted high culture to the future leaders 
of society’ (Lowe, 2005, p290). And yet, as Steven's 
states, Thatcher had quite deliberately set out to 
‘destroy the Newman view of the university’ (Stevens, 
2004, p62). Walford argues that once it had been proved 
that run down publically owned utilities could be 
revitalised by privatisation, the government applied the 
policy as ‘widely as possible’ (Walford, 1988, p62). 
However, forcing higher education institutions into an 
‘industrial and commercial’ mould seriously undermined 
their mission to supply society with ‘responsible but not 
uncritical citizens’ (Walford, 1988, pp61-62). Although 
the polytechnics were subject to similarly ‘tight 
controls’, they were to some extent sheltered by their 
‘track record’ for producing ‘useful’ graduates (Lowe, 
2005, p293). By 1989, half the students in full time 
higher education were attending the already overcrowded 
polytechnics (Stevens, 2004, p62). Even ministers had to 
admit that the polytechnics provided ‘mass cultivation on 
the cheap’; large numbers of students were being ‘herded 
into ever expanding institutions to graze, untutored, on 
ever thinner pastures’ (Stevens, 2004, p52). Walford 
states that this treatment of higher education reveals no 
discernable benefits; academics, students, employers and 
taxpayers ‘all appear to lose in the end’ (Walford, 1988, 
p61). 
 
The ‘energy, optimism and generous vision’ of the Robbins 
era had disappeared along with many traditional ‘liberal 
humanist principles’ (Anderson, 2006, p160). Although 
Thatcher’s policies were largely responsible, some 
considered Robbins to have played a part. His 
recommendations had expanded an ‘historic’ university 
system, which was no longer viable, at a cost which was 
‘ultimately unsustainable’ (Anderson, 2006, p160). Higher 
education’s ‘cultural capital’ had become ‘political 
capital’ and was now measured only by its 'fitness for 
purpose' (Ryan, 1998, p5). By the end of the 1980’s, the 
massification of Britain’s universities had been brought 
within the nations economic grasp but the student 
experience and ultimate purpose of higher education had 
been ‘irreversibly transformed’ (Lowe, 2005, p293).  
 
Ryan argues that the policy of identifying the 
universities with an economic, rather than cultural role 
has caused British society a considerable intellectual 




It was a loss that was the ‘ironic outcome’ of a long 
process that had started with minimal funding at the 
beginning of the twentieth century and finished with 
maximum state intervention at the end (Lowe, 2005, p293). 
 
Lowe comments on the almost ‘quasi-religious’ way in 
which many of Thatcher’s ‘pronouncements on education’ 
evoked a specific set of ‘beliefs and attitudes’ (Lowe, 
2005, p290). Central to those beliefs was the insistence 
that state schools should promote Christianity as the 
‘basis of capitalism’ (Spring, 1998, p129). Thatcher 
maintained that Christian values were an ‘essential’ 
element of the free market whose very existence fulfilled 
a ‘responsibility to God to create wealth’ (Spring, 1998, 
p128). More judicious exponents of neoliberalism avoided 
such pronouncements, preferring the clear-cut directness 
of a doctrine that supported ‘entrepreneurial activity’ 
while being ‘radically opposed to communism’ (Harvey, 
2003, p157). 
 
Thatcher, Reagan and Gorbachev  
 
Thatcher’s ‘strong anti-communist sentiment’ was based 
both on its denial of God and its obstruction to an 
international free market (Lowe, 2005, p290). However 
neither reason prevented her from liaising closely with 
Mikhail Gorbachev when he became the President of the 
Soviet Union. The British Foreign Office had informed 
Thatcher of his ‘potential’ as a liberalising leader in 
1984, well before his ‘rise to power’. It was an 
association of which, she was to make ‘sustained and 
substantial use’ (Hennessy, 1991, p496), including the 
later claim to have ‘discovered’ the pliant Soviet 
Premier (Sheridan, 2013). 
 
Predictions of Gorbachev’s unorthodoxy were born out by a 
series of ‘ideas and policies’ that were ‘glaringly’ 
different from those of his predecessors (Kalashnikov, 
2011, p76). Gorbachev was a ‘committed communist’ and his 
motive was to save the Soviet system from an impending 
economic disaster (Stoner-Weiss & McFaul, 2009, p8). The 
USSR’s financial crisis had caused enough genuine 
hardship to shake the faith of the Russian people. 
Gorbachev was convinced that catastrophe could only be 
avoided by ending the ruinously expensive cold war and 
deregulating the wasteful Soviet planning system 
(Kalashnikov, 2011, p77).  
 
This new regime sought both a more efficient and a ‘more 




Gorbachev gave economists and politicians the freedom to 
express their ideas, he lifted the heavy restrictions 
under which the Soviet media operated and foreign trade 
was ‘partially’ liberated by allowing a ‘select number of 
enterprises’ to operate outside of the USSR (Stoner-Weiss 
& McFaul, 2009, p8). 
 
Thatcher was cautiously supportive during her Moscow 
visit of March 1987 (Sheridan, 2013) and no doubt offered 
advice on Soviet Russia’s first ever ‘local multi-
candidate elections’ which were to take place three 
months later (Kalashnikov, 2011, p77). Gorbachev accepted 
Thatcher’s political input as it provided a counter to 
the ‘staunch anticommunist' position adopted by Ronald 
Reagan, who had taken office demanding a ‘much tougher 
stance’ be taken toward the ‘evil empire’ (Dockrill, 
2007, p309). During his first term, US defence budgets 
were annually increased by twenty five percent, and 
funding was poured into ‘strategic modernisation’ that 
exploited the ‘profound Soviet weakness’ in highly 
advanced technologies (Stoner-Weiss & McFaul, 2009, p18). 
Central to these plans was the Strategic Defence 
Initiative, a network of heavily armed space stations 
equipped to detect and destroy any missile launched 
against America before it could reach its target 
(Dockrill, 2007, p309). This so called ‘Star Wars’ system 
tipped the balance. It forced the USSR to spend more of 
its ‘dwindling resources’ on the development of 
‘expensive weapons’. But the Kremlin could only afford to 
extend its defence budget by eight percent and were 
forced to admit that they simply ‘could not keep up with 
US spending’ (Stoner-Weiss & McFaul, 2009, p18). This was 
good news for Reagan who had partly justified his 
military spending increase as a manoeuvre intended ‘to 
push the Soviet regime into bankruptcy’ (Stoner-Weiss & 
McFaul, 2009, p2). 
 
Soviet Russia’s late 1980’s participation in arms 
limitation talks with America produced positive results 
(Lawton, 2004, p99). This was welcomed by the rest of 
world as any thawing of the Cold War would reduce the 
number of nuclear weapons held by the ‘superpowers’ 
(Dockrill, 2007, p309). Gorbachev understood that a 
reduction in ‘East–West tensions’ would alleviate many of 
his country’s problems (Dockrill, 2007, p310) and he 
wanted to extend the arms reduction talks until 
negotiations ended the Cold War entirely (Laybourn, 2002, 
p218). However, after so many years of ideological 
enmity, the United States of America was ‘initially 




Margaret Thatcher adopted a ‘commanding role’ (Sheridan, 
2013) and used her ‘considerable’ influence with Reagan 
to assure the Americans that Gorbachev had no choice but 
to be sincere in his intentions (Hennessy, 1991, p496). 
Her argument was supported by Russia’s obvious ‘internal 
failures’ and from it a ‘burgeoning confidence’ began to 
grow between the two men (Smith, 1991, p264). 
International affairs were set on a ‘new and more hopeful 
course’. It was an achievement reached by Reagan and 
Thatcher through the promotion of the market economy as 
the ‘mark of a successful state’ and by Gorbachev’s 
acceptance of the ‘bankruptcy of the socialist system’ 
(Smith, 1991, p264). ‘The cold war was virtually over’  
(Lawton, 2004, p99).  
 
Post Cold War economic globalisation 
 
By the end of 1989, the world was simply a ‘different 
place’ (Beabout, 2000, p267). In January, Ronald Reagan's 
term as US President finished, his last official act was 
to express ‘thanks and appreciation’ to Britain’s Prime 
Minister (O'Sullivan, 2008). George W. Bush moved into 
the White House thoroughly appraised of the usefulness of 
Mikhail Gorbachev, America’s ‘trusted friend in the 
Kremlin’ (Stoner-Weiss & McFaul, 2009, p32). For 
Gorbachev, however, such credibility came at a price. 
Determined to produce internationally acceptable foreign 
policies, he had made some ‘fateful decisions’. One 
miscalculation involved a near democratic election for 
delegates in a new Congress of People’s Deputies. This 
went awry when communist candidates failed to win enough 
seats to control the assembly (Stoner-Weiss & McFaul, 
2009, p9). The Deputies in question represented the 
individual ‘soviets’ from which the USSR was constructed 
and, as non-communists were elected, so those ‘republics 
were transformed and democratized’ (Kalashnikov, 2011, 
p77). Gorbachev ‘refused to interfere’; he would not 
jeopardise plans for Russian economic stability, although 
those plans were driving the established political system 
into ‘terminal decline’ (Kalashnikov, 2011, p77).  
 
The USSR’s political weakness rendered it incapable of 
maintaining control over its numerous republics, 
protectorates and satellite states (Dockrill, 2007, 
p310). On November 9th 1989, East Berlin’s Communist 
Party declared that following an alteration in its 
‘relations with the West’ security personnel at border 
checkpoints would be withdrawn (Rosenberg, 2010). 
Jubilant crowds made their way to the Berlin Wall, which 
for twenty-eight years had divided the city, and began to 
tear it down (Nayak, 2009, p158).  
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Within weeks other countries of Soviet Eastern Europe 
were breaking away from their communist overlords 
(Carreras, 2006, p325). Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia 
were the first to demand independence (Kalashnikov, 2011, 
p77), then Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Romania announced 
plans for democratic elections (Lawton, 2004, p98). The 
USSR leadership presented no objections, any attempt to 
crush these ‘democratic’ uprisings would have jeopardised 
the ‘desperately needed’ one hundred billion dollar loan 
promised by ‘foreign governments’ (Stoner-Weiss & McFaul, 
2009, p28); Gorbachev had no choice but to let the East 
European communist countries exit ‘peacefully’ (Stoner-
Weiss & McFaul, 2009, p28). Russia’s newly liberated 
media provided the population with their first 
opportunity to compare the ‘inadequacies of the Soviet 
system’ with an apparently affluent capitalist West 
(Kalashnikov, 2011, p75). Combined with Gorbachev's 
policies of ‘perestroika and glasnost’, this knowledge 
seriously undermined the faith of the people in Marxist-
Leninist principles (Lawton, 2004, p98). The communist 
system collapsed, it had ‘disintegrated from within’ 
(Dockrill, 2007, p310).  
 
The deep divisions of a ‘bipolar structure’ were 
disappearing (Dockrill, 2007, p310), and economic 
globalisation, which had ‘continuously expanded’ 
throughout the industrialised West, arose to bind the 
world together. For the neoliberal business community it 
was a long awaited but expected outcome, they had always 
believed that the Soviet system would inevitably fail and 
that ‘capitalism and democracy’ would prevail (Dockrill, 
2007, p302). Triumphalists declared that the West had 
‘won the battle against communism’ and revelled in the 
general air of the 'end of history’ (Kolthari, 1995, 
p1593). The Soviet Union fragmented into ‘successor 
states’ whose ‘rapidly constituted business elites’ 
rushed to embrace the ideology of neoliberalism (Falk, 
2003, p281). Free market capitalism was ‘in the 
ascendant’ (Nayak, 2009, p158) because its neoliberal 
projects were financially supported by the World Bank and 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) (Spring, 1998, p127). The globalising 
policies of Reagan and Thatcher appeared as a ‘genuine 
revolution in political thinking’; inexperienced 
politicians welcomed the option of concentrating on 
social policy while their newly deregulated economies 
were left to look after themselves (Armstrong, 1998, 
p467). The ‘neoliberal doctrine’ of Hayek and Friedman 
came highly recommended; it had first shaped Anglo-
American economic planning, then made a ‘victorious 
march’ through Europe and was now influencing much of the 
world (Harvey, 2003, p158).  
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The communist leaders of North Korea and Cuba remained 
unconvinced, even when their larger political partner, 
China, began making tentative moves toward a market 
economy (Beabout, 2000, p263). Most of the world’s 
industrialised countries were convinced by the Western 
economists of the benefits of an enterprising, 
competitive and ultimately self-regulating free market. 
Adam Smith’s ‘Wealth of Nations’ was touted as the 
international ‘manifesto for free marketeers’ (Eckes, 
2007, p408). 
 
Reagan and Thatcher had shifted the economic focus of the 
industrialised world ‘from national Keynesianism to 
neoliberal globalisation’ (Mittelman, 2003, p49). Its 
international progress being hugely accelerated by those 
political leaders who willingly accepted, and promoted, 
globalisation as ‘unquestioned commonsense' (Scholte, 
2005, p39). Countries whose deregulated markets were open 
to foreign investment, trade and technology were shown to 
have achieved greater economic growth than countries with 
‘closed economies’ (Coatsworth, 2004, p51). Such examples 
were offered as evidence that national economies operated 
more efficiently when released from ‘excessive 
governmental constraints’ (Beabout, 2000, p267). The 
notion that this was the entry point for a new, and 
‘contemporary phase’ of globalisation (Stearns, 2010, 
p154) was internationally endorsed by those within 
‘business, media and academic circles’ (Scholte, 2005, 
p39). 
 
America’s universal culture 
 
Along with their promotion of the globalised free market, 
the Reagan and Thatcher administrations ‘aggressively 
pushed’ for the worldwide use of the English language 
(Mirrlees, 2006, p202). Its acceptance as a common second 
language was believed to be a ‘major factor’ in the 
further expansion of globalisation (Stearns, 2010, p133). 
This ‘linguistic imperialism’ was underwritten by 
neoliberal think tanks who promoted the view that 
‘finance, the military, culture, and education’ could all 
be more internationally integrated if their business were 
conducted in English (Phillipson, 2009, p337). That 
English had long been a first choice second language made 
potential students aware of the ‘compelling advantage’ in 
learning the same second language as everyone else 
(Legrain, 2003a). The ‘globalization of science’ created 
another inducement; many international conferences and 
journals use the English language, most computer manuals 
are only available in English and over eighty percent of 
all electronically stored data is in English (Stearns, 
2010, p135).  
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The ‘combined global power’ of Britain’s nineteenth 
century and America’s late twentieth century hegemonic 
control created a legacy in which English was the ‘world 
language’ (Spring, 1998, p121). Despite this duel 
heritage many definitions of globalisation classify the 
English language as an ‘American export’ (Legrain, 
2003a). Marling argues that this simply reflects the 
‘worldwide reach’ of US commercial and business activity 
but acknowledges that it could be misconstrued as 
‘nefarious Americanization’ (Marling, 2006, pvii). 
 
This was not a novel observation. W. T. Stead in his 1902 
publication ‘The Americanization of the world’ wrote of 
the disapproval expressed by ‘irate champions of England’ 
for the mere suggestion of such an ‘anti-patriotic’ idea 
(Stead, 1902, pp1-3). Even as Stead was being admonished, 
one American ‘cultural product’ was posed to become 
‘uniquely dominant’ (Legrain, 2003a). The First World War 
brought the European film industry to a ‘standstill’ 
(Sinyard, 2002, p130), but it proved to be the ‘best 
thing that could have happened’ for the American ‘movie’ 
(Marling, 2006, p21). Hollywood, a Californian orange 
grove recently colonised by film production companies was 
ready to supply the demand. By 1918 American filmmakers 
had consolidated international markets and established a 
‘global stranglehold’ that they have ‘never since 
relinquished’ (Sinyard, 2002, p131). 
 
After 1927, sound films not only brought ‘American 
English’ into ‘universal use’ (Marling, 2006, p21) but 
also proved useful in introducing immigrants to the 
‘dress, speech and attitudes’ of their adopted country 
(Johnson, 1991, p224). Exported American films played a 
similar role in the post-World War Two Marshall Plan. 
European cinema audiences were treated to a variety of 
commercial feature and propaganda films which illustrated 
an ‘Americanised vision of their future’ (Ellwood, 1998, 
p33). ‘Operation Bambi’ presented the same material in 
simpler form, largely for children but also for ‘semi-
literate or illiterate adults’ (Ellwood, 1998, p36). The 
message was loud, clear and sometimes in colour, here was 
a ‘new civilisation of opulence and growth’ (Ellwood, 
1998, p41). Although ‘basically entertainment’ when 
cinema reaches a large receptive audience it becomes a 
powerful medium for the dissemination of ideas and 
beliefs, the mainstream Hollywood product has long been a 
conduit for American ‘language and culture’ (Marling, 






A desirable ‘global image’ was considered such a 
political advantage that exporting Hollywood studios 
often received ‘strong backing’ from the US government 
when it came to breaching troublesome ‘cultural barriers’ 
(Eckes, 2007, p412). This international ‘showcase’ for 
the American way of life created a vast overseas market 
for what have become ‘globally shared consumer items’, 
these must include Coca Cola, denim jeans, baseball caps, 
MacDonald’s style fast food restaurants, CNN and Disney 
theme parks (Stearns, 2010, p151). While the ideals of 
globalisation were largely propagated by politicians, 
economists and ‘global cooperation institutions’ such as 
the IMF, the WTO and the World Bank (Mittelman, 2003, 
p49) Aas argues that the genuine popularity of American 
consumerism should not be disregarded (Aas, 2007, p5), 
some people spend their time and money ‘guzzling 
hamburgers and Coke’ simply because they enjoy them 
(Legrain, 2003a). Such tastes may have originally been 
‘inspired and encouraged’ by American marketing but have 
since become assimilated; imported cultural or commercial 
ideas are more readily accepted when subject to 
transformation through the processes of ‘local 
cooperation and adaptation’ (Osterhammel & Petersson, 
2005, p149).  
 
The notion of a ‘universal civilisation modelled on the 
American free market’ (Gifford, 2008, p86) was largely a 
development of the neoliberal theories promoted by the 
'Austrian school of economic thought’ (Harris, 1997, 
p442). The free market philosophy of these Viennese 
economists coincided so closely with that of the 
‘prestigious’ Rockefeller Foundation that in 1924, 
generous terms were offered for them to study in America 
(Hülsmann, 2007, p453). Friedrich von Hayek, possibly the 
group’s leading political thinker, became a professor at 
both the University of Chicago and the London School of 
Economics (Beveridge, 1949, p48). Together with Milton 
Friedman, Hayek mentored the ‘Chicago school’ of 
economists (Wasserstein, 2007, p632) whose ideology 
greatly impressed Sir Keith Joseph (Howe, 1997, p275). 
The political influence that Joseph gained through his 
development of transatlantic economic think tanks 
(Spring, 1998, p125) did much to create the ‘intellectual 
climate’ in which his protégée, Margaret Thatcher, could 
promote a neo-liberal, free market philosophy and a 
monetarist economy (Rubinstein, 1994, p76). Thatcher’s 
friendship with Reagan and her support for his neoliberal 
policies created an ‘Anglo-American nationalism’ 
(Gifford, 2008, p86) that facilitated the international 




This has greatly accelerated the globalisation process. 
However, the economic benefits, or otherwise, of the 
blurred territorial borders and confused cultural 
identities of a more integrated world remain deeply 
contested (Scholte, 2005, p46). The number of economic, 
sociological and political investigations into this 
phenomenon has ‘skyrocketed’ and continuing contemporary 
observation ensures that globalisation will remain the 
‘leitmotif of our age’ (Lang, 2006, 930).  
 
This chapter has examined the promotion of a neoliberal 
ideology by Britain’s political leaders. It affected most 
aspects of society but here I have stressed the impact on 
higher education. The prevailing government view was to 
reduce their responsibility for public services while 
increasing their control of the universities. To this end 
the UGC was abolished, funding was moved onto a 
commercial basis, and more accountable management systems 
were imposed on the institutions themselves. 
 
Mrs Thatcher and America’s President Reagan promoted 
international neoliberalism with almost religious zeal. 
I have described how the two leaders employed their 
collective economic and political power to weaken the 
ideological foundations of the Soviet Empire to the 
extent that it hastened its eventual collapse. The end of 
the Cold War provided a powerful endorsement of the 
benefits of neoliberalist free trade and many the world’s 
governments were swayed. International financial markets 
were deregulated and economic, cultural and educational 
integration was accelerated. The ever-present process of 




My thesis has traced a route through two hundred years of 
British, international and higher education history, 
melding the cultural influence of the universities 
together with the global advance of neoliberalism. I have 
drawn these events together with the contemporary 
experience of higher education being moved closer to a 
market model by the requirement to engage in competitive 
funding and corporatisation via a more managerial 
ideology. These developments were universal but my main 
focus has been to juxtapose English higher education with 
a range of selected historical markers. I started with 
the ‘Rights of Man’ and the Napoleonic war. These events 
are relevant to the thesis because they created the 
political circumstances under which German research-based 
universities flourished.  
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This is important to my argument because it was a model 
that was emulated by two new London universities, which 
sprang from the age of optimism and economic expansion 
that followed Britain’s mid nineteenth century 
declaration of free trade. 
 
The Great Exhibition of 1851 epitomised this imperial 
confidence and my thesis describes how it promoted 
British ingenuity and all that was admirable and 
profitable about the expansion of the British Empire. I 
argue that this led to opportunities for Oxbridge 
graduates in the colonial civil service, who then 
assisted in the spread of English culture by presenting 
themselves to the world as the Christian gentleman 
envisaged by Arnold and Newman.  
 
Higher education opportunities at home also have a 
bearing on my thesis because by the start of the 
twentieth century many regional technical colleges 
succeeded in becoming chartered universities, which, 
along with the London School of Economics became the core 
of a national system. 
 
Further progress in education, in society at large and of 
continuing global integration were dashed in 1914. I have 
related the circumstances of Britain’s entry into the 
conflict that would become the First World War. The 
relevance to my thesis is in the blasé treatment meted 
out to institutions of higher education in the early days 
of the conflict. Universities that were initially 
afforded no special consideration did become more 
important with the rising wartime requirement for skilled 
administrators and researchers. This newfound respect for 
higher education was to last through to Germany’s 
surrender of 1918. Postwar ambitions for a League of 
Nations, an international forum of adjudication to 
prevent further conflict, was significantly diminished by 
the refusal of the US congress to join. This is relevant 
to my thesis because it signaled America’s return to 
isolationism; this allowed Britain to adopt a proxy 
hegemony that reinstated imperial career opportunities 
for university graduates. The demand by postwar students 
for university places so severely stretched available 
finances that the government had to support the system 
with a funding scheme that was managed by the University 
Grants Committee.  
 
The 1920’s were dominated by social unrest and turbulent 
economics and I have described how this culminated in 
America’s 1929 Wall Street crash and the worldwide 
economic depression of the 1930’s.  
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British state aid for universities was reduced, and for 
the first time these institutions had to consider 
strategies for attracting overseas students. The 
University of London worked hard to achieve an 
international standing as a producer of research 
graduates while the civic universities became known for 
the commercial applications of their scientific research. 
 
Economic instability made international politics 
increasingly volatile and my thesis has explored how this 
led Italy, Germany and Spain to fall under the influence 
of charismatic nationalistic leaders. By 1939 personal 
and political ambition had driven the German and Italian 
leadership to the seizure of foreign sovereign 
territories. This breach of League of Nations directives 
caused international fury and compelled Britain and 
France to declare war. These events are included in my 
argument because immediately after this outbreak of war 
the treatment of institutions of higher education was 
quite different. They were regarded as sources of 
expertise and were called upon to provide innovative 
methods of defence and attack as well as the development 
of advanced technologies such as code breaking computers 
and radar. In late 1942 the tone of the conflict was 
radically altered after Japan attacked an America’s navel 
base at Pearl Harbour. The United States applied its 
massive industrial capability toward the production of 
war materials and its diplomatic and political strength 
to the planning of a postwar world. A series of 
international agreements including the Atlantic Charter, 
the United Nations Organisation and the Bretton Woods 
accords ensured that any increased integration of postwar 
economics, trade and culture would be American led. 
These, I argue, would become the building blocks of the 
modern phase of globalisation. 
 
Britain’s own postwar aims included the creation of a 
universal welfare system, better housing and a planned 
expansion of the higher education system. However, in 
common with other European countries, the burden of 
Britain’s war debts was so vast that such ambitions had 
to rely on a series of American loans. I have examined 
the circumstances under which this introduced Europe to 
many of the facets of American life in a process, that by 
the late 50’s, would be for the first time be described 
by the word 'globalisation’.  
 
In 1947 India gained its independence and was the 
forerunner of Britain’s withdrawal from many of its 
colonies and protectorates. The British Empire was, 
during this period, slowly being dismantled.  
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I have explored how this reduced the need for colonial 
officers and civil servants and limited the overseas 
influence previously enjoyed by English higher education. 
This turns the focus of my thesis toward higher education 
at home and an expansion that had been driven by student 
demand rather than foreword planning. A study published 
in 1963 recommended that university expansion was a 
requirement of international economic survival and that 
it should continue at public expense. The government 
agreed, although it was a large financial commitment, and 
shortly afterward the world once again entered into 
economic turmoil. The American economy became so 
destabilised that the US dollar could no longer 
underwrite the Bretton Woods agreements and the system 
had to be abandoned. The significant role played by 
London’s financial institutions in the resulting world 
currency market was largely thanks to Britain’s 1973 
entry into the European Economic Community. This was not 
a universally popular development and a later government 
so feared political repercussions that a much-needed loan 
was sought not from the EEC, but from the IMF. This has a 
bearing on my thesis because the conditions the loan 
introduced elements of monetarism to the British economy. 
Once this ideology was accepted into the system it helped 
to clear the way for a neoliberal monetarist 
administration that would actively endorse the principles 
of free trade and globalisation. 
 
I have explored aspects of Margaret Thatcher’s 
Premiership and how her ideological partnership with 
America’s President Reagan allowed neoliberal monetarist 
theories to be applied to national economies. This led to 
a change in the British government’s view of its 
responsibility to the public sector and much of it was 
privatised. The investment of public funds in Britain’s 
system of higher education was made on the understanding 
that it would return dividends. The government replaced 
the UGC with ministerial control and obliged universities 
to accept almost industrial management techniques. A 
university education became a measurable and purchasable 
service for which institutions would have to compete with 
against each other for ‘customers’. 
 
My thesis closes with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
end of the Cold War. The collapse of Soviet Russia, 
already considerably weakened, was hastened by Anglo-
American economic and political pressure. This was a 
monumental development and many world governments 
accepted it as an example of the superiority of 




It was an ideology that advocated the international 
deregulation of the financial markets, and the greater 
economic, cultural educational integration that is now 
firmly associated with the processes of globalisation. 
  
Neoliberal theorists such as Hayek and Friedman had 
advocated this philosophy since the 1930’s. They promoted 
social policies that encouraged greater ‘individual 
responsibility and self-reliance’ so as to reduce 
governmental responsibility for public services and 
welfare spending (Kurasawa, 2007, p127). Politicians with 
neoliberal ambitions sought to rid the state of publicly 
owned utilities while imposing an ‘entrepreneurial logic’ 
on the remaining public institutions ‘such as 
universities’ (Harvey, 2003, p159). 
 
These policies were justified by the notion that free 
market suppliers would be obliged to compete for business 
by providing better value for money. Eckes argues that 
the idea has ‘deep roots’ which can be traced back to 
ancient traders (Eckes, 2007, p410). Hayek states that 
archaeological evidence supports the existence of the 
‘seeds of free trade’ even in the ‘dimmest past’ (Hayek, 
1992, p39). Ancient peoples lacked the geographic 
knowledge for global ambition but some well-motivated 
groups did create empires so powerful as to consider 
themselves masters of the ‘inhabited world’ (Campbell, 
2007, p287). Hardt and Negri argue that those who claim 
globalisation to be a recent phenomenon have 
‘misunderstood its history’ (Hardt & Negri, 2001, p125). 
The integration and homogenisation of ancient trading 
cultures has become recognised as the ‘complicated 
process’ of globalisation (Jennings, 2011, p7). 
Macgillivray argues that for an event to be identified as 
‘globalising’ it must have either ‘global intent’ or be 
the cause of significant global repercussions 
(Macgillivray, 2006, p26). Such events have ‘ebbed and 
flowed’ through the world’s history of giving the 
impression of waves or phases of globalisation (Das, 
2009, p7).  
 
Early phases involved the great ‘transcontinental trade 
routes’ that crossed mountains and desert (Jennings, 
2011, p7). A ‘discovery’ phase emerged when Europe’s 
fourteenth century maritime fleets started trading along 
Africa’s Northern and Western coasts (Coatsworth, 2004, 
p40). In 1492 Columbus broadened the commercial horizon 






Just six years later, Vasco da Gama shortened the Indian 
spice route by sailing around the Cape of Good Hope 
(Macgillivray, 2006, p49). Such ‘exhausting, and 
hazardous’ feats of maritime skill and commercial 
opportunism (Eckes, 2007, p410) imbued the ‘European 
consciousness’ with a ‘global world-view’ (Macgillivray, 
2006, p49). It was a view that nurtured ambition and a 
century later the maritime supremacy of Spain and 
Portugal began to fade and the British ‘imperial 
imitators’ stepped firmly into the breach (Ferguson, 
2003, pxxv). After taking ‘nominal possession’ of 
Newfoundland in 1583 (Morris, 1979, p42) the British 
began rather hesitantly taking responsibility for ‘half 
the world’ in what appeared ‘a fit of absence of mind’ 
(Seeley, 1914, p8). Britain’s American empire reached 
from Newfoundland to Carolina and included several large 
islands such as Bermuda and Jamaica (Armitage, 2000, 
p174). By the time the thirteen American colonies were 
ready to fight for their independence, Britain’s ‘liberal 
education policy’ had provided the population of two and 
a half million with a total of nine universities (Chanda, 
2007, p194). 
 
European universities were already highly regarded and 
each had their own ‘deep historical roots’ (Altbach, 
2004, p4). Complex societies required a systematic form 
of education to preserve and transmit accumulated 
knowledge, and the earliest European universities were 
religious foundations modelled after Islamic madrasas 
(Goody, 2006, p129). Of the eighty-five existent European 
institutions founded before the sixteenth century, 
seventy are universities (Altbach, 2004, p4). Glasgow’s 
ancient university boasts a faculty that once included 
Professor Adam Smith. He spent almost ten years writing 
‘An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations’ which was published in 1776 (Delong, 1997; 
Faber, 2006). Smith’s book was not only a ‘systematic, 
coherent framework’ for the study of economics and trade 
(Legrain, 2003, p87) but also an ‘attack on mercantilism’ 
(Irwin, 1996, p10). He decried monopolies like the East 
India Company and was critical of the treatment of 
American colonial settlers by the British government 
(Pitts, 2005, p52). Smith maintained that the settlers 
should either be completely free or completely 
integrated, but he understood that neither was 
politically acceptable (Pitts, 2005, p54) and warned that 
no colonial power ‘ever voluntarily gave up the dominion 
of any province’ however ‘troublesome’ (Smith, 1937, 
p582). At the time of publication such sentiments were a 
little out of step as 1776 was also the year of the 
American settlers revolt.  
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America’s War of Independence, the French Revolution and 
its associated Napoleonic War coincided with Britain’s 
Industrial Revolution. It was this combination of 
international political and commercial upheaval that 
‘ushered in the modern world’ (Osterhammel & Petersson, 
2005, p57). It was followed by a hundred years of 
‘relative peace’ in which Europe and America developed 
advances in ‘political and technological’ thinking that 
would transform society and accelerate the ‘pace of 
change’ (Eckes, 2007, p410). 
 
A ‘growing appreciation’ of the principles of Smith and 
his followers came with the dawn of the nineteenth 
century; examples of comparative advantage were 
particularly persuasive and diverted official thinking 
from the ‘mercantilist approach of the past’ (Das, 2009, 
p6). The giant monopolies of which Smith had been 
critical were slowly replaced by ‘intensely competing 
firms’, both trade and the variety of traded commodities 
expanded dramatically (Das, 2009, p7). Increased shipping 
and more liberal trade laws not only ensured that 
‘globalisation gathered considerable momentum’ (Magee & 
Thompson, 2010, p62) but also that it became more 
‘economically meaningful’ (O'Rourke & Williamson, 2004, 
p109). After the abolition of the Corn Law in 1846 the 
British government declared unilateral free trade and the 
‘forces of capitalism’ were ‘unleashed’ (Das, 2009, p6). 
 
The Great Exhibition of 1851, made an impressive show of 
the globalising power of railways, steamships, the 
electric telegraph (Legrain, 2003, p89). These feats of 
engineering and technology ‘dramatically accelerated 
international transportation and communications’ (Eckes, 
2007, p410) and allowed the exhibition to present the 
rest of the world’s business revolving in a ‘British-
centred economic orbit’ (Auerbach 2008, pxi). In 1851 
almost all of the one hundred awards for manufacturing 
excellence went to British companies; at the Paris 
Exhibition of 1867 Britons garnered just ten, the 
‘industrial sceptre was slipping’ (Ryan, 1998, p14). 
Ironically as British industrial supremacy lapsed into 
gradual decline, nineteenth century globalisation was 
reaching a ‘crescendo’ (Das, 2009, p7). British imperial 
networks criss-crossed the world ‘benevolently’ bestowing 
‘Anglobalization’ (Magee & Thompson, 2010, p62) on 
regions, countries and continents, globalising the planet 
in a system that was to become the closest, to date, to a 






As advances in transport and communications technology 
physically accelerated global travel and interactions 
they had the apparent effect of compressing time and 
space (Scheuerman, 2008, p43). The British Empire 
inaugurated many such earth shrinking technologies, 
gaining global convergence on commodity prices and even 
managing to ‘diminish’ the distance between divergent 
‘national’ economies and thereby creating its own 
‘borderless world’ (Magee & Thompson, 2010, p63). The 
twentieth century ushered in a ‘complicated’ new phase of 
globalisation, the ‘epoch of the European empires’ (Hall 
& Rose, 2006, p12). Britain’s maritime supremacy could 
not prevent ‘inspired competitors’ from colonially 
controlling large tracts of land (Amin & Luckin, 1996, 
p234). The French, Belgian and the German governments all 
sought opportunities for overseas territorial expansion 
(Schmitt, 1918, p3). Britain had long been wary of 
Germany’s commercial and military development but the 
addition of these expansionist ambitions elevated the 
Kaiser to ‘primary threat’ (Thompson, 2000, p18). German 
newspapers responded by frequently reminding readers of 
the ‘English danger’ (Schmitt, 1918, p1). Germans were 
told that for a century Britain had stood ‘aloof from 
Continental politics’, preferring to deal instead with 
colonial possessions in India, Africa, Egypt and Burma – 
but now it was time for Germany to acquire ‘a place in 
the sun’ (Schmitt, 1918, p5). As ‘great power rivalries’ 
began to build up (Anderson, 2006, p66) the countries of 
Europe split into two major factions, each with its own 
‘tangle’ of military and defence alliances (O’Farrell, 
2007, p367). The situation became so precipitous that it 
only required ‘one stray firework’ to fall into the box 
and the whole of Europe caught fire (O’Farrell, 2007, 
p367).  
 
The First World War saw the ruin of the British economy 
and the emergence of America as financial world leader 
(Allen, 1954, p743). The determinedly isolationist 
American stance allowed the British to continue as if 
economically unaffected (Molle, 2003, p22). The 
territorial spoils of war had extended the British Empire 
beyond all previous boundaries and further bolstered the 
illusion of Britain’s continuing imperial status 
(Walworth, 1986, p1). English higher education maintained 
its high level of international influence with the 
founding institutions around the world that were modelled 
on the British university (Collini, 2003, p5). Given that 
they had a public image to nurture, Oxford and Cambridge 
universities began to cooperate for the specific purpose 




A ‘sense of place’ was created by their projection of 
themselves that combined patriotism, pride in empire and 
a respect for the past (Harrison, 1994, p81). It was an 
image endorsed by popular authors such as Waugh and 
Betjeman (Anderson, 2006, p120). Public awareness was 
raised through the promotion inter-university sporting 
contests; rugby, cricket the Boat Race succeeded in 
becoming ‘events of national interest’ (Barnard, 1961, 
p125; Roberts, 1947, p33). 
 
When not promoting sporting entertainment the perceived 
role of the Oxbridge universities was to blend the ‘old 
aristocracy’ into the far more numerous upper middle 
class (Callinicos, 2006, p24) to produce graduates with 
enough drive to maintain the ‘old professions’ or 
sufficient ‘sense of superiority to run the British 
Empire’ (Mackney, 2006, p4). The late nineteenth century 
civic universities of industrial cities like Birmingham, 
Manchester, Leeds and Liverpool were founded by ‘local 
initiatives’ to meet ‘local needs’ (Collini, 2003, p4). 
Their perceived role was to produce graduates with the 
training and skill to manage modern industrial processes 
or to teach in the ‘expanding education system’ 
(Callinicos, 2006, p24). Although the civic universities 
were initially intended as an alternative to Oxbridge 
they soon felt compelled to combat an aura of ‘second 
best’ by imitating the ‘curriculum and academic style’ of 
the ‘elite institutions’ (Barnes, 1996, p271). This often 
included the provision of student accommodation in an 
effort to become all-residential institutions (Barnes, 
1996, p281). Halsey states that this ‘shift in scope’ was 
hardly surprising as the provincial universities would 
have been as susceptible to the status of the Oxbridge 
model as were their overseas counterparts (Halsey, 1992, 
p71).  
 
After the Second World War international trade was 
revived under the regulations of the Bretton Woods 
institutions. The Marshall Plan was set up to help 
Europe’s shattered economies return to the 'world market' 
(Waters, 2001, p105) and with it came an array of 
transatlantic cultural influences (Marling, 2006, p23). 
Globalisation was gathering the impetus to exceed its 
1914 limits and the values and lifestyles that it 
promoted became, and have remained American (Ellwood, 
2002, p18). Britain was 'especially open to American 
cultural imports' as the two countries share both a 
language as well as a similar ‘consumerist and 
individualist’ outlook (Martell, 2008, p462). The 
'globalization of American culture' was fuelled by the 
United States ability to mass-produce the materials 
required for 'mass consumption’ (Martell, 2008, p462). 
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Such 'technological advantages' when combined with 
'military might' and the economic levers of the Bretton 
Woods institutions made the United States the undisputed 
global hegemon (Waters, 2001, p105).  
 
International trade put cash-rich America in a position 
to advance near bankrupt Britain a loan of almost four 
billion dollars (Barnett, 2011, p2). The stipulations 
attached all related to the empire, which had long been a 
‘thorn in the flesh’ of American politicians (Clarke, 
2008, p379). Britain was told that it must address the 
question of Indian self-determination as well as opening 
its other colonies and dominions to ‘multilateral free 
trade’ (Clarke, 2008, p380). The British did not object.  
The enormously expensive ‘imperial heritage’ no longer 
offered an ‘economic or strategic advantage’ (Judt, 2005, 
293) and most on the government benches considered ‘that 
the game was up’ (Clarke, 2008, p365). 1947 saw 
independence for India and Pakistan, and for Burma and 
Ceylon in the following year. The sprawling empire which 
English university graduates had administered under ‘the 
banner of Arnold and Newman’ was being dissolved  
(Barnett, 1987, p225). The character of the Indian 
subcontinent, the British Empire’s greatest ‘economic and 
military’ asset (Darwin, 2009, p650) and the rest of the 
South Asian region was changed forever as a procession of 
‘colonial residents and administrators’ beat an ‘orderly’ 
retreat to the English shires (Judt, 2005, 293). 
 
Britain’s concerns were now for its own future and the 
newly inaugurated welfare state; a better educated 
workforce would not only generate the revenue for ‘cradle 
to the grave' security but would also fulfil the 
expectations of a more egalitarian society (Field, 2011, 
p2). A series of authoritative inquiries recommended that 
higher education should become a more accessible 
educational experience (Walklaad, 1964, p389). The 
Robbins committee cleared away the last of the barriers 
to mass higher education by recommending huge government 
subsidies to cover all of the costs of qualifying 
students (Pratt, 1992, p32). Consequently student numbers 
rose as fast as the cost of educating them. Britain was 
once again living beyond its means (Pimlott, 2000, p34) 
and the generosity of the financial support agreed after 
the Robbins Report was regretted (Gifford, 2008, p65).  
 
The Keynesian view that public money should be spent to 
reflate the economy was in question (Bowles, 2007, p27). 
Neo-liberal politicians advocated a ‘monetarist’ 
approach; they wanted a self-supporting, free and 
unregulated market, which made fewer demands on the 
public purse (Bowles, 2007, pp27-28).  
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Neoliberal governments in Britain and American promoted 
their free market policy so successfully that ‘centre-
left parties’ of other countries began to adopt 
neoliberal programmes (Howard & King, 2008, p6).  
 
In the mid 1980’s came the news that even the Soviet 
Union planned to opt for a ‘market-based economic 
approach’ as well as a ‘more open political style’ 
(Stearns, 2010, p133). Nationalist movements in Soviet 
satellite states took the Russian leaders at their word 
and seized the opportunity for open dissent. European 
communism collapsed throughout 1989–91, numerous newly 
independent countries became potential participants of 
the expanding world market (Stearns, 2010, p133). Stearns 
argues that changes in political thinking, more 
integrated economies, advancing technology and the 
homogenising of culture represented a unique and ‘largely 
voluntary embrace’ of globalisation (Stearns, 2010, 
p154). Neoliberalist policies have integrated all major 
international economic and trading markets; Anderson 
states that with no ‘significant opposition’, 
neoliberalism has become ‘the most successful ideology in 
world history’ (Anderson, 2000, p13). This ‘heightened 
integration’ of world cultures and economies has been 
facilitated by a faith in international financial 
organisations that ‘bundles neoliberalism and 
globalization’ together (Mittelman, 2003, pp48-49).  
 
Throughout much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
the terms 'England, Britain and British Empire were near-
synonymous’, politics, commercial advertising, magazine 
and newspaper items all served as reminders of the 
prosperity that was owed to an ‘international sea-borne 
empire’ (Judt, 2005, 279). From the elementary school 
onward, education was ‘infused’ with ‘imperial 
nationalism’, students received lessons intended to 
encourage ‘patriotism, good citizenship and moral 
training’ (McClelland & Rose, 2006, p286). Barnett argues 
that state education became inculcated with the 
principles of the ‘Arnoldian public school and Newmanian 
Oxbridge’ at teaching training level (Barnett, 1987, 
p223). The public schools and Oxford and Cambridge 
universities were universally accepted as the ‘custodians 
and transmitters’ of the national imperial culture 
(McCulloch, 1991, p16). ‘Empire lore’ was passed through 
the British education system for decades and eventually 
‘permeated the whole of society’ (Porter, 2004, p62). 
Throughout an imperial past and a neoliberal present, 
Britain had set in motion the globalisation processes of 
which it was ‘both an agent and recipient’ (Martell, 
2008, p464).  
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Britain’s higher education institutions experienced many 
political masters and numerous policy changes during the 
period but by 1989 the ‘pass the parcel’ years appeared 
to be over (Collini, 2011, p10).  
 
Government made it abundantly clear that if higher 
education expected public funding it must play a ‘vital 
role’ in stabilising the country’s economic position (St. 
George, 2006, p593). Collini argues that higher education 
spending can only be justified to the electorate in terms 
of the ‘benefits’ gained from medical and technological 
research or in the production of experts (Collini, 2003, 
p7). Most of the world’s industrial countries were 
acquiring a new respect for ‘expertise’ that was 
considered a distillation of the ‘knowledge, research, 
and innovation’ culture of higher education (Välimaa & 
Hoffman, 2008, p265).  
 
The start of the last decade of the twentieth century 
marked the recognition that ‘knowledge’ was ‘central to 
survival and success’ (Brennan, 2008, pp382). This rise 
of the ‘knowledge society’ was a concept that brought a 
‘different understanding of the purpose of higher 
education and research’ (Bleiklie, 2005, p54). Greater 
kudos was attached to ‘educational credentials’, not just 
as an indicator of ‘social status’ but also as an aid to 
'positional advantage' (Brennan, 2008, p383). Higher 
education was the foundation on which the ‘global 
knowledge economies’ were built and higher education 
institutions became the key to the development of 
information technology and knowledge production (Välimaa 
& Hoffman, 2008, p266). An educational qualification in 
an internationally crowded workplace not only improved 
the ‘lifetime opportunities’ of the individual 
(Marginson, 2006, p3), but a highly educated nation was 
more likely to live in an economically successful country 
(Brennan, 2008, p383).  
 
Many of the technological and engineering advances that 
brought about the ‘great transformations' of the 
industrial revolution were not specifically studied in 
universities until the late nineteenth century 
(Rothblatt, 2000, p5). Thus the prospect of a major 
contribution to the national economy from higher 
education was seen as 'new system for creating wealth' 
(St. George, 2006, p590). Knowledge based industries 
favour the problem-solving skills of graduates who have 
experienced some specialist training within a 'broad’ 





The 'special mission' of the 'education business' (Morey, 
2004, p147) was to produce graduates with the 
‘flexibility’ to cope with ‘rapidly changing situations’ 
(St. George, 2006, p592). To fulfil this requirement,  
many universities encouraged cultural, corporate and 
industrial diversity, they ‘blurred’ teaching boundaries 
to encompass ‘multi-campus international universities’, 
‘virtual universities’ and ‘university-industry 
partnerships’; they created new networks that reached out 
nationally and ‘globally’ (Blight et al, 2000, p112). 
 
The concept of a knowledge society seems to echo Cardinal 
Newman’s statement that education should be seen as a 
‘preparation for knowledge’ (Newman, 1886, p144). 
Certainly the requirement of twenty first century 
employers for ‘creative, independent’ graduates who have 
‘broadly based skills that can be used as a basis for 
specific job skills training’ (St. George, 2006, p592) is 
reminiscent of both Newman and Arnold’s view that non-
vocational study produced graduates with skills 
applicable to a ‘wide range of jobs’ (Anderson, 2010). 
Lowe argues that while Britain’s higher education system 
has been hugely transformed it still bears the ‘marks of 
its Victorian origins’ being unable to entirely throw off 
its ‘social... hierarchical... even elitist structure’ 
(Lowe, 2005, p281). 
 
Globalisation has encouraged international progress in 
the areas of science, medicine and communications; it has 
required ‘a new global economy’ and the redrafting of 
international law and the ‘development of regional and 
global governance structures’ (Held, 2002, p2). The 1648 
treaty of Westphalia advanced the European notion of the 
‘state’ but the ‘linkage’ between the state and its 
population as a ‘nation’ was not established until 1789 
and the declarations of the French Revolution (Armstrong, 
1998, p467). A ‘new age of political order’ was created 
to accommodate the view of a population as both nation 
and state (Osterhammel & Petersson, 2005, p57). The 
concept of the nation-state within the framework of 
‘Western thought’ has for two centuries been ‘exported 
throughout the world’ (Osterhammel & Petersson, 2005, 
p28). It was to become the colonial formula imposed and 
administered by Britain's 'classically trained 
administrative elite' (Weir & Beetham, 1999, p35). By the 
mid-twentieth century the free market ideals and 
‘laissez-faire convictions’ of these liberally educated 
civil servants were to be recast as ‘neoliberalism’ 
(Scholte, 2005, p38). It was a ‘political economic 
doctrine’ that gained support because it was opposed to 




Historically, the commercial and cultural activities of 
Britain and its colonies ‘promoted’ globalisation 
(Ferguson, 2003, pxxiv). The universities were at the 
same time ‘facilitating globalisation’ through their 
international dissemination of Western ideals and the 
eventual creation of an overseas, but British-styled, 
‘business and governmental elite’ (Dodds, 2008, p513). 
More recently universities have adapted and adopted 
‘industry-based models of management’ (Dodds, 2008, p514) 
which in conjunction with the requirements of global 
knowledge economies have opened up a ‘world-wide 
positional market of elite universities’ (Marginson, 
2006, p1). The resulting international blend of 
‘competition, privatisation and promotion’ has 
contributed to a ‘globalising academic arms race' 
(Brennan 2008, p386) that has transformed some higher 
profile universities into ‘truly global operations’ 
(Morey, 2004, p131). Through such activities some key 
higher education institutions have influenced 
international outcomes to the extent that they have been 
identified as ‘engines of globalisation’ (Dodds, 2008, 
p513; Smeby & Trondal 2003, p4).   
 
Globalisation and the English universities have advanced 
in a loose confederation that started with those 
graduates who accepted the concept of ‘privileged 
service’ (Morris, 1979, p23) and introduced the far-flung 
outposts of empire to the Oxbridge ideals of fair play, 
‘balance and detachment’ (Barnett, 1987, p221). English 
universities have since ‘undergone some dramatic shifts’, 
most significantly the steady transformation ‘from an 
elite, mainly private system to an open, public system of 
mass education’ (Morey, 2004, p147). The increasing 
appreciation of ‘innovation’ and ‘expertise’ is 
transforming the ‘social role of universities in the 
globalized world’ (Välimaa & Hoffman, 2008, p265).  
’Schools, and universities’ have played a significant 
role in ‘developing and disseminating’ neoliberal 
globalisation (Mittelman, 2003, p49); however, the 
globalising world is still identifiably the ‘product of 
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